Preference Aggregation and Global Governance: An Analysis of Voting Power in the UN Security Council Reform Proposals

Alexandru Volacu

Abstract: In this paper I discuss a dimension of power distribution in one of the most important international organs tasked with the design and implementation of global governance, namely the UN Security Council. Specifically, I analyze the a priori voting power of states and regional groups under various proposals for reforming Security Council membership and voting rules submitted in 2005: (1) the Secretary-General’s In Larger Freedom Report, (2) the G4 draft resolution, (3) the Uniting for Consensus draft resolution and (4) the Ezulwini Consensus draft resolution. In order to accomplish this, I first use the Normalized Banzhaf (1965), Coleman Power to Prevent Action (1971), Coleman Power to Initiate Action (1971) and Shapley-Shubik (1954) indices to identify and understand the changes in voting power of permanent and non-permanent members under proposed reform plans, both individually and cumulatively. Secondly, I use the same measures of power distribution in committees to analyze the shifts in voting power shares of regional groups. The paper can therefore be considered both a contribution to the topic of voting power in the Security Council as well as a contribution to contemporary debates on the obstacles, implications and consequences of a UN Security Council reform.

Keywords: power indices, reform proposals, regional groups, Security Council, voting power

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1. Introduction

The topic of reforming the UN Security Council has been present in the debates on the institutional configuration of the UN System ever since the adoption of the UN Charter. In this paper I seek to provide an analysis of *a priori* voting power distribution in the most recent reform proposals, which were submitted in 2005 by either the Secretary-General of the United Nations, i.e. the *In Larger Freedom* Report, or sponsored by various groups of states, namely the *G4* proposal, the *Uniting for Consensus* proposal and the *Ezulwini Consensus* proposal.

By using *a priori* voting power indices, namely the Normalized Banzhaf index (1965), the Coleman Power to Prevent Action index (1971), the Coleman Power to Initiate Action index (1971) and the Shapley-Shubik index (1954), I seek to only analyze the influence which each member state or regional group exerts on the decision-making process of the Security Council, in a decidedly abstract fashion, since *a priori* voting power only “tells us about the power implications of the legislature itself in a pure sense” (Leech: 2002a, p.11) and it “provides an insight into the power implications of the decision rule” (Leech: 2002b, p.6). I will therefore ignore other dimensions of power in general and even more narrowly of “actual” voting power, which would need to take into account patterns of coalition formation, but would be less relevant when analyzing proposed changes to the structure of the committee, as is the case here.

The paper is structured as follows: in the next section I provide a brief theoretical outline of the relevant literature on *a priori* voting power analysis in the Security Council, focusing in particular on the work of Schwodiauer (1968) who, to my knowledge, develops the first fully-fledged research paper on this topic. In section (3) I explain the methodological framework, describing the procedure through which the voting rules of the Security Council can be reinterpreted as a weighted voting system, thus enabling its analysis through the means of voting power indices (which I subsequently informally describe). In section (4) I describe the above mentioned Security Council reform proposals, with a focus on the elements relevant to voting power, i.e. the number of veto and non-veto states, the majority required for substantive decision-making and the distribution of seats amongst regional groups. In section (5) I analyze the *a priori* voting power of individual states in reform proposals by comparison with both the status-quo
and with other proposals and I also discuss the issue of cumulative voting power shares of veto and non-veto member states. In section (6) I analyze the \textit{a priori} cumulative voting power shares of regional groups in reform proposals, once again by comparison with both the status-quo and with other proposals. Finally, in section (7) I draw the conclusions of the analysis and discuss some potential critical directions.

2. Theoretical Background

The issue of voting power in the Security Council has been analyzed by various authors. The first such attempt is that of Shapley and Shubik (1954) who apply the index subsequently named after them\(^2\) to a number of committees, dedicating a paragraph to the Security Council in which they show that cumulatively, the P5 held at that time 98.7\% of the voting power in the Council and the other 6 members only cumulatively held the remaining 1.3\% of voting shares (Shapley, Shubik: 1954, p.791). Schwodiauer (1968) extends this type of analysis, by seeking to answer three research questions: (1) how did the distribution of voting power look like in the United Nations at that time, (2) did the 1965 expansion of the Council significantly influence the distribution of voting power in the United Nations and (3) what effect would the abolition of veto rights have on the distribution of voting power in the UN (Schwodiauer: 1968, p.2). In order to answer these questions, Schwodiauer also uses the Shapley-Shubik index and applies it to both the Security Council and the General Assembly, dividing all countries into 4 groups: the Soviet Union, other P5 members, other non-permanent Security Council members and regular UN members which are not a part of the Security Council. Schwodiauer shows that the “power-share” of the Soviet Union at that time was more than twice the size of any other P5 member, namely 4.44\% of the total share of voting power compared to the 1.98\% of the USA, UK, France or PRC\(^3\). Further, taking into account both voting power in the UNSC and UNGA, Schwodiauer reaches the conclusion that differences between

\(^2\) See infra, section 3 for a description.

\(^3\) Of course Schwodiauer’s analysis faces some of the common problems which stem from the informational parcimony inherent in using voting power indices, which cannot rigorously take into account information that may be significant for the effective power shares of agents. For instance, in this case, the fact that the resolutions passed by the Security Council are legally-binding while those passed by the General Assembly are not, should have the practical effect of significantly diminishing the difference of power shares between the Soviet Union and other P5 members, as the superiority of the former in Schwodiauer’s paper is predicated on having more votes in the General Assembly.
P5 members and non-permanent members were not that high, with a mere 0.34% between them (Schwodiauer: 1968, p.9). Further, in response to his second research question, he shows that the 1965 Security Council reform led to a slight decrease in the voting power of all P5 members and non-Security Council members as well, to the expense of an increase in voting power (of 0.18% for each member) of non-permanent SC members. But perhaps the most interesting result obtained by Schwodiauer was in concern to the abolition of veto rights. In that case, the Soviet Union, whose voting share would have increased to 6.11% would have retained a small advantage in voting power over other SC members\(^4\), who would each possess 5.66% of the voting share. The effect of removing veto rights would therefore have had (and still have to the present day) the highly counter-intuitive effect that the voting power of all SC members, even those whose veto power had been removed, would skyrocket by comparison with the previous situation, while the voting power of all UN member states not in the Security Council would plummet. Schwodiauer explains this *prima facie* peculiar phenomenon, stating that “by abolishing the vetoes the number of possible blocking coalitions is reduced drastically – this will raise the power of even those who are deprived of their privileges. It seems that equality within an oligarchic group maximizes the oligarchs’ power” (Schwodiauer: 1968, p.11). Following these works, a number of other contributions to voting power in the Security Council emerged, such as those of Coleman (1971) who illustrated the two indices developed with an application to the Security Council, Brams (1975) who compares the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices as applied to the Security Council, O’Neill (1996) who studies the effects on voting power of adding new seats with or without veto rights and with or without increasing the quota required for taking substantive decisions or Strand and Rapkin (2011) who analyze voting power in various reform proposals of the UNSC which prescribe the use of weighted voting systems instead of the current system of voting rules\(^5\).

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\(^4\) Since the Soviet Union had three seats in the General Assembly, accounting for Ukraine and Belarus as well (Schwodiauer: 1968, p.3).

\(^5\) This is by no means an exhaustive list. For a more detailed survey see O’Neill (1996).
3. Methodological framework

In order to use voting power indices as tools of analysis for Security Council reforms, we need to reinterpret the voting rules in the SC as a weighted voting system. Let us consider that a number \( v \) of states in the SC have veto rights while a number \( n \) do not have such rights, but have the right to vote. Then \( N = v + n \) represents the total amount of seats in the Security Council. Let us also consider that there is a number \( q \) which represents the majority required for a decision to pass. Under these conditions, we can adjust the number of votes assigned to each \( v \)-type state so that the quota in place is impossible to reach without its approval. We can express this in mathematical terms as the system of linear equations \(^6\) (1):

\[
vw + (q - v) = c \\
(v - 1)w + n = c - 1 \tag{1}
\]

In (1) \( v \) denotes the number of states with veto rights, \( w \) the amount of votes assigned to each veto state in the reinterpreted voting system, \( q \) the quota required for decision-making, \( c \) the quota required for decision-making in the reinterpreted voting system and \( n \) the number of states without veto rights. As an illustration, let us apply this system of equations to the current composition of the Security Council. We know that the SC has 5 members with veto rights, therefore \( v = 5 \), that the SC has 10 members without veto rights, therefore \( n = 10 \) and the majority required to take decisions, i.e. \( q = 9 \). Then by replacing the terms in the equation above we obtain: \( 5w + 4 = c \) and \( 4w + 10 = c - 1 \). If we add the negative expression of the second equation to the first, we then obtain \( w = 7 \). By replacing \( w \) in the first equation, we further obtain \( c = 39 \). The voting rules of the Security Council can therefore be reinterpreted as a weighted voting system, whereby P5 states each have 7 votes and non-permanent member states each have 1 vote, with 39 votes required for any resolution to pass.

By appealing to the above mechanism we can apply a number of voting power indices to both the current Security Council and the configurations envisioned in the

\(^6\) This method is implicitly used in most papers on voting power in the Security Council (see for instance Schwodiauer: 1968, p.4) and made explicit in others (see for instance Miroiu: 2007, p.90).
reform proposals\textsuperscript{7}. For the Report of Secretary-General\textsuperscript{8} and the Ezulwini Consensus\textsuperscript{9}, the proposals do not specifically address the question of the majority required for adopting decisions. In these two cases I followed the current practice in the Security Council and considered that $q = \left\lceil \frac{n}{2} \right\rceil + 2$, thus obtaining $q = 14$ for the Report and $q = 15$ for the Ezulwini Consensus. The results are synthesized in Table 1.

\textbf{Table 1. A reinterpretation of proposed UN voting mechanisms as weighted voting systems}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposal</th>
<th>$v$</th>
<th>$n$</th>
<th>$q$</th>
<th>$w$</th>
<th>$c$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>\textit{Status-quo}</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textit{In Larger Freedom}\textsuperscript{10}</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textit{G4}</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textit{United for Consensus}</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textit{Ezulwini Consensus}</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In general, voting power indices are based on the idea that “a member’s power rests on how often he or she can add his or her votes to those of a losing coalition so that it wins” (Leech: 2002a, p.5), although both the theoretical and methodological framework used differ between indices. In this paper I will use 4 power indices: (1) the Normalized Banzhaf index (Banzhaf: 1965), (2) the Coleman Power to Prevent Action index (Coleman: 1971), (3) the Coleman Power to Initiate Action index (Coleman: 1971) and (4) the Shapley-Shubik index (Shapley, Shubik: 1954), which I consider sufficient in order to show the same patterns of voting power generally emerge under various power

\textsuperscript{7} I will not include the detailed calculations for the 4 reform proposals in the paper. Since the mathematical apparatus is extremely simple, the reader can easily verify that they are correct.

\textsuperscript{8} See infra, Section 4.1.

\textsuperscript{9} See infra, Section 4.4.

\textsuperscript{10} Since Plan A and Plan B only differ in the nature of the positions attributed to states, but not in any of the variables relevant for voting power indices, i.e. total number of seats, veto rights, regional membership or the majority required for decision-making, I will not differentiate between them and generically refer to both as the In Larger Freedom Report, or, alternatively, the Report of the Secretary-General.
indices but also in order to reveal that there can be relative differences in voting power between states in the SC and between the same state under the status-quo and under proposed reforms, when we use different indices.

In the following lines I will briefly describe the indices used here, with no reference to their formal structure\(^{11}\). The Normalized Banzhaf index largely draws on the work of Penrose (1946) and is alternatively called simply the Banzhaf index, contrasting with the Penrose index which is sometimes termed the Absolute Banzhaf index (see Miroiu: 2007, pp.92-94). The Penrose power index seeks to reflect the probability that a player is essential in order for the coalition to which he belongs in the committee to be a winning one, when all coalitions are equiprobable. The index is calculated on a scale from 0 to 1 for each player, with a player who is essential for all successful coalitions having the power 1 and one who is not essential for any, having the power 0. The Banzhaf index normalizes the Penrose index by calculating the relative voting power of states, with the total sum of voting powers equaling 1. Since both indices give results which are proportional to one another and indicate the same direction (although the actual values differ), I will only incorporate the latter into the analysis. The Coleman indices appear as a reaction against the game-theoretical approach of Shapley and Shubik (described below) and in convergence with the probability approach of Penrose and Banzhaf. As Leech notices, Coleman’s proposal “shifted the focus of the analysis from the powers of the members in relation to each other to the relationship between the powers of individual members and that of the collectivity” (Leech: 2002b, p.3). A very brief description of the two indices can be made in the following manner: the Power to Prevent Action represents “the ability of member i to prevent action by withholding his vote from a group which would win to one which loses” (Leech: 2002b, p.7) while the Power to Initiate Action represents “the ability of member i to swing a vote that would fail to produce a majority for action without him, to one which wins with him” (Leech: 2002b, p.7). Finally, the Shapley-Shubik index represents the probability that a player is essential for a winning coalition, when all orderings of players are equally likely (Leech: 2002a, p.7). The Shapley-Shubik index has the fact that it is normalized (i.e. reveals the voting shares of players with the sum of all voting power values being equal to 1) in

\(^{11}\) See Leech (2002a, pp.6-10) for the formal framework.
common with the Banzhaf index, but it differs from the two Coleman indices which do not take values which must necessarily sum up to 1. A second taxonomy widely used in voting power analysis is that of Felsenthal and Machover (1998), who divide voting power indices into two categories according to the way in which they interpret power, i.e. as influence, which is the case of the Normalized Banzhaf index and the Coleman indices or as prize, which is the case of the Shapley-Shubik index. This classification is undergirded by the fact that Shapley and Shubik’s game theoretical approach treats power as a benefit pool which is to be divided amongst the winners, with utility values received by each player in proportion to his contribution to the creation of the winning coalition (Miroiu: 2007, p.95).

4. The UN Security Council Reform

As Weiss states, when “the UN Charter was drafted, delegates who were dissatisfied with a revival of a kind of nineteenth-century Concert of Europe — with more powerful states given special roles — but also did not wish to impede the effective creation of the new world body expected that a review conference for all UN member states would be convened relatively quickly to discuss changes in the charter and organizational structures” (Weiss: 2003, p.148). But in the almost 70 years since the draft of the UN Charter, the Security Council experienced a single modification of its membership configuration, in 1965, namely the expansion from 11 to 15 members (and, consequently, from 6 non-permanent members to 9) and the alteration of the majority requirements for substantive votes from 7 affirmative votes (including P5) to 9 (including P5)\textsuperscript{12} 13. The regional distribution of the non-permanent members, which are not eligible for immediate re-election is: 3 seats to African states, 2 seats to Asian states, 2 seats to the Latin America and Caribbean group, 2 seats to the Western Europe and Others group and 1 seat to Eastern Europe (Cox: 2009, p.92).

The main area of focus for the reform has always been an extended representation, better suited to both regional arrangements and the global power structure. However,

\textsuperscript{13} For a detailed history of the debates surrounding the Security Council reform before 2005 see Fassbender (1998) or Bourantonis (2005).
other topics such as the abolition or a scope reduction of veto rights, enhancing the effectiveness and procedural workings as well as an increase in the openness of the Council have also been amongst the main sources of debate and disagreement among the members of the UN General Assembly (Cox: 2009, p.102). Two primary problems with passing reform measures are synthesized by Weiss (2003, pp.150-152). First of all, the fact that major reforms, such as those concerned with membership categories or substantive voting rules can only be introduced by amending the UN Charter. But according to Article 109 (2) of the UN Charter, any amendments to it require ratification by all permanent members of the Security Council, which effectively amounts to granting each of them veto rights over amending the UN Charter. Secondly, the issue of membership extension of both permanent and non-permanent members has usually led to what Weiss terms “political paralysis” (2003, p.151), since smaller regional powers seek to block the access of bigger regional powers to permanent seats, while regional blocs disagree amongst themselves on the distribution of newly created non-permanent seats. The first of these two issues, i.e. the potential of each P5 member to unilaterally block any reform proposal, has had the consequence that while most UN members consider the veto right “anachronistic” (Cox: 2009, p.119), very few reform proposals would either take away this right from the current P5 members, or extend it to other members, even newly created permanent ones. The second of these issues has lead to the creation of various coalitions of either geographically eeterogenous (such as the sponsors of the G4 resolution or the United for Consensus group) or geographically homogenous (such as the members of the Ezulwini Consensus) countries, supporting a common position in the reconfiguration of the Council.

In the following sub-sections I briefly outline the 4 reform proposals analyzed in this paper. Since I am only concerned with voting power, I will intentionally ommit various operative clauses or points in the draft resolutions/reports which target other issues such as increased transparency and accountability, restraining the use of veto rights, consultation with other bodies, etc.\textsuperscript{14}, and only focus on: (1) number of newly created permanent, semi-permanent and non-permanent seats, (2) the question of extending veto

\textsuperscript{14} For comprehensive analyses of the 2005 UNSC reform proposals which also approach these topics see Blum (2005) and Cox (2009).
rights to newly created permanent seats, (3) the regional distribution of newly created seats and (4) the majority required for substantive decisions.

4.1. In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all

The report *In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*, delivered by Kofi Annan in his capacity as Secretary-General of the UN in front of the General Assembly on 21.03.2005, based in turn on the Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, titled *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, was, inter alia, the first major UN Security Council reform proposal in the last 15 years, although this was only a small (albeit highly significant part) of a wider project which aimed at overhauling the entire UN System. Concerning the issues of membership expansion and voting rules, the report contained two different plans, termed Plan A and Plan B. Plan A, which mirrors to a certain extent the proposal sponsored by the G4 states, envisioned the creation of 6 new permanent seats (distributed as such: 2 for Africa, 2 for Asia and Pacific, 1 for Europe and 1 for the Americas) and three new non-permanent seats (with no possibility of immediate renewal), thus bringing the total number of SC mandates to 24. Model B proposed the restructuring of the Council with the same number of states as Plan A, and further, geographically distributed in the same manner, i.e. 6 African states, 6 states from Asia and Pacific, 6 European states and 6 American states, but the new categories of membership differed, in deference to the concerns of some of the countries supporting the *Uniting for Consensus* group. Unlike Plan A, this proposal would thus create no new permanent seats, but 8 new four-year renewable seats and 1 new two-year non-permanent and non-renewable seat.

The eligibility criteria for the newly established seats tried to balance an expansion of diverse representation and wider accountability with the current power

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17 The only recent significant proposal before this was the Razali plan, introduced on the 20th of March 1997, who was however never subjected to vote. See [https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/security-council-as-an-institution/41310-razali-reform-paper.html](https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/security-council-as-an-institution/41310-razali-reform-paper.html), accessed on 04.06.2014.
18 The report contained no less than 222 paragraphs, out of which only 4 (from 167 to 170) specifically targeted the reconfiguration of the Security Council.
19 Equitably distributed amongst each of the four regional groups.
structure, as reflected in the first principle of the operationalization of membership expansion, which stated that the reforms should lead to an “increase the involvement in decision-making of those who contribute most to the United Nations financially, militarily and diplomatically, specifically in terms of contributions to United Nations assessed budgets, participation in mandated peace operations, contributions to voluntary activities of the United Nations in the areas of security and development, and diplomatic activities in support of United Nations objectives and mandates. Among developed countries, achieving or making substantial progress towards the internationally agreed level of 0.7 per cent of GNP for ODA should be considered an important criterion of contribution”\(^{20}\).

A final important aspect is that both plans denied the expansion of veto rights to other members, either them being new permanent members (as in the case of Plan A), semi-permanent (as in the case of Plan B) or non-permanent and at the same time denied an abolition of the veto right for the current P5 members.

**4.2. The G4 proposal**

The so-called G4 proposal\(^ {21}\), embodied in Draft Resolution A /59/L.64, was named after the group containing Brazil, Germany, Japan and India. One of the primary reasons for the proposal was for the G4 to obtain permanent seats in the Security Council, in proportionality with their status in the international order and with their financial contribution to the UN. The draft resolution was co-sponsored by 23 other states, including many European ones (France, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Czech Republic, Poland, Portugal etc.) and countries from the Pacific region (Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu), and tabled by the General Assembly on the 6\(^{th}\) of July 2005.

The G4 proposal called for the addition of 6 new permanent members, identically to Plan A, discussed in (4.1), but with the further addition of 4 new non-permanent members instead of 3. The distribution of new permanent seats was also similar to Plan A, but more in tune with the current distributional arrangements in place for the SC,


prescribing 2 seats for African states, 2 for Asian states, 1 for Latin America and the Carribean states and 1 for the Western Europe and Others group. The 4 non-permanent seats were to be equitably distributed between Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and the Latin American and Carribean states. Unlike the Annan proposals, the G4 draft resolution also specifically provided an amendment of the UN Charter in conformation with the newly established SC structure, increasing the requirement of majority for substantive decision-making from 9 to 14.

The question of veto rights was a particularly significant one, since while the G4 members claimed that their bid for a seat of equal importance as the current P5 members was perfectly legitimate, it could not, on reasons of practicality, go so far as to either propose a remove of veto rights for current P5 members or an outright extension of veto rights to new permanent seats, without alienating both some of the current P5 members and many other countries who sought to block the proposal even in its lighter form. The solution devised in the draft resolution was to strike a balance between the opposing views, by maintaining the status-quo for a period of at least fifteen years after the entry into force of the amendments of the UN Charter, followed by a review of the situations which aimed to establish at that time whether veto rights would be extended to the new permanent members or not.

4.3. The Uniting for Consensus proposal

The Uniting for Consensus proposal\(^\text{22}\), which became Draft Resolution A/59/L.68, was an initiative spearheaded by Italy and joined by Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, San Marino, Spain and Turkey, tabled on the 21\(^{\text{st}}\) of July 2005. It constituted a “reaction against the alleged efforts of certain G4 plan proponents to become permanent members of the Council” (Cox: 2009, p.107). Aside from other provisions concerning the internal workings of the Security Council, such as the introduction of procedures for increasing transparency in the decision-making process or a wider engagement of states which are not members of the Council and other UN bodies, the draft resolution proposed an increase of overall

seats to 25, with no new permanent or semi-permanent members. According to the *Uniting for Consensus* proposal, the 20 non-permanent seats would be distributed in accordance with the following regional arrangement: 6 African states, 4 Latin American and Caribbean States, 5 from Asian states, 3 states from the Western Europe and Other group and 2 states from Eastern Europe. All regional groups would decide internally on the re-election and rotation of its members, a further important provision being that any state would be able to run for immediate re-election, following the end of its 2 year term.

Finally, the proposed majority required for substantive decisions according to the resolution was to be of 15 members, obviously including the P5 members, the benchmark being higher than the regular one used in the SC for the 11 member and 15 member configuration, which was given by the formula \( \left\lfloor \frac{n}{2} \right\rfloor + 2 \), to \( \left\lfloor \frac{n}{2} \right\rfloor + 3 \), signalling the intention of the group to promote a wider engagement of actors (in this case Council members) in the decision-making process.

### 4.4. The Ezulwini Consensus

The Ezulwini Consensus, alternatively termed the *Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations* is a position adopted by the African Union\(^{23}\) at its 7th extraordinary session, between 7 and 8 March 2005. The text adopted was subsequently proposed as a draft resolution in the Security Council, namely Draft Resolution A/59/L.67, on the 14th of July 2005\(^{24}\). The primary target of the sponsor states, which all came from Africa, was to reconfigure the Security Council in such a way as to shift “from an enforcement body concerned with defeating aggression to a guarantor of general, ill-defined freedoms” (Cox: 2009, p.108), redrawing the membership arrangements and voting rules of the Council with African states and at its core.

Thus, the proposal was to extend the Council to 26 seats, more than the number provisioned by any other UNSC reform proposal. Within the newly created 11 seats, 6 additional permanent seats were to be created: 2 for Africa, 2 for Asia, 1 for Latin


America and the Caribbean and 1 for the Western Europe and Other group. Out of the 5 remaining non-permanent seats, 2 were supposed to be distributed to Africa, 1 to Asia, 1 to Latin America and the Caribbean and 1 to Eastern Europe. Even more interesting than the wide expansion of African states representation in the Council, was the proposal made through article b) of the draft resolution, whereby the newly established permanent seats of the Security Council were to be granted the same privileges as those of the current P5 members, specifically the right to veto.

4.5. A synthesis of UN Reform proposals

The four reform proposals discussed above are marked by similarities and differences. All of them recognize the need to expand the Security Council in order to ensure a wider representation of UN member states, in accordance with contemporary evolutions in the field of international political and economic relations. Most of them, with the exception of the proposal of the African Union, also agree on not expanding veto rights (at least for the moment, in the case of the G4 proposal) to other new members, irrespectively of whether they are non-permanent, semi-permanent or permanent.

Most of them, once again with the exception of the African Union proposal, consider that membership criteria should continue to primarily take into account the contribution of states to maintaining international peace and security, alongside an equitable geographical representation. Most proposals, this time with the exception of the Report of the Secretary-General, also maintained the same composition for regional blocs as that used by the UNSC in 2005, namely the five-tier division between Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Western Europe and Others, Eastern Europe. The main points of disagreement between at least 3 or even all four proposals primarily concern the number of new positions added to the SC, the nature of these positions (permanent, non-permanent, semi-permanent), the distribution of new seats amongst regional groups and the majority required for substantive decision-making.

25 Out of the four, the Ezulwini Consensus is the only one which does not make any references to the importance of contributions to the UN, but rather emphasizes the paramount importance of effective regional representation.

26 In 2011, the Asia group changed its name to the Asia-Pacific Group, in response to states in the Pacific who were previously a part of the group as well. For the full list of regional group membership see: http://www.un.int/wcm/webdav/site/gmun/shared/documents/GA_regionalgrps_Web.pdf, accessed on 06.06.2014.
Table 2. A synthesis of UNSC reform provisions which influence voting power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposal</th>
<th>Total number of members</th>
<th>Number of states with veto rights</th>
<th>Regional membership</th>
<th>Majority requirement for substantive decisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Status-quo</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Africa: 3, Asia: 3, Latin America and Caribbean: 2, Western Europe and Others: 5, Eastern Europe: 2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Larger Freedom(^{27})</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Africa: 6, Asia and Pacific: 6, Europe: 6, Americas: 6</td>
<td>not specified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Africa: 6, Asia: 6, Latin America and Caribbean: 4, Western Europe and Others: 6, Eastern Europe: 3</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United for Consensus</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Africa: 6, Asia: 6, Latin America and Caribbean: 4, Western Europe and Others: 6, Eastern Europe: 3</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ezulwini Consensus</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Africa: 7, Asia: 6, Latin America and Caribbean: 4, Western Europe and Others: 6, Eastern Europe: 3</td>
<td>not specified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An illustration of the main points of agreement and disagreement relevant to voting power can be found in Table 2.

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\(^{27}\) Since Plan A and Plan B only differ in the nature of the positions attributed to states, but not in any of the variables relevant for voting power indices, i.e. total number of seats, veto rights, regional membership or the majority required for decision-making, I will not differentiate between them and generically refer to both as the *In Larger Freedom* Report, or, alternatively, the Report of the Secretary-General.
5. Voting power of individual states under the 2005 UNSC reform proposals

By applying the indices described in Section 3 on the four reform proposals outlined in the previous section, we obtain a number of interesting results. A summary of voting power values resulted from this application can be found in Table 3.

Table 3. Voting power of member states under UNSC reform proposals\(^{28}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposal</th>
<th>Normalized Banzhaf</th>
<th>Coleman PPA(^{29})</th>
<th>Coleman PIA(^{30})</th>
<th>Shapley-Shubik</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>V(^{31})</td>
<td>N-V</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>N-V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status-quo</td>
<td>0.166929</td>
<td>0.016535</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
<td>0.099057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Larger Freedom</td>
<td>0.136145</td>
<td>0.016804</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
<td>0.123428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G4</td>
<td>0.144372</td>
<td>0.013907</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
<td>0.096329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniting for Consensus</td>
<td>0.125062</td>
<td>0.018735</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
<td>0.149802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ezulwini Consensus</td>
<td>0.089529</td>
<td>0.001012</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
<td>0.011307</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first interesting, albeit intuitive, result which is similar for the Banzhaf, Coleman PIA and Shapley-Shubik indices is that under all reform proposals the voting power of states with veto rights would decrease. While in the Shapley-Shubik index and the Coleman PIA index the decrease is almost unobservable for the first three proposals, ranging between 0.11%\(^{32}\) and 0.38% for the former and between 0.26% and 0.78% for the latter (thus the shifts are lower than 1%), in the Banzhaf index the changes are somewhat more relevant, with the lowest decrease being that of the G4 proposal, of only 2.25%, the second lowest being that of the Report of the SG, of 3.07%, the third lowest being that of the Uniting for Consensus group, of 4.18% and the highest being that of the

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\(^{28}\) The indices were computed using the \textit{ipgenf}\footnote{Coleman Power to Prevent Action.} program for the Banzhaf and Coleman indices and the \textit{ssgenf}\footnote{Coleman Power to Initiate Action.} for calculating the Shapley-Shubik index. The programs are available at \url{http://homepages.warwick.ac.uk/~ecaae/#Program_List}, last accessed on 25.05.2014.

\(^{29}\) Coleman Power to Prevent Action.

\(^{30}\) Coleman Power to Initiate Action.

\(^{31}\) V represents states with veto rights and N-V states without veto rights.

\(^{32}\) The percentages are relative to the highest values which the indices can take, namely 1, and are not calculated as a percentage of the shift from the status-quo.
Ezulwini Consensus, of a significant 7.74%. The Shapley-Shubik and Coleman PIA also capture a massive decrease of voting power for states with veto rights under the Ezulwini Consensus proposal, their percentage of voting power being reduced by 10.53% under the former and 2.608% under the latter, to a value of under 0.1%. The Coleman PPA predictably shows no decrease in the voting power of states with veto rights under any proposal, since each of them still retains the power to unilaterally block the passing of any draft resolution.

However, while all indices point to a decrease in the voting power of individual states with veto rights, Table 4 shows if we add the total of voting shares for veto and non-veto members respectively, the Ezulwini Consensus proposal actually increases the voting power of all veto states with 15.02%, to an absolute value of 98.48%, with the Banzhaf index. The other three proposals, however, show a significant decrease in the cumulative voting power of veto states, with the most radical being the Uniting for Consensus proposal, which would yield only 62.53% of voting power to veto states in the Council, maintaining a difference of 20.93% to the current status-quo. The Shapley-Shubik index on the other hand is not very sensitive to these variations, as the cumulative voting power of veto states is almost absolute, with 95% of voting shares being held by them in each case. However, the Ezulwini Consensus proposal is indeed by far the most favorable to veto states according the Shapley-Shubik index, if taken together, with 99.99% of the voting shares belonging to them.

If the four indices used point to the same direction in the case of voting power of veto states under all reform proposals, albeit with different values, the same convergence is not symptomatic for the case of non-veto states. First of all, the Banzhaf index, Coleman PPA and Coleman PIA all point to a decrease in the voting power of non-veto members under the G4 proposal and the Ezulwini Consensus, but an increase for the In Larger Freedom Report and the Uniting for Consensus proposal. While the increase in the Report proposal is not very high (0.026% for Banzhaf, 2.43% for Coleman PPA and 0.003% for Coleman PIA), the increase in the Uniting for Consensus proposal is somewhat higher (0.22% in Banzhaf, 5.075% in Coleman PPA and 0.02% in Coleman
The Shapley-Shubik index also shows an increase in voting power for non-veto states under the Uniting for Consensus proposal, although the increase is almost insignificantly small, but it does not follow the pattern of the other three indices in the case of the SG Report.

Table 4. Cumulative voting shares of states with veto rights and states without veto rights under UNSC reform proposals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposal</th>
<th>Banzhaf</th>
<th>Shapley-Shubik</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>V (t)</td>
<td>N-V (t)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status-quo</td>
<td>0.834645</td>
<td>0.16535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Larger Freedom G4</td>
<td>0.680725</td>
<td>0.319275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniting for Consensus</td>
<td>0.62531</td>
<td>0.3747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ezulwini Consensus</td>
<td>0.984819</td>
<td>0.01518</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Somewhat surprisingly, the G4 proposal would lead to a decrease in the voting power of non-veto states, most significantly captured by the Banzhaf index, which shows that the difference amounts to 0.26%. All other indices point to a similar decrease of under 1%. Finally, the Ezulwini Consensus would lead to a major decrease of voting power for all individual non-veto states, from 1.65% under the status-quo to 0.1%, according to the Banzhaf index, from 9.9% under the status-quo to 1.1% according to Coleman PPA, from 0.26% under the status-quo to 0.0005% according to Coleman PIA and from 0.18% under the status-quo to 0.0003% according to the Shapley-Shubik index.

However, if we are interested in the total voting shares of non-veto member states, both the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik indices point to an increase of voting power for

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33 If we take into account the fact that even veto states do not exceed the value of 3% in either the status-quo or the reform proposals, we notice that the 0.02% increase is not a very small value.

34 Table 4 contains only the two normalized indices used in the analysis, since it seeks to illustrate the voting shares which veto states and non-veto states cumulatively have relative to the total power shares.
member states, the lowest one under Banzhaf being for the G4 proposal, of 11.28% and the highest one being for the Uniting for Consensus proposal, of 20.94%. These results vary significantly between the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices, since in the latter, the increase is almost insignificant in all three reform proposals, with the highest one (Uniting for Consensus) amounting to only 1.9%. The Ezulwini Consensus, by contrast with the first three proposals, proposes a massive decrease in the voting power of non-veto states both individually and collectively, with the Banzhaf index showing a decrease of 15.02%, to less than 2% of the total voting power shares and the Shapley-Shubik index showing a decrease to 0.0045%.

Synthesizing these results, we can draw the following conclusions: (1) the Uniting for Consensus proposal is the most favorable to non-veto member states, as it leads to an increase in their voting power under all indices used, both individually and cumulatively, and to a decrease in the voting power of veto states, under all indices used except for Coleman PPA\textsuperscript{35}. Further, the Banzhaf index shows that under the Uniting for Consensus proposal, the voting power of all non-veto states would significantly approach that of veto states, with a ratio of approximately 37% for the former and 63% for the latter, (2) the In Larger Freedom Report would also expand individual voting power for non-veto member states, both individually\textsuperscript{36} and cumulatively, and would lead to a decrease in voting power for veto states, both individually and cumulatively, but at a lower rate than the Uniting for Consensus proposal, (3) the G4 proposal is much more moderate than both the Uniting for Consensus and In Larger Freedom Report, with individual and cumulative voting power still decreasing for veto states (although at a much lower rate), but with individual voting power also decreasing for non-veto states under all indices used. This fact confirms O’Neill’s (1994, p.224) statement concerning the essential role played by majority quotas, since the only difference relevant to voting power between the G4 proposal and the Uniting for Consensus proposal is an increase of 1 in the majority quota for the latter, (4) the Ezulwini Consensus proposal is devastating to both the individual and collective power of non-veto states, reducing them to almost 0 under all indices (see especially the Shapley-Shubik index). The proposal would also lead to a

\textsuperscript{35} Which cannot be altered as long as veto rights remain in place.
\textsuperscript{36} For all indices except Shapley-Shubik.
decrease in the voting power of each veto state, but to a massive increase of the cumulative voting power of these states. Under the Ezulwini Consensus proposal the veto states would effectively hold all the power in the Security Council, while the role of non-veto states would be virtually non-existent. Under these circumstances, it is unclear how the proposal would address the concerns raised by the African group in the pre-ambulatory clauses of the draft resolution, namely: “acknowledging the need for the Security Council to reflect present world realities and be more responsive to the aspirations of all States Members of the United Nations”, “mindful of the need to ensure Africa, like all the other regions of the world, effective representation in the Security Council” or “realizing the need to engage fully all regions of the world in the work of the United Nations and to enlist their support for the progress of humanity”37, since the proposal would simply amount to a quasi-cartelization of the Security Council by 11 UN member states, while all other 181 states38 would not be ensured any effective representation. Thus, it is important to note that Anne-Marie Slaughter’s claim that “a larger and more representative Security Council is likely to diminish the impact of the veto in a number of ways, from isolating a veto-wielding permanent member seeking to cast its veto against the weight of global public opinion, to creating a larger potential majority in favor of having an action proceed in the face of a veto” (Slaughter: 2005, p.631) can also be extended to a priori voting power, but only in cases in which the expansion of the Security Council does not apply to veto rights as well, and especially in cases where the majority quota is also kept at a high level.

6. Voting power of regional groups under the 2005 UNSC reform proposals

The need for a more inclusive and geographically representative Security Council is strongly highlighted in all of its reform proposals. One plausible interpretation of an increase in representation is that regional groups, either in their present configuration or in a modified one39, should receive a fairer and more balanced distribution of seats in the

38 At the time when this article was written.
39 See for example the In Larger Freedom Report (p.43) which seeks to replace the 5 regional groups currently in existence with 4, by replacing the Eastern Europe, Western Europe & Others and Latin America & Caribbean groups with Europe and Americas.
Council. One way in which we can make sense of this idea, and the one I use here, is to consider that regional representation corresponds to the voting power shares held by each regional group in the Security Council, calculated as a sum of individual voting shares of veto and non-veto states which compose that group. Since the point of interest is represented by voting shares, I will only take into account normalized indices, i.e. the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik ones. The results of the analysis are displayed in Table 5.

The first aspect which we can notice by looking at Table 5 is that the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik index give similar results in terms of the direction of increase/decrease of voting power shares for regional groups, but in many cases widely differ on the size of these shifts. Thus, while under the Banzhaf index voting power shares for the African group would grow to 10.08% in the SG Report proposal, to 8.34% in the G4 proposal and to 11.24% in the Uniting for Consensus proposal, under the Shapley-Shubik index the increase in voting power would be practically insignificant, to 0.9% in the SG Report, 0.72% in the G4 proposal and 1.13% in the Uniting for Consensus proposal. The same major differences apply for the increase in voting power of Latin America and Caribbean group and for the decrease in voting power of Western Europe and Others group. In the case of Asia & Pacific and Eastern Europe, the indices are relatively similar.

According to the Banzhaf index, all three proposals would have moderately significant effects on representation, with the voting shares of the African group almost doubling in all proposals, the Asian group increasing with between 1-2%, the Latin America and Caribbean group almost doubling in the G4 proposal and the Uniting for Consensus, while the introduction of the USA in the Americas group under the In Larger Freedom Report would have the effect of raising its voting share from 3.3% to 22.01%

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40 An alternative course of action would have been to consider that the regional groups vote in bloc, namely that all states will vote the same way all the time. Such an analysis yields interesting results as well, with the African and Latin America & Caribbean groups shown to have 0 voting power under all indices for both the status-quo and any reform proposal except for the Ezulwini Consensus, where they would have an equal voting power to all other regional groups. The assumption of bloc voting however is severely restrictive and unreflective of reality, therefore I will not adopt it here. Using cumulative voting power shares requires no such unrealistic assumption of unitary bloc voting.

41 This is a natural consequence of the fact that veto rights weigh much more under the Shapley-Shubik index than under the Banzhaf index. When we have no states with veto rights in a group the Shapley-Shubik index tends to grant it a lot less power than the Banzhaf index and, conversely, when there are a lot of veto states in a group, the Shapley-Shubik index estimates its voting power at a much higher level than the Banzhaf index.
and the Western Europe and Others or Europe in the SG Report proposal voting shares decreasing with between approximately 6 and 10%\textsuperscript{42}.

Table 5. Cumulative voting power shares of regional groups under UNSC reform proposals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional groups</th>
<th>Status-Quo</th>
<th>In Larger Freedom</th>
<th>G4</th>
<th>Uniting for Consensus</th>
<th>Ezulwini Consensus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B\textsuperscript{43}</td>
<td>S-S\textsuperscript{44}</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>S-S</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>0.0496</td>
<td>0.0055</td>
<td>0.1008</td>
<td>0.0090</td>
<td>0.0834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia and Pacific</td>
<td>0.1999</td>
<td>0.1999</td>
<td>0.2201</td>
<td>0.2018</td>
<td>0.2139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and Caribbean</td>
<td>0.0330</td>
<td>0.0037</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe and Others</td>
<td>0.5337</td>
<td>0.5923</td>
<td>0.4748</td>
<td>0.5890</td>
<td>0.4313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>0.1834</td>
<td>0.1981</td>
<td>0.1721</td>
<td>0.1975</td>
<td>0.1625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.4588</td>
<td>0.5862</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.2201</td>
<td>0.2018</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Under the Shapley-Shubik index however, the three proposals for reconfiguration would be almost void of any real impact. In the most optimistic case (the Uniting for Consensus proposal), Africa would gain merely 0.58% more voting shares, Asia & Pacific would get 0.19% more, Latin America and Caribbean would get 0.38% more, Eastern Europe would lose 0.19% and the Western Europe and Others group would lose

\textsuperscript{42} Under the G4 proposal and the Uniting for Consensus one, Eastern Europe would also have a slightly lower voting share, of approximately 1-2%.

\textsuperscript{43} Sum of normalized Banzhaf index values.

\textsuperscript{44} Sum of Shapley-Shubik index values.
0.93%. Under the SG Report, the reconfiguration of groups would indeed be the cause of yielding a higher share to the Americas, of 20.18%, but Europe itself would be left unharmed, retaining 58.62% of the total of voting shares.

The case of the Ezulwini Consensus proposal however differs radically from the previous three. First of all, the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices give approximately the same values (the highest difference margin being 0.39%, for Asia & Pacific) for all regional groups, showing a *prima facie* balance in the distribution of veto rights. Secondly, the results depict an image of a much more equitable distribution of voting power shares among regional groups, with values ranging between approximately 9% for Eastern Europe and Latin America & Caribbean and 36% for Western Europe & Others, with the African group at 18% and the Asia & Pacific group at 27% in the middle. A third interesting fact is that while this proposal is the only one genuinely endorsed by sponsor states on the basis of regional geographical allegiance, it still only provides the sponsor group with half of the voting power shares of the strongest regional group in the Council, making the proposal significantly less radical than thought when we only look at the analysis in Section 5.

Synthesizing these results, we can state that the Ezulwini Consensus proposal is by far the most favorable to expanding regional representation, while the other three proposals offer mixed results on the question if they would be even slightly effective at this task. While the Ezulwini Consensus would unambiguously increase the voting power shares of the African, Latin America & Caribbean and Asia & Pacific groups, leaving the difference between the “weakest” and “strongest” regional groups at only 26.86%, the other three proposals would only moderately increase these voting power shares under the Banzhaf index analysis, leaving the difference at a higher 35.8% for the SG Report, 41.92% for the G4 proposal and 35.64% for the Uniting for Consensus proposal, and almost unobservably increase the voting power shares under the Shapley-Shubik index analysis, leaving the difference at the much higher figures of 57.72% for the SG Report, 58.42% for the G4 proposal and 57.54% for the Uniting for Consensus proposal.

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45 See *supra*, footnote 41.
46 The difference in the present configuration of the Security Council, for the Shapley-Shubik index being of 50.07% for the Banzhaf index and 58.86% for the Shapley-Shubik index.
7. Conclusions and critical remarks

The conclusions of the paper can be summarized as follows: out of the three proposals for reforming the Security Council which did not incorporate an expansion of veto rights, the *Uniting for Consensus* proposal, which called for an expansion of the Council to 25 members with a majority quota of 15 members (including the P5), is the most favorable to an increase in the *a priori* voting power of non-veto states in the Council, both when taken individually and cumulatively, to a decrease in the *a priori* voting power of veto states, both when taken individually and cumulatively, to an increase in the *a priori* voting power of the most underrepresented regional groups, i.e. Africa, Latin America & Caribbean and Asia & Pacific and to a decrease in the voting power of the most overrepresented regional group, i.e. Western Europe & Others. While the G4 proposal and the *In Larger Freedom* Report of the UN Secretary-General both generally point in the same direction, they call for a lighter, less representation-enhancing reform than that proposed by the *Uniting for Consensus* group. The only major reform proposal which sought an expansion of veto rights to 6 more states, i.e. the Ezulwini Consensus, can be considered both the least able to provide better representation and the most able to do it, depending on the philosophical vantage point of the observer. If we atomize the unit of analysis at the level of states, and include these units in the *explanans* for a theory of representation, then the Ezulwini Consensus is severely detrimental to it, since it basically channels all the *a priori* voting power in the Security Council into the hands of 11 states, while leaving all other states of the UN with almost no power to influence the passing of resolutions. If, however, we atomize the unit of analysis at the level of regional groups, by claiming that states in a certain regional group act as genuine representatives of that group, then the Ezulwini Consensus is the most representation-enhancing proposal, as it significantly increases the *a priori* voting power shares of the three most underrepresented regional groups and significantly decreases those of the Western Europe and Others group. However, as long as the current status-quo concerning regional group configuration is in place, atomizing at the level of regional groups does

\[\text{footnote}{47} \] I also include the G4 proposal in this category, since their proposal simply called for a re-opening of the discussion on the matter at a later time in the future. 

\[\text{footnote}{48} \] With the former being lighter still than the latter.
not appear to make sense across-the-board, since states in many regional groups have highly diverging positions on a wide number of policies.\textsuperscript{49}

One of the most important aspects of a UNSC reform which seeks to provide a higher degree of representation would therefore be to reconfigure regional groups\textsuperscript{50} in such a way so as both veto and non-veto states which represent the respective group in the Security Council, would actually adhere, at least broadly, to the policies and positions of those states. A second important aspect would be to ensure a balanced representation of veto rights amongst these groups, since as the Shapley-Shubik index shows, no veto rights for a regional group means a lack of any effective representation. A third aspect, irrespective of any change which might occur in the reconfiguration of regional groups, is that the massive power of the veto right can be balanced (even if not fully) by an increase in the quota required for substantive decision-making\textsuperscript{51}, thus a reform proposal which seeks to increase both the individual and cumulative power of non-veto states should attempt to raise the quota as high as possible. While an increase in the number of non-veto seats in the Council can be an important factor in enhancing representation, it can only be used effectively in combination with a significant increase in the majority quota.

There are various limitations and critical remarks which can be potentially problematic for the analysis conducted here. First of all, it is important to notice that \textit{a priori} voting power measurements capture a single dimension of power in a committee and this dimension may be outweighed in practice by other considerations. O’Neill (1996, p.221) for instance mentions prestige and and access to information as other components of power conveyed by a seat in the Security Council as well as the possibility to induce others to support a certain member by using resource incentives. Kuziemko and Werker (2006) further show that membership in the Security Council can enhance other dimensions of power, when interpreted more broadly, such as the power to accumulate

\textsuperscript{49} See for instance the Eastern Europe group, which on the one hand includes the Russian Federation and on the other one many states which are currently much more closely aligned to the positions of the Western Europe and Others group.

\textsuperscript{50} The proposal of the \textit{In Larger Freedom} Report would not fare much better though, since it would insert for instance the Russian Federation in the Europe group, appearing to give it, as a regional group, more power than it would actually hold.

\textsuperscript{51} As iterated before already, this is the primary reason why the Uniting for Consensus group yielded a more equitable distribution of voting power than the G4 proposal and the SG Report.

\textsuperscript{52} Subjected to constraints of efficiency and seeking to avoid objections from current P5 members.
resources by attracting international aid from the UN and the US and Dreher et al (2009) show that the same conclusion can be drawn in relation to funding from the World Bank. These aspects raise a problem for measuring voting power via indices, since they are not able to capture the difference between a permanent, semi-permanent and non-permanent seat, if the seats entails no veto rights, but the continuous presence of a state in the Security Council may be sufficient for extending its power on dimensions unrelated to a priori voting power53.

Secondly, it might be claimed that a priori voting power itself is only one out of a number of dimensions relevant for understanding the issue of effective representation and legitimacy of the Security Council. Thus, our focus should primarily (or at least complementary) go to the study of other topics such as the “deliberative deficit” (Johnstone: 2008), imposing strict deadlines on decision-making in combination with a limitation on the number of vetoes which a state would be able to cast on the same issue (Winter: 1996), ensuring that the Council is free from external influence and that it “uses force under Chapter VII only as a last resort” (Davis: 2010, p.37), or other such issues.

In spite of these limitations however, I maintain that analyzing a priori voting power is an essential part of a complex understanding of power and representation in one of the most important international bodies charged with effectively ensuring a significant dimension of what can be subsumed under the umbrella-term “global governance”. The present paper therefore represents a contribution in this direction and a contribution to on-going debates on the positive and negative aspects of UN Security Council reform proposals.

Bibliographical references


53 This is in fact one of the most controversial issues between the proposals, representing the main difference between Plan A and Plan B in the SG Report and one of the main differences between the G4 proposal and the Uniting for Consensus proposal.


