Online Paper Room
Theme:
Research Committee Sessions
(RC20) Political Finance and Political Corruption
Panel:
RC20 — Why Voters Do Not Throw the Rascals Out: Explaining Corruption’s Social Contract and the Failure of Vertical Accountability
Paper:
Why Do Voters Forgive Corrupt Politicians: Cynicism, Skepticism or Implicit Exchange?
Abstract:
Contrarily to what democratic theory would expect and what citizens overwhelmingly declare in conventional surveys, evidence tends to show a very limited (if any) electoral punsihment of corruption. Why do voters seem to forgive corrupt politicians and parties? Previous research has suggested several hypotheses: the noise hypothesis (voters percieve corruption allegations as partisan tricks with limited credibility), the implicit exchange hypothesis (other elements of the politicians or parties’ performance counterbalance the effects of corruption), and the cynicism hypothesis (voters’ political cynicism leads them to think that any politician would behave in a corrupt way). In this paper we design and analyze a survey experiment concieved to attribute among these hypotheses, in order to disentangle which of the above mechanisms plays a stronger role in explaining the social tolerance towards corruption.
Authors:
Jordi Munoz
Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Spain
Eva Anduiza
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain
Aina Gallego
Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Spain
 
International Political Science Association and Secretariat Partners :
UNESCO ISSC Concordia University Montréal International IAPSS