Party membership in Latin America: a glance on current literature and the case of Mexico.

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to make a brief review of recent literature about party membership in Latin America, illustrating with the case of Mexico. One first glance shows that the topic is recent and there are few theoretical foundations in order to initiate the study of political party’s membership in the area. There is no relevant research about who are party supporters, under what incentives they work for, how large are their memberships, even if there are still any membership campaign of recruitment. There is also an absence of surveys made out to research purposes, therefore scholars need to look among European or American studies that include Latin American countries. This lack of research can be explained by two major effects of the path towards democracy: the arrival of new parties which have few grassroots working for them, and the decline of traditional membership recruitment (voluntary work, mainly) by political parties, because of the use of TIC’s that are less expensive and sometimes more effective, both reasons can explain the deficiency of studies about the topic. As an illustration of this lack of literature we made an approach using the case of Mexico.

Key words: political party, party membership, political activism

Membership and activism in Latin America

One seminal and quite relevant work on the topic that includes Latin American some countries can be the one of Paul F. Whitely “Is the party over? The decline of party activism and membership across the democratic world” (2010). Taking into account data from Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Venezuela and Uruguay this study shows the first figures about membership in a comparative perspective. This contribution also helps to understand changes over time using three models to explain those changes: civic voluntarism, cognitive engagement and social capital. Although the study is perhaps the best start point for the study of membership in Latin America is more likely to fit the old and more consolidated democracies, than the ones in the region, because their particular stage on democratization and the development of party systems.

Another book review essay from Steven Levitsky “Inside the black box: Recent Studies of Latin American Party Organizations” (2001) which report five relevant works on party
systems in Latin America: James McGuire’s “Peronism Without Peron: Unions, Parties, and Democracy in Argentina” that studies Argentina and Peron’s Justicialista party and the problems derived from that personalistic style of polity. The second contribution reviewed by Levitsky is Scott’s Mainwaring’s “Rethinking Party systems in the third wave of Democratization: the case of Brasil” which point out to the weak institutionalization of party system and the negative influence on the type of polity (neopopulist leadership, electoral volatility, low accountability, poor representation of popular interests and so on) in that country.

The third study reviewed by Levitsky is about Venezuelan case written by Michael Coppedege “Strong Parties and Lame Ducks: Presidential Partiarchy and Factionalism in Venezuela” notably important insight on Venezuelan regime and its strong dominance in all electoral processes, legislative agenda, and party organizations.

The study of parties in Chile and Peru that Levitsky take into account is the one written by Kenneth Robert “Deepening Democracy? The Modern Left and Social Movements in Chile and Peru”. This research attempts to put forward the concept of democratic deepening arguing that increasing citizen activism from social movements can be more important to develop democracy than traditional electoral systems.

One last contribution reviewed by Levitsky is from Kathleen Bruhn’s Taking on the Goliat: The emergence of New Left Party and Struggle for Democracy in Mexico” which is a very useful historical framework for analyzing the new parties in Mexico, especially the ones of leftist orientation.

The Levitsky’s compilation although is rather relevant for the study of party systems in some Latin American countries, can only be considered the basis, because what is necessary is to continue with the membership and activism topic.

Finally two major contributions may be considered relevant: the working paper written by Scott Mainwaring and Mariano Torcal “Party System Institutionalization and Party System Theory after the third Wave of Democratization” (2005) that is quite useful to understand the
level of institutionalization of political parties in new democracies that can be applied to Latin American systems, since institutionalization may include the size and permanence of membership. As well as the book written by Paul Webb and Stephan White “Party Politics in New Democracies” (2007) that particularly includes five Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Costa Rica and Chile. The best contribution of the whole study is the conceptualization and performance of political parties in these countries (includes also others from Eastern Europe) in a comparative perspective. The conceptualization of how party systems works in new democracies is exactly what was necessary to begin the study of party membership, and the first part of the book advance considerably in that basis. Three theoretical dimensions cover the cases: party connections with the electorate (partisan identification, electoral volatility, and membership change, development of party organizations over time and party performance within political systems.

This book offers to the scholars the best point of departure to make research on country cases, such as the one we present in the next section, which is devoted to Mexico and its development of party democratic system, but focusing at last in the subject of membership and recruitment patterns in two parties: National Action Party (Partido Accion National) and Democratic Revolution Party (Partido de la Revolución Democratica).

**Party membership and recruitment patterns: the case of the Mexican PAN and PRD**

Recent and influential comparative studies have shown that changes in opposition party membership and recruitment patterns were highly relevant in explaining transitions from competitive authoritarian regimes to fully competitive multi-party democracies in Latin America, particularly in Mexico’s transition to democracy. Greene (2007) shows that, alongside major changes in the country’s political economy, more open patterns of party recruitment allowed small and niche-oriented opposition parties with limited electoral appeal to expand into catch-all competitors with broader (and more centrist) appeal, and able to seriously challenge the dominant Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI).
However, to understand major transformations in party competition as well as party change and adaptation to large-scale electoral change, the study of party membership and recruitment patterns from a comparative perspective is still a major gap in the literature of party politics in Latin America. This section aims to contribute to fill the gap by examining the dynamics of political recruitment into the centre-left, Party of the Democratic Revolution (Partido de la Revolución Democrática, PRD) and the centre-right, National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, PAN) in Mexico, and how changes in party membership and recruitment patterns relate to other important aspects of party organization and behaviour involving: ideological positioning, the processes of candidate selection, and electoral campaigning.

**Democratization in Mexico**

Scholars of Mexican politics tend to agree that Mexican transition to democracy differed significantly from the elite-pact model of transitions described in the early action-focused democratisation literature (e.g. O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Przeworski, 1991). Perhaps the main difference in the Mexican transition was its departure point. For the most part of the last century Mexico was a ‘competitive authoritarian regime’ (Levitsky and Way, 2002) led by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Following its foundation in 1929, the PRI won every gubernatorial election until 1989, held the majority in Congress until 1997, and won every presidential election until 2000. The Mexican case is thus the best example of ‘dominant party authoritarian regimes’ (DPARs), a subtype of competitive authoritarianism characterised by ‘continuous executive and legislative rule by a single party for at least 20 years or at least four consecutive elections’ (Greene, 2007: 12). In spite of the academic

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1 Levitski and Way (2010a: 5) define competitive authoritarian regimes as: ‘civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbents’ abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents. Such regimes are competitive in that opposition parties use democratic institutions to contest seriously for power, but they are not democratic because the playing field is heavily skewed in favor of incumbents. Competition is thus real but unfair’. They define a skewed political playing field as ‘one in which incumbent abuse of the state generates such disparities in access to resources, media, or state institutions that opposition parties’ ability to organize and compete for national office is seriously impaired’ (2010b: 57) (For a review of the main characteristics of competitive authoritarianism, see Levitski and Way (2010a).

2 As Greene notes (2007: 15), ‘[a]ll DPARs are competitive authoritarian regimes, but not all competitive authoritarian regimes have dominant parties. To be considered dominant, incumbents must also surpass power and longevity thresholds’. 
debates on the various factors driving Mexican transition to democracy (socioeconomic modernisation, international pressure, economic liberalisation, institutional change, and opposition party strategies) (Molinar, 1991; Becerra et al., 2000; Beer, 2003; Merino, 2003; Eisenstadt, 2004; Méndez de Hoyos, 2006; Greene, 2007; Levitsky and Way, 2010a), it is almost undisputed that the move from a dominant to a fully competitive party system fostered a number of democratic features and institutions, involving effective separation of powers, divided governments, the increasingly marked role of Congress vis à vis the executive in the policymaking process, greater checks on the executive’s prerogatives, etc.

The role of socioeconomic modernization

The rise of a competitive multiparty system is, in part, explained by socioeconomic modernisation during the post-war period. At least until the 1970s, the ruling party’s public policies provided rapid and sustained economic growth, alongside relative welfare and social stability to the country. Although socioeconomic development explains much of the PRI’s long-lasting electoral success, paradoxically it also had major negative consequences for the party’s dominance. On the one hand, it gradually eroded its traditional rural bases of social support. On the other hand, it also provided the foundations for a more complex and pluralistic society by fostering the growth of more urban, better-educated, and middle-class sectors of the population, which eventually constituted the social bases of opposition parties’ support. A number of analyses on voting behavior using aggregate electoral data (Ames, 1970; Ramos Oranday, 1985; Klesner, 1987; Molinar and Weldon, 1990; Klesner, 1993, 1994, 1995, 2005; Méndez de Hoyos, 2006) provide evidence on the key role played by socioeconomic modernization factors, including urbanization, industrialization, education, and income, to explain the gradual increase in electoral competitiveness in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.

However, electoral competitiveness accelerated in the last decades of the twenty century as a result of factors other than those related to socioeconomic development. Méndez de Hoyos (2006) study shows that although socioeconomic modernization factors were significant
predictors of electoral competitiveness in the elections from 1979 to 1991, their significance as explanatory variables of competitiveness diminished from 1994 onwards. This suggests that, in spite of its salience during the 1980s and 1990s, the impact of modernization is not enough to explain the accelerated decline of the PRI during this period. Therefore, other relevant explanatory factors involving severe economic crisis in the mid-1980s and mid-1990s and major electoral reforms in the 1990s must also be taken into account.

The role of electoral reforms

A number of studies have focused on the role of electoral reforms in fostering electoral change in Mexico (Molinar, 1991; Becerra et al., 2000; Merino, 2003; Méndez de Hoyos, 2006). The large-scale electoral reforms that took place during the 1990s as a result of negotiations between the PRI and major opposition parties levelled the electoral playing field by introducing, among other features: a) changes in the electoral system, from a plurality to a mixed system (with an important component of proportionality); b) changes in the electoral administration, from a government-controlled to a more autonomous and independent model which improved the integrity and credibility of the voting and vote-counting processes; c) changes in the rules of party and campaign financing and parties’ access to the media, which provided opposition parties with important resources for competing against the PRI. Electoral reforms also established stricter campaign spending limits, reporting requirements, and sanctions against the use of public resources for electoral purposes, etc. In this vein, Méndez de Hoyos (2006) analysis provided evidence of a positive association between quantitative

\[\text{The first-past-the-post electoral system made it extremely difficult for opposition parties to win executive positions and legislative seats. Besides, the electoral formula allowed an over-representation of the ruling party, and under-representation of opposition parties (see Molinar, 1991; Valdés Zurita, 1995; Molinar, 1996; Becerra et al., 2000).}\]

\[\text{The highly politicised governmental model of electoral management limited opposition parties’ opportunity to scrutinise electoral processes since elections were completely organised and validated by the executive branch through the Secretaria de Gobernacion (Ministry of the Interior) and also made it easier for the PRI-government to organise and commit electoral fraud (Méndez de Hoyos, 2006).}\]
measures of the degree of fairness of electoral reforms and electoral competitiveness, even after controlling by socioeconomic modernization factors.

*The role of the economy*

Studies on economic voting indicate that retrospective evaluations shaped Mexicans’ voting intentions in the 1990s (Magaloni, 1999; Poiré, 1999; Buendía, 2004; Magaloni, 2006). Nevertheless, the impact of these negative retrospective evaluations was not as strong as in established democracies. According to the comparative literature on the economic vote, ‘when economic conditions are bad, citizens vote against the ruling party’ (Lewis-Beck, 1991: 2) (see also Fiorina, 1981). However, the PRI continued to win elections, even in the context of severe economic crises in the 1980s and 1990s. In fact, survey studies carried out during the late 1980s and early 1990s show that voting intentions for the PRI remained high even among those who expressed most dissatisfaction with the ruling party’s economic performance (Domínguez and McCann, 1996).

Two different but complementary explanations have been proposed for the protracted decline of the PRI in the face of severe and continuous economic crises. The first one focuses on the role of voters in ending one-party rule, and draws on a modified model of retrospective voting behavior. According to Magaloni (2006), the PRI was able to survive in spite of its poor economic performance in the 1980s because voters’ accumulated life experiences – through the many years of economic stability and growth – mitigated the negative evaluations of the PRI’s poor economic management. Thus, younger voters tended to turn away from the PRI faster than older ones simply because they had not experienced a longer period of economic growth and stability under dominant party rule. In contrast, older voters tended to weigh all those years of development against the more recent years of poor economic management, resulting in a more gradual turning away from the PRI. In contrast to prospective economic voting theories, which argue that economic crises also provide strong incentives to vote for the opposition, the revised model stresses the role of voters’ risk aversion in sustaining the PRI’s dominance. Voters in Mexico tended to fear opposition rule because they lacked enough information on the performance of opposition parties in office. This lack of
information also negatively affected the credibility of the PAN and the PRD in terms of prospective policy offers. Noting this, Magaloni argues that the PRI’s electoral dominance diminished only after the subsequent economic crisis in the mid-1990s, once the retrospective weight of many years of economic stability had tended to fade off, and voters had become more likely to take their chances and vote for the opposition.

The role of party change and opposition parties’ internal membership and recruitment dynamics

An alternative explanation, which emphasizes the role of opposition party elites and their strategies, is that the transformation of the PAN and the PRD from niche into catch-all parties propelled the dramatic rise of electoral competitiveness during the 1990s and the end of the PRI’s dominance (Greene, 2007). According to this theory, economic crises and the subsequent response in the form of economic liberalization fostered the PRI’s decline. Whereas during the 1980s the dominant party still enjoyed significant incumbency advantages, related to access to massive governmental resources (and their use for electoral purposes)\(^5\), the situation changed substantially in the 1990s as a result of market-oriented reforms. The privatization of formerly state-owned enterprises deprived the PRI of important sources of patronage and clientelism to buy back voters’ support and undermine opposition parties’ competitiveness.\(^6\)

\(^5\) The Mexican party system was characterized by dominant party hyper-incumbency advantages primarily obtained from diverting public funds for electoral use. These advantages were possible because of a) a large public sector; b) the PRI’s continuing incumbency status, as it held most of the executive branches at the federal, state, and local levels; c) the unrestricted use of such public resources for electoral purposes, due to an extensive and politically permissive public bureaucracy and the lack of an independent electoral management body with effective oversight and sanction functions (Klesner, 2005; Greene, 2007). As a result, the ruling-party elites were able to systematically skew electoral competition in their favor, significantly outspending competitors not only during election campaigns, but also in all aspects of party-development (Greene, 2007).

\(^6\) Particularly relevant changes were the privatization of public enterprises and other market-oriented reforms of the administrations of Presidents Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) and Carlos Salinas (1988-1994) and the electoral reforms of the 1990-96 period that increased public party and campaign funding and provided more equitable access to the mass media.
However, even when the dominant party’s incumbency advantages faded, and it faced increasing voter dissatisfaction with its economic performance, voters were still reluctant to vote for the opposition. While Magaloni’s work argues that this was due to voters’ fears, based on uncertainties about opposition rule; this second perspective looks at the failures of opposition parties to respond to a changing and more competitive electoral market. According to this theory, the PRI’s imminent demise was severely delayed not only due to structural factors, but also because of the opposition parties’ limited organizational and electoral mobilization capacity to expand their limited bases of social support. They could not exploit the expansion of the electoral market as a result of the dealignment of the Mexican electorate from the PRI, nor capitalize on the reduction of the magnitude of the dominant party’s resource advantages (Greene, 2007).

Both the PAN and the PRD were highly constrained by their origins as small, niche organizations characterized by ‘tight links to core constituencies and high barriers to new activist affiliation’ (Greene, 2007: 208). As Greene (2007) notes, the impediments to party development faced by elites and activists who joined opposition parties in their early stages, when resource asymmetries and the use of targeted repression were high⁷, forced them to build small party organizations with highly exclusive affiliation rules (either formal or informal), primarily oriented to recruiting ‘hard core activists who were more likely to remain active despite high costs and low benefits’ (Greene, 2007: 208).⁸ They were also forced to maintain tight, programmatic linkages with core (albeit reduced) electoral constituencies (the PRD’s electoral support came primarily from the urban poor and the PAN drew support from upper- and middle-class voters). These organizational models played a key role in the

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⁷ Opposition party-development during the authoritarian period was also difficult because of the PRI’s capacity to selectively target repressive measures against opposition parties’ activists, which substantially raised the costs of joining opposition party organisations (Greene, 2007).

⁸ Restrictive affiliation rules ensured that only those that shared the ideological principles of one or the other party were allowed to join them. Mizrahi (2003) argues that the PAN was a sectarian party that ‘institutionalized a set of internal rules designed to preserve its central ideological principles and safeguard it against political opportunists’ (2003: 52). The PRD’s formal affiliation rules were more open, however, ‘recruitment was de facto regulated by factions comprising partisan groups, social movements, and nongovernmental organization […] Factions operated as filters to ensure that only recruits who were known to share the party’s ideological line played a role in local leadership and party conventions’ (Greene 2007:190).
opposition parties’ development and survival in an extremely adverse electoral context, characterized by massive resource asymmetries between them and the PRI, and by targeted repression. However, they ‘were poorly designed for innovation’ (Greene, 2007: 208), and highly ineffective in generating the organizational changes required to take advantage of increasing voters’ detachment from the PRI in order to appeal to new constituencies and expand their limited social bases of support (for a similar argument on the PAN, see: Mizrahi, 2003).  

Thus, although the process of electoral dealignment provided ‘powerful incentives to the development of catch-all parties’ (Klesner, 2005: 135), opposition parties’ catch-all transformation was not easy, nor came without substantial internal tensions. Despite the diminishing PRI incumbency advantages, the increasing number of floating voters and fairer conditions for party competition during the 1980s and 1990s, a number of opposition parties’ ideological-programmatic and organizational dynamics – involving activist recruitment, candidate selection, and electoral campaigning – still displayed niche-oriented features in the mid-1990s that prevented them from taking advantage of growing electoral dealignment and so expand their limited bases of support (Klesner, 2005; Greene, 2007). The leaders, candidates, and activists who joined opposition parties in their early stages tended to prefer specialized policy appeals to core constituencies by means of grassroots campaigns.  

9 According to Greene (2007), these ‘quality rather than quantity’ affiliation rules and procedures oriented to recruiting only loyal and highly ideologically committed activists served a number of important aims. For instance, they prevented co-opting by the dominant party and the infiltration of political opportunists, and protected the scarce resources that opposition parties could generate for its members. Unfortunately, restrictive political recruitment patterns also limited the growth of party members and activists, as well as the arrival of new party leaders and candidates, able to transform both parties into catch-all competitors. Similarly, Mizrahi (2003) argues that the PAN’s highly restrictive internal ‘rules allowed the party to survive as an independent opposition party in a non-competitive regime, they became a source of weakness as the electoral environment became more competitive […] [these] rules restrain the growth of party militants, curtail the party’s flexibility to respond effectively to a changing and more demanding electorate, and hinder the PAN’s entrenchment among broader sections of the population’ (2003: 52).  

10 Greene (2007: 118) notes that this was particularly true in the case of the PRD, since ‘many older-style party elites had dedicated their lives to consciousness raising and local organization building’. However, it applies to the PAN as well, since campaigning was seen as a method to educate citizens and to disseminate the ideological principles of the party, rather than a vote-seeking instrument, by the older generation of activists (see also Mizrahi, 2003).
contrast, the more moderate and pragmatic personnel who joined them after the dominant party’s resource advantages had substantially diminished were more willing to make centrist appeals to the electorate at large through media-based campaign communication channels (Greene, 2007).\footnote{It should be noted that niche-oriented organizational features and behavior were mutually reinforcing and complementary. For instance, restrictive recruitment practices provided opposition candidates with passionate and highly committed party and campaign activists who fully engaged in labor-intensive campaigns, facing the challenging task of persuading voters to embrace their programmatic-based appeals and refuse the patronage-based appeals of the dominant party. However, the reduced numbers of these ‘grassroots gladiators’ posed important restrictions to opposition parties’ electoral mobilization capacity in the new, competitive campaign environment. Thus, one of the reasons that the presidential candidate of the PAN in 2000 built a para-party organization was not only to get additional private funds, but also to recruit campaign activists en masse in order to supplement the still limited activist base of his party (Greene, 2007).}

Thus, alongside internal ideological polarization and the preference for traditional electoral mobilization tactics, high restrictiveness in candidate selection processes and party membership and recruitment patterns explain much of opposition parties’ incapacity to seriously challenge the dominant party. Greene (2007: 208) shows that the catch-all-ization of both parties was a ‘slow and halting’ process that occurred only after a major shift in their internal membership and recruitment dynamics. As the PRI incumbency advantages diminished, and elections became fairer and more competitive, opposition parties turned out to be increasingly attractive to more moderate and pragmatic leaders and activists, who could transform them into catch-all parties able to appeal to a broader available electorate, and so challenge the PRI’s electoral dominance. Thus, ambitious leaders coming from the neopanismo like Vicente Fox were eventually successful in transforming a small, policy-seeking and highly restrictive party into a more open, vote-seeking organization, able to recruit members and activists from diverse sectors of society and make broader and more centrist appeals to diverse groups of voters in order to defeat the dominant party.

To sum up, although this perspective regards that opposition party development was strongly shaped (perhaps ultimately determined) by structural factors (e.g. economic liberalization, which substantially diminished the massive dominant party’s incumbency advantages), it
also shows that internal ideological conflict among rival party factions limited opposition parties’ strategic flexibility to successfully adapt to changing structural conditions.\textsuperscript{12} Thus, from this view, opposition parties’ transformation from niche to catch-all competitors (and the underlying changes in their party membership and recruitment patterns) played an important role in fostering electoral competitiveness and the democratization process.

\textit{Conclusion}

Over the last two decades of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, Mexican politics moved from a dominant party authoritarian regime under PRI rule to a fully competitive multiparty democracy. Mexican transition to democracy was a long and protracted process, driven by a number of mutually reinforcing factors involving socioeconomic modernisation, international pressure, economic liberalisation, institutional change, and opposition party strategies. Therefore, there is still considerable disagreement among scholars of Mexican politics on which causal conditions were more important than others in shaping democratisation. (Eisenstadt, 2004; Magaloni, 2006; Méndez de Hoyos, 2006; Greene, 2007; Levitsky and Way, 2010a).

Perhaps because the Mexican transition to democracy was characterised by the absence of key explanatory features described by the early action-focused approaches to democratisation (e.g. clear regime breakdown, elite pacts, etc.), scholars tended to exclude agency factors from their analyses, and believed that it was more appropriate to focus on the structural and institutional variables underlying the process of politico-electoral change. However, a newer current of work has reconsidered the role of party agency in the democratisation process by focusing on factors such as opposition parties’ internal recruitment and membership dynamics (Greene, 2007). According to this perspective, for most of the twenty century, the PAN and the PRD were small party organisations with limited electoral mobilisation capacity

\textsuperscript{12} In this sense, more open party recruitment patterns affected two relevant dimensions on which according to Levitski (2003), parties’ strategic flexibility depends on: leadership renovation and leadership autonomy (see also Burgess and Levitsky, 2003).
and primarily oriented to maintain strong linkages with loyal but reduced electoral constituencies.

Party elites and activists that joined both parties during the authoritarian period, characterised by massive dominant party advantages and selective repression created highly restrictive and rigid “party organizations that are slow to innovate in the face of new opportunities” (Greene, 2007: 175). Although these niche-oriented organisational structures were important – perhaps crucial – for opposition parties’ development and survival under single-party rule, they were ill-suited to adapting to an increasingly competitive marketplace for votes (Greene, 2007; see also, Mizrahi, 2003).

During the 1980s and the early 1990s, both, the PAN and the PRD were still internally divided. Substantial differences in policy preferences among their members produced major intraparty conflicts that contributed to the parties’ limited capacity to adopt catch-all party-building and electoral strategies that allowed them to take advantage of the new and more competitive electoral market of the 1990s, as a result of declining dominant party hyper-incumbency advantages and increasing access to substantial public resources for all parties in order to finance their campaign and party-building efforts. Both parties were only capable to challenge the dominant party after they solved intra-party coordination issues and their leaders decided to adopt more open party membership and recruitment patterns, exhibit more centrist policy positions, and target electoral constituencies outside their core bases of support. In fact, the PAN’s victory over the PRI in the 2000 presidential election was only possible after the party targeted both: core and new constituencies with more centrists and media-based political appeals.

According to recent literature in Latin America our contribution to the study of Mexican case and the parties in the new democratic era, may help to fill a gap to start research in the topic of membership. Of course this is just the beginning, future works need to cover size and performance on party membership. It is worth to mention that surveys on the topic are extremely necessary.
References


