Developing Local Democracy in South Korea: Challenges and Prospects

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South Korea (Korea hereafter) is widely known as one of successful third-wave democracies in East Asia. The transition from authoritarian rule to democracy in 1987 has ultimately brought about democracy at all levels of government. In 1995, for the first time in 35 years, Korean people had an opportunity to elect directly their mayor and governor.\(^1\) This historic event signified the beginning of local democracy in Korea. Since then, three more local elections have been held and on all such occasions voters were free to choose who would govern their cities and provinces. It is only a decade that has passed since electoral local democracy began in Korea.

Local democracy in Korea is a product of democratic movement. Local government is primarily justified as a means of participation and democracy. However, the conception of local government as an efficient provider of public services remains prevalent. This conception overlooks the role of local government as the forum for local policy debate. Hence, many reform measures are intended to improve the efficiency of local government in delivering standard public services. There has been little effort to strengthen the democratic mechanisms of local politics and to expand the extent of local autonomy.

Yet, the democratic movement overthrowing authoritarian rule advocates the ideal of grassroots democracy. The transition from authoritarian rule to democracy justifies a belief that ‘the people are the source of power.’ Thus, democratizing local politics is

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\(^1\) The Local Autonomy Act was first legislated in 1949, but it was not until 1960 that the first local elections in Korean history were held. However, since the military coup in 1961 local autonomy had been suspended. In the wake of democratization in 1987 the Local Autonomy Act was revised in 1988, which ultimately led to the gradual restoration of local autonomy. Elections for local council were first introduced in 1990 and elections for mayors and governors were later introduced in 1995.
viewed as essential for developing a polyarchy (Dahl 1971). Local elections are seen as the very first step for establishing grassroots democracy, which would further contribute to the development of democracy at the national level.

The case for local democracy may not be self-evident (King and Stoker 1996). Yet, following a liberal conception of local government, we presuppose the desirability and value of local democracy. Local elections are indispensable for local democracy because democracy is a form of government whose political accountability is secured through periodic competitive elections. However, a developmental view of democracy emphasizes that periodic competitive elections do not guarantee a high-quality of democracy and that they are not sufficient in themselves for democratic consolidation (Diamond 1999).

Local democracy and autonomy can be defended because “an over-centralized decision-making process undercuts the vitality of all democracy” (Phillips 1996, 25). It is justified as an effective means to decentralize governmental power and to provide opportunities for citizen participation in government. Local democracy is regarded as essential for democratic consolidation because it serves as a vital place for learning democratic norms and practices (Pratchett and Wilson 1996). It is why grassroots democracy is viewed as the cornerstone of a vibrant democracy.

In assessing the quality of local democracy it is important to determine whether the conduct of local government meets democratic criteria. On the basis of the democratic principles of popular control and political equality, Beetham (1996) proposes three criteria against which the quality of local democracy can be evaluated. First, the criterion of accountability requires that local government is held accountable to local people for policy decisions. Second, the criterion of responsiveness requires that local government...
considers a diversity of local needs in making policy decisions. Third, the criterion of representativeness requires that local government is open to a wider range of local people in making policy decisions. In brief, local democracy requires that local government is accountable, responsive, and representative through a set of local political institutions and processes. Local elections are needed for popular authorization of local government. Besides elections, many other political institutions are needed to make local government more democratic.

Making local government more democratic, first of all, requires greater local autonomy and discretion. Meaningful local autonomy is a minimal condition for local democracy. In his discussion of the constitutional status of local government ensuring local autonomy, Loughlin (1996) identifies four defining characteristics of the modern institution of local government. First, local government takes responsibility for a broad range of functions. Second, local government has a broad discretion of responding to local needs. Third, local government possesses an independent power of taxation. Fourth, local government is subject to periodic elections. In order to develop local democracy, elected local government should be functionally and financially autonomous from the central government.

In this paper we explore the challenges facing local government and democracy in Korea. We take a developmental view of local democracy and assume that developing local democracy requires not only greater local autonomy but also democratic local political institutions and practices. From this standpoint, we examine the relationship between the center and localities, the structure and practices of local government, the nature of local society and the quality of citizenship.
Local Autonomy

Korea is a unitary state, where governmental power is delegated by the central government to sub-national governments. Korean sub-national governmental system is a two-tier system. Regional governments consist of the higher tier while local governments, the lower tier. Currently, there are 16 regional governments and 234 local governments. Regional governments include 7 metropolitan governments and 9 provincial governments while local governments include 77 city governments, 89 county governments and 68 district governments. As found in other unitary states, sub-national governments in Korea do not have power comparable to those in federal states. Governmental power is highly centralized both formally and informally.

Korean local government appears to have constitutional autonomy. The constitution contains a section for local government. According to Article 117 of the constitution, “local governments shall deal with administrative matters pertaining to the welfare of local residents, manage properties, and may enact their own provisions relating to local autonomy, within the limits of law and regulations.” The constitution apparently gives local government a general grant of authority. Hence, local government can engage in any activities within the limits of law and regulations.

The constitutional status of local government in Korea embodies no formal principle of *ultra vires*. Local government has the ability to engage in any activities not

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2 In general local governments refer to sub-national governments. In this paper, however, lower-tier sub-national governments are called local governments while high-tier ones regional governments. Regional governments refer to sub-national governments of metropolitan cities and provinces while local governments, sub-national governments of cities and counties of the provinces and districts of the metropolitan cities.

3 The population size of local governments varies greatly from less than 50,000 to over 1 million. About two fifths of local governments have less than 100,000 and about one tenth has more than 500,000.
expressly prohibited by law. However, it should be noted that the constitution also permits the central government to control local government with executive and ministerial regulations. The central government narrowly interprets a power of general competence for local government and controls local decisions on spending and taxing. Local government is subject to the de facto ultra vires rule and lacks meaningful autonomy and discretion in the management of local affairs.

Korean local government takes responsibility for a limited range of functions. A government study shows that in 1994 one-fourth (25%) of state functions was local. Another government study shows that in 2002 a little more than one-fourth (27%) of state functions were local (MOGAHA 2006). The functional base of local government has changed little over a decade of local autonomy. Notable is that although the constitution gives local government a general grant of authority, the law excludes police function from local government’s responsibility. Local government also has no direct control over the provision of education service within its geographic boundary.

Korean local government performs not only proper functions and but also assigned functions, for which the central government provides finances. The assigned functions can be divided into two types. The first type is entity-assigned functions, which are delegated to local government as a whole. These functions are not distinguishable from other functions. Their existence evidently indicates the limited functional base of local government. The second type is agency-assigned functions, which are delegated to local chief executive. In implementing these functions, local chief executive is regarded as a local administrative agency of the central government. Hence, elected local chief executive is subject to tight control of the central government. Their existence clearly
illustrates limited local government power and autonomy.

Another notable feature is the presence of special local administrative agencies not subject to local electoral control but central administrative control. These special agencies, which operate independently of local government, stress functional lines of authority rather than areal lines of authority (Reed 1986). The existence of these agencies, whose work parallels that of local government, greatly narrows the responsibilities of local government. Hence, the proliferation of special local administrative agencies fragments the structure of local governance and undermines meaningful local autonomy.

Korean local government is not free to make decisions tailored to local needs and priorities. According to Article 15 of the Local Autonomy Act, local ordinances should be consistent with not only legislative laws but also executive regulations. The central government utilizes a variety of means for controlling local government. Especially, administrative guidance is the most controversial tool the central government uses to control local government’s decisions. The central government’s involvement in the businesses of local government often is not based on laws of the National Assembly. Hence, local government is not protected from politically motivated control of the central government.

The central government controls local government’s taxing and spending. The taxes local government can impose are determined by laws and the rates of local taxes vary only within a limited range. Central control of local taxes is exceedingly tight while local discretion to shape spending priorities is slight.\(^4\) Local government is limited in its ability to increase local revenues through borrowing. The central government can enforce local

\(^4\) The central government’s practice of allocation tax discourages local government to increase the tax base.
government’s fiscal responsibility through a multitude of rules and regulations.

As shown in Table 1, a majority of local governments register low levels of financial autonomy (Kwon 2004). As of 2004, more than half of them depended on the central government for more than 70 percent of their budgets. Over the last decade, levels of financial autonomy for local government have rather declined. For instance, levels of financial autonomy for city government sharply fell from 53 percent in 1996 to 39 percent in 2004. For county government they decreased from 23 percent in 1996 to 17 percent in 2004. For district government they also dropped from 53 percent in 1996 to 43 percent in 2004. As these figures evidently show, most local governments in Korea spend far more than what they collect as tax revenues. Consequently, they have to rely heavily on the central government for supplementing their ordinary expenditures and financing their local development projects. Korean local government is yet to be financially autonomous.

(Table 1 about here)

In 1995 an old system of local administration was transformed into a new system of local government. Over the last decade, however, the power of local government has increased little and remains substantially circumscribed. Despite its constitutional autonomy, Korean local government is yet to be autonomous enough for its own collective decision-making. The intergovernmental distribution of authority and resources indicates the limited power of general competence for local government. Such functional and financial base of local government evidently shows the unbalanced power relationship between the center and localities, which hinders enhancing the democratic foundations of local government. In this highly centralized system of intergovernmental
relations, local government is less likely to become the center of local politics.

**Local Elections**

Popular authorization of local government is a minimum condition for local democracy. As mentioned earlier, such a condition came into being in Korea in 1995, when mayor and governor as well as councilmen were directly elected by local people. Before 1995, the executive head of local government was appointed by the central government. Since 1995 local government is subject to periodic popular authorization rather than central appointment. Mayor, governor, councilmen are chosen in partisan elections. Local councilmen had been chosen in non-partisan elections until 2006. Despite increasing criticism against party politicization of local government, the influence of national political parties in local elections appears to have rather increased.

For the last decade, local electoral turnout has gradually declined. More than two thirds (68%) of the electorate cast their ballots in the 1995 local election. However, in the subsequent local elections only barely a half (53% in 1998, 49% in 2002 and 51% in 2006) went to the poll. Popular enthusiasm for grassroots democracy, which was strong in the aftermath of democratization in 1987, has been apparently subdued. A notable feature of Korean local politics is the nationalization of local elections. Local issues and personalities hardly dominate local electoral processes. Local elections are often regarded as referenda on the central government. Such nationalization of local elections greatly undermines the development of local democracy.

Another notable feature is that local elections tend to reflect regional political cleavages as found in national elections. In all the local elections held since 1995 a majority of the electorate voted for a party which was identified with their region of
residence. As shown in Table 2, for instance, in the Yongnam region, which has been a stronghold of the Grand National Party (GNP), the percentage of elected GNP mayoral candidates was 50 percent in 1995, 68 percent in 1998, 87 percent in 2002, and 86 percent in 2006. In the Honam region, which has been a stronghold of the Democratic Party (DP) or the Uri Party (UP), the percentage of elected DP or UP mayoral candidates was 93 percent in 1995 and 71 percent in all the subsequent elections of 1998, 2002, and 2006. In contrast, electoral performances of these political parties in rival regions appear to be miserable. In the Honam region, no GNP candidates have been elected in the last four local elections. In the Yongnam region, only one DP candidate was elected in 1995 and 1998, none in 2002 and two UP candidates in 2006.

(Table 2 about here)

These voting patterns amply illustrate a great influence major national political parties have on local elections. Local accountability is clearly limited. Since party labels are generally important for getting votes, independent candidates can hardly compete with partisan candidates. It often is advantageous to run for local offices under the party flag. In localities where hegemonic parties exist, party nomination may be a sufficient condition for winning elections. In those localities, local government tends to be completely controlled by a single party. It does not mean that local issues and local leadership are never relevant in local elections. Yet, being a candidate of a regional hegemonic party greatly determines a chance of his winning the election (Hwang 2002). As local elections are used to pass judgment on the central government, electoral outcomes hardly reflect the performance of local government. The nationalization of electoral choice reduces local political accountability, which further undermines local

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5 The UP, which was separated from the DP in 2004, is the ruling party.
Local council elections use a multi-member ward system with some form of proportional representation. Before the 2006 election a single-member ward system (first past the post) without any form of proportional representation had been used. Whether these changes would weaken the power of a single party to have majority control of local government remains to be seen.

Local Government

The form of local government in Korea reflects democratic institutional principles such as separation of powers and checks and balances. Executive power under mayor is separated from legislative power under local council. According to Article 118 of the Constitution, “the local government shall have a council” and “the organization and powers of local councils, and the election of their members; election procedures for heads of local governments; and other matters pertaining to the organization and operation of local governments shall be determined by laws.” Every local government maintains the same form of government and there is no exception.

Mayor and councilmen are popularly elected through partisan ballots. Since mayor and local council are tied to the electorate, the structure of local government primarily embodies the principle of political accountability. Yet, the rest of local officials are not elected but appointed based on merits. Local bureaucracy, which has long developed professional norms of administration, is the core part of local government. The structure of local government appears to embody the principles of both political accountability and

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6 Over the last decade local politics in Korea has been dominated by national politics because of a highly centralized system of center-locality relations. Furthermore, the nationalization of local elections and the politics of regionalism render local politics primarily national rather than local. It can be argued that regardless of levels of government all politics in Korea is national.
Local government in Korea maintains a strong mayor-weak council form of government. Mayor and local council share budgeting, legislation of ordinances and other policy-making functions. However, the power of local government is distributed in favor of mayor over local council. For instance, mayor has an authority to appoint local bureaucrats, to submit a budget of expenditures and revenues and to veto ordinances passed by local council.

Mirroring the internal structure of local government, mayor dominates local politics (Park 2000). He plays a leading role in both policy initiation and administration. He dominates budgeting processes and makes key administrative appointments. His formal authority and monopoly of information, assisted by professional local bureaucracy makes him overpower other local political actors. He holds a much wider base of geographic representation than any other local-based politicians. Mayor is engaged in distributive politics based on the exchange of benefits. By financing their pet project mayor induces councilmen to join his informal political faction.

Local council is formally responsible for making all ordinances and performing representative and oversight functions. Yet, because of local council’s low expertise, policy initiatives are likely to come from mayor assisted by local bureaucracy. Rather than using local council as a forum for policy debate, individual councilmen develop an exchange relationship with mayor who controls local public resources. Mayor offers councilmen spending favors in return for their general support. Mayor’s informal local faction often performs a role similar to that of local political machines (Guterbock 1980).

Mayor commands professional local bureaucracy by exercising his formal authority.
However, mayor’s control over local bureaucrats is by no means complete. Local bureaucrats tend to develop functional loyalties based on professional expertise defined by the central bureaucracy. They used to be regarded as MOGAHA (Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs) officials. Therefore, local bureaucrats tend to be susceptible to central regulations and standards. They are reluctant to follow mayor’s local decisions which are not compatible with central guidelines. Professional norms of efficiency and neutrality help local bureaucrats resist strong pressures from mayor. Nonetheless, it does not mean that local bureaucrats are independent of mayor who controls personnel decisions. Hence, individual local bureaucrats often develop an exchange relationship with mayor.

In short, the structure of local government has made it possible for mayor to dominate local politics over the last decade (Park 2000). Mayor does not significantly share local power with other local governmental actors. Mayor dominates local politics through his personal networks of clientelistic nature, which are highly liable to corruption (Piattoni 2001). The practices of local government fall short of democratic ideals.

**Local Society**

Enhancing local democracy requires a vibrant local society, which is supposed to encompass a diversity of local voluntary groups. Yet, economic interests at the local level are poorly organized. Local chambers of commerce fail to play a key role in representing local economic interests. Since there are industry-by-industry national associations, individual local businesses hardly look to local chambers of commerce for representing their interests. As a result, local chambers of commerce are less likely to become a major force in local political processes.
The low organization of local economic interests attests the limited power and scope of local government. Korean local government, unlike those in federal states, has little discretion to pursue development policies by using tax abatement, land grants, subsidies, and so forth (Peterson 1981). A range of policy instruments local government can choose is substantially restricted. Therefore, local economic interests have few incentives to organize themselves.

There exist local branches of government-sponsored associations, professional organizations and civic associations. Perhaps because of the limited scope of local government, local politics is unlikely to be as the target of these local associations’ activities. Hence, active members often use their associations to advance personal ambitions for local offices or to get benefits for themselves rather than to represent and promote their common interests. Yet, the influence of civic associations on local politics appears to be growing. New social movements such as environment protection, consumer rights and feminist movements have spawned various local civic or issue groups. These voluntary groups become an increasingly significant force in local governance. Whether these changes would empower local civil society and bring about significant changes in the distribution of local power remains to be seen.

Local residents remain atomized rather than organized. Their involvement in local politics is largely passive and particularized. Yet, they often organize themselves when their own real property interests are at stake (Logan and Molotch 1987). In this regard, dominant local conflicts, if any, have to do with residence than to occupation. Local people are organized not as members of an economic class but as residents of particular neighborhoods. Class conflict is hardly a feature of Korean local politics.
Overall, Korean local society is largely unorganized or poorly organized. There are only a few local groups, which are hardly representative of local society. A large segment of local society remains marginalized in the local political process. There is yet to be a pluralistic social order contributing to democracy at the local level.

Local Citizenship

Democratic citizenship at the local level requires support for local autonomy and government. Despite declining electoral turnout, the conception of elected local government is widely endorsed. In a five cities sample survey in 1999, an average of 86 percent was supportive of popular election of mayor (Park 2003). A 2001 national sample survey of the electorate shows that 85 percent of respondents were supportive of a system in which mayor is elected directly by local people (MOGAHA 2002). These findings suggest that a belief in the legitimacy of electoral local democracy is widely held among Korean people.

Yet, local politics appears to be a sideshow of national politics for a majority of local residents. In the 1999 five cities sample survey, only an average of 8 percent saw local government as having much impact on their daily lives. Moreover, an average of 62 percent believed that local government made little or no difference in improving local conditions (Park 2003).

Despite a broad support for elected local government, there is a widespread opposition to party politicization of local government. In the 1999 five cities sample survey, an average of 56 percent showed opposition to party nomination of mayoral candidates (Park 2003). In the 2001 national sample survey of the electorate, 60 percent was opposed to an election system in which mayoral candidates run under the banner of

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7 The cities surveyed included Bucheon, Cheongju, Jinju, Pyeongtaek and Seongnam.
political parties (MOGAHA 2002). In a most recent national sample survey in 2005, more than a half of respondents (52%) were opposed to party nomination of mayoral candidates (MOGAHA 2005). An anti-politics vision of local elections can also be found in a broad opposition to party nomination of council candidates. In the 1999 five cities sample survey, an average of 57 percent exhibited opposition to party nomination of council candidates (Park 2003). In a national sample survey in 2000, more than a half (55%) of the electorate expressed opposition to party nomination of council candidates (MOGAHA 2002). All of these findings evidently illustrate not only popular cynicism toward local party politics but also discontent with the current local election system.

Democratic citizenship requires being informed about local politics because if citizens are informed about local politics, they are likely to be politically competent and active in local political processes. The 1999 five cities sample survey shows that local people’s levels of knowledge about local politics were considerably low (Park 2003). A majority of local residents did not know who their mayor or councilmen were. They did not know whether party nomination of candidates for local offices was allowed or not. These findings illustrate a lack of public interest in local politics. Since local people have little motivation to acquire local political information, their understanding about local politics appears to be unclear or ambiguous.

Democratic citizenship requires awareness of politics, which is a minimal condition of political involvement (Almond and Verba 1963). The 1999 five cities sample survey shows that an average of 65 percent said they had little or no interest in local politics and that an average of 76 percent said they seldom or never talked about local affairs with neighbors (Park 2003). In the 2000 national sample survey, only 30 percent of
respondents exhibited some degree of interest in local government (MOGAHA 2002). These findings show that a majority of local people prefer to be bystanders, not active participants in local political processes. For them local politics is not a major concern.

Political efficacy is an essential component of democratic citizenship. People who are politically efficacious are more interested in politics, more informed about public affairs, and more involved in political activities than those who are not politically efficacious. A nine cities sample survey in 2003 shows that an average of 30 percent felt politically competent (Park and Kang 2005). Local people seemed to feel cognitively impotent when confronted by a complexity of local politics close to their ordinary lives. The 1999 five cities sample survey shows that there is a sense of powerlessness among local people, when dealing with control within democratic government (Park 2003). All of these findings suggest that an empowered citizenry at the local level is yet to be developed.

Voluntary associations are known to contribute to the growth of democratic citizenship. The 1999 five cities sample survey shows that the extent of membership in voluntary associations was extremely limited. Nearly four in five people were not affiliated with any social organizations (Park 2003). A 2003 national sample survey reports that most Koreans were hardly joiners (Park and Shin 2005). These findings demonstrate that a vast majority of local people are not effectively linked to social networks that infuse them with democratic citizenship. They are socially atomized. It is evident that associational life in Korean localities is hardly vital.

Social trust is known as another component of democratic citizenship. Especially,

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8 The cities surveyed included Cheongju, Chuncheon, Jeonju, Incheon, Kwangju, Pusan, Suwon, Taegu and Taejeon.
generalized trust makes it easier to form voluntary groups and to facilitate civic cooperation, which enhances the quality of democracy. The 1999 five cities sample survey shows that only an average of 38 percent agreed that “most people can be trusted” (Park 2003). The 2003 national sample survey shows that less than two-fifths (39%) of respondents expressed trust in other people (Park and Shin 2005). Both a lack of social participation and a paucity of generalized social trust attest the undergrowth of democratic citizenship at the local level.

The functioning of local democracy needs democratic citizenship at the local level. The undergrowth of democratic citizenship may retard the consolidation of grassroots democracy. As presented above, the practices of citizenship at the local level reflect democratic deficit. It is hard to find an empowered local citizenry. Mass political life at the local level can be characterized, not by the participant political culture of involvement and activism, but by the parochial or subject political culture of alienation and passivity. There exists a strong anti-politics sentiment among local people. Democratic citizenship suitable for local democracy is yet to be developed.

Conclusion

In this paper we take a developmental view of democracy and suppose that developing local democracy requires expanding local autonomy, democratizing local government and enhancing the quality of citizenship. From this perspective, we examine the relationship between the center and localities, institutions and practices of local government and the quality of local society and citizenship.

Some features of Korean local politics can be identified. First, local government remains functionally and financially limited despite its constitutional status. Second, the
structure of local governance remains fragmented and dispersed. Third, local
government’s decisions are subject to tight central control. Fourth, mayor does not share
local power with other local governmental actors. Fifth, local politics, especially local
elections are increasingly nationalized. Sixth, local market and civil society actors are not
empowered and the quality of local democratic citizenship is low. These patterns of local
political institutions and processes may be an inevitable feature of highly centralized
unitary states like Korea.

There are two competing conceptions of local government in Korea as elsewhere
(Stoker 1996). One stresses popular participation and views local government as the site
for collective decision-making. The other stresses efficient administration and views local
government as an efficient service provider. The legacy of a system of local
administration for more than three decades has justified the value of efficient local
service delivery. By contrast, recent political democratization defends the value of public
participation.

Hence, reform measures for the last decade have reflected these divergent visions.
Some measures focused on improving local service delivery while others enhancing
public involvement. The conception of local government as the efficient service provider
promotes local institutions ensuring financial and technical accountability. By contrast,
the notion of local government as the forum for policy debate promotes local institutions
ensuring electoral and political accountability (Cochrane 1996). Meanwhile, two ideals of
democracy offer contending solutions to public involvement. The ideal of direct
democracy stresses instituting modes of citizen direct participation such as referenda,
initiatives and recalls. By contrast, the ideal of pluralist democracy stresses enhancing
group representation and checks and balances within government (Wolman 1995).

In order to make up local democratic deficit, which could be further increased by centralization of power and globalization of competition, the functional and financial base for local government needs to be expanded. Local government should assume responsibility for a wider range of functions including police and education. The number of special local administrative agencies narrowing the responsibilities of local government needs to be reduced. Governmental power needs to be greatly decentralized in order to ensure meaningful local autonomy. Local government should be made the center of local decision-making (Pratchett and Wilwon 1996). As local government would be empowered to become the site for local decision-making, local civil society would grow and the democratic quality of local citizenship be improved. Local empowerment appears to be one of the formidable challenges Korean new local democracy is now faced with.
References


*Social Indicators Research* 62, 63: 291-319.


Table 1 Financial Autonomy of Local Governments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels of financial autonomy (%)</th>
<th>Number of local government(%)</th>
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<tr>
<td>90 and higher</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70-90</td>
<td>1.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>50-70</td>
<td>7.3</td>
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<td>30-50</td>
<td>35.0</td>
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<td>10-30</td>
<td>50.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lower than 10</td>
<td>4.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(234)</td>
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</table>

Source) Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs (http://login.mogaha.go.kr)
Table 2 Party Affiliations of Elected Heads of Local Governments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Grand National Party</th>
<th>Democratic Party (Uri Party)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yongnam*</td>
<td>34(68)</td>
<td>49(72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honam**</td>
<td>0(43)</td>
<td>0(41)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Entries are the number of the elected and the total number of contested mayoral positions is in parenthesis.

* Includes Pusan, Taegu, Ulsan, North and South Kyongnsang.

** Includes Kwangju, North and South Cholla.

Source) National Election Commission (http://www.nec.go.kr)