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SS03 Institutional Legitimacy, Interest, Representation
and Democratic Practice

SS03.458 <The European Union: Is Democracy Working?>

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1. Introduction

The European Parliament (EP) is generally considered as an institution based on the principle of representative democracy.¹ Even before the Treaty of Rome (1958), the founders of the European Community such as Jean Monnet expected that the European institutions would be built on representative democracy.² By this principle of representative democracy, political parties of the EP must work for their electorate because they feel responsible for it and they don’t want to be out of their office.³ According to it, it’s logical that the left parties of the EP⁴ ought to represent the working class’ —their classical and major electorate— interests in their decision-makings. More precisely, left parties have to oppose the liberal policies such as the Bolkestein directive considered making the working class lose their work and be poorer.⁵ But in the case of the Bolkestein directive, it does not seem to work.

So, what is the Bolkestein directive? It’s a ‘Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on services in the internal market’⁶ that provoked a lot of

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¹ According to Christopher Lord, there are four types of representations: national territorial representation; regional representation; interest representation; ideological representation. This paper will take the point of views of national territorial representation, interest representation and ideological representation. Lord, Christophe, *A Democratic Audit of the European Union*, Houndsmill; Basingstoke; Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

² The democracy of the EU was expected from the beginning of the European integration. Jean Monnet wanted to “ensure that in their limited field the new institutions were thoroughly democratic.” Quoted in Holland, Martin, *European Community Integration*, London: Pinter, 1993, p. 145.


⁴ There are the center-left/socialist group (PES), the greens and regionalists (Greens/EFA(European Free Alliance)), far left and former communists (confederal group of the European united left/ Nordic Green Left: EUL/NGL), and euroskeptics(Democracies and Diversities: EDD)). The EDD was replaced by the IND/DEM(Independence/Democracy Group in the European Parliament) from the 6th legislature.

⁵ In this paper, we examine opinions of the working class on European policies, not the real economic or social effects of the liberal policies like the Bolkestein directive on the working class’ interests.

controversies in Western Europe from 2004. These controversies originated from two different positions: on one hand, the European Commission (Commission), the entrepreneurs and eastern European countries in favor of the liberalization of internal service market in the European Union (EU); on the other hand, the working class and the syndicates of the Western European countries for protecting their pockets against workers of neighbor countries, particularly Eastern European ones. This paper will not focus on controversies over the Bolkestein directive, but examine another side: the reaction of the members of the European Parliament (MEPs) of the left political party group (party) to the liberal proposals of the Commission.

Then, what did left parties when they are faced with liberal policies including the Bolkestein directive? Did they oppose them according to their political position? Contrary to our expectation, the MEPs didn’t resist them, but remained silent. Their silence may go back to 2000 when Lisbon European Council was held. The EU heads of states and governments agreed to make out of the EU “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-driven economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion by 2010.” But conclusions of Lisbon European Council might discontent the working class, because the working class feels threatened and fear of losing their jobs by workers of the Eastern European countries. Moreover, articles related to the liberalization of internal market did not exclude the country of origin principle, i.e. the most disputable and disputed point in the Bolkestein directive and big worries and potential problems to the working

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7 The controversies were especially serious in France and Belgium. See “Bolkestein: les députés européens adoptent la version allégée”, La libération, 16 February 2006.
8 Indirectly, the MEPs’ indifference to liberal policies could go back to 1957, the Treaty of Rome. The treaty of Rome enshrined the freedom of movement for services, as well as people and goods, although many barriers existed in practice (articles 48-73). It remains effective until today. See also the articles 3(1)(c), 3(1)(h), 10, 14(2), 18(1), 23, 24 and Part Three of the Treaty establishing the European Community.
10 Ibid.
11 According to this principle, it is law of his origin country when one wants to enter other member countries of the EU to provide his service to be applied to this service provider and the consumers. The working class and syndicates of the Western European countries assert that cheaper workers of the Eastern European countries could provoke “social dumping” in receiving countries whose legislations are relatively flexible. That’s why they feel threatened by East European workers. Though many studies showed that the worries of the working class would not be realized, but the left parties MEPs should had have to take care of the working class’ interest if they wanted to satisfy the working class and to be re-elected in next direct election.
class. Since the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) of 1978 defined that “the receiving countries should not impose any restrictions on service providers of other member countries,” it was anticipatable that the Commission would include this principle in following communications.

But left parties agreed to Lisbon European Council and following work of the Commission proposed at the end of the same year and even welcomed them. The same went for the next communications of the Commission in 2002, 2003 and 2004. The left parties went hand in hand with the Commission and voted for its liberal proposals including the country of origin principle. It was not until massive demonstrations were held from 2004 in Western European countries that left parties seemed to break their long silence at last. But it was too late to say that democracy is efficiently working in the EP.

This mal-function of representative democracy in the EP is often explained as one of the results of democratic deficit of the EU. There are a few researches who assert that the European political parties of the PE form normal coalition among left-left or right-

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12 ECJ, Case 120/78, judgment of 20 February 1979 (Cassis), 1979, ECR 649.
17 This paper means the representative democracy by democracy if there aren’t any special remarks.
right parties as is the case with national parliaments. But they made nothing but exceptions. Most studies assert that instead of functioning on left-right dimensions, most parties remain still pro-European and they very often represent national interests, not their electorates’ interest. One of them studies their voting behaviors on liberal proposals of the Commission including the Bolkestein directive.

So far, studies in democratic deficit of the EU, particularly the EP, have been concentrated on attitudes of the electorates in direct election of the EP — studies from below. In this paper, we will try to change view from the electorate upward the MEPs — studies from above. For this propose, we will examine left parties MEPs’ voting behaviors on the Commission proposals for the liberalization of internal service market including the Bolkestein directive in order to verify their indifference in the face of dissatisfactions and worries of the working class and throw doubt on the efficiency of democracy in the EP. Then we will search for possible reasons to understand meanings of their long silence of left parties about liberal politics of the Commission.

2. Is Representative Democracy Working in the EP?

: Analysis of the MEPs Voting Behaviors in the Commission Proposals for Liberalization of Internal Service Market of the EU from 2003 to 2006

The plan of the Lisbon European Council allowed the Commission to launch liberalization of internal service market with the communication of 2000 which was to be followed by other communications. To respond to the Commission’s work, the EP voted for six resolutions: once in 2002, twice in 2003, once in 2004 and 2005, and once

19 There are studies in coalition of political parties, but they are generally focused if the EP is functioning like normal parliament such as national one, not if the representative democracy is well working in the EP.
in 2006. Three vote results of them — those of February 2003, March 2004 and February 2006 — are open to public and so available to be analyzed for us to see voting behaviors of every individual MEP and his or her party. Analysis of these three votes is important, for they show clearly the MEPs voting behaviors on liberal policies. Since first two votes include controversial issues, particularly the country of origin principle, they are worthier of our attention. If democracy is normally working in the EP, left parties should have voted against resolutions not only of 2006, but also of 2003 and 2004.

Graphic 1) Percentages of vote results of the EP resolutions

It shows vote results of the left MEPs who participated in at least one of three votes. It examines whether their vote results are working on the principle of representative democracy. Results of yes, no and abstention votes on each resolution are calculated in 9 cases as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYV/TV</th>
<th>YVLP/TV</th>
<th>YVLP/LPV</th>
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<tr>
<td>TNV/TV</td>
<td>NVLP/TV</td>
<td>NVLP/LPV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAV/TV</td>
<td>AVLP/TV</td>
<td>AVLP/LPV</td>
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The most meaningful results are YVLP/LPV, NVLP/LPV, and AVLP/LPV because they clearly show the changes of voting behaviors of the MEPs of left parties. In Graphic 1, first two percentages of YVLP/LPV (79.88% in 2003 and 53.19% in 2004)

22 Data of table are established from yes, no or abstention votes of left parties MEPs. Certain of MEPs reelected to the 6th legislature may have 3 vote results, but most of them have only one or two vote results.
23 AVLP/LPV : Abstention votes of left parties / Left parties votes
AVLP/TV : Abstention votes of left parties / Total votes
NVLP/LPV : No votes of left parties / Left parties votes
NVLP/TV : No votes of left parties / Total votes
TAV/TV : Total abstention votes / Total votes
TNV/TV : Total no votes / Total votes
TYV/TV : Total yes votes / Total votes
YVLP/LPV : Yes votes of left parties / Left parties votes
YVLP/TV : Yes votes of left parties / Total votes.
are relatively high to compare with that of 2006 (49.47%), while those percentages of no votes are lower (7.32% in 2003, 39.01% in 2004) to compare with that of 2006 (47.00%). The most interesting thing is that we can see a considerable change of their voting behaviors in 2006. Their NVLP/LPVs markedly increased by 642.07%, while yes and abstention votes diminished by -39% and -72.42%. In other words, the left MEPs have changed abruptly their voting behaviors from yes to no, and they are transformed from the cooperative partner of the Commission into its refractory competitor. The apparent decline of abstention votes shows that the MEPs now became aware of the importance of the issue by massive demonstration since 2004 and that they might be obliged to do in such a way. One can say that increased no votes from 2004 signify democracy is functioning or that it’s probably back to the EP. But it would be more probable that national parliaments pushed by demonstrations of the workers and the syndicate might influence on their European members’ decision and that the left MEPs could not help but change their mind.

Graphic 2) Percentages of the realization of representative democracy in the EP

Graphic 2 regroups 3 vote results into five: (1) absence of representative democracy; (2) weak absence of representative democracy; (3) hesitation; (4) weak realization of representative democracy; (5) realization of representative democracy.\(^{24}\) The results are as follows: (1) 49.14% of the left MEP votes represents the absence of democracy; (2) 1.23%, weak absence of democracy; (3) 9.88%, hesitation; (4) 9.63%, weak realization of representative democracy; (5) 30.12%, realization of representative democracy. Democracy absence cases are much more frequent than its presence by 1.63 times. We can hardly say that democracy is working in the EP and that the MEPs speak for the working class. And the rate of weak presence of representative democracy is quite higher than that of its weak absence by 7.82 times. It’s related to the voting behavior constancy. Yes voters in 2003 tend to change their political position and most of them

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\(^{24}\) Votes started by Y and finished by Y (via N or A possible) count as ‘Absence of representative democracy’; votes started by A or N and finished by Y (via A or N possible) count as ‘Weak absence of representative democracy’; votes finished by A (via Y or N possible) count as ‘Hesitation’; votes started by A or Y and finished by Y (via Y or A possible) count as ‘Weak realization of representative democracy’; votes started by N and finished by N (Y or A possible) count as ‘Realization of representative democracy’.
are the socialist MEPs.

Graphic 3) Constancy of voting behaviors of left parties

Graphic 3 makes clear this inconstancy of left MEPs voting behaviors. Graphic 3 shows vote preferences constancy of 4 left parties. It allows us to know which party kept the same voting behaviors through 3 votes and at last which party’s voting behaviors are nearer to the absence of representative democracy in the EP. We’ll consider the MEPs who cast the consecutive same votes —yes-yes votes or no-no votes— as voters who have constant voting behaviors. If the majority of the left MEPs cast no votes more than twice over three votes —no-no votes— to liberal proposals of the Commission, we can consider that democracy is functioning in the EP. On the contrary, if yes voters kept constant voting behavior —yes-yes votes, they seemed to forget interest of the working class and to think that other values are more important than representative democracy.

According to graphic 3, 85.87% is the percentage of left MEPs who cast yes votes at least twice total over total left MEPs who keep their voting behaviors constancy. The percentage of the MEPs who kept the constancy in no votes is only 14.13%. This means that the voting behaviors of yes voters are more constant that that of no voters and there are more ‘pro-Bolkestein MEPs than the MEPs who care about the electorate’s interest. This high constancy of yes votes is already expected in table 1 (YVLP/LPVs are 79.88% in 2003, 53.19% in 2004 and 49.47% in 2006). The percentage of yes voter constancy is much higher than that of YVLP/LPVs. Meanwhile, the percentage of no voter constancy is very low to compare with that of NVLP/LPVs (7.32% in 2003, 39.01% in 2004, and 47.00% in 2006.) It’s because most of no voters do not cast their no votes twice or three times, but just once in 2004 or more generally in 2006. What is more, there are two left parties who did not cast no votes at all in 2003. Then, which parties are far from constant no votes? Did all left MEPs vote indifferently to their electorates’ worries or some of them? Graphics 2 and 3 give an answer.

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25 79 MEPs.
26 13 MEPs.
27 See table 1.
According to graphic 2, the percentage of the realization of democracy of PES marks 78.42%, the highest record of absence of representative democracy, whilst those of the Greens, the EDD and the EUL/NGL rest 6.45%, 15.79% and 0%. But the percentages of the realization of democracy are totally different. That of the PES is only 6.22%, while that of the Greens, 59.68%; that of the EDD, 73.68%; that of the EUL/NGL, 65.63%. It is the PES who cast massive yes votes to liberal proposals of the Commission, not the others.

The same outcome could be obtained from graphic 3. The PES shows the most constant voting behaviors in yes-yes votes (97.37%) while that of other 3 left parties reaches 2.53% at most (the percentage of the Greens and EUL/GUL are 0%, and that of the EDD is 2.53%). On the contrary, the PES shows the weakest constant voting behaviors in no-no votes (7.69%) whilst that of other parties are relatively high (the percentage of the Greens is 46.15%, the EDD and EUL/GUL are 23.08% for each party). Furthermore, there were no votes of the PES and the Greens in 2003 and just several no votes in 2004 (6 members of the PES and 13 members of the Greens). These voting behaviors of the PES and the Greens prove that they considered liberal proposals of the Commission as indispensable. They might think that the pro-European policy will make the EU more integrated and more enlarged economically or politically. If so, the PES, as one of big parties, often hesitates to vote for between pro-European policies or to perform their duty to protect the working class’ interest. We will examine further reasons below.

We have analyzed above vote results and voting behaviors of left MEPs. As far as liberal proposals of the Commission concerned, left parties did not seem to be obliged to work as the representative of the working class and to represent their point of view in the EP. So, we should ask following questions. Why did they forget or ignore their duty to represent the working class’ interest? Why didn’t they, the representatives of the working class, consider their responsibility of the representative as the most important one? We’ll try to answer these questions through the historical and political direction of the socialist group and try to find possible reasons to understand the results of above.

3. Why Does Representative Democracy Malfunction in the EP?

: Possible Reasons of the Deficit of Representative Democracy
We have seen that the left MEPs have not voted on the principle of representative democracy. Considering that the MEPs are directly elected by the European citizen and that the EP is founded on the principle of representative democracy, our analysis results may seem difficult to understand. Given that, we can not be sure that representative democracy is working in the EP. What are the reasons of these strange results? Why did the activities of the left MEPs detour around the principle of representative democracy?

(1) The first possible reason consists in the socialist group’s long-term political policy on the EU integration. From the beginning of the EU history, the socialists have largely contributed to the European integration. The development of the European integration was enriched by the endeavor of Jean Monnet and his followers in the early days of the EP as well as nowadays. And the socialist MEPs’ votes for the proposals of the liberalization of the internal service market can be said to testify this tradition, which opposes the socialist proper political aim, i.e. to make the working class’ voice heard. And, sometimes, there are little difference between the left MEPs’ votes and those of right MEPs.

This “lack of an opposition” explains why voting behaviors of the PES remain pro-EU since the treaty of Rome (1958). A certain analysis shows that voting behaviors of the PES are highly pro-European while those of EUL/NGL and EDD are anti-European and that of the greens/EFA is located in the middle of the two positions. Since the proposal for liberalization of internal service market of the Commission aims

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29 Smith, Julie, Europe’s Elected Parliament, Contemporary European Studies 5, Sheffield : Sheffield Academic Press Ltd., 1999, p. 148: “most MEPs are in favour of further European integration and are obliged to work consensually by the majority requirements for much EU legislation, and vote on draft legislation on that basis”; Schmitt, Hermann, Op. Cit., p. 126: “the parties of the EP are “as cohesive as national parties in their position-taking on [...] European Union policy dimensions”.
30 Jean Monnet is one of the crucial political leaders of the beginning of the EC, but his technocratic approach saw little need for a parliamentary assembly. See Smith Julie, Op. Cit., 1999, p. 27.
31 In 1970, British, Irish, Danish and Norwegian socialist parties apparently opposed to theirs governments to enter the EU, and, in 1990’s, the socialist parties of certain countries resisted to the Treaty of Maastricht. But generally the socialist parties are in favour of European integration. See Hix, Simon, The Political System of the European Union, London: Palgrave, 1997, p. 36.
to promote the European integration, the socialist MEPs cast massive yes votes on it in 2003, 2004 and still 2006.

Pro-EU tradition of the PES and the Greens is related to the nature of the EP as a political institution. Newly born on 1958, the EP has tried to reinforce its legislative power. In spite of the power it recently obtained to work as real legislator with the Council of Europe (the Council), the co-decision process does not make sure the EP functions as an equal legislative partner of the Council, because its application is limited to a few numbers of fields. Therefore it’s natural that the EP has look forward to acquiring stronger legislative power and so often chose to vote for pro-European integration proposals instead of fulfilling their duty to represent the working class’ interest. Consequently the EP, like other EU institutions, may be far from independent of where the Europe is expected to go to, but seeks to promote its own weight on the decision-makings.

Then what about liberal policies of the Commission including the Bolkestein directive? Generally they are considered as proposals to make the EU more integrated. That’s why most left MEPs have cast votes for the Commission proposals from 2000 to 2004. Hence, while smaller parties such as EDD, EUL/NGL, and the Greens who are anti-EU parties were relatively free to meet their electorates’ expectations, the PES — one of the two largest parties in the EP and always the largest left party since 1979— has got a tendency to favor pro-EU proposals of the Commission, especially when it concerns big issues like the Bolkestein directive.

(2) In the second place, left parties’ pro-EU voting comes from the distance between

34 The co-decision was attributed to the EP by the treaty of Amsterdam and reinforced by the treaty of Maastricht.
35 On application fields of the co-decision, see Raepenbusch, Sean Van, Droit institutionnel de l’Union et des Communautés européennes, Bruxelles : De Boeck & Larcier, 2001, pp. 222-223.
37 79.88% in 2003 and 53.19% in 2004. See table 1 and 3.
38 “Major EU parties are somewhat closer together on European Union issues than major national parties are. … distinctive positions in EU policy questions are taken by small polar parties rather than by the major party alternatives in the EU and the national political systems”. See Schmitt, Hermann, Op. Cit., p. 126.
39 Consequently, with the position as the second party group of the PES, “much of Parliament’s influence to date has depended upon its ability to act entrepreneurially in pursuit of its own interests”. Warleigh, Alex, Op. Cit., 2002, p. 75.
political parties and their electorates,\(^{40}\) which is one of the evidences of democratic deficit. This distance has four causes: the European citizen’s indifference to the EP; MEPs’ strong dependence on national parties; invisibility of the conciliation; small place of the MEPs in political scene.

i) From the first direct election of the EP in 1979, we have seen the European citizen’s consecutive declining interest in the EP from their high abstention. One of the reasons consists in the nature of the EU as a supranational polity: its “decision making appears distant and unfamiliar to most citizens”;\(^{41}\) the EP does not seem as powerful as national parliamentary institutions. And, although almost every discussion of the EP is open to public, it remains still in fog in the eyes of European citizen. That’s one of the reasons why the EP is not “recognized by member-state citizens and publics as an instrument with which to make EU decision making more democratic.”\(^{42}\)

ii) And the distance between the EP and the European citizen is also due to the failure of Europeanization of the EP. The political parties of the EP are too dependent on national parties from the beginning. If the EP is a normally working institution based on the principle of representative democracy, the MEPs have to represent their electorate’s interests in order not to be out of office in the next election. In principle, it should be the European parties that lead the MEPs. But it is in fact the national parties that move the MEPs. It should be European issues that the MEPs deal with. But, in fact, it is national interests that often precede European perspective. The national parties are main players who determine the order of MEPs on the list.\(^{43}\) And it’s national or regional issue, not European level issues that dominate the EP election campaign. Thus “an MEP’s chance of re-election is not dependent upon his or her performance in the EP, but is determined by the popularity of his or her national party,”\(^{44}\) because “the Europeanization of political parties as a whole remains low.”\(^{45}\) Furthermore, the left MEPs’ position change

\(^{40}\) The EP ought to be an institution that reflects the European citizen’s interest, but it’s not the EP, but the ECJ commonly perceived to act in the citizens’ interest. See Jean, Blondel, *Op. Cit.*, 1998.


from 2004, in fact, was under the influence of the national parties’ decisions. We will take examples of the voting behaviors of French and Belgian MEPs. In 2003 when there was not visible resistance from the working class of each country, they largely supported the Commission proposal by casting yes votes (French: 13 yes votes and 10 no votes; Belgian: 9 yes votes).

Table 1) French and Belgian left MEPs’ voting behaviors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>PES</th>
<th>Greens</th>
<th>EDD</th>
<th>EUL/NGL</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>FR</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>FR</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>BG</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>BG</td>
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<th>2004</th>
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<th>EDD</th>
<th>EUL/NGL</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>FR</td>
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<td>BG</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>BG</td>
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<table>
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<th>Greens</th>
<th>EDD</th>
<th>EUL/NGL</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>FR</td>
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<td>3</td>
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But, from 2004, their decisions were completely changed: in 2004, the French left MEPs cast 12 no votes and 14 abstentions, and the left Belgians, 5 no votes and 5 abstentions; in 2006, the French left MEPs, 2 yes vote, 43 no votes and 1 abstention, and the left Belgians, 1 yes vote and 8 no votes. French left MEPs had been favorable for the Commission in 2003; they hesitated or a little bit disagreed with it in 2004; and they totally oppose it in 2006. Belgian MEPs’ voting behaviors are similar to that of the French. As demonstrations were particularly serious in two countries, the French and Belgian MEPs could not help being under the influence of national parties’ intention to reject or at least modify the Commission proposal. Table 1 shows us that the French and Belgian MEPs were not free from their domestic situations. It would be interesting to note that the MEPs of other EU member countries were not so much changed as France.

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46 See table 1.
and Belgium, which may be explained by the fact that there was not critical opposition as is the case with France and Belgium.

iii) The distance between the MEPs and European citizens is not only due to excessive dependence of the EP on national parties, but also partially due to newly attributed power to the EP — co-decision. In this procedure, the conciliation is crucial in case that the EP and the Council can not arrive at an agreement. Problem is that conciliation does not take place in open. During conciliation, the MEPs are unable to develop the political positions of their parties or have meaningful plenary debate which might give it greater visibility. Two legislators go unseen and the EP can not have transparent result based on public debate, but rather is “the result of Parliament’s entry into the metaphorical ‘smoke-filled rooms’ in which EU policy deals are negotiated and bargained in camera.”

iv) The distance between the MEPs and the electorate is concerned with low media coverage. Even during the campaign for direct election, the MEP candidates are not enough covered by the media to make possible for the electorate to have sufficient information and therefore their candidacy appears unimpressive even though each of them is skillful and talented politician. What is more, professional experience as a MEP is often considered either “as a training ground for a job in national politics or as a ‘retirement home’ at the end of national career.”

4. Conclusion

In principle, the EP is a unique institution built on the principle of representative democracy in the EU. But, in fact, we can not help throwing some doubts on whether this principle is working well. Left MEPs’ voting behaviors on liberal proposals of the Commission including the Bolkestein directive since 2000 reinforced these doubts. If they represent the working class’ interest, they should have voted against those

47 Conciliation is the negotiations between the EP and the Council on who to resolve their differences over the proposed legislation.
proposals. According to the analysis of three votes of 2003, 2004 and 2006, there are more yes votes than no votes, though they have started to change their voting behaviors since 2004. Their voting behaviors show that the left MEPs had ignored their duty to represent the electorate but, from 2004, started to work on the basis of national and ideological interest.

The lack of representative democracy in the EP is in part owing to the pro-EU policy tradition of the socialist MEPs. This tradition made them to cast yes votes to the Commission proposals which promote the European integration. The lack of representative democracy also comes from the distance between the MEPs and their electorates. If the electorate feels as close to the MEPs as to the members of national parliament, voting of the MEPs would be under surveillance of the electorate and voting results could have been different. This distance may be caused by four reasons: the European citizen’s indifference to the EP, dependence of the MEPs on national parties, invisibility of conciliation, and small place of the MEPs in political scene.

We have seen that the representative democracy in the EP is not working and searched for some possible reasons of that. But, for final conclusion, we have to wait the next votes after the 2nd and 3rd reading in the EP.
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Graphic 1) Percentages of vote results of the EP resolutions

![Bar chart showing vote percentages for various political parties over the years 2003, 2004, and 2005.]
Graphic 2) Percentages of the realization of representative democracy (RD)
Graphic 3) Constancy of voting behaviors of left parties