It Takes Three to Tango? Re-Examining Ethnic Bargaining in Rump-Yugoslavia

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Introduction

In ‘Ethnic Bargaining: The Paradox of Minority Empowerment’, Erin Jenne claims that an effective way to understand the ethnopolitical mobilization of minority groups is through the relationship between a minority ethnic group, the state which hosts them, and an external actor which engages with the host state on the minority’s behalf.1 The text develops a theory of ethnic bargaining,2 drawing from the wealth of literature in ethnic conflict studies which has increasingly focussed on the agency of minority groups, and the conditions which affect their decision to act against the interests of the centre. Using case studies from Central and Eastern Europe, Jenne develops and tests a rational choice strategic model in order to explain and predict fluctuations in the political behaviour of minority groups in the region. The claims advanced by this study go so far as to suggest that the importance of a lobby actor will influence a minority to radicalise or accommodate the actions of the host state, even when to do so would be counter-intuitive. Advocating a dynamic theoretical approach, Jenne argues that this work goes beyond the limits of explaining minority actions using purely structural explanations, of which the economic features of a group are included as a possibly influential condition for conflict.

However, the large body of work by theorists investigating the relationship between economics and ethnic mobilisation, and the prevalent approach of conflict prevention through inequality-reduction policies, suggests that the economic status of minority groups deserves more than a cursory glance from those scholars who advocate minority bargaining explanatory approaches. In particular, the theory of relative deprivation between minority and majority groups, whether regionally concentrated or otherwise, as developed by Gurr3 and Horowitz,4 is widely referenced by scholars of ethnic conflict, although this is far from an uncontested issue. Yet in Ethnic Bargaining, economic explanations are either briefly mentioned, superficially engaged with or discredited when applied to case studies, despite Jenne’s concluding remarks that there is value in economic interpretations, providing that they are not treated in isolation.5 This paper does not advocate treating economic disparities between minority and majority as a mono-causal condition; on the contrary, it
suggests that expansion of the ethnic bargaining approach to include economic opportunity-structures, group features, and interpretation of economic signals, is a necessary adaptation for a model which places such a strong emphasis on rationality.

Meanwhile, as the majority of literature which investigates economics and minority radicalisation focuses on cases of civil war, violent rebellion, or secession, there is a case for arguing that prevalent economic approaches currently neglect the spectrum of non-violent and moderate minority claims, as are engaged with by ethnic bargaining theory. Additionally, existing empirical tests of economic conditions often struggle to account for the fluctuations of minority behaviour over time, which is another feature of ethnic bargaining theory that its authors present as its inherent value as an explanatory approach. By understanding that conflicts between a minority and majority are not predominantly conducted through violent means,6 encompassing economic features into ethnic bargaining theory addresses both the bias towards violence in the study of ethnic conflict, as identified by Jenne, but also the overwhelming focus on the relationship between economic grievances and violent minority mobilization.

This paper draws from these theoretical debates regarding the role of economics in ethnic mobilisation, and questions to what extent, if any, do shifts in the economic status of a minority, host state and kin state affect the ethnic bargaining game, particularly in times of crisis. The central contention of the paper is that the unwillingness of ethnic bargaining scholarship to critically engage with economic arguments reduces its explanatory value as a theoretical approach. It utilises recent work on minority mobilisation to argue that inclusion of economic interpretation by minority actors could be used to expand the levels of analysis examined by ethnic bargaining theory, and in doing so, address concerns with the limitations of this model in explaining minority mobilization. Such limitations include the way in which it oversimplifies the relationship between minorities and majorities, its reliance on visible radicalisation, and an over-emphasis of the agency that marginalised groups have in navigating opportunity structures. By expanding the triadic bargaining game to a quadratic nexus7 it is possible to scrutinise the simplifications that such a model relies on, and highlight the need to reconceptualise the way ethnic bargaining interprets the actors and structures at play in minority-majority dynamics. Multi-level analysis is another contribution that the inclusion of economic factors can make to this approach, as economic conditions and networks exist on the local, national, and international fields of interaction that the bargaining approach can include.

Furthermore, this paper contributes to the study of ethnic conflict from a minority-majority perspective by applying the ethnic bargaining model to the comparative cases of the Albanian and Hungarian national minorities in the rump-Yugoslav state of Serbia, with assessment of their fluctuating mobilization from 2006 to 2013. These case studies are placed within the context of the
global economic crisis of 2008, in order to further expand the model by exploring the potential effect that reduced economic wellbeing across all levels of the nexus has on the bargaining game. In doing so it examines how ethnic bargaining approaches can be scrutinised through the inclusion of this important structural feature, and why it has been neglected in previous research.

**Whither Economics? Minority Mobilisation and Economic Explanations**

Conceptualised frequently as the ‘greed and grievance’ debate, literature on the subject of economics and ethnic conflict is predominantly divided between approaches which explain the mobilisation of minority groups that either occupy a position of economic advantage or disadvantage with the central state. This includes studies of regional opportunism, ethnic divisions within labour networks, inter-group competition over material goods or resources, and the political economy of civil conflict and violent rebellion.

One strand of economic explanation that continues to be explored and supported by both theoretical and policy-oriented scholarship, is the concept of economic grievance as a highly influential factor for ethnic minority mobilization. Primarily developed by Gurr in 1970, recent work by Stewart and Cederman, Wimmer and Min, has emphasised that the issue of horizontal inequalities in multi-ethnic societies remains an important issue, whilst Regan and Norton argue that despite calls to look beyond the grievance argument, the relationship between inequality and communal mobilisation is a salient one. These studies, much like the wider field of inquiry, focus on the phenomena of violent actions of ethnic groups, and have neglected cases of minority mobilization which have not resulted in civil war.

The many varied differences in the minority groups that each theory may apply to has provoked a wealth of empirical studies and debate, and indicates that rather than being contradictory (for example, wealthy versus impoverished minority groups as being more or less likely to mobilise), the relationship between economics and ethnic marginalisation exhibits a variety of case-specific features. However, the central thesis of both these approaches is relatively similar; that minority groups are motivated to radicalise against the centre by the prospect of achieving economic advantage through political mobilisation along ethnic lines, and that the decision to do so is a rational one based upon cost-benefit analysis of the minority’s position in the state.

Turning to literature which introduces processes of bargaining to minority-majority relations, early developments of this approach advocate conceptualising minority behaviour as a bargaining game between minority groups and the state majority, with Brubaker introducing the term ‘triadic nexus’ to emphasise the role that third party actors (such as a national minority’s kin state) has on the outcome of such a bargain. All of these studies briefly mention previous theories of structuralist influences, of which economic status is sometimes included as one of many, alongside aspects such as
group size, territorial location, and salience of minority identity. However, they predominantly discuss the strategic mechanisms of minority-majority bargains, rather than alternative theoretical approaches to minority mobilization.

The ethnic bargaining text which has most comprehensively discussed the value of a bargaining model against more structuralist arguments is Jenne’s *Ethnic Bargaining*, which includes economic theories in its introductory review of existing explanations. In this introduction, Jenne prioritises regional wealth and relative deprivation theories, and cites studies by Fearon and Laitin and Herrera as ‘empirical work that casts doubts on the causal influence that either regional disparities or other economic grievances have on group radicalization’. Instead, she supports Collier’s argument that economics is only really influential through the material support for conducting violent rebellions, ‘insofar as they leverage the strategic power of the group’. The text then proceeds to test the explanatory value of the strategic ethnic bargaining model that Jenne develops, against the competing explanations that were originally reviewed, including the category ‘economic theories’, by applying these approaches to selected comparative case studies from Central and Eastern Europe. The conclusion regarding economic explanations of minority bargaining is not that there is a lack of value, but rather that they should not be treated in isolation as an influential factor.

In the analysis of each case study, economic theories do not fare particularly well. Jenne asserts that economic opportunism fails to explain Hungarian mobilization in Slovakia and Romania, whilst it incorrectly predicts the claims made by the Moravian and Slovak minorities in Czechoslovakia. Economic opportunism is also rejected as an explanation for the actions of Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia, and the behaviour of Hungarians and Kosovar Albanians in Yugoslavia is concluded as being the opposite to what theories of regional economic status would suggest. Based on the theoretical line presented in the text’s literature review, this is hardly surprising. However, when the details of these case studies are examined more closely, it becomes evident that Jenne’s interpretation of the economic features of each minority are more nuanced than the term ‘incorrectly predicts’ might indicate.

In the case of Hungarians in Slovakia and Romania, economic opportunism is the selected theory for analysis, but due to the slight relative deprivation of these minorities compared to the majority population of the host-state, which Jenne argues is significant enough to describe the minority-occupied regions as backward, surely interpreting the groups’ mobilisation as being influenced by economic inequalities would be a more applicable test. The case of Slovaks and Moravians is conducted in a similar manner but in reverse, with relative deprivation being described as the most applicable theory to test, and discredited due to the slight discrepancies between the economic hardship of minority and majority populations at the time. This begs the question as to why such slight differences between Hungarian minorities and the majorities of their host states were
considered to be valid for determining the minority regions as backward, and hence unlikely to behave in the way that they did, which was claiming for territorial autonomy. This discrepancy between value indicators makes it possible to discredit economic explanations in these cases, but the lack of consistency indicates that there is merit in re-evaluating the role that economics could play in minority bargaining.

This scrutiny is not to suggest that these theories are applied to the cases at face value, as in several of the cases Jenne isolates specific economic factors, such as the influence of market reforms in Czechoslovakia as a signal of policy intent to its regions. In fact, it is in the more specific analysis of economic features such as this that the possible contribution of economic theory to ethnic bargaining becomes tentatively apparent.

The Economics of Ethnic Bargaining

As has already been mentioned, Herrera’s research on regionalism in Russia as an empirical piece of work challenges the validity of material economic disparities as concretely affecting minority mobilisation. Herrera argues that the importance of material circumstances of minorities is less significant than the way in which minority leaders construct or “imagine” the relationship between the state centre regarding economic issues, such as investment in regional infrastructure, or federal budgetary contributions. Whilst this does not support purely materialist theories of relative deprivation, it still places importance on the interpretation and perception of economic features that minorities, supporting a call for economics not to be sidelined by ethnic bargaining theory. Moreover, Herrera’s work advocates a position which supports the constructivist nature of ethnic bargaining theory; that the discursive interpretation by minority elites of other actors’ signals is a process of utmost importance for the conduct of a bargaining game. Jenne tentatively supports this by suggesting that in the case of Czech market reforms, the importance for minority mobilisation ‘was not so much because of their direct material impact – which was still relatively slight – but, rather, because of what they signalled in terms of future government policies’. This is one way in which signals of economic policy intent could be encompassed by ethnic bargaining approaches, with an increased focus on how economic moves are interpreted by minority actors.

Another important consideration when examining the role of economics in the processes of minority mobilisation is that the causal complexity of such processes cannot be underestimated. Cebotari and Vink emphasise that group mobilization is ‘configurational, where an independent factor rarely leads fully to the presence or the absence of ethnic contention’. Their qualitative and quantitative work aims to understand why minorities’ mobilization fluctuates in intensity over time, and thus shares a similar aim to ethnic bargaining as a dynamic explanatory theory, which examines both the radicalisation and de-radicalisation of minority demands, on a scale ranging from cultural
rights to irredentism or secession. They are critical of research which treats ‘the impact of each condition on conflict, as is usually done in the literature’. Although the inclusion of economic issues specifically could be viewed as isolating one condition, synthesising bargaining and economic explanations could address their call for case-sensitive research where all conditions are treated as potentially sufficient, but not necessary for minority mobilisation.

This synthesis of arguments is developed in recently published research on external kin, economic disparity and minority ethnic group mobilisation, which draws from both the role of horizontal inequalities in ethnic conflict, and from triadic concepts of minority and kin-state relationships. Han, O’Mahoney, and Paik argue that rather than focussing on the deprivation of a minority relative to the population of its host state, a more influential relationship can be found in the comparisons made by a minority of the discrepancies between the economic status of itself, and its external kin. By doing so, they treat the external kin’s economic status as a reference point for a minority to interpret their own state of deprivation, which informs whether or not a group may mobilise. Yet they also highlight that their quantitative use of cross-sectional data does not account for specific fluctuations or transitions of minority mobilisation. This limitation does not signify that the structuralist and dynamic aspects of this issue are incompatible, merely that there is a need for further, detailed case work to go beyond the case studies of the Uighur minority in China and the Malay Muslims in Thailand, which they conduct prior to their statistical tests of the Minorities at Risk dataset. As ethnic bargaining claims to accommodate dynamic shifts in minority behaviour over time, this represents a further opportunity for bargaining studies to engage more specifically with certain structural or contextual conditions.

In order to integrate considerations of minority disparities and economic interpretation into the ethnic bargaining game, adaptation of the core ethnic bargaining hypothesis is necessary, so as to suggest how minority groups may interpret economic signals from other game players, as has been hinted at in the literature. The previous literature review noted that there are similarities between prevalent arguments of economic explanations, but also criticised previous engagement of economic theories in ethnic bargaining literature for discrepancies in the application of relevant theories to specific cases. I therefore establish how minority groups with different economic status within a host state may behave in a triadic or quadratic ethnic bargaining game, using theories of relative wealth or relative deprivation to develop hypotheses for interpretation of economic signals.

Working on the theoretical understanding that perceptions of negative or positive disparities in the economic status of a minority and majority could incite the risk of mobilisation, it is suggested that efforts made by external lobby actor to reduce these differences are attempts to influence the accommodation of minority actors. This can apply to both wealthy and marginalised minorities, albeit through different moves by non-minority actors. In the case of relatively wealthy groups,
unwillingness of a lobby actor to provide economic assistance or direct policy towards external kin could be interpreted by minority groups as an indicator that radical claims, framed around protection against exploitation by a backward centre, would not be supported by their lobby actor. Therefore they would accommodate the host state, even if to do so would leave the minority unprotected from any future economic downturns affecting the host-state. Similarly, for relatively deprived groups, the indication of an external lobby actor to reduce the economic marginalisation of external minority kin can be understood as a way of integrating the group into the host state, for example, through increasing education levels to enable employment in the public sector or by reducing the incentives of minorities to seek informal trans-border economic activities. The deprived minority’s response could reasonably be expected to de-radicalise from any existing claims framed in terms of economic grievance, as support from a third party has reduced the need for advancing radical claims against the centre in order to address certain inequalities, even if the minority remains overall economically marginalised by policies of the host state.

This hypothesis, that supportive and unsupportive economic signals from an external lobby actor can influence the accommodation of a national minority within a host state, explains possible conditions for de-radicalisation within a dynamic bargaining game not solely as a triadic nexus, as international actors in the quadratic sphere could also be responsible for making moves that are interpreted as such. The large number of international institutions, such as the World Bank and non-governmental organisations, which explore possible action of inequality reduction strategies, may also signify policy intent to increase the integration of economically marginalised groups into formal participation structures, or demonstrate an unwillingness to support the economic activities of increasingly radical groups which threaten the stability of a host state. Quadratic nexus bargaining in this form would address concerns that triadic ethnic bargaining models do not adequately reflect the influence that international organisations can have in issues of communal politics, and that by increasing the levels of analysis, the potential influential factors increase, making it more possible to discern the complexity of minority mobilisation within a wider context.

What has been neglected up until this point is how signals made by the host state could be interpreted by a minority, and the role that economic signals by non-minority actors could have on radicalisation. Shifting the focus onto the interactions between the minority and its host state reduces the ethnic bargaining game from the triadic or quadratic nexus, and emphasises the importance of domestic relations and economic conditions, both material and perceived. If third-party attempts to integrate a marginalised minority into formal economic participation, through indicating intent to reduce horizontal inequalities, are a contributing factor for de-radicalisation, then logically the same signals made by the host state could be interpreted in a similar way by minorities. As Jenne’s ethnic bargaining model treats host state movements as either being repressive or non-repressive, the alternative to de-radicalising policies could be visible intent to limit minority participation in majority
dominated structures of economic advantage, such as unwillingness by the centre to implement investment in minority-language university education.\textsuperscript{40} Limited policies by the majority which neglect inequality adjustment could therefore be treated as state repression, which according to triadic ethnic bargaining theory, minorities will radicalise against only if they perceive there to be adequate support for mobilization from an external lobby actor. For relatively wealthy groups, increasingly exploitative signals from the centre could also be interpreted as repressive, as although this would enhance the economic networks between the state and the minority, it could be understood by prosperous minority leaders as engagement which exists to benefit the majority whilst constraining the minority from utilising these resources for mobilisation.

Another important factor to take into consideration is the reliance these hypotheses make on the minority interpreting these signals as such. According to Cetinyan’s perfect information strategic model, the ability of all players to access the information which would allow them to correctly interpret the true intent of another actor;\textsuperscript{41} however, Brubaker’s nationalising fields of interaction argue that interpretation of the triad contributes to spiral of radical minority mobilisation.\textsuperscript{42} Jenne’s bargaining model treats minorities as actors which must attempt to navigate the various behaviours of other actors in order to infer the credibility of the intent such behaviour could indicate.\textsuperscript{43} Therefore it is entirely possible for minorities to misinterpret signals of economic assistance from an external lobby actor as tacit support for strengthening the group’s capability to bargain for future autonomy, secession, or irredentism, when in fact the policy was intended to reduce the appeal of trans-border economic migration. Alternatively, a regionally concentrated minority could interpret host state investment as a positive step in reducing inequalities, whilst the reality of improved infrastructure is implemented to facilitate resource extraction with minimal local redistribution.

The final issue to discuss in this section is the aspect of economic crisis. Further expanding the levels of ethnic bargaining, through awareness of a process which interacts, and potentially affects, actors at the international, national and local spheres, this paper seeks to briefly examine whether the shock of sudden negative economic indicators is influential to the bargaining process. Jenne argues that ‘the majority and lobby actor preferences can change suddenly due to economic shocks, changes in government, shifts in public opinion, or interest group pressures’,\textsuperscript{44} and that this complicates the minority’s ability to update its awareness and perception of the other actors’ intent towards minority groups. This idea is implicitly rooted in the belief that economic shocks, such as a crisis, can shift state and international level actors’ priorities due to a concern for their own economic prosperity and stability, which could lead to a reduction in the availability of resources to be allocated for de-radicalising minorities at risk. Rather than isolate the factor of economic crisis within the bargaining game in order to hypothesise, the following case studies will be conducted within a time frame of a global economic crisis, in order to observe how an economically-framed bargaining game is further complicated by such a crisis.
With the aforementioned complications of multi-level analysis, risks of misinterpretation, and the fluctuating non-minority actor preferences in times of crisis, this paper conducts a comparative case study of the Albanian and Hungarian minorities in the rump-Yugoslav state of Serbia, in order to scrutinise how economic concerns could be integrated into ethnic bargaining explanations of minority mobilisation.

**Exploring Economic Ethnic Bargaining in Rump-Yugoslavia**

This case study explores the integration of economics into ethnic bargaining by attempting to understand the minority groups’ fluctuations in mobilization through the relevant economic theories as identified in the theoretical part of the paper, and assessing the relationship between the perceived economic statuses of the actors, the way that moves in the game are framed in economic terms, and the minorities’ responsive behaviour.

It is necessary to begin the analysis at a transitional event, as Jenne’s game theory model assumes that the vulnerability which could be felt by a minority during a period of state transition means that ‘the minority prefers concessions to equal treatment’, and therefore the minority will express demands that require both the majority and the external lobby actor to respond with signals of either accommodation or repression (the majority) or support or non-support (the external lobby actor). The choice of rump-Yugoslavia as a transitional host state therefore makes it possible to begin the comparative analysis of minority bargaining in 2006, which was the year that Montenegro declared independence and formally ended the two-nation federation with Serbia, previously known as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. For minorities in the rump state, this transition could have demonstrated an opportunity to redefine their relationship with the state centre, and their position within domestic institutional structures. It could also have provoked a sense of insecurity, as the state had lost a significant proportion of territorial influence, and may have moved to secure its dominance over the remaining area of control, to prevent further secession from other regions and particularly those with considerable autonomy.

Serbia has also been chosen as a host-state due to the acute affects the global economic crisis has had on its economy. Although Serbia was initially sheltered from the crisis, due to its continued transition from the isolation of the Milosevic era, the consequences of the negative growth suffered by its main trading partners eventually affected Serbia’s growth too, through decreased demand. By 2009 Gross Domestic Product had dropped by 3.5 per cent from the previous year, Household Consumption reduced by 2 percent, and there was a significant decrease in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from 7.3 per cent of GDP for 2005 to 2009, to 4 percent between 2008 and 2012. This shift in
the economic condition of the host-state during the time period selected means that the possible effects that such a reduction in the prosperity of the centre may have on how an ethnic bargaining game is conducted can be examined.

The minority cases have been selected both for their suitability and their respective positions in the literature. The non-violent cases of Hungarians in Vojvodina and Albanians in the Preševo Valley both have a varying number of relational fields of nationalizing actors, presenting aspects of a triadic game between the minority, majority, and the minority’s external lobby actor, or a quadratic game between all of the above, but with international organisations as an additional field open to discursive interpretation. The Hungarian case also expands on previous research undertaken by ethnic bargaining scholars, whilst the Albanian case engages with a group which has largely been under-examined by minority mobilization studies. Regarding economic theories, each case is specifically relevant to investigation of different theoretical understandings of why minorities would radicalize or de-radicalize, as according to the hypotheses framed in the previous theoretical section.

Vojvodina as a region is considered to be one of the most advanced regions in the former Yugoslavia, and yet it is also one of the most ethnically diverse areas, with Hungarians only constituting a majority in the provinces of Bečaj, Bačka Topola, Mali Idoš, Subotica, Ada, Kanjiža, Senta and Čoka.49 When understanding minority mobilization through an economic lens, it is difficult to establish the Hungarian minority as an actor which may act according to advanced regionalism expectations, when such a region is inhabited primarily by the majority group whose economic disparities from the minority are under consideration. This study will focus on the economic status of municipalities where Hungarians constitute a relative majority with over 25 per cent of the population, in order to account for this regional distribution. By doing so the Hungarian municipalities can be classified as relatively wealthy compared to the centre, albeit by a slight margin, as all of the municipalities, with the exception of Čoka, were classified by an independent study in 2006 as being highly developed or within the national average.50 This assessment remained the same according to the official categorisation of all municipalities in 2012,51 and thus the Hungarian minority can be expected to behave according to the wealthy minority group hypothesis.

It is easier to establish why relative deprivation is the most applicable economic hypothesis for application to the shifts in mobilization of the Albanian population in rump-Yugoslavia. Concentrated as a total majority or sizeable population in the southern areas of Preševo, Bujanovac and Medveda, all three municipalities were classified by the Office for the Sustainable Development of Local Areas as being either highly undeveloped (Medveda) or devastated areas (Preševo and Bujanovac) in 2012. As with the Hungarian municipalities, this classification did not change from the independent study in 2006. In 2009, the official average rate of unemployment in Albanian
municipalities was 39 per cent; however, the International Crisis Group reported from interviews with local officials in Bujanovac and Preševo that unemployment was estimated to be around 60 and 80 percent respectively. This disparity between data highlights the challenge of establishing the precise nature of the economic situation of minority actors, but as according to Herrera’s argument, the minority’s perception of its economic status in relation to the centre is more important than the specific nature of the disparity and relationship.

**Hungarians in Vojvodina**

Prior to the moment of transition in 2006, the first organisation of the Hungarian minority was the formation of the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians (DCVH), after the Milošević regime dissolved Vojvodina’s constitutional right to regional autonomy in 1989. In April 1992 the DCVH adopted the *Memorandum on the Self-Government of Hungarians in the Republic of Serbia*, which presented the concept of Hungarian ‘personal autonomy, a local Hungarian government, and a regional Hungarian government with special [minority] status’. Amid the violence and repression of the 1990s, it was not until the end of the decade that a provisional Hungarian National Council was established, based on the contents of the 1992 memorandum. Vojvodina’s autonomy was not partially restored until February 2002 by the so-called “Omnibus Law” passed by the ruling Democratic Opposition of Serbia. Despite the passing of important minority rights legislation in 2002, there were reports in 2004 of a spate of violent and intimidating anti-Hungarian incidents within Serbia, which prompted pressure from both the Hungarian government and the European Parliament for the state to protect the minority.

By 2006, the Hungarians of Vojvodina had reached an advantageous bargaining position. Although provincial autonomy had not been fully restored to the constitutional status of 1974, the historical and institutional precedent for regional self-governance was still there, something not possessed by other minorities in Serbia. They also became the first minority in Serbia to have a kin-state in the European Union when Hungary became a member in 2004, which presented the perception of greater access to economic benefits for Hungarian kin located outside of the bloc, particularly through initiatives such as National Responsibility Programme.

**Minority Bargaining between 2006 and 2013**

Following Montenegro’s independence in 2006, Article 182 of the new Serbian constitution established the status of Vojvodina as an autonomous province within Serbia’s borders. This autonomy was defined by law as enabling provincial institutions to regulate matters including education, urban planning, healthcare, agriculture and infrastructure; additionally, it stated that seven
percent of the Serbian central budget should be allocated for Vojvodina.\textsuperscript{59} The lack of claims expressed by the Hungarian minority at this time suggest that during the period of transition they were content with developing the senior positions held in government at the next local and national elections. Meanwhile, stable trade relations between the kin and host-state were being consolidated, with a memorandum signed by Serbia and Hungary on co-operation between joint-owned small and medium sized businesses, most of which were located in Vojvodina.\textsuperscript{60}

The first explicitly stated claim on Jenne’s spectrum of minority mobilization, which echoed the declaration made by the DCVH in 1992, was in the run up to the May 2008 national and provincial elections. The Hungarian Coalition, comprised of the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (VMSZ), Democratic Fellowship of Vojvodina Hungarians (DZVM) and Democratic Party of Vojvodina Hungarians (DSVM) parties, contested the election with an underlying goal of ethno-territorial autonomy for the Hungarian majority municipalities in North Bačka and North Banat,\textsuperscript{61} a goal which had been explicitly stated in January by the leader of the VMSZ, István Pástor.\textsuperscript{62} After the polls, however, Pástor quickly backtracked, declaring that due to a lack of political will ‘it would be a multi-ethnic region, not a Hungarian region.’\textsuperscript{63} This shift in mobilization could be attributed to the underperformance of the Hungarian Coalition in the election, which achieved a modest 7.4\% of the Vojvodina Assembly votes,\textsuperscript{64} rather than any sudden economic shifts which occurred during that time period. The kin-state response to the territorial claim was wholly unsupportive, with the Hungarian foreign minister openly rejecting the possibility.\textsuperscript{65}

By 2010 the idea of territorial autonomy had been quietly abandoned, with the focus shifting to cultural autonomy for Hungarians, and the VMSZ branded itself as a regional party seeking full autonomy for the province as a multi-ethnic region.\textsuperscript{66} The willingness and ability of the minority to pursue cultural, rather than territorial, autonomy was enabled by moves made by both the centre and the Hungarian kin-state. The 2009 Law on National Minorities, which provided a legal framework for the formation of official National Minority Councils elicited promises of financial support from the Hungarian government for the work of the council and encouragement of Hungarians to collect enough signatures to hold elections for the body.\textsuperscript{67}

Alongside the move towards minority cultural autonomy, Hungarian representatives further shifted their claims from ethno-territorial to restoring the full multi-ethnic regional autonomy of Vojvodina. The Assembly of Vojvodina adopted a new statute for the province in 2008, which established decentralization which included designating Novi Sad as the provincial capital, and opening a representative office in Brussels to encourage external investment.\textsuperscript{68} Decentralisation at this level, despite being multi-ethnic and within the existing state borders could be interpreted by an economic ethnic bargaining model as a radical move, as Hungarian representatives held significant influence and key positions in the Assembly, and therefore through the statute could better protect the
regional budget from exploitation by the centre, whilst campaigning for greater investment in Hungarian majority municipalities. However, this was also prior to the economic crisis, and whilst Serbia was less economically advanced than the minority’s kin-state, there were no serious economic shocks which could push the minority to radically readdress their position within the state, and the statute reaffirmed the participation of Hungarian majority municipalities within the current borders of Serbia.

A statement in which the issue of autonomy and economic wellbeing were more clearly linked occurred at the end of 2008, when the VMSZ declared the republic’s constitution to be ‘unacceptable’, claiming that the stipulation to allocate seven percent of the budget had not been respected since the constitutional referendum in late 2006.\(^69\) This was to become a re-occurring statement of grievance prior to the parliamentary debates over the annual budgetary issues, particularly following the fiscal measures introduced by the state as part of its response to the global economic crisis. In the VMSZ’s opposition to the 2011 drafting of a public property bill, Pástor acknowledged the state’s restricted financial situation, but argued that there was a ‘discriminatory’ imbalance in the allocation of funding to the Vojvodina Capital Investments Fund.\(^70\) The following year changes proposed by the Vojvodina Assembly to the Law on the Budget System, which argued that previous changes did not follow the constitutionally allocation of 7 per cent of the state budget to the province, were rejected by the government on the basis that it would not follow ‘key changes in the fiscal policy’.\(^71\)

Despite the economic crisis impacting Hungary more severely than Serbia, due to Hungary’s membership of the EU and its comparative openness to financial markets\(^72\) in 2010 the kin-state remained committed to financially supporting the cultural autonomy of Hungarians in Vojvodina by supporting the VMSZ three-year minority education programme.\(^73\) The amendments made to the Act on Hungarian Nationality in 2010, which enabled non-Hungarian citizens to achieve dual citizenship through naturalization, and thus greater trans-border movement, employment and other economic benefits, could have been interpreted as a signal that the kin-state was utilising a trans-border citizenship regime to redefine its borders.\(^74\) The assertion from the Hungarian government that ‘this legislation does not create room for the conferring of citizenship en masse’,\(^75\) and the ongoing positive relationship between the host and kin states, enabled the minority to correctly interpret that this support for their freedom of movement was intended to consolidate their position within the state of Serbia, and to deter illegal economic immigration into Hungary.\(^76\)

Aside from the annual opposition to the budgetary allocation for Vojvodina, contention between the centre and the minority remained minimal until July, when the Constitutional Court declared that twenty provisions of the law on Vojvodina’s jurisdictions were invalid within the Serbian constitution, including the opening of a provincial office in Brussels. The minorities of the
province condemned the decision, perceiving it to be moving towards an abolition of Vojvodina’s autonomy, and the VMSZ reneged on a prior suggestion to Prime Minister designate Ivica Dačić that it would be part of a future coalition government.\textsuperscript{77} This refusal of the leading Hungarian minority party to join the central government demonstrates the importance of provincial autonomy to the Hungarian minority, and that the development of a National Minority Council was not a substitution.

The move elicited muted response from the minority kin-state, with the Hungarian state choosing instead to improve its relationship with the new government following the summer elections, however, the dispute over Vojvodina’s competencies continued into 2013. In April the provincial government sent a draft declaration to the regional government entitled ‘Declaration on the Protection of [Vojvodina’s] Constitutional and Legal Rights’, which accused the state of violating the province’s autonomous status, and the Vojvodina Assembly passed the declaration in May.\textsuperscript{78} Whilst the issue does not cleanly fit into the minority claims spectrum, as it is neither a purely Hungarian issue, nor a newly advanced claim, the contestation of the court’s decision by the minority persisted regardless of the continuation of kin-state investment into the region. This behaviour is tentatively in line with the economic ethnic bargaining theory that whilst the minority perceives there to be little support for radicalisation from the triadic or quadratic spheres, the most profitable course of action is to strengthen existing autonomy mechanisms within the state structure, even though they perceive the centre to be curtailing their economic capabilities.

**Economic Ethnic Bargaining**

The shifts in mobilization by the Hungarian minority can be tenuously understood in terms of economic theories of wealthy regionalism, but doing so elicits several analytical concerns. The first is that despite the aforementioned classification of almost all the Hungarian majority municipalities as being of higher than or in line with average levels of development, this classification is not supported by unemployment rates. There existed in 2009 a vast disparity between municipalities such as Subota, with a below national average rate of 19 percent, and Mali Idos, which with an unemployment rate of 47 per cent, was experiencing higher unemployment than in the devastated Albanian majority areas.\textsuperscript{79} This disparity continued to remain until the end of the bargaining game, with places such as Ada experiencing dramatic drops in unemployment from above to below the national average, whilst in all other Hungarian municipalities unemployment increased.\textsuperscript{80} The unevenness between the economic wellbeing across the area where claims are made by the minority representatives, with the VMSZ performing well electorally in all of these municipalities, shows that extent to which conditions must be bracketed in order to treat the minority according to a specific economic theory in a bargaining situation.
The second concern raised by the Hungarian case is the proportion of claim making which is framed around the status and resources of a multi-ethnic institution. Initially, the persistent attempts to protect the central budget allocation for the region corresponds with ethnic bargaining, as the unequal reciprocation by the centre to reflect the net contribution from the region is a key driver for radicalisation away from an exploitative host-state. However, the complication with such a theory in this case is that the regional contribution is multi-ethnic, despite the high development of Hungarian majority municipalities. Whilst the minority contention can be understood due to the high levels of participation of Hungarian representatives at the regional level, as that is the mechanism through which they can exercise the greatest agency over financial and economic issues, it also demonstrates the difficulty of applying a broad economic theory of mobilization to the specific experiences of one minority in the bargaining game.

Stability between the kin and host states, and the relative lack of quadratic nexus engagement with the region, means that economically framed moves by external actors to influence the minority’s behaviour are more subtle than perhaps they would be if the minority was treated as a relatively deprived group. Throughout the game, the triadic and quadratic actors do encourage the minority’s economic wellbeing within the current state boundaries, through investment, support for cultural autonomy, minority education and freedom of labour movement across the kin-state borders. It is difficult, however, to ascertain to what extent these efforts contribute to the minority’s behaviour, particularly as the VMSZ rarely expressed economic claims aside from the annual budget dispute.

Albanians in the Preševo Valley

The first significant moment of mobilization in the Preševo Valley, prior to 2006, occurred when Albanian leaders conducted a referendum in 1992, in which the population voted for unification with what was then the autonomous region of Kosovo. This vote was never transformed into material attempts to unify the Valley and Kosovo, but the referendum is often referred to by Albanian politicians when making claims against the state.

In January 2000 the Liberation Army of Preševo, Medveđa and Bujanovac (UCPMB) launched an insurgency campaign from the Preševo Valley, with the aim of forcing the removal of the Serbian state from the region, and unification with an internationally-backed Kosovo. The conflict ended with the NATO-mediated Konculj Agreement in May 2001, and governance of the Valley fell under the Čović Plan in order to disband the UCPMB, and assert the territorial integrity of Serbia.

A significant challenge to the Čović Plan occurred on January the 14th, 2006, when the self-titled Albanian Councillors of Preševo Valley signed a declaration which committed them to seek the “unification of Preševo Valley with Kosovo in case of... possible change of [Kosovo’s] borders.”
Despite the declaration of potential secessionist action, the councillors did not suggest that they would pursue the change of Kosovo’s boundaries through force, but rather that they would wait for regional developments to facilitate this change.

As has already been established, at the moment of transition in May 2006, Albanians were concentrated in some of the most economically devastated parts of Serbia, complaining of high unemployment rates, exclusion from public employment, under-developed healthcare and other infrastructure, and lack of access to education in Albanian. All of these factors determine that the group will be studied according to theories of relative deprivation, and whether shifts in their actual or perceived economic relationship with the centre, their kin-state of Kosovo, and the large number of international agencies interested in the stability of the Preševo Valley, affect the Albanian minority’s radicalisation or accommodation of the Serbian state.

*Minority Bargaining between 2006 and 2013*

Following Montenegro’s independence in May 2006, Albanian protestors in June called for decentralization and establishment of a self-administered region of the three municipalities in the Preševo Valley. Legitimised as a genuine claim with support from the President of the leading minority Party for Democratic Action (PVD), Riza Halimi, it was met with silence by the Serbian government and other actors in the bargaining game. Criticism of the state’s engagement with minorities, and the call for decentralisation, was repeated in the autumn of 2006, when the PVD urged Albanians to boycott a national referendum on accepting the new constitution of Serbia.

However, this rejection of the constitution was short-lived, as by January 2007 OSCE and European state ambassadors had convinced the four main Albanian party leaders Riza Halimi, Ragmi Mustafa (Democratic Party of Albanians), Jonuz Musliu (Movement for Democratic Process) and Skender Destani Democratic Union of the Valley) to form ‘the Albanians of Preševo Valley’ and break a fifteen-year boycott of parliamentary elections by running as a coalition. This participatory decision was facilitated by the Republican Electoral Commission, who prior to the election, reduced the signature requirement for minority party registration from 10,000 to 3,000, making minority contestation more achievable. There were also reports of pressure to integrate exerted on the more radical leaders (such as Ragmi Mustafa) by Hashim Thaci, the Prime Minister of Kosovo. Although Mustafa and Musliu later withdrew, the Albanian coalition succeeded in winning one parliamentary seat for Halimi, who consequently became the first ethnic Albanian Member of Parliament in the post-Yugoslav Serbian republic.

The first claim framed in economic terms, albeit partially, was the reaction of Albanians to the Ahtisaari plan, which in March 2007 argued that re-integration of Kosovo into Serbia was not
possible, and advocated instead for an independent, majority-Albanian state backed by the international community. According to ethnic bargaining theory, this signal from the quadratic sphere to the kin-state could be interpreted by the minority as an opportunity for radicalisation, and in September the leaders of the Albanian parties in Preševo issued a declaration supporting the plan, condemning the ‘sluggishness’ actions of the government run Coordination Body for Preševo, Medveđa, and Bujanovac, and claiming that the state was responsible for instability in the area which threatened ‘economic development’.

The Albanian’s concern that regional instability was hampering development became evident when Kosovo eventually declared independence in February 2008. Kosovo authorities immediately introduced stricter border and customs controls to emphasise their statehood, regardless of the consequences for ethnic-kin in Preševo, where cross-border trade effectively ceased. Whilst this negative economic signal from the kin-state did not prevent a ‘Coalition for Preševo Valley’ successfully running in the May parliamentary elections, a second economic effect of the independence led to a shift in the minority mobilization, after the Serbian Ministry of Education stopped recognising the accreditation of diplomas issued in Kosovo in August. Minority party leaders protested to the authorities in Belgrade, threatening to withdraw Albanian participation from the Coordination Body if the Serbian parliament decision was not reversed, as failure to do so would prevent several hundred Albanian students in Preševo to seek employment in Serbia using their qualifications. The threats were dismissed by the Ministry of Education, and responsibility for encouraging Albanians to de-radicalise and reintegrate into multi-ethnic governance bodies was left to international actors such as USAID who, through joint efforts with the Coordination body, signed a three year investment memorandum with the mayors of Preševo, Bujanovac and Medveda, whilst the French ambassador to Serbia pledged EU assistance to tackle regional under-development.

International efforts by donors and the OSCE to re-integrate the Albanian representatives into the Coordination Body were successful in March 2009, despite the outstanding unresolved issues of inhibited cross-border trade, and Serbia’s unrecognition of diplomas issued in Kosovo. Once again, the accommodation lasted only a few months before the assembly of the municipalities sent the government a proposal which reaffirmed the January 2006 declaration for establishing regional autonomy, proportional representation of Albanians in public institutions, and calling to reverse the diploma recognition decision. This declaration followed a statement from Kamberi, the mayor of Bujanovac, which denounced a drastic cut from the previous year in the annual municipality budget allocated by the Coordination Body, and that despite state investment in ‘infrastructural development, which had contributed to improving the quality of living…economic development projects had been lacking’. The perceived awareness minority actors had of their worsening economic status as a result of kin-state actions, and repression by the centre through exclusion of Kosovo diploma holders and underemployment of Albanians in the public sector, could have influenced the group to radicalise
their claims again, despite lack of support from their kin-state, and ongoing international assistance to improve regional economic development.

These latest claims preceded moves made by the government to visibly make progress on regional development beyond infrastructure projects. After years of stalled progress, in October 2009 the bilingual branches of Nis’s University Faculties of Law and Economics opened in Medveđa, with support from USAID and the OSCE, whilst at the start of 2010, 4.3 million euros were allocated to the Coordination Body from the central budget for infrastructure development. Nenad Djurdevic, the body’s director, highlighted that this was a ten percent increase from the previous year, stating that ‘the fact that the Coordination Body is one of the few state institutions that has received more money than it did last year, despite the economic crisis, clearly indicates that southern Serbia is a strategic priority of the government’. Meanwhile, the Albanian government took steps to establish economic cooperation with the region, through assisting Coordination Body projects, and encouraging private investment from Tirana, with the Vice-President urging leaders in the Preševo Valley to establish an Albanian National Council, as was enabled by the Serbian Law on National Councils of National Minorities passed in 2009.

This support, both economic and legislative, appears to follow the hypothesis that perceived investment from both the state and external lobby actors effectively promotes accommodation of the minority, as in June 2010 the Albanian National Council was finally formed with successful elections. This represented a huge step for both the cultural autonomy of the Albanian minority, but also for the attempts by other actors in the bargaining game to reduce calls for more radical, territorially based claims. However, the economic underdevelopment of the region was still a prominent concern for Albanian leaders, with the high unemployment rates and lower than average wages becoming a more pressing issue as the Coordination Body announced that donor assistance was ‘slowly drying up’ and the delayed effects of the economic crisis on the central state wellbeing became clearer. The minority could have perceived an economically weakened centre as a less formidable opponent to bargain with; however, they correctly perceived that a worsening economic state for the state as a whole would lead to reduced budgets for expenditure at multiple levels of governance. Therefore, rather than framing claims in economic terms, the next discernable move made by the minority was a mass boycott of the 2011 population census, which they protested would marginalise Albanians by refusing to include citizens living abroad, an important aspect for an economically depressed region which had experienced steady and significant labour migration.

The opening of a multi-lingual Department of Economics in Subotica as a branch of Novi Sad University in Bujanovac, and a joint Coordination Body and British investment project for Small and Medium Enterprises, were efforts by the state between October 2011 and April 2012 to further address development issues other than infrastructure. This investment may have contributed to a quiet
period of minority claim making, with only a partial, radical, boycott of the May 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections, and a brief but emotive conflict between the municipality of Preševo and the state-backed gendarmerie over the erection, and subsequent removal, of a memorial dedicated to UCPMB fighters in January 2013. Although the Albanians in Preševo did attempt to use the Brussels Agreement proposals for self-governing Serb municipalities in Kosovo as a springboard for claims of an equivalent arrangement in South Serbia, they received minimal support from the Kosovo Assembly, which passed legislation supporting Albanian civil rights, but within the existing state borders. These flare-ups between the minority and the state between 2012 and 2013 would appear to be actions driven by radicals, rather than as claims along the spectrum of mobilization made by legitimate representatives of the group.

*Economic Ethnic Bargaining*

This exploratory case study of Albanians in the Preševo Valley indicatively supports the inclusion of economic theories into ethnic bargaining analysis of minority mobilization.

The relative deprivation of the minority is regularly referenced by actors alongside and independently of other issues when expressing radical claims, whilst appearing to respond temporarily to efforts made by other game players to improve the economic condition of Albanians. The quadratic sphere of ethnic bargaining is also supported by the minority’s confidence in international actors’ involvement through direct regional investment and aid, joint projects with state institutions, and the influence that international institutions and foreign governments could have on the status of their kin-state.

Throughout the period of analysis, actors at the triadic and quadratic actors demonstrate awareness of a need for strong signals of commitment to investment and economic integration following periods of minority radicalization, such as the renewed claims for regional self-governance in 2009. It also demonstrates how economic investment and integrationist political institutions in the region are intricately linked, with the role of the Coordination Body as a decentralised, cooperative institution between the central state and local minority leaders, whilst also providing a degree of minority agency over economic governance structures, but within a structure which enhances existing borders and the legacy of the Čović Plan.

**Conclusion**

This paper has explored a way in which ethnic bargaining as a dynamic theory, could be developed in order to acknowledge the potential influence of economic structures for minority
mobilization. The developed hypotheses and subsequent case studies demonstrate that it is possible to expand previous ethnic bargaining models to include a quadratic nexus of analysis and contextual features of the circumstances in which a bargaining game is taking place, such as a global economic crisis. By doing so, it has addressed concerns that a triadic bargaining game does not effectively account for the influence and participation of international players, such as institutions or non-kin states, in relations between a host-state and national minorities. The Albanian study in particular has raised the need to be aware of the participation of secondary kin-states, when they display greater interest in the economic wellbeing and integration of a minority abroad. Emphasising the constructivist interpretation of economic status and moves by minority players also contributes to the dynamic nature of existing ethnic bargaining theories, ensuring that despite arguing for inclusion of a structural feature, the constructivist roots of bargaining theory are not distorted.

Although the case studies demonstrate minority behaviour which appears to support economic ethnic bargaining hypotheses, they also raise issues regarding the need for bracketing minority features, a reliance on observing the dominant ethnic voice, and the complications that arise when minority claims are expressed through multi-ethnic institutions, such as in the Hungarian case. However, the limitations of the two indicative case studies means that further and more extensive research is required to establish how these could be addressed, or whether these are necessary features of ethnic bargaining models which limit the applicability of the theory to specific minority behaviour. Whilst in both cases claims were expressed in economic terms, and moves made by other players to reduce minority radicalisation through financial means can be observed, the case studies also demonstrate that, in accordance with Cebotari and Vink’s research, relative economic difference between a minority and the centre is a significant but not necessary feature of mobilization.

Therefore, this paper concludes that the possibilities of ethnic bargaining theory remain open for discussion and engagement, particularly through the use of case studies beyond the area of Central and South-Eastern Europe. It welcomes the contribution that ethnic bargaining models make to dynamic theories of comparative ethnic conflict, but also suggests that it could be developed to address the existing limitations it relies on in order to retain a predictive capacity.

Notes


2 In this paper the term ‘bargaining’ refers to the discursive processes undertaken by actors (in this particular case, ethnic minority groups) in order to elicit demands or claims, be they material or symbolic from other, potentially opposing, actors (such as an ethnic-majority government). For example, bargaining for language rights could involve a campaign by ethnic minority representatives for a stronger legislative commitment from
the government to promote the use of minority languages in official documentation at local levels of governance. Such a bargain could be contested by the state due to the extra resources that a dual-language document policy would entail, and therefore may refuse to concede to the minority demand. For more on symbolic and material minority claims, see Kanchan Chandra, “Ethnic Bargains, Group Instability and Social Choice Theory,” *Politics and Society*, 29 (2001): 339.


21 Ibid., 4.

22 Ibid., 120.

23 Ibid., 157.

24 Ibid., 88.

25 Ibid., 178.

26 Ibid., 120.

27 Ibid., 153.

28 Ibid., 153.


33 Cebotari and Vink, “A configurational analysis”, 302.

34 Han et. al, “External kin, economic disparity,” 53.

35 Ibid., 64.


38 Smith, “Framing the National Question,” 3-16.


42 Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, 68.


44 Ibid., 45.


49 For specific demographic detail see Appendix A.


56 Ibid., 3.


66 Zuber, “Ethnic party competition beyond the segmented market,” 936.


88 However, this decision was inexplicably reversed one month before the 2008 national and provincial elections. OSCE, ODIHR, “Republic of Serbia Parliamentary Elections: Election Observation Mission Report” (Warsaw: OSCE, 2007): 6.


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Hale, Henry E. “A political economy of secessionism in federal systems”, *Department of Political Science Working Paper* (Indiana University, 2002).


Appendix A

Minority size and distribution across Hungarian majority and relative majority municipalities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Hungarian population (identified as according to the 2011 census)</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Minority percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kanjiža</td>
<td>21,576</td>
<td>25,343</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senta</td>
<td>18,441</td>
<td>23,316</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ada</td>
<td>12,750</td>
<td>16,991</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bačka Topola</td>
<td>19,307</td>
<td>33,321</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali Idoš</td>
<td>6,486</td>
<td>12,031</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coka</td>
<td>5,661</td>
<td>11,398</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bečaj</td>
<td>17,309</td>
<td>37,351</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subotica</td>
<td>50,469</td>
<td>141,554</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Minority size and distribution across Albanian majority and highly concentrated municipalities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Albanian population (identified as according to the 2002 census)</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Minority percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preševo</td>
<td>31,098</td>
<td>34,904</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bujanovac</td>
<td>23,681</td>
<td>43,302</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medveda</td>
<td>2,816</td>
<td>10,760</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>