PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SPOILT: OVER-POLITICIZATION AND PATRONAGE THREATENING THE PROFESSIONAL POLICY MAKING (HUNGARIAN CASE)

“Is Democracy Working?” 20th World Congress of the International Political Science Association Fukuoka, Japan, 9.-13.7. 2006

Laszlo Vass, PhD. Prof.
Institute of Social Sciences, Budapest College of Communication
E-mail: lvass@bkf.hu WEB: www.bkf.hu

Abstract

After the system-change, the Central and Eastern European countries expected a rapid democratic constitutional-institutional development toward a parliamentary government based on the rule of law. The legal and institutional transition seems to be more than less successful, but the development of a new democratic political culture is lagging behind the institutional development process.

In the Hungarian experiences, an important field of the success in the transition has been the quickly adapting public administration system, including the subsystems of the local governments, the civil service and the government administration. Hungary was champion in CEE in passing the new legal acts on the Local Governments and also on the Civil Service in 1991-1992. A comprehensive public administration reform strategy was elaborated in 1996, gave a strong, professionally high quality basis for the next period of the political-administrative development.

An unexpectedly deepening tendency of the over-politicization has been escalating during the last decade and it is already seriously threatening the professionalism and the quality of the policy making in the government administrative apparatus. Two aspects of the phenomenon should be analyzed: mechanisms and results of the politicization of the recruitment of civil servants and the consequences of the “mediatization” of the governance. The system of political-personal patronage involved a definite decay in the professionalism of civil service, changing the motivations of the civil servants. The mediatization of the governance restructured the job-requirements in the government administration: large number young, communication campaign experts entered to the public administration with lack of knowledge in public policy.

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Introduction

The systemic change in the Hungarian public service involved – first of all - the establishment of clear divisions between the political leadership and the professional public administration. The amended Constitution after the Spring of 1990 separates the limited term political leadership from the permanent administrative leadership. The practical consequence of this mandate has been the appointment of a political state secretary as the political deputy to the minister for the term of the government, and the appointment of an administrative state secretary as a professional deputy to the minister and the head of the ministry's apparatus. The procedure of the appointment of the secretaries is same to the minister's one. The Prime Minister makes the proposal to the President of the Republic. The criteria are basically different at the case of the political and the administrative appointments. Political state secretaries are appointed by the coalition agreement upon the distribution of the “cake of the power”. The position of administrative state secretaries is the issue of expertise and trust. Obviously, the meaning of the trust is very complicated. How much political loyalty is included in this term? What is the difference between the political and personal elements of the loyalty? The basis of the trust is usually the expectation, that the apparatus does not transfer the personal documentation of a minister to his or her successor. (Gaits: 1993) Until now, some Hungarian politician ministers have been irresistibly curious to know the documents of their predecessors. There have also been some bureaucrats played political games or make political carrier on such ministerial expectations.

The two types of state secretary positions have also raised some practical questions. While this division may appear functional and follows similar Western models, the implementation is controversial. First, ministers may appoint administrative secretaries who do not have to be career civil servants. There is little doubt that administrative secretaries are political appointees, with party-political considerations playing an important role in selection. As civil servants, administrative secretaries cannot normally be removed from the service under the law, however the minister can at any time remove them from their positions without having to give reasons for such a decision. The employment is permanent, but the position of administrative secretary is not. The political nature of their employment and the fact that they rely on the minister's goodwill obviously greatly limits the capacity of administrative state secretaries to represent neutral professionalism against political interventions. It limits the role of the Law as a barrier to political interference with the departmental civil service. It also means that continuity is not guaranteed. The lack of standard regulations governing the division of labor between political and administrative secretaries also may result in the administrative position becoming politicized.1

The Law No. XXIII, 1992 on The Legal Position of Civil Servants concerns the administrative staff of the central and sub-central administrative organs, but excludes some categories of public servants for which special regulations have been adopted. (These are the Prime Minister, Ministers and political state secretaries, the armed forces, frontier-guards, the police, the secret services, the Republican Guard, the fire service, customs and finance guards, penal authorities, civil defense and armed security guards.) The Law distinguishes different groups of civil servants according to their tasks: public servants, who have managerial and decision-making positions; officials who have implementing functions; physical employees,

who have technical, supplying functions. The Law defines the educational entry requirements, duties, rights and privileges for each category of public servants.

There are two major defects in the current category system. First, it implies an automatic promotion process. This is not in accordance with performance-oriented assessment procedures. Second, and even more concerning, is the fact that emphasis on the length of service makes it difficult to reward outstanding performance through a more rapid promotion. The idea of regular performance assessment, as adopted by the Law, is incompatible with a promotion system that is based on the criterion of length of service. An additional important problem stems from a lack of effective guarantees for the main aims of the regulations, namely the management of public matters ‘by impartial public servants, neutral from any parties’. While the Law protects the public servants against arbitrary dismissal and also creates solid obstacles against the promotion of staff on the basis of political criteria, there are not strong barriers against the direct interference of ministers in the public service. The fact that ministers can, at will, remove administrative state secretaries remains very controversial. Ministers can also remove heads of departments from their positions without explanation. (In this way the subordinate may avoid unfair argumentation from the master.) In these regards the Law cannot eradicate Hungary’s servile bureaucratic culture and does not facilitate the introduction of the modern system of performance assessment with regards to personnel policy.

Despite of the unified legal regulation of the positions of civil servants, sociologically there is no "Civil Service" as a well-organized, separated institution. Civil servants are the employees of the government organizations, their employers are the ministers. In fact, the Ministry of Interior is administering their personal records, it is rather statistical than essential element of the system. If we want to create a model for the better understanding of the problems of Hungarian civil service, we have to distinguish between three groups: politicians, most senior civil servants, and the rest of civil servants. This is a social triangle, and each side of the triangle may be interpreted.

**Civil servants - administrative leaders**

The politicization of the top civil service positions is still a strong trend. Because of the government change, the "state leader" category was changed by four years or more frequently. We have seen earlier, that the administrative leaders are defenseless against the dismissal, consequently the subordinates do not have stable masters, which would be very important for the stability in a bureaucratic organization. It means that the civil servants regularly loose not only their masters, but their advocates as well. The administrative leaders cannot build the organization by a long-term strategy. They cannot implement a well-founded human resource management practice, because they cannot give real guarantee to their subordinates for a stable promotion policy. The relation between the civil servants and the administrative leaders is still representing the most critical element of the work of the public administration. This relation is the most fragile, because there is a role confusion of the administrative leaders. By principle, their role is a professional-administrative one, they have permanent appointment and they concert the preparation of the policy decisions. In the practice, their position is not safe, political loyalty is first of all requirement and the borderlines of responsibilities of the

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politicians and bureaucrats in the policy process is not clear. Some senior civil servants have chosen to join a political "camp" and took the risk of dismissal at government change. Others are defending their professional mission and try to be politically neutral. A typical third way behavior is balancing between the loyalty and the passive resistance. The consequences of this confusion are very demoralizing in the public administration.

**Politicians - civil servants**

General attitudes of the politicians towards the bureaucrats are a mixture of distrust and contempt. There are two components behind this distrust: (1) politician are supposing that most of the civil servants had served under the communist time and were loyal to the old regime, (2) politicians are also assuming that bureaucrats cheat them, because the bureaucrats are better informed on policies. Civil servants are disdained same time, because they are counter selected, underpaid, servile and defenceless. The civil servants have also a mixed feeling of fear and disdain towards politicians. The reason the fear is coming from their defencelessness. They disdain the politicians because of lack of their professional competence and exaggerated self-confident. This reciprocally negative attitude does not prevent them forming occasional coalitions in order to block reforms for a more transparent and accountable public administration. Most of the civil servants try to maintain and defend their professional integrity. They are fighting against the political influences, but being disciplined and loyal, they never alarm the public when they are experiencing initiatives of politicians are threatening the democratic rules of the game. Traditionally, civil servants as "servants of the state" have been treating the citizens on very authoritarian way. The experiences of the citizens show that bureaucrats do not serve, but control the people. This culture is changing just very slowly. Younger generations of civil servants already have different attitudes. They are more professional and more service oriented. But they are also more demanding in terms of payment and treatment. The old masters in public administration have serious conflicts with these younger generations because of lack of professional management knowledge and capabilities. The high standard of language knowledge and computer skills of younger civil servants is an important factor, which is demanding and provoking the modernization of the public administration from inside.

Finally, it is worth to mention the aspect of the relation between the civil servants and the public. How can the civil servants get any help from the public if their professional autonomy is threatened by the politicians?

The traditional ethos of the Hungarian civil service has an important element - it was mentioned earlier, - the commitment towards professionalism. The professional organizations and trade unions of civil servants are strong advocates of this value. But they also help to maintain the myth of a very special characteristic of the administrative job and the state service, which is too complicated for the public to understand. If the political interventions are threatening the autonomy of the public administration, professional and labor interest organizations immediately blow the whistle. But they may not reckon with public solidarity, because of the myth about their specialty. People think that the struggle of the civil servants for their professional autonomy is a struggle for keeping their special, privileged position. Until bureaucrats do not change their attitudes concerning their social function and position and do not establish clear transparency and accountability in public administration, they cannot gain public support for their struggle against the political defencelessness. The professional organizations have also responsibility in entering the issue to the public discourse.
Political Experiences of Coalition Governments

The reality of the party-system determines whether the one-party or coalition government, minority or majority governance does emerge in a country. In Hungary, majority and coalition governments have been formed during the last Decade. The general political characteristics of the Hungarian political system from the aspects of the coalition government (Körösényi, 1998.) are the follows:

In the last ten years the ability of coalition-making became the starting condition for forming government. The political left-right dimension is dominating in the coalition-making over the rule of the minimal coalition requirement.

Political parties are the key players in politics; therefore the technical or depoliticized understanding of coalition government is misleading. In fact, there has not been any political party in Hungary in last ten year, which was seriously considered a minority government or even a minimal government. The winners in elections have aimed immediately at forming coalition for an effective majority in Parliament. There is a general agreement that minority government has no chance in Hungary. One important reason is the permanent opportunity for opposition parties to make coalitions and to gain a majority against the government. Minority government needs support from an opposition group in the Parliament in order to legislate; therefore the supporting party might claim such a higher price for support than would be possible inside a coalition. The other reason is the pressure of the so-called “two-third majority” requirement for legislation on the most important topics listed in the Constitution.

The real political limits for the government and the Prime Minister are established first by their own party, or by the coalition partner, not by the opposition. The relations between the government and the opposition are regulated in the Parliamentary House Rules, but the operation of the coalition is not regulated by any legal staff, while the consequences of tensions and conflicts in the coalition usually have impacts on the work of the government. One important political finding is that in one-party governments the power is concentrated in the hands of the Prime Minister, but in a coalition the power is more dispersed among the partners. It is not necessarily true that coalitions inherently weaken the political efficiency of the government. A one-party government may have troubles because of the competition among the leading politicians or factions in the government party.

Some authors (Sándor-Vass, 2000.) state that coalition reconciliation, the complicated organizational and personal relations within the coalition, the slower decision-making threatens the effectiveness of the governance. It is true that one-party governments appear to be more unified and have fewer obstacles to retard their actions. A coalition government requires more considerations, compromises and mixed program, but it does not necessarily mean lower political effectiveness and acceptance in the society. On the contrary, the coalition makes possible greater flexibility in following the changes in the support of the parties between the elections, and also the coalition may force corrections in government policies in the face of internal conflicts. The last ten years experiences demonstrate that the convergence in coalition government has dominated over the partisan debates. The partners have strongly preferred to keep the coalition working instead of dividing and risking the loss of the government power.
Coalition Making

The basis of a coalition is an agreement about the common responsibilities in the governance of society. This development is not only a single act but rather is a wish for more permanent collaboration. In order to maintain the collaboration, the partners should establish a disciplined mechanism for the decision-making and the conflict resolution among themselves. Principally, the concept of the coalition government may be one of the following two:

“Common governance” – is based on the common decision-making process. The institutional realization may be the establishing so called mixed ministries (1990-1994), or a special policy reconciliation mechanism for the coalition partners (1994-1998). “Mixed ministry” means that the political leaders (minister and political deputies) of a ministry are coming from different coalition parties. If the ministries have leaders from same party, the government may have Deputy Prime Minister(s) from the coalition partner(s). The Hungarian Constitution does not allow this solution because of the strong Prime Ministerial governance. One other option may be creating formally a “small cabinet” within the government, including the representatives of the coalition partners, with the task of reconciliation before the final government decisions. A (constitutionally) more dangerous option is the establishment of a coalition reconciliation mechanism outside of the formal government. Such political institution easily involves a duplicated structure in the government decision-making process and may weaken the democratic control over the governance.

In the frameworks of the current Hungarian Constitution, there would be possible another special solution for the common governance. The SZDSZ raised this idea, but the MSZP finally resisted accepting it: the junior coalition partner gets the position of minister of finance. This might be a right of veto, because every government decision has financial consequences requiring the agreement of the minister of finance.

“Joint governance” – is based on the distribution of power. This type of the coalition is based on a minimal community of the partners. The governments’ party factions vote together for the budget and the tax-laws, otherwise they follow their own principles in controlling their policy fields.

The experiences of the socialist-liberal government suggest that the joint governance involved serious conflicts. The Orbán-government drew lessons from that experience and established not only the distribution, but also certain a separation of the positions. The senior coalition partner limited the competence of the junior partner onto its portfolios. The partners respect each others competencies, “they do not disturb the others circles”.

One ministry is controlled by only one single party in this coalition model. The distribution and the separation of the policy fields among the partners make the control difficult for the Prime Minister over the portfolios belonging to the coalition partner. Critical question is the policy coordination and the coherence of the governance, despite the junior partner has no chance to revise the decisions of the Prime Minister – who is representing the senior party.

The Fidesz-FKGP-MDF coalition is representing a very special way of operation. The head of government is the Prime Minister, but it seems to be two governments same time. The senior party is controlling the larger part of the responsibilities; the junior party does the smaller one. They do not interfere the others business. This practice is definitely limiting the power of the Prime Minister. This limit has not been set by the Constitution and it is real danger that the rule of law has also been weakened.
Obviously, the political rationality is behind the acceptance of this model. The consequences may be opposite of the professional rationality. In January 2000 the minister of the Prime Ministers’ Office wanted to reorganize the system of coordination among the ministries in order to improve the quality of the government decision-making. The president of the coalition partner party efficiently blocked this project, because he did not want to allow the partner to inspect the work in his ministry. It was revealed, that the relation between the coalition partners has fundamentally political nature, and the professional points of view were pushed into the background.

**Coalition Bargain**

The crucial element at stake in the coalition bargain is the distribution of the government positions among the partners. The numerical balance is an important, but not exclusive objective. (Numerical balance suggests that the proportion of the government positions reflects the proportion of the Parliamentary mandates.) The parties may prefer certain portfolios because of special reasons. In 1994, the Socialist Party offered the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Justice to the Free Democrats instead of Ministry of Interior. (Körösényi, 1995)

The tactics of the senior coalition party in the bargain has usually had the next main points:

- Not offering those positions to the partner, which are vital for the efficient control over the main resources of power;
- Offering the most confliction policy fields to the partner;
- Offering a ministry which is heavily dependent upon the state budget to a partner;
- Offering also a ministry that is very much desired by the partner.

During the political development after the system change and before 2006, the coalition bargains did not concern the administrative state secretary positions. The politicians formally respected this civil service status. In practice, however, ministers have considered this position as very confidential and they have never hesitated to change the administrative state secretaries like political appointees. Until 2006, the minister, the administrative and the political state secretary positions were principally handled equally as political positions. Unfortunately, the politically motivated appointments did not stop at this level. The deputy state secretaries and even the department heads had to learn that their positions are no longer protected. (Vass,1998)

The media and the citizens did not value the importance of the political state secretary positions. The parties cannot make others understand the deal if they get 5 political state secretary positions instead of 1 ministerial position. Nevertheless, in the first round of the coalition bargain, the share of ministerial and political state secretary positions was agreed. In the second round, the coalition parties agreed on the political appointments controlled by the government: ambassadors, heads of central offices (privatization-, tax-, media-related). In the third round, the partners agreed on the lower level appointments, which are definitely non-political issues by principle (deputy state secretaries, executive managers for state-owned companies, and heads of administrative offices). Experience shows that professional requirements were not ignored, but the loyalty also played central role. This level seemed to be the place for cultivating the clientele for the party.
The second and third round changes were not finished at time of the coalition agreement. On those levels changes were made step by step during the term of the government, but the coalition partners paid attention to maintaining the balance among parties. The partners might do the appointments on the basis of a careful, mutual agreement, or on the basis of the separated, individual responsibilities. The governments occasionally established ministerial positions without portfolio in order to compensate the less satisfied coalition partners.

**Coalition and Central Public Administration**

The history of the Hungarian coalition government made the actions of the ministries a center of attention. At the first government the mixed ministry (defined as minister and political state secretary is coming from different political parties) was generally preferred.

The Prime Minister handled every issue as common issue for the coalition. The members of the first government were not experienced politicians, and therefore the Prime Minister wanted to control them professionally and politically as well. This is why the Prime Minister appointed political state secretaries to the coalition partners’ ministries from his party.

The second government established mixed ministry only in special cases. The mixed ministry might become a victim of coalition competitions, and the relation between the minister and the political state secretary could directly influence the professional work of the apparatus. In sum, the mixed ministry has more disadvantages than advantages. The third government discarded the idea almost completely. As a side effect, the power of the Prime Minister in appointments has also been reduced at the case of the coalition partner’s ministries.

The last two Socialist-Liberal governments simply followed the practice of the previous coalition and essentially eliminated the mixed pattern. The politically univocal ministries gave much wider room for maneuvering with patronage in order to strengthening the positions of the governing coalition party within the given ministries.

Number of the non-mixed ministries of the 16 in the governments:

![Graph](image-url)

2006- Number of Ministries was reduced from 16 to 12.

**Coalition and Policy Process**

The coalition government has wider political background than a one-party government. If the coalition can employ this advantage, its effectiveness in governing may increase. Also the
professional interests and supporters of the coalition parties are different, what can be useful in making the policies on more sensitive way. The key question is that how the coalition partners can enrich the policy reconciliation process through mobilizing their special resources and their special support bases?

The first government played pioneer role in establishing a new policy-making process in the government system. The Prime Minister concentrated the policy preparation in the government center, and the Prime Minister’s Office compensated the weaknesses of the junior coalition partners in the policy making process. The policy decisions were made at the government meetings, where the Prime Minister controlled the coalition partner ministers. The administrative state secretaries played the most important professional role in the policy preparation, carried on in a unified and coherent process before the government meetings. The collegiality was very strong in the coalition and most of the conflicts could be solved on informal ways.

The senior party of the Conservative government has carefully studied the experiences of the previous governments and made some crucial changes in the policy-making mechanisms. The Prime Minister’s Office had significantly been reorganized and it became the real political and professional center of governance for Hungary. The minister of the Prime Minister’s Office principally coordinated not only the cross-ministerial issues but also the preparation of the Parliamentary work of the coalition. Unfortunately, this institutional change could not balance the negative effects of the lack of the coalition cooperation in policy coordination. The rigid distribution of the policy fields between the coalition partners and the separation of the authorities by policy areas resulted in the blocking of cross-cutting issues, rather than a cooperative resolution. The generation cleavage between the Fidesz (Young Democrats) and the Independent Smallholders’ Party also deepened the problems with the policy coordination.

The Socialist-Liberal government in the period of 2002-2006 introduced a more cooperating style in governance for the coalition, and same time they kept the system of “joint governance”. Ministers came from different coalition parties could rule their portfolio very autonomously without any intervention coming from the coalition partner. This tendency has definitely supported the growth of political spoils within the span of administrative control of the ministries.

**Growing Influence of Patronage Power**

The after 1990 development of the Hungarian public service has been accompanied by a permanent hypocrisy regarding the closed, life long career system and the legal guarantee against arbitrary dismissal. While the “street level officials” have been protected, the appointed managerial positions have ever been free preys of the political spoils. This fact delimited the validity of the career system. Slowly but surely the public service ethos has been being eroded, and the servile political loyalty replaced the professional impartiality. Before the Parliamentary elections, (senior) public servants did risky gestures towards the opposition political circles expecting higher job safety after the elections if the opposition takes the power. After the second free elections, the political class lost the trust in the political neutrality of the public service and the winner Young Democrats declared that “the telephone directories are not valid anymore”. The legal borderline between the politics and professional public service was not formally ignored, but it was de facto penetrated by the patronage appointments.

In the first half of the term of the government many inexperienced, but well-trained youngsters were appointed to managerial positions. At the second part of the term of
government the Prime Minister introduced a senior public service system, with 450 political appointments. The staff also was nearly doubled in the Prime Minister’s Office, by political appointments as well. The following Socialist-Liberal government noisily opposed this practice of the Young Democrats, but sure is sure, fired the political appointees of the predecessors. The deep distrust towards the public servants just continued, and the current government elected in 2006 openly eliminated the earlier barriers between the politics and administration.

Since 1998, the governing parties have moved their chief campaign activists into public service positions. The Prime Ministers and the Ministers have been using their discretionary power in order to compensate their political affiliates with administrative jobs. There are examples for misusing the legal regulations, or ignoring the organizational and managerial reasons. Most of the public service recruitment became prey to the political will. New appointees could avoid the system of the seniority with extraordinary promotions. Legal regulations could hardly prevent those promotions. (Incidentally some newcomers were not being able to complete the required exams to their position within the legally set time period. The patrons had to move them out from the public servant status to less protected contracted job positions with higher pecuniary compensation…)

During last decade, the more and more explicit mediatization of the politics and governance has also had strong impact on politicization of the public service. At first the Ministers ordered the press and communication units of the ministries under their personal supervision. Later they gradually changed the personnel, replacing the managers with their campaign communicators or communication advisors. As the importance of the communication has been growing up in the policy process, the ministers concentrated also the policy communications within their political cabinet. Obviously, the responsibility (and the job) moved to the political appointees. The increasing role of the communication critically influenced the public officials in general: more and more bureaucrats and public managers found him or herself in the positions of the public actors interviewed by the media about policy details. Speaking of policies to the public is already a risky public role because the speech cannot be neutral in political sense. This public role is not a desired function for the public servants. The political leaders of the government bureaucracy perceived this situation again on the basis of the political distrust, and used their patronage power for moving more political trusties into the administration.

**New Political Governance and Its Consequences**

The year of 2006 may be a turning point in the development of the Hungarian public administration. The governing Socialist-Liberal coalition won the Parliamentary elections with a new generation of the party-leadership. The young Prime Minister personally led the campaign, introducing new, modern campaign communication, using the political marketing very efficiently and aggressively.

The new government declared the politics of the “New Governance”. The model of the concept was the strategy and tactics of the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair. The “New Governance” is not equal to the “Good Governance”, instead, it is “Political Governance”. The Prime Minister expressed that his government is speaking straight, not following the hypocrisy about the separation of the politics and administration. The first steps show significant change in the pattern of the politico-administrative relations in Hungary.

The borderline between the political and the administrative appointments moved down, and same time the strategic policy decisions became totally politicized.
The structural change comes together with substantial functional changes. The Prime Minister wants to establish strong strategic governance. In order to do it, the powers and authorities are essentially restructured between the ministries and the Prime Minister’s Office.

The published key document of the PMO (New Governance: Development and Reform Government) is creating three groups of the ministries’ functions:

1. administration-policy implementation,
2. development-investment,
3. policy strategy-making.
The first function stays the basic function at the Ministry in the future. The development and the strategy-making functions will be concentrated at the PMO. In the ministry, the minister’s political cabinet serves as the “pillar” for the government center transferring the Prime Minister’s political direction from the center to the implementing organization.

**Scheme of the New Governance**

The Prime Minister invited top managers from the private sector for heads to the Development Council and the Center for Government Services. The head of the State Reform Council is a former minister of finance. They have very broad authority to lead and manage the strategy making processes, and they also can decide on strategies. The extreme high level of the centralization and concentration of the power has to serve the more efficient governance, the implementation of austerity measures in the next period in order to balancing the state budget and reducing the deficit, and also using effectively the development resources from the EU structural founds.

In sum, the decision making capacities have been concentrated under the political umbrella, pumped out from the ministries and allocated in the PMO. The “interface” between the politics and the administration is the group of the branch secretaries, also political appointees, but selected also on merit-basis. The highest level of the professional public service is the layer of the department heads. This structure makes explicit and “de jure” the earlier “de facto” practice, eliminating the hypocrisy and stabilizing an over-politicized strategic (political) government. Every appointment over the department heads positions will be openly political, result of the political patronage. The new government has already declared its will to amend the Public Service Act, in order to eliminating the protection of the public service employment, moving closer the public service labor regulations to the private sector employment regulations.

Interestingly enough, the Parliamentary opposition has not attacked the new structure of the politico-administrative arrangement. It reflects that the political class has similar visions of the relations between the politics and the public administration. This is the end of the closed, seniority based career-system in the public service.
The question for the future: Whether within the conditions of the given level of the politicization, what direction will the public administration develop into?

The degradation of the ministries leaves the public servants not only politically defenselessness, but also professionally ignored in certain respect. Creative, inventive, initiative public servant do not really needed in the administrative apparatus, because the political appointees occupy the whole decision-making process.

No doubt, the new governance involves new quality measures, effective performance management and higher discipline in the implementation process. It is very possible that legal guarantees against the arbitrary political actions are badly needed in this new system, otherwise the public administration will completely be spoiled by the politicians.

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