The Canada-United-States relation is one of the most elaborate one in the world. It is also, incidentally, one of the most peaceful. This often celebrated peace is one of the longest lasting one of the modern world. Yet that does not imply that it does not experiment tensions from time to time.

The two North-American partners have known disputes and bitter disputes for years. They move sometimes closer, sometimes further apart. Either in the field of international trade or even of security, both countries have known divergences of views and opposition.

Indeed, there is a past history of defiance that goes back in time. The last war between Canada and the United-States occurred from 1812 to 1814. And even then, Canada engages in the conflict as a British colony. Yet, we must note that settlers, French Canadians as much as loyalists, actively took part in it. The nineteenth century also saw the fenian raids and the Manifest Destiny, calling for the expansion of the United-States northward. We also find Canadian defence plans directed against the US up until 1931 (Eayrs 1964).

Canada was also did not appreciate the 1903 settlement of the Alaska border. (Donneur 1994). Economic policy will evolve from one based on the Reciprocity Treaty (between 1854 and 1866) and a strong protectionist policy, the one inaugurated by Prime Minister John A. Mac Donald in 1867. The goal of the later was to unite the new Canadian federation to protect it from the US who, coming out of the Civil War, had a new period of solid growth. The great the Canadian design was to reinforce relations from coast to coast. When in 1911, Wilfrid Laurier’s Liberals will try in vain to go back to commercial reciprocity (a condition analogue to free trade). Canada then remains a rather protectionist country.

Despite an inter-war period unfavourable to international trade, the increase in American investment, following the decline of British investment, is a striking feature of the era. They are the first and they are direct, making custom measures less effective.
In military affairs, the 1940 Ogdensburg Declaration creates the Permanent Joint Board of Defence and will lead to the elaboration of a North American defence plan. The 1941 Hyde Park Declaration will call for coordination of all resources in the war effort. At US request, the cooperation was pursued after the war. The radar system and especially NORAD since 1958 illustrate this strong cooperation.

In the last few years, we have seen Canada depart from the U.S. position on key global security matters: the American led invasion of Iraq and the Ballistic Missile Defense program. In both cases, the Canadian government went against what seemed to be Washington’s wish to see Canada participate in both endeavor.

As John Holmes argues in his *Life with Uncle*, Canada was one of the most active supporters of the United Nations system. It remains so today (Holmes 1981). It was therefore no real surprise to see the Canadian government go against the American decision to act without the approval of its Security Council. Yet that does not mean that Canada has tried to go against the American objectives of building a new Iraq. Contrarily to some, Canada has remain a steadfast partner of the U.S. when came the time to rebuild Iraq, pledging the eighth largest contribution at the Madrid conference of donor countries, on October 24th 2003 (200 million dollars).

Yet at the height of the crisis, Canada was going its own way. While the five permanent members were failing to reach a consensus, then Canadian ambassador to the UN Paul Heinbecker was proposing a plan to end the deadlock in the negotiations at the Security Council table. Canada was trying to find a way to get the Security Council to work. Canada and the U.S. really parted ways at the moment of the definitive exclusion of any participation in military operations that would not be endorsed by the Security Council. Jean Chrétien announced his decision on that matter in the House of Commons and stood by it. Otherwise, Canada did what it could to support the U.S. in their attempt to disarm the Iraqi regime of the time.
The same could be said of the refusal to formally participate into the Ballistic Missile Defense project. It was impossible for Canadians to turn their back on the U.N.’s cluster of conventions and treaty that pertain to the use of weapons in space. Ottawa accepted that the data gathered by the early warning radars be used by the commandment in charge of the operation of the BMD system, but that was it. The Canadian government gave to Washington what it could without having the feeling of embarking on a project that would have in the long run participated in the death sentence of the Outer Space Treaty, something that would go against Canadians’ values and world view.

Views and comments abound on the matter of what these events mean for the future of the North American partners. After the Canadian refusal to accompany the US in its adventures in Iraq, the relation was assessed as getting colder. The same thing was said after the Canadian refusal to participate actively in the American project of ballistic missile defense (BMD).

For some that kind of behavior was outrageous. It was seen by them as a failure for Canada to recognize its duty as a friend of the US, and foolish pride in front of an ever so important trading partner. Yet, for every commentator being alarmed by colder Canada-US relations, we could find one that would argue that Canada was still supporting the US in Iraq because of the already present Canadian personnel among the US troops and in Afghanistan, and still supporting the US on BMD with the modifications made to NORAD. For both clusters of commentators, Canada is essentially a dependent satellite of the US and as such has little impact on the relation and the general conditions of its prosperity.

We think there is a cliché, what Kirton calls a “comfortable conventional wisdom”, circulating about the relationship between Canada and the US in recent years. When George W. Bush became president, most Canadian commentators, led by Jeffrey Simpson from the Toronto Globe and Mail, noted that Bush was from distant Texas, close to Mexicans, not Canadians. The fact that the first international visit of the new president was to the Mexican President, not to Jean Chrétien confirmed in their eyes this
cliché. The reelection of George W. Bush in 2004 over his French speaking Massachusetts-based opponent John Kerry yet again strengthened the cliché. The implication was that the influence of Canada on the White House was little.

But, as John Kirton notes, this analysis shows flaws. “The US has not had an elected president from northern border states since Franklin Roosevelt died in 1945” (Kirton 2006). John F. Kennedy, from near Massachusetts, did not have harmonious relations with Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and about the 1963 nuclear weapons controversy. In contrast, Californian Ronald Reagan and Texan George H. Bush had excellent relations with Prime Minister Mulroney. And not Mexico, but Canada fought alongside the US in the Gulf War in 1990, in Kosovo in 1999 and in Afghanistan since 2001. And George W. Bush invited Jean Chrétien to be his first foreign visitor to the White House in February 2001. Canada refused to fight in Iraq in 2003 like it also refused to be involved in Vietnam in 1965.

In contrast to these, socioeconomic declinists following a peripheral-dependency logic (Dewitt and Kirton 1983; Donneur 1994; Kirton 2006) argue that the high degree of economic inequalities between the two countries makes Canada deeply dependant of the United States. This would especially be so since the end of the Cold War, and even more so after September 11, which would have made Canada “even more desperate to secure market access to a US free to close its own borders”. (Kirton 2006)

A few declinists – an old tradition in Canada since the 19th century – think that Canada is destined to be absorbed by the USA.

Many adherents of the liberal internationalist school “argue that the vast quantitative and difference in capabilities” between the two countries “means that the US prioritizes global political-security issues, while Canada prioritizes the economic and transborder issues”. (Kirton 2006) The basis for a successful Canada US relationship is a quid pro quo “in which Canada supports the US on global political-security issues” to
spend the diplomatic capital acquired in Washington on the economic issue “with which a lower ruled Canada is primarily concerned” (Donneur 2005; Stairs 2005; Kirton 2006).

“A third school of global power competitors begins with both the US and Canada as global players and powers seeking to maximize their national interest and distinctive national values all around the world.” (Kirton 2006) John Kirton refers to the writings of William T.R. Fox (Fox 1985) and Charles Doran (Doran 1995), for whom “the global balance of power and change in the relative capabilities and roles of principal powers drive Canada’s relationship with the US.” (Kirton 2006).

But in the post-Cold War world, Canadian foreign policy towards the United States has gone beyond the three options that prevailed since 1945: the first option of ad hoc adjustment preferred by the diplomatic capitalists, the second option of deeper integration preferred by the continental socioeconomic declinists, and the third option of disengagement and diversification preferred by the global powers competition school. “Since 1989 Canada as increasingly pursued a fourth option of deep political penetration of the domestic American polity and a fifth option of defining global order alongside and against the United States” (Kirton 2006). The fourth option, pioneered by Allan Gotlieb, former ambassador to the US, consist in dealing not just with the US State Department, “but also lobbying all members of the presidential administration, the Congress”, those “who influence the American executive and legislative branch. It extends to Canadian consulates directly lobbying state governments, municipalities, interest groups, the media, educators, and other opinion leaders”. It was particularly the strategy of Paul Martin’s government.

But it is the fifth option which is important to underline. As we have seen, it means “to deliberately and directly produce a full-scale alternative global order” to that of the United-States. “It involves formulating a vision of global order, based on Canadian interest and values, as ambitious and well defined as that of the United-States” (Kirton 2006). In its extended version, it means competing with the United-States globally to
have the United-States “adjust to the Canadian conception of which ideas and institutions should prevail (Kirton 2006).

These are the different approaches that can be seen at work in Canadian foreign policy. We will now look into certain case that will illustrate some of these approaches.

**Discordance, Conflict and Quantification**

Like we have said before, we hold the view that Canada is helpless and fatally declining before the almighty United-States to be a cliché. The reality of Canada-US relations is far more complex. Canada has surplus capacity at its disposal, and is using it extensively. What we will look into here is an effort to quantify the use of this surplus capacity to engage the world and the US. It is the quantification of this surplus capacity that is at the center of our preoccupation.

To say that Canada is engaging the world and the US in order to assure the projection of Canadian values of a Canadian world view does not exclude disputes of other kinds. Trade disputes are common between Canada and the US. Both countries cooperate extensively, but they also compete for no little amount of things.

We have decided to approach these competitions and disputes from a quantitative point of view for two reasons. First quantitative research often rests on duplicable experiments. Given the number of issues between the two countries, this is no small advantages. Second, quantitative research allows for compilation of data over time. This will help us to see larger tendencies building up.

Quantification and measurement requires obviously the generation of data. Data as such are useful not only because they illustrate something that would otherwise harder to observe, but also because they allow for observation of the **correlation** and **simultaneousness** of different datum.
To approach international relations from a quantitative point of view has now a relatively long tradition. For example, the work of the Correlates of War (COW) Project is still making progress (Geller and Singer 1998). Also in the field is worth noting the work of Kal Holsti (1991). Despite its general interest, to compare the issues discussed by the COW Project to what goes on in the Canada-US relation would not be terribly useful, because we are in presence of low-intensity disputes. Yet, the COW project was for us an inspiration for what is of the use of measurements in international politics.

Literature on conflicts is concerned not only with war but with a variety of conflicts (Gurr 1981). In fact, on the basis of Lewis Coser’s work (1956), there was a “blossoming of conflict research” (Olson and Groom 1991). The founding of the Journal of Conflict Resolution and the manifest of its second issue give evidence of it. We can take note of the research by Kenneth Boulding (1961), John Burton (1981; 1987), or Anatol Rapoport (1960). Conflict Research is pluralist and holistic, embracing different levels of analysis and disciplines. For our purpose, it is important to note its application to disputes in economic area and also to discordances between allies.

Closer to the traditional study of Canadian foreign policy and worth mentioning is the work of Jonathan H. Ping on middle power statecraft (Ping 2005). Through a number of indicators, Ping tries to define middle powers today. His work is also especially interesting for its look into long term trends and dynamics, allowing for states status as small, middle or principal power to evolve according to sets of data. It is that use of data over extended period of time that often makes for the most captivating features of quantitative research.

Indeed, it is the temporal dimension that we have tried to apply to our indicators. Without adopting the same vision than him as to what constitute the different categories of power, we have drawn inspiration from his methods. The mere fact that there are disputes is not in question here. Rather it is the persistence and the evolution of these disputes that we are to be looking at.
Our indicators also aim at illustrating dimensions of non-violent conflicts and discordances. Non-violent conflicts make for much more difficult tracking of events, defining and intensity assessing. This is why in our approach to Canada-US conflicts we have decided to start by looking into the Canadian state apparatus. This means that instead of listing conflicts and then looking into them, we decided to look to the actions of the Canadian government and then try to determine which ones participate in conflicts and disputes. Our data set would then have to come in the form of foreign policy output of some sort.

This is one of the ways we have used to limit our study. The data we have gathered here is essentially about outputs by the Canadian government. This simplifies the process and makes data gathering a task less subject to tempering.

We also have limited this presentation by selecting only a small number of issues. In our effort, we have set out to look into the recent trade disputes between Canada and the US: the very much publicly discussed softwood lumber dispute and the much less publicized dispute on wheat exportation to the US. These two subjects seemed worthy of interest because they are systematically the object of disputes between the two countries and will probably be problematic for quite some time, and this despite the recent agreement reached in the softwood dispute.

We decided to also limit in time the scope of our research. We were to look at events that occurred from 1999 to 2006. This choice is not arbitrary. We chose 1999 to 2006 because this date frames adequately the 2001 events. This time span also had a few international events that would allow us to use them as intervening variables. In this case, we will use Canadian refusal to participate in the Iraq war as intervening variable.

**Commercial disputes in time**

We here present charts of the evolution of the two commercial disputes. The main idea behind the charts pertaining to commercial disputes was to visually represent the
variation in intensity in the activities of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). Based on the premise that any action undertaken by the department would at least be followed by a communiqué, we decided to use these as our quantifier. The number of communiqués would therefore roughly indicate the level of energy put by DFAIT in a certain issue.

In both of our cases, we have gathered all of the relevant communiqués over our chosen period of time. The use of caution in completing this kind of task is necessary. One must always be careful when dealing with the rendition of the meaning of news releases into a quantitative indicator. It is easy to end up missing the forest for the trees. After all, many news releases and communiqués are only published in a rather automatic fashion, and only in reaction to a decision of an independent body.

Indeed, a certain number of the publications emanating from the DFAIT are only signaling a new decision reached by the committees of the WTO or NAFTA. Yet, in the particular cases of commercial disputes, the body of literature composed by the communiqués indicates that they go far beyond the simple reaction and announcement of regular procedure. In many cases, they are notifications of declaration from the minister, comments on American behavior, or announcement of support to the businesses implicated in the disputes. In short, the communiqués cover both decisions from organizations that aim at settling trade disputes, but also just about any action taken by the government of Canada. It is, in the end, the evidence that something has happened in the dispute. In the case of a trade dispute, it is almost necessarily an event that deepens the dispute. No communiqués are sent out to announce normal trade relations, only to underline irregularities.

The case for using communiqués as indicators of a dispute’s intensity can also be argued in the perspective that communiqués are also used to guide the medias’ eye to look at certain issues. More communiqués then means a greater importance of the issue to the DFAIT at the moment of publication. Increase in the speed of publication means
increase in importance of the issue. The communiqués remain therefore a reliable, easily investigable and manageable set of data.

Even if it is not an indicator that is as clearly definite as we would want it to be, we judge that it is reliable enough for our experiment.

In order to evaluate the intensity of the energy put forward by the DFAIT, we have measured the distance in time between the publications of each communiqué. We have then used these measurements in order to produce a chart that shows the progression of the speed of publication with every given communiqué.

Intensity: Intensity is here conceived as the distance in time between the emission of each news release by the Ministry of international trade about Soft Wood Lumber. The first point on the X axis is in fact the average distance in time between the 7 first news release since 10 October 2000, subtracted from 75.

Intensity = Maximal Value - ((Δn1 + Δn2 + Δn3 + Δn4 + Δn5 + Δn6 + Δn7) / 7)

The Maximal Value would be the expected maximal distance between two release on this particular issue. In the case of the soft wood conflict, we arbitrarily decided that this value would be 75 days. This is also a very useful thing to do given that it allows us to convert otherwise falling values into climbing values, bringing about a more graphic rendition of the climbing intensity of the conflict.

Time period: October 10th 2000 to January 11th 2006
On this graphic the intensity indicator is built around the same principle than in the previous case. Yet, because of the scarce data, we have slightly modified the composition. The distance in time between events are averaged over 3 events rather than 8 and our maximal value here is 200

\[
\text{Intensity} = \text{Maximal Value} - \left(\frac{\Delta n_1 + \Delta n_2 + \Delta n_3}{3}\right)
\]

Maximal Value = 200

These show the intensity of activity at the moment of publications. In the softwood dispute, in order to smooth out the curve, we have averaged the values of the seven preceding results and attributed it to the moment of the seventh publication. This aims at underlining tendencies rather than the occasional short sequence of publications that follows a decision by the WTO or the NAFTA board in charge of dispute resolution. In the case of the Wheat board dispute, due to scarcer data, we have averaged every three occurrences.

These graphics clearly show a turning point at the beginning of 2005 when DFAIT started to get rather active in the field of commercial disputes, especially in the case of softwood lumber. Why exactly is this period marked in such a way by heightening activity remains open to interpretation. The minority government of Paul Martin seems to have been especially active. It could be seen as an electoral move, a way to gather some popular support by flexing some muscles in front of Washington (no matter how futile that can be). Yet, there were American reactions to the Canadian activity. Secretary of State Rice was certainly informed of the issue during her visit to Ottawa. Ambassador Wilkins also had his share of attention when he reacted to Prime Minister Martin’s comments on the possibility of finding another buyer for Canadian oil
oversea. This is a lot for something that would have to solely found it’s meaning in an electoral perspective.

**Commercial disputes and Iraq crisis**

The study of the variation and its coincidence with other events can also help shed some light on the matter of Canada-U.S. disputes. For example, when we lay over a visual rendition of the events surrounding the Canadian refusal to join in the Iraq campaign, we can see that those events had a profound effect on the publicity given to commercial disputes.

![Variation in Canadian and American relations](chart.png)

This chart shows an unexpected coincidence. The variations in the green curve represents the period of time between the moment then ambassador Paul Heinbecker made a proposal to the Security Council for a resolution that would set a firm time limit to Sadam Hussein’s regime, and the moment of the American acceptance of Canadian companies as bidders on reconstruction contract in early 2004. This time span covers all of the turbulence that occurred between Canada and the U.S. around that matter.
As we can see, that period also registered a sharp drop in the number of publications about the softwood dispute. The asymmetry is rather obvious. This can be interpreted in a certain number of ways. First, it could of course be due to the lack of events in the dispute. The WTO and the NAFTA bodies and committees need time to study disputes and pronounce settlements. It is a possibility that there were no significant event at the time that would justify the publication of communiqués. Never the less, we are tempted to down play this explanation because of the roughly similar patterns of progression that can be observe between the two curves. Even if the amplitude of the variation is very different, it is observable that on both issues the DFAIT has followed the same basic patterns of acceleration and deceleration in the publication of communiqués. This means that the DFAIT’s publications are somewhat independent of the work cycle of the WTO and the likes.

This also leads us to discuss the idea of margin of manoeuvre. Canada can certainly afford to frustrate the U.S. in its agenda and does so rather often. Yet there is a certain restrain that is observable in cases such as the one we have been discussing. There is no benefit to be reaped in confronting the U.S. on all fronts all the time. Instead, Canada seems to be ready to disagree here and keep silence there if it can ease its relation with the U.S.

In the case of the Iraq war, Canada saw her relation with Washington cool down as a result of her refusal to participate to the coalition force. The most obvious consequence of the refusal to go was the denial of the privilege to bid on reconstruction contracts. As long as this matter hovered over the bilateral relation, DFAIT choose not to discuss other issues such as trade disputes. As soon as this was cleared from the table, the communiqués started to come out again. What we see on this chart is the evolution of the use of Canadian capacity to push and tackle issues against the US perceived interest.
Disputes in the field of environmental policy

Environmental policy is composed of those actions that government take in order to protect their environment. In the cases of Canada and the United-States, environmental policy is composed of a web of domestic laws, international treaties, contributions to organizations and support for initiatives.

In that field, Canadian and American policy often follow different path, evolve differently, if not bluntly rough each others feathers. Despite allege shared interest in the pursuit of a sustainable environment, both countries find it difficult to agree on what means are suited to protect which environment and what position it should take in the order of priorities.

The now classical (and desperately contemporary) example of this is the opposing position of both countries on the issue of the Kyoto protocol, an amendment to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Canada has been until very recently a staunch supporter of the Kyoto protocol while the U.S., or at least many Republicans, find it incompatible with their economic interest. In this case, the Canadian House of Commons (under liberal rule during the negotiation, signature and ratification of the protocol) opposed the American Senate. On the 25th of July 2005 the senators adopted unanimously the Byrd-Hagel resolution, stating that the United-States should not engage in any agreement that does not bind the developing countries in their emission of greenhouse gas emission or that would “result in serious harm to the economy of the United-States” (United-States 1997).

This difference in policy came close to become a diplomatic skirmish at the Montreal Conference on climate change when then Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin came out deploiring the lack of U.S. commitment to the protocol and appeared in front of the cameras with former U.S. president Bill Clinton, a strong defender of the protocol in his country and abroad. U.S. ambassador David Wilkins then suggested that the Canadian
Prime Minister Paul Martin (by then in campaign for reelection) was trying to get political credit by attacking the U.S. environmental policy.

Treaty ratification have been looked into in the past, but mostly to assess the conditions that makes a state sign them rather than as an indicator of policy cohesion among countries (Recchia 2002). Still, it is possible, just by the number of treaties ratified to see that Canada is more incline to ratify these than the US. None the less we must put a flat on this conclusion because the US constitution requires that two thirds of the Senate agrees in favor of ratification. This is a rather important obstacle to ratification, making the process much easier to block than in Canada.

There are a number of factor influencing ratification process in democracies explored by Recchia, many of them coming from outside the actual state apparatus. It is much more easier to look into international cooperation on environmental issues by following the money trail (Stairs 2003). Money contributed by governments to certain programs and initiatives is certainly relevant to the evaluation of the international involvement of states.

As to know if this is true or not or in what proportion it may be is hard to evaluate. An observation of the evolution of Canadian and American participations to the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) illustrates this. It shows that the U.S. has significantly reduced its contribution while Canada increased hers over the same period.
Over five years, we can see that the relative size of the Canadian and American contributions is changing. The Canadian contribution started out as 11% of the American one and ended up five years later being equivalent to 34% of it.

Considering that the Canadian population is today said to be equivalent to no more than 11% of the American population, it is easy to see that Canada has put a premium on participation in UNEP.
From this later example, we can see how progression of contributions to international programs can be used to illustrate the general policy direction and order of priority in countries foreign policy. It is also easier to imagine what a great cluster of such indicators could do. If enough data about the participation of states in international programs was to be gathered, we could see who is doing more and who is doing less, and what the general orientation of the efforts of both countries. The desire of the Canadian government to see the US get more involved in the field of environmental policy is illustrated by it’s involvement in favour of the protocol.

**General context of Canada-US conflicts**

As we have seen, Canada has been quite capable of taking opposing directions from the US and to oppose it if needed. This ability is no stranger to the more diffuse international system that is emerging since the end of the Cold War (since the American defeat in Vietnam would argue Kirton (2006)). There is indeed an increasing number of opportunities to take advantage of for Canada, and some of them at US expense. But to argue from a systemic point of view does not tell the whole story.

Indeed, we can find some commentators that will explain the increase of discordance within the Canada-US relationship the symptom of domestic factors. It has been lately somewhat of a trend to look into the relevance of distinctive Canadian values in explanations of Canadian foreign policy, or at least to be concerned with them. The work of Michael Adams (Adams 2003) is emblematic of this trend but is also supported by some others, such as Nelson Michaud, who looked into the question (Donneur 2005). Kirton also elaborates on the subject to Canadian values.(Kirton 2006) Adams puts emphasis on the social values of Canadians, which increasingly sets them apart from Americans. These values do not necessarily translate into foreign policy decisions, but it does provides a legitimizing discourse for the fifth option described by Kirton, which implies contradicting the US and promoting an alternate world order. Indeed, if Canadians are dissatisfied with the US world order perspective, there is no reason why
this would not translate into foreign policy, especially given the efforts that the liberal government had put on dialoguing with the population on the matter (Canada 2003).

The illustration of the transformation of Canadians in their relation to the American world view and their discontentment with it can also be illustrated by a few statistics on public opinion. Following President Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech in January 2002, the Canadian public has started to oscillate in its support of American foreign policy. 62 % of Canadians supported Canadian involvement in Iraq during the first Gulf War in 1991. In March 2002, 52% of Canadians approved of US intervention in Iraq, yet, that number rapidly slipped to 36% in January 2003 (Parkin 2003).

Canadians seem overtly discontent with American international behaviour and hope for their government at least not to go along with it. This trend tends to legitimize the use by the Canadian government of the fifth option mentioned before. This option also implies a distinctly Canadian view of world order which competes with the American one. This distinctive outlook combined with Canada’s excess capability run against the better wishes of those who insist on the eminent decline and evaporation of the Canadian state. Recent disregard for the dispute settlement mechanism of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) by the American government in the softwood dispute also affects the general climate of the bilateral relations. An enduring Canada, having the world’s second largest oil reserves, could be in a position to increasingly try to strike deals and compete internationally outside of the bilateral relation shared with the US (United-States 2006).

Conclusion

It is quite clear that there is something to be said in favor of quantifying and measuring, especially on a long time span. A tool that would keep a systematic record of all issues surfacing between the two countries would certainly help us understand the evolution of Canadian actions in the world. It is when we face crossroads that demands of us to make hard choices that we need the most precise information on issues such as these.
It seems today like the crossroads appear where very few people were expecting them. US foreign policy during the Cold War was somewhat define by the bipolar system. The opportunities and consequences of US foreign policy were clearer. Today, things have changed greatly. The moral appeal of the US cause is not as great as it used to be and even Canadians have their own issues with US foreign policy. The level of discomfort has actually increased over the last years, and in areas of trouble not seen since the end of the Cold War and the ratification of NAFTA. As we have seen, outputs of energies spent in the pursuit of Canada’s perceived interest as been on the increase and all of these energies have been spent trying to win the US over on certain points.

It is also important to note that while Canada does not always win against the US, it remains capable of developing strategies and tactics in pursuit of its interest. The international system is more and more diverse and diffuse. Opportunities for the advancement of Canadian national interest are appearing where there were none before. It will be more and more important to have precise knowledge of the actual evolution of efforts being made and of their consequences.
References


