This paper attempts to offer a global survey of semi-presidential regimes. Starting with Duverger’s tripartite definition, it is argued that there is an institutional core of semi-presidentialism that is inherent in the definition but has been generally overlooked. That institutional core is dual chains of legitimacy, command, and responsibility (dual CLCRs). The dual CLCRs are the key to understanding the upstream, midstream, downstream, and evolution of the SP regimes. It is here that democratic nascence interacts with semi-presidentialism, making the system easy to choose, difficult to operate, and risky when it evolves. Subtypes of semi-presidentialism are identified, based on the mode of interaction between the president and the parliament under congruence and incongruence. They are quasi-parliamentarism (president as titular head under both congruence and incongruence), cohabitation (president all powerful under congruence but yielding to opposition PM under incongruence), compromise (cohabitation plus specific presidential domains), presidential supremacy (president all powerful under both congruence and incongruence and parliament yields), and collision (president asserting and parliament fighting back). A global survey is then conducted, using a democracy test, a formal test, and two substantive tests to identify SP regimes in both broad and narrow versions. We then subdivide the SP regimes based on subtypes, and come up with a global distribution of semi-presidentialism. An evolutionary trend is identified. West European SP regimes in established democracies are predominantly quasi-parliamentary. Ex-satellites in the post-Leninist group spread widely among the five subtypes. Ex-Soviet republics and the post-colonial countries (francophone, lusophone, and Asian) are predominantly president supreme. The evolutionary trend is for the middle actors to tilt towards the two institutional poles: quasi-parliamentarism (BSP) and presidential supremacy. Those tilting towards presidential supremacy run the risk of degenerating into authoritarian politics. Semi-presidentialism proves easy to enter, difficult to operate, and risky when it evolves.
Semi-presidentialism as a concept in the study of constitutional systems has not fared very well when compared with its counterparts of parliamentarism and presidentialism. The basic reason is semi-presidentialism is always considered a hybrid regime type that straddles between the parliamentary and the presidential systems. As such, semi-presidentialism is defined in terms of the two referent regime types. It is seen as lacking inherent characteristics that warrant the coining of a new concept. Despite wide adoption of semi-presidential structures by the “third-wave democracies,” i.e., the post-communist Eurasian countries and post-colonial African countries, and rapid expansion of the literature on semi-presidentialism, acceptance of the concept is still not universal.  

Semi-presidentialism is still struggling for conceptual legitimacy (Elgie 1999b). It is obviously a most unsatisfactory situation, as the study of semi-presidentialism is absolutely crucial in understanding democratic consolidation in nascent democracies (Gunther 1999, 66). The ill fate of the Weimar Republic in interwar Germany, a semi-presidential regime in a then nascent democracy, vividly demonstrates the vulnerability of semi-presidentialism in social crisis, and the possibility of a nascent semi-presidential regime to falter into the abyss of totalitarianism.

In the vast literature on semi-presidentialism one finds four types of works: conceptual/definitional, typological/theoretical, encyclopedic, and stream-specific. The first type of works is best demonstrated by Duverger (1980, 1992, 1997), and Elgie (1998, 2003). They deal with the development of the concept, and the debate on its proper definition. A good example of the second type of literature is the pioneering work of Shugart & Carey (1992) which lays out typological patterns and investigates empirical cases. The encyclopedic works provide country cases and are rich in historical and developmental details. Elgie (1999a) is the best cited. Finally, stream-specific works refer to studies concentrated on various stages, or streams, of development of semi-presidential regimes (Lijphart 1992, Elster 1997). The upstream literature focuses on institutional origins. The midstream works deal with operation of
the system. The downstream analyses concentrate on institutional impact. In the existing literature on semi-presidential, seldom has focus been put on cross-stream, evolutionary aspect of the regime. In country-specific study, although one does find details of the evolution of the country’s semi-presidential system, there is usually no effort to build frame of comparative analysis, let alone general theory of institutional change. The literature is also overwhelmingly Europe-centered. Although Europe remains the continent that hosts the largest number of existing semi-presidential regimes, the system has spread to other continents, and cannot be fully understood without going beyond Europe’s borders. In short, the literature needs an expansion in analytical scope (from stream to cross-stream), and geographical scope (from Europe to beyond Europe). Such expansion is important in that most of the semi-presidential regimes in the world are in nascent democracies, and the relationship between democratic nascence and semi-presidentialism cannot be fully explored without looking into the whole evolutionary process of semi-presidentialism, and investigating into country cases that are not covered by Europe-centered literature.

**Dual CLCRs as the institutional and research core**

We shall start with Maurice Duverger’s classical definition of semi-presidentialism, i.e. a constitutional system with directly elected president, considerable presidential powers, and government responsible to the parliament (Duverger 1980). This tripartite definition is widely considered a breakthrough in the post-communist countries. Easter (1997) discusses solidarity of the elite of the old regime, control over power resources, and the choice of constitutional system. Both conclude that the nearer the country in question is to Russia, the greater the possibility that it will adopt a constitutional system that stresses the power of the president.

Wu Tung-yeh (1996) compares the semi-presidential regimes on Duverger’s 1970 list and those post-communist SP regimes, particularly France and Russia. Baylis (1996) focuses on the competitive relationship between the president and the premier in nascent democracies in Eastern Europe, and points out the tendency for the president to expand his powers.

Gunther (1999) stresses that it is difficult for a political institution to satisfy various demands on it, such as political stability, policy innovation, decisiveness and consistence of policy-making, representation of social groups, protection of minorities, and political participation. He then comes up with a multi-dimensional comparison of the performance of semi-presidentialism with that of presidentialism and parliamentarism. Chou (1996) focuses on political stability, and compares presidentialism, parliamentarism, and semi-presidentialism in this regard. Shugart (1996) analyzes the relationship between the executive and the legislature in post-communist countries, and asserts that the premier-presidential system is more politically stable than the president-parliamentary system. Lin Jih-wen (2000) applies a strategic equilibrium model to investigate the outcome of semi-presidentialism under different electoral systems, social cleavages, presidential powers, etc. Lin Chia-lung (2000) combines different sub-types of semi-presidentialism (premier-presidential system and president-parliamentary system) and president-parliamentary relations (unified government or divided government), and investigate the impact on democratic survival. He also examines four semi-presidential systems: Weimar Germany, French Fifth Republic, post-communist Poland, and Russian Federation.

Elgie (1999) is a decisive step in the direction of expanding the research scope of semi-presidentialism, for it expands into the study of post-communist, nascent democracies in Eastern Europe. Besides Austria, Finland, France, Iceland, and Ireland, i.e. those established democracies that are already in Duverger’s list, Elgies includes Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. However, this expansion into post-communist Europe does not go far enough as to include Asian and African semi-presidential regimes.
field. Up to this date, most researchers applying the semi-presidential concept feel obliged to cite the Duvergerian definition as the starting point of their research. The great achievement by Duverger resides in his introducing semi-presidentialism as a concept to the academic community, and in his offering a concrete definition of the concept. Prior to Duverger, constitutional scholars were certainly aware of the “mixed systems” that straddle between parliamentary and presidential regime types. However, those interested in this type of systems did not have a well-defined concept to tackle the issue at hand. Research focus was difficult to come by for one has to deal with “mixed systems,” an amorphous concept defined in terms of “neither parliamentarism nor presidentialism.” With the Duvergerian definition, however, the mixed systems are concretely defined. Duverger gives shape to the hitherto residual category. It is indeed a great leap forward, and following his pioneer work comparative studies have been made (most noticeably Shugart & Carey 1992 and Elgie 1999a) that greatly enhance our understanding of semi-presidentialism in theory and in practice. With the complexities of the system and its rapid spread, however, more study needs to be done.

What has not been made explicit, but inherent in Duverger’s tripartite definition is there exists an institutional core of the semi-presidential system that gives it a unique set of characteristics. This institutional core also entails unique operational difficulties for the system. The institutional core of the semi-presidential regime is the dual chains of legitimacy, command, and responsibility (CLCR hereafter) that flow from both the parliament and the president to the government. In a parliamentary system, the government is formed by the political party (parties) that commands majority in the parliament. The government thus gains legitimacy to rule. It is also responsible to the parliament and can be voted down by that body. The CLCR is thus clear. It stems from the parliament to the government. In a presidential system, the popularly elected president directly leads the government. The cabinet members and the state agencies they command are legitimated by the president who leads the whole administration. The government takes orders from the president and is responsible to him/her. The CLCR in this system is also unmistakable. It stems from the president to the government.

The unique feature of a semi-presidential system, however, is the existence of dual CLCRs (Wu 2003). This fact is established through the three conditions that Duverger set to define the system. With government responsible to the parliament (Duvergerian condition three), there exists a parliamentary chain of command and responsibility like in a parliamentary system. However, the fact that the president is elected popularly (Duvergerian condition one), i.e. not elected by the parliament, establishes presidency as an independent institution on a par with the parliament. The empowerment of the president on a significant scale (Duvergerian condition two) makes him capable of exercising real influence over the premier and the cabinet, hence the second, or the presidential chain of command and responsibility. The existence of the dual CLCRs then becomes the defining feature, the institutional core of semi-presidentialism. Both the parliament and the president can thus make a claim to the government, and to state power. This sets the stage for potential conflict between the president and the parliament over control of government, as the two CLCRs may

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9 Sometimes this type of system is understood as “dual leadership,” or “bicephalous.” Blondel (1992) extends the discussion of this type of political regime to non-democratic countries, such as dual monarchies in history, and communist countries.
collide. Such phenomenon is not seen in either parliamentary system or presidential system wherein one finds only one CLCR. The contrast between single CLCR and dual CLCR is shown in figure 1, where one sees the parliamentary system is characterized by a single parliamentary chain of legitimacy, command, and responsibility (in red), and the presidential system is characterized by a single presidential chain of legitimacy, command, and responsibility (in blue). The semi-presidential system is unique in that one finds the existence of both the parliamentary and presidential CLCR.

Figure 1  From single to dual CLCRs

Dual CLCRs are the key to understanding the origins of semi-presidential regimes, the inherent operational difficulties wherein, the sources of major dissatisfaction with the system, and even with democracy, and the momentum for the semi-presidential regime to shift between subtypes in the system, to migrate to other democratic constitutional types, or to degenerate into non-democratic regimes. To begin with, it is the insistence that both parliamentary and presidential principles of government are honored that gives rise to a semi-presidential system. The origins of semi-presidentialism is thus to be found in the cause of this simultaneous insistence. This is the upstream study of the institution. In the midstream study of semi-presidentialism, the most pressing issue is how to handle two conflicting CLCRs when the president and the parliamentary majority are not from the same political party. Four modes of interaction between the president and the parliament under incongruent relations can be identified: cohabitation, compromise, collision, and presidential supremacy. This is the midstream study of the operation of the system. None of the mentioned four modes of president-parliamentary interaction under incongruence is easy to practice. Here we see the Achilles heel of the semi-presidential regimes. Stagnation, confusion, recrimination, and frustration may result. This is the downstream study of the political institution. The inherent operational difficulty in semi-presidentialism gives rise to all kinds of dissatisfaction with the system, sometimes even with democracy per se, and prompts political elite to think of changing the constitutional framework in order to avoid the contradictions inherent in the conflicting CLCRs. This may lead to modifications of the SP order and shift from one type of sub-system to another, to a migration to parliamentarism or presidentialism, or to outright collapse of democracy and a degeneration into authoritarian or totalitarian regime. This is the issue of the evolution study of political institution. In sum, the dual CLCRs are the core of our study of semi-presidentialism in its four main aspects: upstream (institutional origins), midstream (institutional operation), downstream (institutional impact), and evolution (institutional change). It offers a clue to a cross-stream analysis of semi-presidentialism.

Democratic nascence and dual CLCRs

The “cohabitation” and “compromise” mode are what Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey would call “premier-presidential system,” while the “collision” and “presidential supremacy” mode are the “president-parliamentary system” in the parlance of Shugart and Carey. See Matthew & Carey (1992, ch. 4).
Democratic nascence affects all the four main aspects of the SP studies. Of particular importance is its effect on the mode of president-parliament interaction under incongruence, i.e., the Achilles heel of semi-presidentialism. In this respect, lack of democratic tradition that guides and constrains political actors when the problem of dual CLCRs emerges tends to tilt the interaction mode toward certain pattern. The authoritarian tradition and the strongman politics in the past cast a shadow on the working of nascent democratic institutions. The newly empowered parliament is eager to assert itself in the constitutional framework for it symbolizes democracy and reflects popular will. The directly elected president, on the other hand, has the dictators in the past to follow as examples and find no lack of popular willingness to accept his strongman rule, particularly when the country is experiencing difficulties in transforming its economic structure and/or facing severe external threats (Baylis 1996). A clash of the parliament and the president is a natural result. It can be argued that the maturity of an established semi-presidential system resides exactly in its ability to handle the inherent contradictions of dual CLCRs in the system compared with the inexperience of a nascent semi-presidential regime. In short, democratic nascence exacerbates the inherent problem of dual CLCRs in a semi-presidential system, while democratic maturity resides in the capacity of the system to adjust to the situation, and to develop durable patterns that reduce the tension between the directly elected president and the parliament. A comparison between a nascent democratic regime and an established democracy will throw this contrast into sharp relief.

The fight between the parliament and the president over control of government starts with the appointment of the premier and the formation of cabinet (Wu 2002a; Wu 2002b). This situation arises when the president and the parliamentary majority are not of the same political party (presidential-parliamentary incongruence). The president then faces the choice of “To cohabit, or not to cohabit?” (Wu 2001; Cabestan 2003). A comparison between an established and a nascent semi-presidential country is particularly meaningful here, for one can then look into the presidential decision in government formation, investigate the factors that account for that particular decision, and discern whether lack of democratic experience has any impact on the president’s actions at this critical juncture. One also needs to look into the parliament’s response to the president’s decision. Different combinations of presidential decision and parliamentary response constitute different interaction modes. The most intriguing question then boils down to under what conditions would a semi-presidential regime take a particular interaction mode.

There are four president-parliamentary modes of interaction under incongruence, centered on the issue of premier appointment and cabinet formation. Semi-presidential regimes can in this way be classified into four subtypes (Wu 2000). When the president yields to the parliament, one finds “cohabitation” wherein the majority party in the parliament organizes the government and wields the ultimate ruling power in the country. This is the mode of the French Fifth Republic. The president may also strike a division of labor with the prime minister who is still from the majority party (or the ruling coalition) of the parliament. In this way, the president and the premier divide the administration and the two are responsible for different state functions (the “compromise” mode). This is the mode of the semi-presidential system in Finland and Poland. Yet another response is for the president to insist on appointing his own favorite as prime minister against the will of the majority in the parliament, and support the new government with presidential powers. Usually this would result in
strong reaction from the parliament, and the president and the parliament would be at war with each other. The parliament may react to the president’s presumptuous actions by casting a vote of no-confidence on the government, and then the president may retaliate by dissolving the parliament. Extra-constitutional powers of the president may be invoked to overcome the parliament’s resistance, and the whole democratic institution may be at the risk of collapsing (the “collision” mode). This is the mode of Weimar Germany. It is also possible that the parliament may opt to back up at any point during this escalating process, and temporarily defuse the crisis. In this way, the president persists, and the parliament yields (the “presidential supremacy” mode). This is the situation in the Russian Federation. In table 1 we use dichotomous variables “yield” and “not yield” to reach the four interaction modes. We can also use “degree of concession” in lieu of “yield” and “not yield” and come up with a two dimensional diagram for more precise positioning of different semi-presidential systems (see figure 2).

Table 1
President and Parliament under Incongruence

Figure 2
President and Parliament under Incongruence

Translated into our triangular diagrams, we find in figure 3 the four modes presented in colors. The cohabitation mode is shown with the premier and the parliament in a red circle, while the president being the odd man out in his own narrowed blue circle. Furthermore, we use “plus” (+) and “minus” (—) to denote congruent and incongruent relation between actors. The opposing arrows in the president-parliament relations suggest they are from different political parties. The positive relation between the parliament and the prime minister/cabinet suggests that it is the leader of the majority party in the parliament taking the role of prime minister and forming the government. As a result, the relation between the president and the prime minister/cabinet is a negative one. The parliamentary CLCR is asserted (hence the bright red color), while the presidential CLCR is subdued (hence the light blue color). In the next presidential supremacy mode the president and the premier are in the same blue circle, while the parliament is the odd man out in its own narrowed red circle. This mode witnesses the president either forming a single-party cabinet under his wing, or inviting other parties to a minority coalition government. The parliament here succumbs to the president’s will, hence the subdued parliamentary CLCR in pink. In compromise one finds a coalition cabinet where the parliamentary red circle and the presidential blue circle mingle well, and both the parliamentary and presidential CLCRs are asserted, but in a concerted manner. In collision the presidential blue circle and the parliamentary red circle overlap each other, suggesting a direct confrontation over the control of the government. Here the parliamentary and presidential CLCRs are asserted, but in a conflicting manner. The president appoints his own partisan as prime minister and dominates the formation of government, while the parliament opposes to this presidential intransigence and attempts to elect its majority leader prime minister.
How the premier would be appointed and cabinet formed is determined by the balance of power between the president and the parliament in a semi-presidential system. Once the premier is appointed and government formed, the interaction between the president and the parliament also hinges on the distribution of power between these two main players (Wu 2003). The president-parliament balance of power is the “axial variable” in determining the functioning and performance of the system. This leads us to the factors determining the relative powers of the president and the parliament. Does the president have the power to unilaterally appoint and/or dismiss the premier (i.e. without the parliament’s consent)\textsuperscript{11}, can the president dissolve the parliament and under what conditions, can the parliament appoint the premier and/or the cabinet, does the parliament have the power to impeach the president or replace the premier (Fish 2003), what is the party system and its impact on the legislature’s ability to resist the authority of the president (Wang 2003), what is the electoral regime and how does it affect the party system in the context of semi-presidentialism (Cabestan 2003), how possible can the parliament come up with a successful vote of no confidence? (Wu 2005, Lin 2006) These are among the most important questions that one would ask when it comes to the balance of power between the president and the parliament. In a nascent democracy, usually the president would assert his own power and depending on whether the parliament opts to oppose him, one would find the country moving into either the “collision” mode, or the “presidential supremacy” mode. On the other hand, in an established democracy, or one in which parliamentary politics has a long history, then the usual solution is the “cohabitation” or the “compromise” mode. The major difference between the “compromise” and “cohabitation” modes on the one hand, and the “collision” and “presidential supremacy” modes on the other hand, is the president yields in the former, but refuses to do so in the latter. It boils down to the presidential decision at the crucial moment.

Up to this point, we emphasize that the dual CLCRs are the institutional core of semi-presidentialism and the key to understanding the origins, operation, impact, and evolution of the system, and that dual CLCRs are the clue to a cross-stream analysis of semi-presidential regimes. We argue that democratic nascence affects the balance of power between the president and the parliament, and tilts the system towards “collision” and “presidential supremacy” under incongruence when it comes to the appointment of the prime minister and the forming of the government. This way the difficulties in operating a semi-presidential system are amplified by democratic nascence, for the newly empowered legislature and the popularly elected president naturally tend to exert their powers to the limit, hence exacerbating the conflict inherent in dual CLCRs. We further contend that the mode of president-parliamentary interaction under incongruence has a lot to do with the performance and legitimacy of the system, and thus affects the fate of the semi-presidential regime. In short, the dual CLCRs are the essence of semi-presidentialism. It interacts differently with democratic

\textsuperscript{11} For Shugart and Carey (1992), the major difference between a “president-parliamentary system” and a “premier-presidential system” is in the former case the president has the power to unilaterally dismiss the premier. Other scholars emphasize the president’s ability to unilaterally appoint the prime minister (Wang 2003, Wu 2003).
maturity and democratic nascence, and it is through this interaction that the semi-presidential regime evolves. What is proposed here is actually a research agenda, one that can act as a platform for various kinds of semi-presidential study. In the remaining part of this paper, I will first identify the existing semi-presidential regimes in the world, and then make a preliminary attempt to test the hypotheses concerning their evolution.

Identifying the SP regimes

One of the biggest problems with semi-presidential study is the fluid boundary of the concept and its slippery empirical referents. Just which countries have a semi-presidential system? Take for example Duverger’s famous list, which has Finland as a semi-presidential regime. It can be easily pointed out that the Finnish president was not popularly elected until a major constitutional amendment made it so. Without fully satisfying Duverger’s tripartite definition, Finland however had been widely considered a semi-presidential regime well before direct election of the president was introduced. It is obvious that before any systemic analysis of semi-presidentialism can be done, one needs to determine which countries fall into the category.

We have made an exhaustive survey of all the countries in the world in an effort to discern which of them are semi-presidential. The survey is composed of four tests, as can be seen in figure 4/4-1. First we run a democracy test (DT) to exclude non-democratic regimes. It is necessary because we are primarily interested in democracies, not in all regimes whose nominal constitutional structure is semi-presidential. We use two criteria. The first one is Freedom Rating of all the nations in the world by Freedom House. There are three categories: free, partly free, and not free. This overall status of a nation is based on the average of political rights and civil liberties ratings. The second criterion is Polity IV 2003, which rates a country on a democracy-autocracy spectrum from 10 (most democratic) to -10 (most autocratic). We exclude only those countries that are “not free” in Freedom Rating and receive a Polity IV score of less than 7 (6 is considered the minimum score for a democracy). This gives us 149 democracies and 46 non-democratic regimes (see Table 2). We mark the non-democratic regimes in dark blue, both in figure 4/4-1 and in our world institutional map (figure 5). For the democracies we then run a formal test (FT), to separate monarchies from republics, and to make sure that those republics are headed by a president. We find that all the democratic monarchies have a parliamentary system, and we designate those as parliamentary regimes type A (PA-a). In the formal test we further separate those republics with a prime minister heading the government from those whose president directly heads the cabinet (see table 2). The latter are the presidential regimes type A (PR-a), marked in blue in both figure 4/4-1

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12 This way, we exclude those ostensibly semi-presidential and bicephalous regimes that do not meet our democracy standards. Although this action serves our current purpose of investigating only semi-presidential democracies, we still run the risk of not being able to look into cases where a semi-presidential or bicephalous autocratic regime may evolve into a semi-presidential democracy, and such evolvement may contain important clues to the origins of semi-presidentialism. Future investigation into those “potential semi-presidential democracies” is thus highly warranted.

13 Besides the usual span from -10 to 10, -66 denotes an “interruption,” -77 denotes an “interregnum,” and -88 a “transition.”
and in world institutional map (figure 5). Through the formal test we are now down to 60 candidate countries. All of them are republics with a president and a prime minister (president-premier republics). In all those cases, one can talk about the triangular relationships among the president, the parliament, and the prime minister, which is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of semi-presidentialism. In short, the democracy test excludes non-democratic regimes from our list, and the formal test deletes democracies that either do not have a president, or do not have a prime minister.

Figure 4, 4-1 Identifying semi-presidential regimes

Table 2 Democracy Test and Formal Test

Figure 5 World Institutional Map

The next step is to run two substance tests on those president-premier republics. Substance test I (ST I) is to separate those with their president elected by the parliament from those with popular presidential election, or with indirect presidential election by a non-parliamentary electoral body. Those with parliamentary election of president are parliamentary regimes type B (PA-b), also marked in red in figure 4/4-1 and figure 5, as their counterparts the parliamentary regimes A. ST I also makes sure that the prime minister is responsible to the parliament through the mechanism of vote of no confidence. Those without such mechanism usually make the prime minister chief lieutenant of the president. They are presidential regimes B (PR-b), also marked in blue in figure 4/4-1 and figure 5, as their counterparts the presidential regimes type A. We find a total of 33 countries that successfully pass ST I. They are semi-presidential regimes (SP) (see table 3). The theoretical meaning of the test is we want to find among all the president-premier republics those with dual CLCRs, i.e., the president is not beholden to the parliament for he is independently elected, and the prime minister is responsible to the parliament. Excluded are those PA-b regimes whose presidents are elected by the parliament and beholden to it, and those PR-b regimes whose prime ministers are actually lieutenants of the president and are not responsible to the parliament.

The SP regimes we get from ST I only satisfy two of Duverger’s tripartite definitions: direct election of president, and prime minister as head of government is responsible to the parliament. As Elgie consistently argues, those two conditions are sufficient to define semi-presidentialism, and to insist on the third leg, namely

14 We are narrowing down to get the semi-presidential regimes. What matters here is the president should not be elected by the parliament, for that would mean only one, i.e. parliamentary, CLCR. As long as that condition is satisfied, it really doesn’t matter that much whether the president is popularly elected, or elected through a non-parliamentary body, for as long as the president is not elected by the parliament, an alternative presidential CLCR will appear, and satisfy the essential requirement of dual CLCRs in a semi-presidential regime.

15 In table 3, we also look at whether the appointment of the prime minister requires parliamentary consent, but the primary criterion remains whether there is the mechanism of vote of no confidence that can force the prime minister to be responsible to the parliament.
substantive presidential power, is methodologically troubling. Nevertheless, we still need to get to the traditionally defined SP regimes. They are the hardcore cases of semi-presidentialism. For this we run substance test II (ST II) to separate those SP regimes that meet only Elgie’s dual definition from those that meet all three of Duvergerian conditions (see table 3). The major difference between those two genres is the hardcore SP regimes have president with substantial power. We shall refer to those meeting only two conditions “broadly defined semi-presidential” regimes (BSPs), and those meeting all three conditions “narrowly defined semi-presidential regimes” (NSPs). The BSPs are in light green in figure 4/4-1 and figure 5, and the NSPs are in dark green in both figures. Among all the 33 SP regimes, only eight are BSPs (Austria, Bulgaria, Iceland, Ireland, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovenia, and Singapore). All the remaining 25 are NSPs. Suffice it to say at this stage of discussion that the BSPs are SP regimes that operate just like a parliamentary system, with the president acting as the titular head of state, and rarely intervening into government affairs. The NSPs, however, the president plays a much more active role, even when he respects the parliament’s ultimate authority.

Table 3 Substance Test I and Substance Test II

All the SP regimes belong to one of the three groups: established West European democracies, post-Leninist Eurasian countries, and post-colonial regimes. West European SP democracies include Austria, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, and Portugal. Post-Leninist SP countries are Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Taiwan, and Ukraine. Finally, post-colonial SP regimes are Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, East Timor, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Namibia, San Tome and Principe, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Yemen. Among the six established semi-presidential democracies in Western Europe, Portugal is unique in that it is a third-wave democracy. There are 15 post-Leninist SP countries, making it the largest subgroup in world SP regimes. Among them only Mongolia and Taiwan are in Asia, the rest being in Europe. Taiwan is unique in that it is post-Leninist, but not post-communist. Finally, we find 12 post-colonial SP regimes, with eight of them in

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16 Elgie (1999, 2003) reflects on the study of semi-presidentialism, and charts possible courses for the development of the field. He discusses the various definitions of semi-presidentialism and the methodological utility of each. He reflects on Duverger’s tripartite definition and suggests a concentration on the parts that are readily operational, i.e. directly-elected president and government responsible to the parliament. Significant presidential power is not included in Elgie’s revised definition of semi-presidentialism. This is an attempt to go beyond Duverger’s original definition and seek to identify the core of semi-presidentialism.

17 Here we look at three areas of presidential power and constitutional practices. The presidential powers are appointment power, i.e., the presidential power to appoint the prime minister without consent of the parliament; dissolution power, i.e., the presidential power to actively dissolve the parliament; and decree power, i.e., the presidential power to issue ordinances stipulated by the constitution. The possession of any of those powers is considered an important piece of evidence that the SP regime in question is a hardcore, i.e. narrowly defined SP (NSP), and the lack of possession of any of those powers suggests the SP regime in question is a broadly defined SP (BSP). However, since the constitutional practices in many countries deviate from constitutional stipulations (Duverger 1980; Hsieh 2003), one would have to look into the practices in order to determine whether an SP regime is of a narrowly defined type, or a broadly defined type. This question shall be dealt with later in the discussion of the various interaction modes between the president and the parliament under incongruence.
Africa, four in Asia (East Timor, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Yemen). The absolute majority of the post-colonial regimes are either former French (Burkina Faso, Gabon, Madagascar, Mali, all of them gained independence in 1960), or former Portuguese colonies (Cape Verde 1975, East Timor 1975-2002, Guinea-Bissau 1974, San Tome and Principe 1975), with the exception of Namibia (former South African colony), Sri Lanka, Singapore and Yemen (former British colonies). In short, three clear profiles emerge among world SP regimes: they are established West European democracies, post-Leninist countries (mainly Central and Eastern Europe), and predominantly francophone/lusophone post-colonial regimes in Africa.

**Entry modes**

How did countries adopt a semi-presidential constitutional structure? First of all, the absolute majority of the SP regimes adopted their system as a new nation, or when they went through the process of democratization, i.e., as a nascent democracy. Very few of them changed from other types of democratic constitutional system to semi-presidentialism. This may sound natural when we look at the post-colonial and the post-Leninist subgroups, knowing that they adopted semi-presidentialism as new nations and/or as nascent democracies. The former French colonies gained independence from France all in 1960, but did not democratize until in the early 1990’s. The former Portuguese colonies gained independence later, in 1974-75 amidst the political upheaval in Portugal, and did not democratize until early 1990’s, like their francophone counterparts, after they spent 15 years in a Leninist interregnum. However, for the West European SP regimes, one may be amazed to find that most of them adopted the system as a new nation: Finland after its independence from the Russian Empire, Austria as a new nation with the demise of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Ireland as a new republic separated from Britain, and Iceland with the severance of relations with Denmark that was then under German occupation. Even Weimar Germany went into semi-presidentialism after the defeat of the Second Reich in World War I, and not as a democracy changing its constitutional regime. In the same category is Portugal that adopted a democratic semi-presidential constitution in 1976 after the overthrow of the military regime. The only cases where one can find entry into semi-presidentialism as an established democracy are France (1958, the only case in Europe), Sri Lanka (1978), Singapore (1991), and Slovakia (1999), all entering the SP realm as a republican parliamentary system (PA-b) and through changing the way the president is elected from parliamentary election to popular (or semi-popular) election. In short, the absolute majority of SP regimes adopted the system as a new nation, or as a nascent democracy, and in the few cases when democracies evolved into semi-presidentialism, they were from republic parliamentarism through changing the mode of presidential election.

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18 Exactly like other former Portuguese colonies, East Timor announced independence in 1975, but only to be invaded by the Indonesian army. Conflict between the Timorese independence movement and the Indonesian government continued until international intervention was brought in and an independence referendum was passed in 1999. The country gained full independence and international recognition in 2002.
The three subgroups of SP regimes moved into the system for different reasons. In Western Europe, it was the combination of parliamentary tradition and the need for strong leadership, or for unmistakable national symbol that brought about semi-presidentialism. This can be said of Finland (crisis-strong leader), Austria (crisis-strong leader), Iceland (independence-national symbol), and Ireland (independence-national symbol), all new nations/nascent democracies with long years of parliamentary tradition. This can also be said of Weimar Germany (crisis-strong leader) that emerged from the humiliating defeat in WWI, and of the French V Republic (crisis-stronger leader) that came into being in the aftermath of the Algerian crisis. A common feature of all those West European SP regimes is they did not inherit dual-head institutional legacy from the past, nor was institutional demonstration a prominent factor. What mattered most was the coincidence of parliamentary tradition and perceived need for strong national leader in political crisis, or the need for national symbol when the nation was born.

The same cannot be said of post-Leninist regimes. Those are countries with a totalitarian past, without meaningful parliamentary tradition. The very bicephalous power structure of the party state laid a deep impact on the post-Leninist countries. The General Secretary cum State President was always the ultimate leader of the country, aided by the Prime Minister, the president’s chief lieutenant (Blondel 1992).

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19 Finland gained independence after the Russian Revolution in 1917, in the midst of WWI. During that turbulent time the Finnish people supported the idea of a strong national leader in the president who has considerable powers, particularly in foreign affairs. This semi-presidential arrangement was strongly supported by the Right (former Monarchists, Conservatives, Swedish People’s Party, etc) who besides insistence on strong national leader were fearful of a Left government based in parliament (exactly like in Weimar Germany). The opinion of the Social Democrats who desired a purely parliamentary system was overruled (Arter 1999, 52). Technically not directly elected by the people, the Finnish president between 1919 and 1988 was chosen by an electoral college made up of electors selected by voters in the presidential election, following the example of the United States. In the 1988 presidential election, a two-phase system was adopted in which if no candidate can gain majority, the president will be elected by an electoral college chosen in the same election. Since 1994, the president has been elected by a direct popular vote.

20 The presidency of Austria was created in 1920 when the constitution was enacted. However, this was a figurehead president elected by the federal assembly. It was during the social upheaval of 1929 that the constitution was amended to provide for a popularly elected president (Müller 1999, 23-25).

21 Although the Icelandic parliament, the Althingi, was originally not interested in creating a powerful president in 1942, and intended the president to be elected by itself. However this proposal was rejected by the people, at a time when the country was attempting to terminate Union with Denmark, a turning point in Iceland’s political development. At this critical juncture, the Icelandic people expected a leader directly chosen by themselves to signify a break with Denmark (Kristinsson 1999, 89-90).

22 After the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in December 1921, an Irish Free State was formed as a dominion in the British Empire. That did not satisfy those who wanted an outright independent Republic of Ireland. Full sovereignty was gained in 1937 after long struggle between the supporters and opponents of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, and the first Irish president was elected popularly, marking a decisive break with Britain. The creation of a directly elected president reflected the mood at that critical moment, as a symbol of national independence (Gallagher 1999, 106).

This “dual leadership” underwent democratization, and people expect their president directly to be elected in a popular vote, and the prime minister to be responsible to the parliament, as *sine qua non* of democracy. The democratized president/premier dual structure spells semi-presidentialism. As a result, among the 27 post-communist regimes, 21 chose semi-presidentialism. Taiwan is a unique case here, as it is post-Leninist but not post-communist. It also has a democratic constitutional tradition, though a short-lived one, before the Nationalist Government was dislocated from mainland China in the Chinese Civil War. The 1947 Constitution basically offers a parliamentary structure, a PA-b type. This liberal democracy tradition was suspended with the onset of an extraordinary period of anti-communist rebellion, and with the imposition of martial law. Democratization in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s naturally revived the parliamentary tradition of the late 1940’s, but the institutional legacy of half a century of party state rule was so strong, that President Lee Teng-hui was able to revive it in the democratization process by translating it into semi-presidentialism in a major constitutional amendment in 1997 (Lee & Chu 2003). This shows how powerful the historical legacy of party state is in post-Leninist countries.\(^{24}\)

Finally, in the post-colonial world, semi-presidentialism was born of the institution of the mother country, typically France and Portugal.\(^{25}\) In eight of twelve post-colonial SP regimes, four are former Portuguese colonies, and four are francophone. The first batch gained independence in the aftermath of Portugal’s democratic revolution that overthrew the military regime. The francophone quartet became new nations in 1960, that is after the Algerian crisis and the birth of the Fifth Republic. None of the post-colonial countries became democracy after they gained independence. It was only after a prolonged authoritarian/totalitarian interregnum that they democratized in the early 1990’s. This time, they adopted their former colonial masters’ constitutional framework, and became semi-presidential regimes. Unlike in the West European cases, post-colonial countries had little meaningful parliamentary tradition, nor did they have the historical legacy of dual leadership, as in the post-Leninist countries. The post-colonial regimes adopted semi-presidentialism primarily because they learned from the experience of their former colonial metropolis. Here institutional demonstration effect played a crucial role.

One has to be careful in differentiating political backgrounds against which the West European on the one hand, and post-Leninist, and post-colonial countries on the other hand adopted semi-presidentialism. The differences between the West European entry mode and that of the post-Leninist and post-colonial countries speak a lot in explaining the divergent evolution of the resultant SP regimes. Specifically, the parliamentary tradition of the West European countries makes it difficult for SP presidents to bulldoze the parliament and unilaterally appoint presidential favorites prime minister. When a West European country moved into semi-presidentialism,

\(^{24}\) Besides Taiwan’s post-Leninist structure, direct election of president was also advocated by those who wanted to create a national symbol of independence against China in a directly elected national leader. This is quite like the Irish case when the independence minded elite insisted on a directly elected president. As can be expected, those who were for ultimate unification with the mainland were against such an idea, preferring an indirectly elected president chosen by a National Assembly symbolically representing all the Chinese people.

typically it had experienced many years of parliamentary politics, and had accepted the belief that government should have the confidence of parliament. A president-appointed government hanging onto political power without consent by parliament is considered not only inoperable, but illegitimate. The lack of such precondition among post-Leninist and post-colonial countries makes them vulnerable to presidential supremacy, a possible first step towards democratic degeneration.\textsuperscript{26}

*President-parliamentary interaction modes*

One can find altogether five interaction modes between president and parliament in a semi-presidential system. The first mode is quasi-parliamentarism, with the directly-elected president performing a basically ceremonial role, just like his counterpart in a purely parliamentary system. This mode is also designated as “broadly defined semi-presidentialism” in this paper. It can be identified by locating the real power of governance in the hands of the prime minister under congruence. In other words, the president designates a co-partisan prime minister when the presidential party is the majority in the parliament, and contends himself with the role of titular head of state. It can be imagined that if such is the self-perception of the president, then under incongruence he will also yield to the opposition leader whose party or party coalition controls the parliament and appoint the latter prime minister. Congruence or not, a quasi-parliamentary president would never be the real power holder, and he would always live with a powerful prime minister. Amongst the 33 SP regimes, we find eight quasi-parliamentary. They are Austria, Bulgaria, Iceland, Ireland, Lithuania, Portugal, Singapore, and Slovenia (table 5). In these countries the president does not wield real power even under congruence, let alone under incongruence.

![Figure 6 Modes of Interaction between President and Parliament](image)

**Table 5 Classification of SP Regimes**

Quasi-parliamentarism, or BSP, can be identified under congruence. The other four modes of interaction, however, cannot be discerned without the country moving into incongruence, i.e. when the presidential party and the majority party in the parliament oppose each other (see figure 6). The presidential and the parliamentary CLCRs are then brought into direct conflict. Under those circumstances, the critical question is: how should the prime minister be appointed, and government formed? Should the will the president be respected, despite the balance of power in the parliament; or should the leader of the majority party in the parliament be appointed prime minister? Would there be a compromise between the two, or a collision? No semi-presidential regime can evade this difficult situation, unless of course incongruence never arises, which suggests the presidential party always wins parliamentary elections.\textsuperscript{27} Barring this unlikely possibility, an SP regime would have

\textsuperscript{26} Skach & Colton (2005) raise the danger of semi-presidentialism evolving into a constitutional dictatorship with the expansion of presidential powers, as in Russia.

\textsuperscript{27} Amongst the 33 SP regimes, very few are in this category, the most prominent among which is
to resort to one of the four modes under incongruence: cohabitation, compromise, collision, and presidential supremacy. Cohabitation is close to quasi-parliamentarism in that both modes find the president respectful of parliamentary supremacy, and willing to appoint the majority leader in the parliament prime minister under incongruence. The difference between the two is thrown into relief under congruence. Here the president in the cohabitation mode would exercise supreme power in his capacity as the leader of the presidential party. On the other hand, a BSP president would yield to the prime minister who leads the ruling party. Both quasi-parliamentarism and cohabitation presume parliamentary supremacy, but differ in the role of the president in his own party. In a quasi-parliamentary system, because the president is merely a titular head of state, the leader of the presidential party would not want to take that position, but would assume premiership instead. In the cohabitation mode, when there is congruence the president is the head of state by constitution, and head of government by his role as leader of the majority party in the parliament. The prime minister is for all practical purposes the president’s chief lieutenant. Under incongruence, however, the president is “titularized” and sees his power migrate to the opposition leader cum prime minister, hence the ostensible alternation between presidentialism and parliamentarism. This being said, cohabitation is still the closest mode to quasi-parliamentarism, for both respect parliamentary supremacy.

The most prominent example of cohabitation is the French Fifth Republic. It

Singapore. Obviously there is lots of criticism on Singapore’s democracy. As our own democracy test shows, the country is considered “partly free” in Freedom Rating, and gets -2 in Polity IV (6 is considered minimum for a democracy). The very strong state and the overwhelming position of the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) since 1965 makes it possible for the president and the parliamentary majority to be always in sync. Singapore had been a parliamentary republic until it amended the constitution in 1991 and vested more power in the hands of the president who since then has been popularly elected. Even though Singapore has not experienced incongruence between president and parliament, its record since independence and particularly since the 1991 constitutional amendment clearly shows that it is a BSP, or a quasi-parliamentary SP regime, with the president acting as the titular head of state and serving primarily a ceremonial role, although he is empowered to veto the government's budget and appointments to public office, and to examine the administration's enforcement of the Internal Security Act and religious harmony laws, and to look into investigations of corruption. Both President Ong Teng Cheong (1993-1999) and current President Sellapan Ramanathan (1999-2005, 2005- ) were prominent civil servants before they were elected president. Even though generally speaking, the president-parliamentary relation remains harmonious under the two popularly elected presidents, there was a certain degree of tension between President Ong and the government, not as a structural problem, but reflecting intra-PAP power competition related to political succession to Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. In any case, the fact Singapore since 1991 has been a BSP foretells that if the opposition achieves parliamentary majority, then the president would appoint its leader prime minister. This is an unlikely situation, though, as the opposition has hardly won any seat in the overwhelmingly PAP parliament (82 of 84 seats in the parliament elected in 2006). Besides Singapore, Cape Verde and several African SP countries have also kept themselves in congruence since democratization, although the pattern there is slightly different.

28 Actually the cohabitation SP regimes do not alternate between presidentialism and parliamentarism. Under congruence, the president exercises his power as head of the executive not because of constitutional stipulation, but by dint of his role in the majority party. This is not presidentialism per se. Under incongruence, because the president’s role in his party can no longer work in his relation with the parliament, he simply respects the opposition majority and behaves like a titular head of state in a parliamentary republic, hence cohabitation. The essence of cohabitation is respect for the parliament as the ultimate authority in the nation. In short, the “presidentialism” phase in the mode is more apparent than real. The president’s authority is based on his role as leader of the majority party. Ultimately, it is the balance of power in the parliament that counts.
typifies the defining features of cohabitation SP regime in having an all-powerful president under congruence, appointing whomever to his liking prime minister. The same president, however, would yield to the opposition under incongruence, and dutifully appoint its leader prime minister. In no mode of president-parliamentary interaction is the contrast between congruence and incongruence in terms of presidential power greater than under cohabitation. That makes it an inherently difficult system to operate, as the president may see his power plummeting right after parliamentary elections, and his role reduced to a head of state as found in a parliamentary system. That is why when an SP regime moves from congruence to incongruence, it is unlikely that the incumbent president would opt for cohabitation, unless he is facing extremely strong pressure from the parliament. Countries taking this mode of interaction include Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, France, Macedonia, Mongolia, and Slovakia  

All the interaction modes except quasi-parliamentarism and cohabitation witness powerful president under incongruence. Among them, compromise is the most stable one. Compromise is reached between the president and the parliament in various ways. The president may be given constitutional powers in specific areas, most typically in foreign affairs, and is actually the head of government in those areas, while the prime minister is in charge of the remaining fields of national affairs. A typical example is the Finnish president who was charged with foreign relations by the 1919 Constitution (Arter 1999, 53), although his powers waxed and waned in the following years, approaching BSP after 2000. Another way for the president to exercise power in the compromise mode is to have direct control over specific cabinet members, insuring his dominance in those areas of national affairs. A pertinent case is Poland under the Little Constitution of 1992 wherein the president was given authority to affect the appointment of ministers of foreign affairs, national defense and internal affairs. The Polish president thus effectively brought those areas under his control.  

29 Slovakia has a short history as an SP regime. Originally a parliamentary republic (PA-b), the country witnessed the strongman politics of Vladimír Mečiar from 1993 to 1998 as prime minister. During that period of time, Mečiar was in serious conflict with his HZDS (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia) comrade, President Michal Kováč. Under the original Slovak Constitution, the president was elected by the parliament (the 150-seat unicameral National Council) to a five-year term. Since the parliament was unable to agree on a successor to President Kováč when his term ended in March 1998, most presidential powers reverted to the prime minister. In January 1999, the parliament passed a constitutional amendment allowing for direct election of the president. Rudolf Schuster of Party of Civic Understanding (SOP) was elected president in a May 1999 run-off with former PM Mečiar. At that time, the prime minister was Mikuláš Dzurinda, who led the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) and defeated Mečiar’s HZDS in 1998. This was the first cohabitation that lasted until the second presidential election in 2004 that witnessed Ivan Gašparovič, a former colleague of Mečiar, defeating his former ally. Since President Gašparovič led a splinter party from HZDS, his relationship with PM Dzurinda was also a cohabitation. The June 2006 parliamentary election did not change the picture, with President Gašparovič’s party not gaining any seat in the parliament. The president serves as commander in chief of the armed forces, appoints ministers, grants pardons, and has the right to dissolve the parliament under certain circumstances. The president also signs laws and has the right to return legislation to the parliament, but the parliament can override this veto with a simple majority vote. These are typical powers that one finds in a parliamentary regime. However, with Mečiar still running for president in both 1999 and 2004, the likelihood remains that if he is elected, the president would become quite strong in influencing government formation. At this stage, when we have only a period of incongruence to judge the president-premier relationship, we can only characterize the Slovak SP regime as cohabitational, and not as quasi-parliamentary, although the likelihood is for Slovakia to tilt more and more toward BSP if the current trend continues.

30 The Polish Little Constitution refers to the Constitutional Act on the Mutual Relations Between the
cases, when the country is under congruence, the president would exert great power and the prime minister would be his chief lieutenant. However, if the presidential party is not in a majority position in the parliament, or in a majority coalition, then the president would appoint the leader of the opposition prime minister, but still retain the powers that the constitution puts into his hands, either by exercising them through agencies directly under his control, or by commanding the cabinet ministers whose appointment and/or dismissal falls into his hands. This way, compromise is cohabitation plus presidential domains. Here we can again bring up the Polish case as a typical example. Both President Lech Wałęsa and President Aleksander Kwasniowski dutifully appointed opposition leaders prime minister when the Sejm was dominated by the opposition, but retained powers that the constitution provided. This may cause some tension between the president and the government, as vividly demonstrated by the clash between Wałęsa from the Right and Prime Ministers Waldemar Pawlak (1993-1995) and Józef Oleksy from the Left (1995-1996) (Jasiewicz 1997). However, this is not collision, as the tension usually did not erupt into the vicious spiral of no-confidence vote and dissolution of parliament, or even into extra-constitutional ways of confrontation.  

Countries in this mode are Finland and Poland (table 5).

Presidential supremacy and collision are differentiated not by the act of the president, but by the act of the parliament. Those who fall into the presidential supremacy mode have more deeply rooted strongman tradition and comparatively much weaker parliamentary institution, while in collision the parliament would mount fierce resistance to the president’s will to dominate. Russia is a typical case of presidential supremacy. After becoming an independent country in 1992, Russia has been ruled by two presidents, Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin. Yeltsin’s entire reign was under incongruence, with the Duma controlled by the opposition composed mainly of the ultranationalists and the communists. However, Yeltsin continuously appointed his favorites prime minister, disregarding the opposition from the Duma. Because the Duma could only delay presidential appointment of prime minister (the third rejection would result in its own dissolution by the president), Yeltsin had a free hand in picking a string of technocrats to his liking to lead the government (Viktor Chernomyrdin, Sergei Kiriyenko, Yevgenii Primakov, Sergei Stepashin, and Vladimir Putin). After Putin was elected president, the pro-government parties dominated the Duma, and Putin ends up having even greater power than his predecessor. Another case of presidential supremacy is Romania, where the legacy of President Ion Iliescu strongly tilts the country toward presidential domination of politics. Other countries

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31 As will be discussed later, the 1997 Constitution significantly reduced presidential powers, and made Poland more a cohabitation, than a compromise SP regimes, i.e., the president would remain dominant when his party is in power, but would not interfere into government affairs when his party loses majority position in the parliament.

32 After the overthrow of Nicolae Ceaușescu in December 1989, Romania was for a long time dominated by President Ion Iliescu (from 1990 to 1996, and 2000 to 2004), who was a former Ceaușescu ally in the communist leadership. As the leader of the dominant political party National Salvation Front (FSN: Frontul Salvării Naționale), the NSDF (National Salvation Democratic Front), the Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PDSR), and the Social Democratic Party (PSD), President Iliescu wielded great political power when his party ruled the country. His relationship with his prime ministers was at first confrontational, as the riots in Bucharest in September 1991 that led to the ouster of Prime Minister Petre Roman demonstrates, but then much more amicable, with the pecking order between the two
in this category are Armenia, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gabon, Georgia, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Namibia, Sao Tome and Principe, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Ukraine, and Yemen. This is the largest category of SP regimes (table 5).

Collision is the mode when president wants to assert his supremacy, but faces challenges from the parliament. The most famous case of collision is Weimar Germany. Weimar Republic is the first historical case of semi-presidentialism. In both 1925 and 1932 Marshall Paul von Hindenburg was elected president of the Weimar Republic. Hindenburg was from the Junker landowning class of old Prussia, a war hero in WWI. His political inclination necessarily conflicted with both the communists on the extreme left and Adolf Hitler’s Nazis on the extreme right, the two political forces that dominated the Reichstag in the 1930s. Since the prime minister is held responsible to both the president and the parliament, he would have to cast his political allegiance to either the president or the parliament and bear pressure from the other side. In March 1930 the Social Democrat Chancellor Hermann Müller was forced to resign under pressure from the Reichstag, and Hindenburg decided to appoint his favorite Heinrich Brüning as prime minister, disregarding opposition from the parliament. From that time on a series of president-appointed cabinets headed by Brüning, Franz von Papen, and Kurt von Schleicher survived an antagonistic parliament with Hindenburg’s emergency powers. During this period of intense conflict Hindenburg dissolves the Reichstag three times (September 1930, July 1932, and November 1932), only to see the rapid expansion of the political influence of Hitler whom he detested. Finally in January 1933 Hindenburg was forced to appoint Hitler as chancellor. What followed was a Hitler-manipulated parliamentary election in March 1933. The Nazis won 44 percent of popular vote and Hitler was again asked to form the government. Soon the Nazi-dominated Reichstag passed an enabling law to give the government dictatorial power. On August 2, 1934, Hindenburg died, one day after the parliament combined the positions of the premier and the president and bestowed that super power to Hitler. This measure was confirmed in a referendum held on August 19. This is not only the end of the collision mode of the Weimar semi-presidentialism, but also the end of German democracy. One does not find real-life cases of collision, but the Weimar case is a vivid example of how a semi-presidential regime can degenerate into a non-democratic form of government.

definitively set. Theodor Stolojan (1991-1992), Nicolae Văcăroiu (1992-1996) and Adrian Năstase (2000-2004) were dutiful prime ministers supported by President Iliescu. As Romania has a multi-party system, the president, though officially non-affiliated with any political party and endowed with limited power, actually wields great influence beyond that of the prime minister who depends on a coalition that the president helps to forge and maintain (Verheijen 1999). There have been two periods when Iliescu and his party did not rule. In the 1996 presidential election, Emil Constantinescu of the Romanian Democratic Convention (CDR) defeated Iliescu, and appointed three consecutive prime ministers (Victor Ciorbea, Radu Vasile, Mugur Isarescu) who are either co-partisans or technocrats. Finally, the 2004 presidential and parliamentary elections brought about another congruence between President Traian Băsescu (Democratic Party, PD) and Prime Minister Călin Popescu-Târiceanu (National Liberal Party, PNL). PD and PNL are coalition partners. In short, Romania with its concurrent presidential and parliamentary elections has unfailingly produced congruent president-parliamentary relations, thus it is difficult to imagine what would happen if incongruence emerges. With the lingering legacy of Ion Iliescu, the most likely scenario would be presidential supremacy.

A close example is the semi-presidential regime in East Timor, where ethnic strife and elite infighting have pushed the country onto the brink of collapse.
Distribution of Patterns and Evolutionary Trends

If one takes a look at the distribution of the mode of semi-presidentialism in Europe, one can easily detect a dividing line that runs through Europe, from between Finland and Russia, down all the way to between Rumania and Bulgaria, with all the SP regimes to the left of the line belonging to the quasi-parliamentary mode (Austria, Bulgaria, Iceland, Ireland, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovenia), the cohabitation mode (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, France, Macedonia\textsuperscript{34}, Slovakia) or the compromise mode (Finland, Poland), while all the nations to the right of the line belonging to the presidential supremacy mode (Armenia, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Ukraine) (see table 5). This dividing line basically puts the West European established democracies and the “ex-satellites” in one camp and separates them from the “ex-Soviet republics,” although Lithuania is on the west side, while Romania is on the east side.\textsuperscript{35}

If we look closer at the “west camp,” we will find that most of the quasi-parliamentary regimes, the BSPs with minimum presidential powers, are West European established democracies. This is hardly surprising. However, the fact that post-communist Lithuania, Bulgaria, and Slovenia are also in this group requires some explanation. In all the three cases, the person expected to win the founding presidential election (Vytautas Landsbergis, Zhelyu Zhelev, and Milan Kučan) and the political forces behind them (Sąjūdis, Union of Democratic Forces, and League of Communists) proposed strong presidency, which was welcome among voters but resisted by the their political opponents (Democratic Labor Party, Bulgarian Socialist Party, Liberal Democratic Party). Since it was impossible to stop the installation of a directly-elected presidency, the forces against the three popular politicians then worked to minimize the powers of the president, and wrote that into the constitution (Urbanavicius 1999, 151-153; Ganev 1999, 127; Cerar 1999 1999, 239). A compromise was then reached: the president would be popularly elected, but would be equipped with limited power.

It is interesting to note that the SP dividing line in Europe runs between the ex-satellites and ex-republics, that is within the post-communist bloc, and not between the bloc and Western Europe. This throws into relief the fact that the ex-satellites and the ex-republics have adopted different institutions and echoes the literature on institutional choice. It is widely observed that among the post-communist countries,

\textsuperscript{34} It has been established as a pattern in Macedonia that under congruence the president would call the shots (witness the relationship between President Kiro Grigorov and Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski from 1994 to 1998), and under incongruence he would yield to the opposition leader who commands the support of parliamentary majority, as the two periods of cohabitation between Social Democratic Union and IMRO-DPMNU (1998-1999, 2002-2004) demonstrate. This is a typical case of cohabitation.

\textsuperscript{35} In Lithuania the person who acted as the head of state during the transition period from March 1990 to November 1992, Chairman of the Supreme Council of Lithuania Vytautas Landsbergis (leader of Sąjūdis), was a strong political figure. Landsbergis championed a constitution with a strong presidency but failed to get it approved in the referendum of May 1992 for low voter turnout. The constitution that finally got approved is one with diluted presidential powers. Since the first popularly elected president Algirdas Brazauskas took office in 1993, a tradition has been established with the president yielding to the prime minister under congruence (e.g. Democratic Labor Party’s co-partisan Adofas Slezevicius) and incongruence (e.g. Homeland Union’s Gediminas Vagnorius) (Urbanavicius 1999). In this sense, Lithuania has developed into a quasi-parliamentary system, or a BSP.
the westernmost cases tended to reassert their pre-communist commonality with Western Europe, ending up with pure parliamentarism and proportional representation, while the easternmost cases became de facto authoritarian presidentialism. Semi-presidentialism is the choice between the two, and with the more parliamentary versions of SP to the west and the more presidential versions to the east (Easter 1997; Winckler 2004). The distance of the country in question to the core of Western Europe is a key variable that explains the different choices of institution among post-communist nascent democracies (Kopstein & Reilly 2000). The geographical line dividing ex-satellites and ex-republics, or dividing the quasi-parliamentary, cohabitation, and compromise modes on the one hand, and the presidential supremacy mode on the other hand, bears out the wisdom of the institutional choice literature.

We can use the powers of the president as a proxy of the interaction mode here, with BSP receiving lowest points, and presidential supremacy receiving the highest points, to demonstrate the distribution of SP regimes in Europe. As table 6 shows, established West European SP regimes have the weakest presidents, with an average of presidential powers at 2.83, hence clustering towards quasi-parliamentarism. The ex-satellites typically have stronger presidents than the West European SP regimes, with an average of presidential powers at 3.29, and spread from quasi-parliamentarism to presidential supremacy. However, the ex-satellite countries pale in comparison with the ex-republics in presidential powers, with an average at 6.0, and the dominant mode of interaction in the ex-republics is presidential supremacy. One thus finds two institutional cascades here: between established West European SP regimes and the ex-satellites (2.83/3.29), and between the ex-satellites and the ex-publics (3.29/6.0). The West European regimes are typically BSP (four of six), the ex-republics are typically president supreme (four of five), while the ex-satellites are spread widely among BSP, cohabitation, compromise, and presidential supremacy. The distribution of interaction mode corresponds quite well with the powers of president in table 6.

At this stage we can bring in the post-colonial SP regimes. The African SP regimes are typically former colonies of France or Portugal, with the only exception of Namibia. They typically have strong presidents, thus high scores in table 6 with the average at 6.8, and their predominant mode of interaction is presidential supremacy. The Asian post-colonial SP regimes demonstrate great variance, with Singapore being a BSP, while Sri Lanka and Yemen presidential supreme. In all, the post-colonial SP regimes are characterized by great presidential powers, and are typically presidential supreme. This makes them closer to the ex-republics in Europe.

After identifying the distribution of SP regimes, we can now move to the evolutionary tendency. Again we can consult table 6 for the change of presidential powers, and the corresponding change of SP mode. A general observation can be made here. For all the countries to the left of the dividing line, there has been either no change of presidential power/mode, or a decline of presidential power and corresponding change in mode. Among West European SP regimes, one finds Finland (from 6 in 1956-1994, 5 in 1994-2000, and 2 since 2000), and Portugal (from 6 in 1976-1982 to 3 since 1982) making great strides towards parliamentarism. The same tendency can be found in Poland (from 6 in 1992-1997 to 3 since 1997) and Croatia (from 6 in 1990-2000 and 4 since 2000). For all the countries to the right of the line,

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36 Those moves towards greater parliamentarism has to do with both the rough experience of handling
either there has been no change, or some change toward greater presidential power, as witnessed by Ukraine (6 in 1992-1996 to 7 since 1996). SP regimes outside Europe basically remain the same, with Taiwan demonstrating a tendency to rewrite the Republic of China Constitution, and making it more presidential, East Timor plunging into collision and chaos, and Sri Lanka falling into ethnic strife again. It can be argued that the greatest movement in the semi-presidential world is for the middle actors to move towards the poles, particularly towards the BSP, or quasi-parliamentary end of the SP spectrum (see figure 4-1).

Conclusion

Dual chains of legitimacy, command, and responsibility are the core feature of semi-presidentialism. Using the existence of dual CLCRs as the criterion, we design a series of tests (DT, FT, ST I, ST II) to identify the semi-presidential regimes of both the broadly-defined and narrowly-defined versions (BSPs, NSPs). Three clusters of SP regimes are identified: established West European democracies, post-Leninist Eurasian countries, and post-colonial francophone and lusophone regimes. The West European SP regimes were instituted primarily because there was strong demand for powerful head of state, or an acute need for a directly elected president to represent the nation when it achieved independence. At the same time, in almost all cases in this subgroup there had been a long tradition of parliamentarism when the country made the constitutional choice. The post-Leninist countries adopted an SP solution mainly as a result of their bicephalous tradition, and the impact of democratization on both presidency and parliament. The post-colonial SP regimes simply copied the institution of their former colonial metropolis, and in the case of the former Portuguese colonies also under the influence of the Leninist interregnum between independence and democratization. The different entry modes of the three clusters of SP regimes are conducive to their divergent evolution, with the parliamentary tradition of the West European group predisposing it towards SP modes closer to parliamentarism.

Sooner or later, all the SP regimes would experience the difficult president-parliamentary relation under incongruence (with the rare exception of Singapore, etc.), and they would develop into different subtypes of semi-presidentialism based on the interaction mode between the president and the dual-executive relationship under incongruence, and the influence of Western Europe which is the core of parliamentarism and exercises great influence on those countries that wish to join it. For example, Finnish President Mauno Koivisto was elected in 1982 with an express commitment to reverse the authoritarianism of his predecessor Urho Kekkonen. In Poland, the 1997 constitutional amendment was led by President Aleksander Kwaśniewski who witnessed the strife between the former President Lech Wałęsa and the government of the Democratic Left Alliance that Kwaśniewski led. In the case of Croatia, the authoritarianism of President Franjo Tudjman was the background of the amendment of the Croatian Constitution after Tudjman’s death under the new president Stjepan "Stipe" Mesić.

Although the Orange Revolution and its aftermath have made some constitutional impact on the presidential powers there, as witnessed by President Viktor Yushchenko’s forced nomination of Yulia Timoshenko as the prime minister after the 2006 parliamentary elections. For Ukraine’s semi-presidential regime, see Oleh (2003), Wolczuk (2001).

37 Until very recently, the ruling Democratic Progressive Party had been advocating a shift to presidentialism, i.e. not just a change of mode under the SP rubric, but exiting the SP altogether.
parliament. Those subtypes are quasi-parliamentarism (BSPs), cohabitation, compromise, collision, and presidential supremacy (four NSP subtypes). Classification of all the SP regimes based on the interaction mode is made. It is found that there is a clear line that runs across Europe, separating it into two parts with those SP regimes on the left side being BSPs or NSPs spreading across quasi-parliamentarism, cohabitation, compromise, and presidential supremacy, and those on the right side being NSPs all embracing presidential supremacy. There appear two institutional cascades separating West European, ex-satellite, and ex-Soviet republic SP regimes. The SP type and the presidential power indicator correspond nicely. Two different trends are identified among the SP regimes; one is on the left side of the dividing line and is towards less presidential power and toward the quasi-parliamentary mode. The other trend is obvious on the right side of the dividing line (as well as in post-colonial SP regimes), towards greater presidential power and the presidential supremacy mode, with the perfect example of Russia under Putin (Skach & Colton 2005). As quasi-parliamentarism and cohabitation are the most stable SP subtypes, the “west camp” regimes can be expected to experience greater political stability than those “east bank” regimes that are prone to presidential supremacy. Some “east bank” SP regimes are already bordering on autocratic politics. In short, one witnesses a polarization of SP regimes on the institutional spectrum: those in the middle are evolving either into quasi-parliamentarism, or into presidential supremacy. It shows that the middle point of semi-presidentialism is difficult to hang on to.

The purpose of this paper is to present a cross-stream, cross-continental analysis of the evolution of global semi-presidentialism. It shows that despite the different entry modes across the three groups of countries (Western Europe, post-Leninist, post-colonial), SP regimes are clustering into two extremes (quasi-parliamentarism and presidential supremacy). A structural reason can be found here: it is inherently difficult to sustain dual CLCRs, and so when incongruence appears the SP regime is propelled toward either of the two tendencies inherent in it: parliamentarism and presidentialism. The problem with the latter tendency is when president in a semi-presidential regime consolidates his power, what emerges may not be a checks-and-balances system a la the U.S. presidentialism, but an unchecked presidency a la the Russian Federation. If the parliament resists and the country moves into president-parliamentary collision, then there even exists the possibility of the country sliding into authoritarian or totalitarian politics a la Weimar Germany. In short, semi-presidentialism is an institution easy to adopt, difficult to operate, and risky when it evolves.
Figure 1  From single to dual CLCRs

Parliamentarism
Monarch or President → Parliament
Prime minister and the cabinet

Presidentialism
President → Parliament
Cabinet

Semi-Presidentialism
President → Parliament
Cabinet
### Table 1
President and Parliament under Incongruence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parliament yields</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cohabitation</td>
<td>Collision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>French Fifth Republic</td>
<td>Weimar Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Compromise</td>
<td>Supremacy of president</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finland, Poland</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Figure 2
President and Parliament under Incongruence

Max

Parliamentary concessions

Max

Presidential concessions

Figure 3  Four modes of president-parliament interactions under semi-presidentialism

Cohabitation

President

Prime minister and the cabinet

Parliament

Presidential CLCR

Parliamentary CLCR

Presidential supremacy

President

Prime minister and the cabinet

Parliament

Presidential CLCR

Parliamentary CLCR

Compromise

President

Prime minister and the cabinet

Parliament

Presidential CLCR

Parliamentary CLCR

Collision

President

Prime minister and the cabinet

Parliament

Presidential CLCR

Parliamentary CLCR
Figure 4  Identifying semi-presidential regimes

- **Non-democratic regimes**
  - Democracies: *Freedom House* *Polity IV*
  - Monarchies
  - Republics

- **Parliamentary regimes A** (PA-a)
  - Prime Minister as head of government

- **Parliamentary regimes B**
  - Direct election of President (PA-b)

- **Semi-presidentialism**
  - Direct election of president, PM responsible to Parliament (SP)
    - Broadly defined SP: President with Limited power (BSP)
    - Narrowly defined SP: President with Substantive power (NSP)

- **Presidential regimes A**
  - President as Executive head, No prime minister (PR-a)

- **Presidential regimes B**
  - Prime Minister not responsible To Parliament, but to President (PR-b)

**Tests:**
- DT: Democracy Test
- FT: Formal Test
- STI: Substance Test I
- STII: Substance Test II

Legend:
- All Nations
- Prime Minister As head of government
- President as Executive head, No prime minister
Figure 4-1  Identifying semi-presidential regimes

- Non-democratic monarchial regimes
- Monarchical democracies
- Parliamentary regimes A
- Monarchical regimes B: president elected by parliament
- Republican parliamentary regimes B: president elected
- Presidential regimes A: president head of government
- No prime minister
- Presidential regimes B: president elected by parliament
- Prime minister responsible to president, not parliament
- Non-democratic republican regimes

Parliamentary regimes

Semi-presidential regimes

Presidential regimes

Parliamentary

CLCR

President

CLCR

Cabinet
Figure 5  World Institutional Map
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country (#195)</th>
<th>Democracy Test</th>
<th>Formal Test</th>
<th>Combined Result from Democracy &amp; Formal Test (#59)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>Freedom House¹ (Freedom Rating)²</td>
<td>Freedom House³ (Political Rights Rating)⁴</td>
<td>Polity IV 2003⁵</td>
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<td>Partly Free</td>
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<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Andorra</td>
<td>Free</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>Antigua and Barbuda</td>
<td>Free</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country (#60)</td>
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<td>Substance test II</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Responsible Government</td>
<td>Semi-Presidential #33</td>
<td>Power of President</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Vote of No Confidence</td>
<td>Consent of Parliament</td>
<td>Appointment Power of President</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>4 Austria</td>
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<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
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<td>5 Bangladesh</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Bulgaria</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Cape Verde</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4  Entry Modes of SP Regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of entry</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New nation</td>
<td><strong>WE:</strong> Finland, Austria, Ireland, Iceland;  <strong>PL:</strong> Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Russia, Slovenia, Ukraine;  <strong>PC:</strong> Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nascent democracy</td>
<td><strong>WE:</strong> Weimar Germany, Portugal;  <strong>PL:</strong> Bulgaria, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Taiwan;  <strong>PC:</strong> Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, East Timor, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Namibia, San Tome and Principe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy changing constitutional structure</td>
<td><strong>WE:</strong> France;  <strong>PL:</strong> Slovakia;  <strong>PC:</strong> Sri Lanka, Singapore</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 6  Modes of Interaction between President and Parliament

President C

Yields to copartisans in parliament

BSP
President w/ Limited power

Yields to opposition in parliament

Appoints favorite PM

Cohabitation

Compromise

Collision

Presidential supremacy

C: Congruence
IC: Incongruence
PY: Parliament yields

NO

YES

NO

YES
### Table 5  Classification of SP Regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Entry</th>
<th>BSP/NSP</th>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
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<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>COH</td>
<td>COH</td>
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<tr>
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<td>PSU</td>
<td>PSU</td>
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<td>Sao Tome and</td>
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<td>NSP</td>
<td>PSU</td>
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<td>NSP</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Collapse</td>
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</table>

NN: New Nation; ND: Nascent Democracy; ED: Established Democracy
BSP; COH: Cohabitation; COM: Compromise; COL: Collision; PSU: Presidential Supremacy; AUT: Authoritarianism
Figure 7  A Dividing Line in Semi-Presidential Europe
Table 6: Semi-Presidential Democracies By Time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Power of President</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1919-1933</td>
<td>Low 1-3: Germany 5, Medium 4-5: Finland 5</td>
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<td>1919-1956</td>
<td>Low 1-3: Finland 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1944-</td>
<td>Medium 4-5: Iceland 1</td>
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<td>1945-</td>
<td>Medium 4-5: Austria 1</td>
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<td>1948-</td>
<td>Medium 4-5: Ireland 3</td>
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<td>1956-1994</td>
<td>Low 1-3: Finland 6, Medium 4-5: France 7</td>
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<td>Medium 4-5: Portugal 6</td>
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<td>1976-1982</td>
<td>Medium 4-5: France 7, Medium 4-5: Portugal 6</td>
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<td>1982-</td>
<td>Low 1-3: Portugal 3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990-2000</td>
<td>Low 1-3: Croatia 6</td>
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<td>1990-</td>
<td>Low 1-3: Sao Tome 8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991-</td>
<td>Medium 4-5: Bulgaria 3</td>
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<td>1992-</td>
<td>Medium 4-5: Lithuania 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-</td>
<td>Medium 4-5: Cape Verde 6</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Medium 4-5: Mali 7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Low 1-3: Moldova 5, Medium 4-5: Finland 5</td>
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<td>Low 1-3: Croatia 4</td>
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<td>Average for West European SP regimes: 2.83</td>
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<td>Average for “ex-satellites” SP regimes: 3.29</td>
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<td>Average for “ex-Soviet republics” SP regimes: 6.00</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average for post-colonial SP regimes: 6.80</td>
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*Mongolia not included.
References


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