Changing Concepts of Security: 
the Implications for Civil-Military Relations 
and Defence Policy in Brazil

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This study presents two recently developed paradigms taken from the theoretical literature of the discipline of security studies and analyses their applicability to the Latin American—particularly Brazilian—context with a view to civil-military relations and military threat and mission definition. These progressively-oriented concepts—namely human security and the securitisation or “Copenhagen” approach—perhaps ironically present a high degree of conceptual overlap with the predominantly conservative Cold War-era National Security Doctrines held by the region’s military establishments. This would logically presage a high level of adaptability of these concepts and a high degree of promise for them in shoring up civilian supremacy without taking a threatening stance towards established military prerogatives. Rather these approaches, almost as a by-product of how each conceptualises security (and security policy) place the civil-military relationship on a novel footing that may indeed fundamentally shift the indicators of the quality of CMR.

The study will first lay out the intellectual history and conceptual definition of human security in its various iterations. A short presentation on the securitisation process, as envisioned by the speech-act approach developed at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, follows, which serves to illuminate the mechanisms by which political issues are framed in security terms and are eventually reflected in national policies. A discussion of the specificities of the Brazilian and Latin American security ambits follows which pays particular attention to the US-inspired Doctrines of National Security that pervade military thinking throughout the continent.

The study then examines threats to human security—as defined by the United Nations Development Programme in its groundbreaking 1994 report which brought the human security paradigm to the fore—in the Brazilian context. It next demonstrates how attempts to securitise these issues have failed before moving to its final analysis of the factors explaining the failure of this securitisation and the implications for civil-military
relations. The approach that underlies this investigation is situated at the confluence of several of the key issues facing states in the Latin American region today, particularly non-traditional security threats, civil-military relations, and the redefinition of the region’s relationship with the developed North in the post-Cold War era. The focus is on the ramifications of these approaches for the governance of armed forces in the region.

In short, the study focuses on the intersection between security concepts and CMR, and seeks to evaluate the potential of new security theory for placing CMR on a new footing that addresses the military identity crisis during the political transition to democratic control while abiding by *de facto* civilian supremacy. A focus on new indicators and new conceptualizations of security and military missions may allow a middle ground to found while leaving effective democratic control out of any doubt. The basic premise is that one of retaining fundamental categories while switching their logic from one of militarisation to one of demilitarization, while deployment remains similar. The example of environmental factors as a security threat is one example: while military deployment may remain very similar, the logic behind it is transformed from one of militarizing the environment to one of “greening the military”. This transformation is explained below, beginning with an introduction to the conceptualizations of security in question.

The human security paradigm

The human security paradigm holds promise as a means of integrating non-traditional military roles with firm civilian supremacy over the armed forces. It does so primarily by placing the states’ monopoly on physical violence at the service of an ideology that is directed against the state. Human security has its origins in a challenge to the state-centric realist conception of security that is so closely related to the abuse of power by the military. It seeks to answer the question: what if the state is the problem? How can individuals be protected from their own state? It thus has at its heart a philosophy very
similar to that which seeks to limit the ability of military establishments to impinge upon human rights and a democratic political order.

Though it has its conceptual roots in global humanism\(^1\), and less abstractly in the work of the Brandt\(^2\), Palme\(^3\) and Brundtland\(^4\) Commissions, human security was first cogently formulated by Mahbub ul-Haq in the chapter “New dimensions of human security” in the 1994 edition of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)’s Human Development Report\(^5\). Though this initial contribution has since been significantly honed and narrowed over the last decade, it remains the point of departure for any informed analysis of the concept.

The essence of the concept of human security is that it removes the focus of security concerns—both analytically and in the policy realm—from the state and places it on the individual human being. In doing so it weds the traditional existential preoccupations of the security realm with the quality-of-life focus hitherto more characteristic of the international development community. Paraphrasing from the report of the United States Secretary of State to his government on the San Francisco conference at which the UN Charter was signed, the UNDP’s definition establishes the two fundamental characteristics of human security: freedom for fear and freedom from want. The first clearly evinces a focus on traditional security concerns, while the second encompasses the development side of the human security equation. This dyad of freedoms remains to this day a fundamental

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marker of the paradigm’s basic notions.

The 1994 UNDP Report further elaborates seven basic categories of human security; these will assist in orienting the present analysis of the human security situation on the Latin American continent. The seven categories and their main thematic concerns are:

**Freedom from want:**

- **economic security**, which centres around the notion of an assured basic income;
- **food security**, whose definition is physical and economic access by all people to basic food;
- **health security**, which calls for access to basic health care services and clean drinking water for all;
- **environmental security**, requiring a healthy physical environment, most notably with regard to a clean water and air supply.

**Freedom from fear:**

- **personal security**, which indicates freedom from threats such as state-sanctioned torture, war, ethnic violence, crime and the abuse of women and children;
- **community security**, which, much like the notion of societal security developed by the Copenhagen School, revolves around the provision of security derived from belonging to social collectivities such as the extended family, ethnic or religious groups;
- **political security**, which is ensured by the provision of basic human rights.

The UNDP definition of security is intended only as a first step towards shifting the locus of security, and remains little more than an undifferentiated and unprioritised laundry

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6 ibid, pp. 24-33.
list. Its implementability is further problematised by a fundamental tension between one of its normative commitments and one of the prerequisites for its implementation. One of the foundational tenets of human security is that it is meant to alleviate a lacuna in the traditional state-centred notion of security: if security is provided to individuals by the state through their status as citizens, how does one account for situations in which the state is the problem, in which threats to people’s security emanate from the state itself?

Human security’s focus on the individual thus contains no small element of direction against the state. The state, however, remains the most powerful and effective actor for providing human security to individuals. This tension in the role of states as the major source of threats to human security while they remain its most effective guarantors constituted one of the first hurdles in the concept’s intellectual development.

Of the several states that chose to take up the mantle of operationalising the concept, Canada, under the leadership of then-Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, can be said to have had the most success in moving the notion forward from ul-Haq’s broad categories to an analytically and practically cohesive foreign policy agenda for a state.

While Japan, the other major actor with a human security agenda, has adopted a broad definition that focusses largely on development-oriented “freedom from want” issues, Canada has clearly chosen to focus its attention on the aspects of “freedom from fear”. The emphasis of Canadian efforts has from the beginning been to render the concept implementable by state policy, and providing “freedom from fear” has been the crux of those efforts, in keeping with Canada’s well-established vocation in the field of peacekeeping. The first human security document published by the then-Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, entitled “Safety for people in a changing world; established Canada’s focus within the broader human security conception as a preoccupation with violent conflict as it affects quality-of-life and development issues.

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“Freedom from fear” is, in fact, the title of Foreign Affairs Canada’s defining human security document\(^8\) in which Ottawa’s diplomats outline five priorities for the country’s human security initiatives: the protection of civilians, peace support operations, conflict prevention, governance and accountability, and public safety. One of the most salient Canadian initiatives within the human security ambit, and one whose impact on the perception of human security in Latin America should not be underestimated, is the establishment of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).

The ICISS’ Report, entitled *The Responsibility to Protect*\(^9\), seeks to establish the eponymous concept, referred to in Canadian parlance as R2P, as a norm in the conduct of international affairs. The basic premise of the responsibility to protect is taken from a recharacterisation of the very foundations of the classic sovereigntist notion of politics: states have a responsibility to protect their citizens. R2P claims that when states fail to fulfil this element of the contractual obligation that is sovereignty, they lose their right to reap its benefits, notably the right to non-intervention by foreign powers in their internal affairs and the inviolability of their national territory.

The ICISS terms this the “right to humanitarian intervention”, also defined as “external military intervention for human protection purposes”\(^10\). In the words of the ICISS,

State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with state itself. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.\(^11\)

The ICISS grounds this claim primarily in the obligations inherent in sovereignty itself, and in the obligations of the United Nations Security Council under the provisions of

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\(^10\) ibid., p. vii.

\(^11\) ibid., p. xi.
Article 24 of the Organization’s Charter\textsuperscript{12}. The responsibility to protect consists of three subsets of responsibility:

- The responsibility to prevent: to address both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting populations at risk.
- The responsibility to react: to respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention.
- The responsibility to rebuild: to provide, particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert.\textsuperscript{13}

The R2P approach represents an inversion of the view of sovereignty as exclusive control of national territory that holds sway in the military establishments, and often among the political elites, of Latin America. The Latin America sovereigntist notion is closely tied to the continental security context—one which clearly has specificities which bear out arguments both for and against the application of the human security and “responsibility to protect” paradigms in the region.

In terms of its repercussions for civil-military relations, there are two major foreseeable effects of the adoption of a human security perspective by a government in transition to democracy. First, the concept places emphasis not only on the relationship of the military establishment to the organs of state, but additionally, even primarily, on their relationship with and responsibility towards the individual citizen. Their action comes to be judged not on the basis of their functional or legal role within the state order, but in terms of their adherence to a set of values and principles to which they are bound by their own doctrine, regardless of the potential for their involvement in the country’s political situation.

Secondly, human security, with its non-traditional focus, is bound eventually to involve armed forces in secondary missions, including those within their country’s borders. It does so, however, in accordance with a logic that is the reverse of that underlying armies’ justifying internal intervention today. The potential of the human security paradigm lies in

\textsuperscript{12} ibid., p. xi.
\textsuperscript{13} ibid., p. xi.
the fact that it provides a platform that facilitates militaries’ mission definition during the identity crises that ensue from transitions to democracy and changes to the mechanisms of control of the military. Put succinctly, it legitimises internal missions, but in accordance with a set of values that moves firmly away from military ambitions for political power, placing a premium on assistance to the citizen.

Securitisation

The authors of what has become known as the “Copenhagen School”—most notably Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver—developed an approach to the study of security issues based on the notion of the speech act. In this approach, security is defined and measured not in terms of objectively acknowledged threats, but as a semantic field in which actors seek to label a given problem with the term security for political purposes. Securitisation, as such a move is called, is a heightened form of politicisation which places an issue so labelled at the top of the political agenda. This priority is justified by the fact that the term security refers explicitly to the presence of an existential threat to a given human collectivity¹⁴ on whose behalf these actors purport to speak.

The units of the “new framework for analysis” proposed by Buzan, Wæver and Jaap de Wilde are securitising actors, referent objects, and functional actors¹⁵. Of primary importance to our analysis are referent objects and securitising actors. The referent object of a posited security threat consists of a collectivity that is “seen to be existentially threatened and that [has] a legitimate claim to survival”.¹⁶ The nature of that collectivity, and of the “social glue”¹⁷ that holds it together, is the core of the role of securitising actors.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 37.
¹⁶ Ibid., p. 36.
These actors are empowered—in accordance with the rules that constitute the collectivity as such—to declare a given issue a “security” issue. To securitise an issue is to engage in a speech act by which an issue is moved “beyond the established rules of the game” and framed “either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. ... What is essential is the designation of an existential threat requiring emergency action or special measures and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience”\textsuperscript{18}.

In the case of states such as Brazil, this means “authorised representatives” of the state, in accordance with the norms and rules underpinning its existence as a state. In democratic states enjoying the rule of law, securitising actors are effectively designated in the Constitution and other bylaws establishing competence in the security policy domain. Thus, in societies in transition to democracy, as many in Latin America currently are, who is able to attain securitising actor status is often in itself a highly effective measure of the state of the civil-military relationship.

In these contexts securitising actors emerge who do not fit the model of democratic control that is prevalent in the West, such as retired military officers and representatives of officers’ clubs and the military educational system. The differences in political values, institutional and parochial motivations, and in understanding of the nature of civil-military relations between these actors and the classic state securitising actors are posited here as one important determinant of the diffusion of human security and securitisation into public consciousness and government policy in Latin American societies in transition.

The Copenhagen approach is predicated upon the consideration of five distinct thematic fields, labelled sectors, each with its own central focus, in which securitisation takes place. This sectorialisation has been one of the most influential means of broadening

\textsuperscript{18} Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, \textit{New framework}, pp. 23, 27. The issue of audience remains underdeveloped in the securitisation approach. It is posited as a pivotal piece of the puzzle, in that a “significant audience” must buy into a securitisation attempt, but the matter of how this measured, and who constitutes the audience, is not addressed. Several authors have tried to flesh this point out, including inter alia Balzacq, Thierry. “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context”. \textit{European Journal of International Relations}. Vol. 11, No. 2 (2005); pp. 171-202.
the definition of the analytical concept of security beyond its narrow realist interpretation. Beyond the military sector, which echoes the foundations of the realist approach, the further fields are the economic, environmental, political and societal sectors.

In the military sector, with which this analysis of civil-military relations concerns itself, the guiding principle is limited to relations of military coercion. The resultant referent object is almost exclusively the state, and the securitising actors are government elites, again as specified by the rules and norms constituting the state as a collectivity. Securitisation theory does not specify whether these elites are civilian or military, however. It is the audience of state citizens themselves who set the criterion that identifies either civilian or military actors as securitisers. There is thus a dual measure of that status, reflected both in constitutional provisions in a state context, and in popular acceptance—or, more aptly, non-resistance—towards the conferral of such status. Where military claims to status as securitising actors often rest upon exclusive technical competence in military issues, civilians’ claim is based in constitutional imperatives related to civilian supremacy. The target audience for civil society representatives wishing to become securitising actors—represented in this case by local academic experts in the field of defence studies—is the mixed community of decision-makers with the authority to set policy directives. Of particular interest in the analysis of the Copenhagen sectors is the high degree of overlap between their structure and that of the Cold War-era national security doctrines that still form the basis of military thinking in many South American states as well as South Africa.

*The Latin American security context: external and internal factors*

In this analysis of the conditions of security in Latin America, the focus will be on Brazil, although a close analysis of that nation allows for more generally applicable statements to be made about the continental context as a whole. Major determinant factors

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19 On the military sector, see Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, *New framework*, pp. 49-70.
of attitudes towards international security in the region include the absence of major interstate conflict on the continent for over a century (and an attendant shift in security preoccupations to internal issues), the continent’s perceived lack of geostrategic importance (particularly during the Cold War) and finally the legacy of involvement in the region by the United States.

The last interstate conflict involving South America’s major powers was the War of the Triple Alliance between 1865 and 1870. Since then, the region has seen at worst minor interstate conflicts (such as the 1941 and 1985 border skirmishes between Peru and Ecuador), and limited involvement in the two World Wars. Due in part to a tradition of armed forces’ involvement in internal affairs both during and after the colonial period and

owing to the difficulties of territorial acquisition, Latin Americans transformed geopolitical strategy from conquest of physical space to that of political space, while still preserving the organic concept of the state.20

The lack of external military threat and preoccupation with internal matters such as crime, drug trafficking, internal revolution and infrastructural development has led to a “conceptual morass” surrounding the use of the term “security” in Latin America21; there is considerable confusion regarding the distinction between traditional defence against external military threat and internal security matters such as policing and use of the armed forces within state borders. This comes in part as a result of the adoption during the Cold War by many of the region’s military establishments of national security doctrines inspired and taught by the armed forces of the United States.

Geared as this body of doctrine was towards combating the Marxist ideological enemy, some of its elements contributed to blurring the distinction between internal and external security and condoned, if not encouraged, armed forces’ involvement in politics and governance. Though the various strains of national security doctrine elaborated by

Latin American military establishments differ considerably in their sources (some supplemented American counterinsurgency tactics with the writings of German and French military thinkers as well as local traditions), there are important commonalities among the doctrines found in the region. These include:

1. A conceptual framework linking national security, strategy, national objectives, and national policy;
2. A conflict hypothesis stressing internal security, specifically the threat of revolutionary insurgencies sponsored by the international communist movement, rather than conventional external threats;
3. A theory of revolutionary war defining the nature of the internal security threat and the appropriate military and policy responses to that threat;
4. A rationale justifying human rights violations (torture, disappearances) as necessary to eliminate the revolutionary threat;
5. The thesis of security and development, causally linking the internal security threat to socio-economic underdevelopment; and
6. The belief that direct military rule is justified when the policy failures of civilian governments endanger national security.\(^{22}\)

The most salient legacies of the American-inspired *Doutrina de Segurança Nacional* (DSN) in a general context are the conceptual confusion that permeates debates on security between external and internal threats and military missions, and the stigma placed on issues involving the armed forces—though curiously not the Brazilian Armed Forces themselves—by the human rights violations perpetrated under the cloak of the DSN during the military dictatorship. Further, due to the increased severity of internal security problems such as public safety and drug trafficking, military matters in Brazil are not at all a high priority in both civil society and policymaking discussions in Brazil.

So low a priority was defence that Brazil did not have a unified defence policy until 1996, when President Fernando Henrique Cardoso issued the National Defence Policy, or *Política de Defesa Nacional* (PDN). Similarly, the Armed Forces were able to carry over sufficient influence into the democratic civilian governmental structures established in 1985 that a civilian-led Ministry of Defence was not created until 1999.

In sum, in the Brazilian and by extension South American contexts, due to a lack of inter-state conflict for over a century and half, the area’s relative lack of perceived

geostrategic importance to the Cold War superpowers, and evidence within the region of the worldwide trend to conflicts shifting to within national borders, matters of national security are not a high priority. Coupled with a rise in internal violence and crime this has led to a conflation of internal and external security in the regional context. This confusion is exacerbated by the traditionally strong involvement of the region’s military establishments in political governance and their influential role in national economic development and the provision of crucial infrastructure, particularly in rural and sparsely-settled regions.

These latter armed forces roles find their justification in the doctrines taught in the various military educational systems in the region. In terms both of doctrine and schools, Brazil shows perhaps the highest degree of development in the region. The Brazilian doctrine, the American-inspired DSN, in some aspects shows a high degree of conceptual overlap with two approaches that would emerge only decades later: the human security paradigm, and the sector-based securitisation approach developed by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute.

In its most concise form, Brazilian military doctrine, in the shape of the DSN, can be summarised into the “binomial” of security and development. Our focus is on the security part of the equation. The fundamental structure of the DSN, as outlined in the *Fundamentos da Doutrina*, relies heavily on geopolitics and romantic concepts as evidenced by its basic structure: the doctrine’s basic concepts are National Objectives, National Power, National Policy, and National Strategy. The capitalisation reflects the usage within the

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DSN; the practice is widespread among those whose work is based on the DSN and other ESG output.

National Objectives are “the crystallisation of interests and aspirations which, in a particular phase of its evolution, the Nation seeks to satisfy”\(^{24}\). National Objectives in turn are divided into Permanent and Current National Objectives. The determinants of these national objectives include human, physical, institutional and external factors; among the human determinants is the reified notion of National Character. The Brazilian national character is described by the self-described guardians of the nation’s destiny as shaped by “individualism, adaptability, improvisation, a pacifist vocation, cordiality, emotionality and creativity”\(^{25}\). According to the doctrine, Brazil’s National Objectives are:

- Democracy
- National integration
- Integrity of the national heritage (patrimônio)
- Social peace
- Progress
- Sovereignty.\(^{26}\)

According to the *Fundamentos*, “power is the capacity to impose one’s will—here you have what can be said is its most simple expression”.\(^{27}\) “The power of groups”, the document continues, “however, is not born and does not remain acephalic—as spontaneously as it appears, it gives origin to authority, a principle of order that leads to the concentration, in one or a few wills, of the Power of the group.\(^{28}\) The Nation, in organising itself as a State, chooses a form of agglutinating and expressing its National Power—this is why the State is the Nation, politically organised”\(^{29}\). National Power is divided into four “expressions”, each with its own points of reference:

- The political expression, such as people, territory and political institutions;
- The economic expression, such as human resources, natural resources and economic institutions;
- The psycho-social expression, such as the human person, the environment and social institutions;

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\(^{25}\) Ibid, p. 35.
\(^{26}\) Ibid, pp. 39-45.
\(^{27}\) Ibid, p. 52.
\(^{28}\) Ibid, p. 52.
\(^{29}\) Ibid, p. 53.
The military expression, such as human resources, territory and military institutions.\textsuperscript{30}

This short quotation suffices to make evident how the lack of definition of these concepts—both in terms of distinguishing them clearly from one another (several of the expressions’ points of reference overlap) and the internal consistency of each—has contributed to Fitch’s abovementioned “conceptual morass”. A major problem is that the political expression is not subordinated conceptually to the military expression, which, as Domício Proença Júnior points out, betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of (or rejection of) the workings of democratic control on a theoretical level. Alongside the lack of clear definitions of concepts, the doctrine itself devotes little attention to the transformation of its guidelines into national policy, devoting only six of the fundamental document’s 344 pages to “National Policy”\textsuperscript{31}.

The division of National Power into four sectors, or “expressions”, shows clear parallels to the Copenhagen approach\textsuperscript{32}. In the case of the DSN, the “expressions” are laid out as follows—in what noted Brazilian security analyst Domício Proença Júnior has termed “little more than a glossary”\textsuperscript{33}—as taken from the various relevant chapters of the Fundamentos:

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid, pp. 62-63.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid, pp. 75-81.
\textsuperscript{33} Proenca, Visão, p. 4.
## Foundational principles of Brazilian national security doctrine

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| Economic   | Human Resources | Science and Technology | Agric. Sector | Ind. of Potential |
|           | Natural Resources | Capital Accumulation | Indus. Sector | Ind. of Situation (conjuntura) |
|           | Econ. Institutions | Productive Capacity | Service Sector | Ind. of Trends |
|           |                   | Cap. for Inst. Change |               | Ind. of Security |

| Psycho-social | Human person | Demographics | Man | largely statistical indicators, adapted to each enunciated factor |
|               | Environment | Education/Culture | Society |               |
|               | Social Institutions | Health, Nutr., Sanitation |                |               |
|               |             | Labour |                |               |
|               |             | Housing |                |               |
|               |             | Urbanization |                |               |
|               |             | Social Welfare |                |               |
|               |             | Science and Technology |                |               |
|               |             | Social Communication |                |               |
|               |             | Social Mobility |                |               |
|               |             | Social Integration |                |               |
|               |             | Indiv./Comm. Security |                |               |
|               |             | Religion/Ethics/Morals |                |               |
|               |             | National Character |                |               |
|               |             | National Morale |                |               |

| Military    | Human Resources | Military Doctrine | Army | Manpower |
|             | Territory       | Military Structure | Navy | Mobilisable Population |
|             | Military Insts. | Command Capacity | Air Force | Length of Mil. Service |
|             |             | Integration of FA |               | Types of Recruitment |
|             |             | Instr./Trng./Readiness |               | Matériel and Equipment |
|             |             | Military Morale |               | Military Structure |
|             |             | Mobilisation Capacity |                | Military Spending |
|             |             | Military Service |                | Military Morale |
|             |             | Psychosocial Factors |                | Levels of Instr./Trng./Readiness |
|             |             | Political Factors |                | Command Capacity |
|             |             | Economic Factors |                | Adaptation of Mil. Doctrine |
|             |             | Science and Technology |            | Level of Integr. of FA |
|             |             |                   |                | Support from Public Opinion |
|             |             |                   |                | Geopolitical Situation |
|             |             |                   |                | Mobilisation Capacity |
|             |             |                   |                | Economic Resources |
|             |             |                   |                | Level of Tech. Devt. |
|             |             |                   |                | Degree of Pol. Stability |
The purpose of the following sections will be to analyse the conceptual overlap between the *Doutrina de Segurança Nacional*, the human security paradigm, and an “objective” assessment of the security issues, both internal and external (or, both human and national) facing the country. Using the securitisation approach, the analysis will seek to explain where and why areas of potential strong overlap fail to find their way into official Brazilian policy documents. In doing so, this investigation by extension elucidates some of the factors governing the diffusion of the human security agenda into public policy in Latin America. The main emphasis in doing so is to enumerate the possibilities these approaches harbour in terms of their applicability to improving the democratic control of the armed forces in Latin America’s societies in transition.

**Commonalities: the DSN, securitisation and the human security agenda**

The Brazilian National Security Doctrine and the two progressive security paradigms outlined above, securitisation and human security, share important commonalities that indicate high compatibility and adaptability to the exigencies of Latin America’s weak states and civil-military relations. Yet their adoption into policy documents remains a different story, as the conceptual evolution of security concepts in the region remains far behind the theoretical advancements on which these progressive concepts are based; additionally, resistance runs high in military and other circles to these concepts imported from the North. Nevertheless, two elements in particular show a high degree of commonality and applicability to the South American context: these are, in the case of the Copenhagen approach, the sectorialisation of security and the role of elites in threat determination. With regard to securitisation and the actors empowered to engage in it, according both to the DSN and current practice, the role of Brazil’s top military academy, the Escola  

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34 This section will eventually contain a treatment of one very important element of conceptual overlap between the human security paradigm and the *Doutrina*: the issue of linkage between the logics of development and security. For reasons of the timing of field research it cannot be treated in full here and has been omitted.
Superior de Guerra, is to produce a normatively homogenous elite, both civilian and military, that would function as the country’s sole “accredited” securitising actors. Alexandre Barros, underscores the school’s function as a training centre for an elite chosen to implement the military’s project for the development of Brazil:

The military had developed inside their corporation a project which involved civilians and military [sic] in the continual building of the nation state. However, the civilian side of this group was incapable—as defined by the military—both in quality and in quantity, to perform many of the tasks the military felt that had to be performed, thus forcing the military to rationally their stay in power for at least some time, while the elite which the military were training achieved the required degree of “maturity”, again as defined by the military.35

The recently retired Brazilian civil-military relations expert Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira has outlined the mechanism by which military elites choose or create civilian elites by positing the “egoism of the elites (for political direction [of the country]) and the unpreparedness of the masses”36. Oliveira goes on to illustrate how this logic appropriates for the military action on behalf of the “common good”37; this is another way of describing the role of securitising actors. The unpreparedness of the masses—as compared to the specialised expertise of ESG-trained elites for running the country—is embodied in the second marginalising tactic, which claims for the military a monopoly on competence in military issues. This logical link is made by a member of the ESG teaching corps, who in an article pervaded by language typical of the abidingly ubiquitous DSN states that the role of ESG is to fill a “lacuna” in competence within the country with regard to matters of security and defence 38.

One retired general provided clear example of this marginalising tactic in admonishing that “the academics in civil society need to develop the capacity to bring their debate up to the higher level of that within the military; they will gladly have the barracks

35 Barros, p. 169.
37 ibid., p. 45.
doors opened to them once they are competent” 39. This rather disingenuous argument—for, as will be shown below, civilian expertise is highly dependent on military cooperation—leads to claims that civilian universities are less legitimate sources of scholarship and that “strategic problems lend themselves better to being dealt with by institutions with greater access to the necessary information” 40.

This selection criterion for those who speak in the name of Brazil on security matters is entirely in line with the Copenhagen approach. The COPRI authors designate several possible securitising actors, including political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists and pressure groups. These actors vary depending on what criteria are used by the audience that they are attempting to convince that a given issue is worthy of securitisation. In other words, the role of securitising actors is played by elites, although the approach deals both with the status of elites through which they gain access and with the internal requirements for the commonality of viewpoint needed to mobilise their potential influence: “[s]ecurity is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites” 41.

Wæver points out that in order for attempts by elites to mobilise for or against the securitisation of an issue, a shared world view must be sustained within at least an inner circle of the most powerful such actors 42. It is important to note that if the target audience—often the referent object itself—is not convinced, either because of actors’ lack of credentials as a securitising actor or because it is patently problematic or not useful to label an issue a security issue, securitisation attempts can and frequently do fail. The second element of considerable overlap between sectorialised security and the DSN is the very issue itself of dividing security into sectors.

42 Ibid., p. 60.
As noted above, this is not far removed from the Copenhagen conception with its military, political, economic sectors joined by environmental and societal (or identity) components\(^4\). The definitions of the military, political and economic sectors are quite similar, and elements of the DSN psycho-social expression are to be found in the Copenhagen focus on identity in the societal sector. It would appear that as of August 2005, ESG scholars are working to add to the DSN conception an element of environmental security as well. Many of the threats allocated to the non-military sectors in both of these approaches form a part of the human security agenda as well; the next section will illustrate the threats to human security faced by Brazil.

*Human security in Brazil: failed securitisations*

Four issues in particular make up the human security threats faced by the Brazilian nation, and dealt with in some form or another by its government. These are food security, environmental concerns, particularly inasmuch as they overlap with a traditionally strong military presence in the Amazonian region; drug trafficking; and public security, especially the problem of high crime rates in urban centres.

Long ignored by public policy in Brazil, particularly that dealing with the security realm, food security—the provision of basic nourishment to the population—has under President Luís Inácio “Lula” da Silva become one of the government’s foremost priorities and one of its most prominent policy programmes. It handles this quintessential human security problem in a way diametrically opposed to the human security logic, however: the governments has billed it as a public policy which aims to eradicate hunger and social exclusion. It is a policy because it expresses the Federal Government’s decision to frame the problem of hunger as a national question and not as an individual fatality. When President Lula said that his life’s mission would be accomplished if at the end of this term every Brazilian would have access to three daily meals, he was not making a promise but making a challenge and establishing the guidelines of a daring national project. It is for this reason that since its inception, Zero Hunger became a civic mobilisation, in which

\(^4\) On the Copenhagen sectors, see Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, pp. 25-49.
society is linked to the state, which in its turn allocates human and financial resources with the goal of extending the rights of citizenship to millions of excluded Brazilians.\textsuperscript{44}

The Zero Hunger project has been kept clearly separate from state policies intended to deal with issues traditionally identified with Brazil’s national security. It has in fact contributed to making military issues even less of a priority than usual under the Lula government. The primacy of the state in dealing with what would potentially be a characteristic human security issue is in the Brazilian case partially a product of the country’s strong positivist traditions, instilled in the military ambit by the French \textit{mission militaire} despatched to the country in the aftermath of the First World War, and in the political ambit by the influence of such intellectual figures as Benjamin Constant.

Many components of the military establishment continue to resist internal non-military missions such as might be involved in an eventual participation in the Zero Hunger programme, despite the ongoing identity crisis and search for new missions capable of justifying the retention of the numerous prerogatives carried over into the democratic era from the period of military rule\textsuperscript{45}. In an analysis of the Chilean case that is equally relevant in the Brazilian context, one analyst attributes resistance to such missions to the prevalence of role beliefs within the military that see the armed forces as war-fighting corporations, not as providers of non-military improvements to the quality of life of citizens within the country’s borders\textsuperscript{46}.

The Brazilian military continues to profit politically from its historically-based strong presence in the Amazon region. It is in this region that two of the main human security threats Brazilian take on their most urgent manifestation: drug trafficking and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{44} \url{http://www.fomezero.gov.br/ContentPage.aspx?filename=pfz_9100.xml}.
\item \textsuperscript{45} On the military identity crisis and the search for new missions, see Fuccille, Luís Alexandre. \textit{As forças armadas e a temática interna no Brasil contemporâneo: uma análise da construção de missões de ordem e segurança internas no período pós-guerra fria}. M.A. thesis, Universidade Federal de São Carlos, 1999. Though João R. Martins Filho and Daniel Zirker argue that by the time of the creation of the MD, the identity crisis had been largely overcome, they do highlight succinctly the sources of military preoccupation with a loss of status and redefinition of their mission. See Martins Filho, João R. and Daniel Zirker, “The Brazilian Military Under Cardoso: Overcoming the Identity Crisis”. \textit{Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs}. Vol. 42, No. 3 (2000); pp. 143-170.
\end{itemize}
environmental degradation. Both of these issues have been more successfully securitised, and have found their way into official defence policy documents. In addition to the 1996 *Política de Defesa Nacional*, which represents the first co-ordinated attempt at a national defence policy, both of these concerns are mentioned in the matrix of defence issues established in a document entitled *Modernização do Sistema de Defesa Nacional* which is the product of consultations in 2000 between the Ministry of Defence and a largely civilian Experts’ Commission (*Comissão de Notáveis*) it convened in 2000.

The presence of these issues in this document reflects the increasing potential for significant improvement in the state of civil-military relations in Brazil, as their inclusion can be traced to the contributions of civilian members of the Commission. In the vocabulary of the Copenhagen approach, civilian actors were able to successfully securitise these issues and to share in influencing security policy outcomes. Whether this means that the heavily state-based conception in effect within the military establishment and the Ministry of Defence will be opened to the logic of human security is too early to tell, but their inclusion is certainly a positive sign in terms of the diffusion of the human security paradigm in the Brazilian context.\(^{47}\)

**Conclusion: paradigm diffusion and CMR: a two-way street**

The issue of the securitisation of human security threats in the Brazilian context is intimately linked to the state of civil-military relations within the country; the same is true of Brazil’s regional neighbours; Keizer’s analysis of the Chilean situation is particularly innovative in this respect. The relationship is a two-way street: the degree of civilian control delimits the extent to which progressive paradigms such as human security can be

included by civil society actors in the security policy debate \cite{Kenkel2005}, and the diffusion of the human security agenda in turn serves to strengthen the primacy of the civilian side of this important relationship by resituating traditional secondary (internal) roles on a footing that does not jeopardise civilian oversight.

The reasons for the failure of certain Brazilian and Latin American security issues to be securitised in human security terms are at least three in number. The first is the primacy of the state as the prime actor in international and domestic politics in the conceptions held by many policymakers in the region, both civilian and in uniform. This primacy of the state, coupled with the historical role of the armed forces, leads to a tension—present in the immediate post-apartheid South African context as well—of human security and securitisation being used, due to their overlap with national security doctrines—for opposite purposes by civilian and military policymakers.

This can be best summed up using the example of the security-development linkage inherent in human security. Civilian human security advocates see in human security the possibility of demilitarising the security ambit, and bringing development missions to the core of the state monopoly on violence. Military policymakers, on the other hand, see in the paradigm the opportunity to militarise the development component and to bring the ethic of military establishment to an ever-increasing number of policy fields, thus justifying the retention of budgetary and political prerogatives.

This is closely connected to the second hurdle to human security, which stems from the fact that the roles fulfilled by armed forces in a human security context require a significantly different skill set from that possessed by most Latin American militaries. Humanitarian intervention as foreseen by the human security paradigm is best carried out by the small, mobile, well-equipped armies of developed states; the Brazilian Army, on the

\footnote{On this point, see Kai Michael Kenkel, *Whispering to the Prince: Academic experts and national security policy formulation in Brazil, South Africa and Canada*, (Ph.D. thesis, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, 2005), 75-135. The chapter on Brazil also discusses the military educational system, its doctrine and the development of the academic discipline of security studies in Brazil.}
other hand, is ill-equipped for power projection and lightweight mobility; successes in its high-profile leadership of the United Nations peace operation in Haiti have come at the expense of the battle-readiness of units on the home front. In addition, as Keizer points out, secondary missions present a challenge to role beliefs of soldiers in Latin America, whose allegiance is often not to the political process but to an abstract idea of the nation, and who see their vocation as waging traditional war against an external military enemy⁴⁹.

The third hurdle to the diffusion of human security in the region is strong resistance to the interventionist logic that underpins the “responsibility to protect”. Several key Brazilian policymakers have indicated to the author that the common belief in the region is that its extended period of peace has come as a result of the respect for the norms of non-intervention and territorial inviolability. Coupled with this is a resistance to many ideas viewed as more advantageous to the North than to Latin Americans themselves⁵⁰. This is summed up succinctly in the idea that, in dealing with the issue of humanitarian intervention at the regional level, where Canadian human security promoters might see Brazil as a regional hegemon intervening in smaller states in the name of human security, historically Brazilians when they think of intervention see themselves as the target of intervention from the hemispheric hegemon, the United States. This association presents a strong barrier to human security’s taking hold in the region.

While there are key elements of overlap between the conceptualisations of security embodied in the National Security Doctrines and the human security paradigm, their underlying logics are in many ways diametrically opposed, and essentially the situation is one where ironically, very similar lines of argumentation are being used to make contrary claims. Because of the fragile situation regarding civil-military relations in many states in the region, and the effects of the extent of civilian control on security policy outcomes such as

⁵⁰ Keizer, p. 7.
might one day reflect a human security logic, advocates of human security in South America must go about exposing the region to progressive, non-state-based visions of security very skilfully. Rather than to present salient national issues as human security threats, the process must begin with changing the very discourse of security—and its dominance by the military. Positive changes to CMR may occur as a result of changing what it is the armed forces are intended to implement, as opposed to the reverse, which has until now often been the case.