The Executive-Legislative Relationship in Mexican Foreign Policy
Making: Conflict or Cooperation?

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Abstract

The objective of this paper is to analyze the relationship between the Executive and Legislative branches in foreign policy issues during the 2000-2006 period. While in quantitative terms there was not a significant change, the relationship between both branches was characterized by being conflictive. The key argument is that the confrontation between the Executive and the Legislative in foreign policy issues was due to the electoral interests of the key political actors. The paper is divided into three parts. The first one describes the theoretical and legal frame that explains the relationship between the Congress and the Executive in foreign policy matters. The second part analyzes this interaction from a quantitative perspective. Finally, the last part evaluates the relationship from a qualitative criterion, using the cases of the Mexican relationship towards the United States, Cuba and Venezuela.
Introduction

For a long time, the study of the relationship between the Congress and the Executive in foreign policy matters was not a priority among Mexican academics because the relationship was plain and simple. The Mexican Legislative Branch was subordinated to the president’s will. In other words, the Congress functioned as a rubber-stamp during the PRI’s regime because the Mexican president held practically a monopoly in the foreign policy decision-making process. Therefore, the political game among the political actors within the Congress was not relevant for the formulation process. However, this situation changed when the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) lost majority in the lower Chamber in 1997. Then, the Legislative branch has strengthened its political position vis-à-vis the Executive and has shown greater interest in participating in the foreign policy decision making.

The key argument of this paper is that, from a quantitative point of view, the relationship between Mexican Congress and the Executive was characterized by being cooperative since the majority of the initiatives that were presented by the former were passed by the latter during the 2000-2006 administration. However, from a qualitative perspective, the relationship was characterized by being conflictive due to the following reasons: a) the ideological differences on foreign policy issues between the president Vicente Fox and some legislators, especially from the PRD (Partido de la Revolucion Democratica); b) the new elements of the Mexican political system after year 2000 in which several political actors have more leeway after the end of the presidentialist regime; c) the political confrontations between the first foreign affairs minister, Jorge G. Castañeda, and some opposite legislators, especially in the Cuban and US issues; d) the
lack of will of president Fox to construct consensus among political parties inside Congress in key foreign policy issues such as Cuba, the United States, and Venezuela.

In general terms, opposite political parties inside Congress criticized Fox’s foreign policy in order to win political assets inside the country (especially in the electoral sphere) and the political party in power, PAN (Partido Accion Nacional), tried to back up Fox’s foreign policy decisions. Therefore, Mexican foreign policy during the Fox administration was a domestic issue of significant importance for the Mexican political system.

The separation of powers that resulted after Vicente Fox’ electoral victory brought about more leeway for Mexican Congress before the Executive. However, the separation meant more confrontations between the two branches instead of more cooperation.

The paper is divided into three parts. The first one describes the theoretical and legal frame that explains the relationship between the Congress and the Executive in foreign policy matters. The second part analyzes this interaction from a quantitative perspective. Finally, the last part evaluates the relationship from a qualitative criterion, using the cases of the Mexican relationship towards the United States, Cuba and Venezuela.

1. The relationship between Congress and the Executive in foreign policy: ¿Checks and balances?

There are several scholarly works that have analyzed the relationship between Congress and the Executive in foreign policy matters (Thurber, 1996; Vanderbush, 2002; Mann, 1990; Lehman, 1976; Hamilton, 2002; Crabb, 1992). Most of these works center on identifying patterns of cooperation and conflict between these two branches in the
foreign policy decision making process. These authors have revised the legal and extralegal prerogatives that each actor has in this sphere. The conclusion is that both the Executive and the Congress share powers and responsibilities in international affairs. Normally, Congress broadly cooperates in themes that are priority for national interests. In secondary issues, there could be some conflict because both try to impose their views in such topics. In electoral periods, opposite lawmakers attack the foreign policy of the incumbent party to gain political benefits and attract votes for their party.

Usually, the Executive is the actor that influences the most in the foreign policy decision making process because, generally, he has formal and informal powers that give him more advantages and leeway before other actors. The formal powers are bestowed by the Constitution and the informal powers are derived from the functioning of the political system and the political customs. Generally, the main powers of the Executive in foreign policy are: to be responsible of the general foreign policy of the nation; to appoint diplomatic posts; to sign international treaties; to declare war on behalf of the nation; and to be the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. On the other hand, congresses are in charge of ratifying treaties, approving diplomatic appointments, authorizing the declaration of war and the movement of military troops abroad, and allocating budget for foreign policy objectives.

In general terms, the relationship revolves around the check-and-balances process. In other words, lawmakers try to oversee the foreign policy conduct of the Executive and attempt to influence the decision making process. The goal is to serve as a balance so the Executive does not exceed in its functions. There are several strategies that congresses use to control the Executive: such as the allocation or not of financial resources, the rebuff of a diplomatic appointment or a treaty, and exhortations to act or not to in a certain manner or issues.
As for the Executive, he also tries to broaden his prerogatives in foreign policy matters and to avoid the Congress from obstructing his initiatives in this topic. His strategies are: executive agreements (they are to circumvent the congress since these agreements do not need congressional approval), request of special powers, lobbying among lawmakers and presentation of bills to reform legislation to have broader scope.

Generally, the relationship between Congress and the Executive in foreign policy is conflictive because both try to maintain and broaden theirs powers in this matter. In other words the relationship is characterized by a constant struggle between both of them so their preferences prevail. Other source of conflict has been the interpretation of the legislation regarding their prerogatives in foreign policy issues. Some presidents argue that the Constitutions provide them with ample powers and, for this reason, they do not have to consult with the Legislative in this matters. On the other hand, lawmakers insist that they play an important role in foreign policy decisions and, thus, they have to be consulted. However, in crisis situations, congresses tend to support the Presidency. In these cases, schemes of cooperation may arise between both of them.

Some academicians (Rourk, 1991, p. 128) have claimed that the Executive branch has supremacy in the foreign policy decision making process due to the formal an informal powers presidents have. The reasons of this supremacy are the following: a) presidents have a broader view of what is best for the country’s national interests, while lawmakers represent a multitude of regional and local interests; b) the Executive relies on a professional staff and count on accurate information; c) the president has a broader margin of negotiation while Congress only has to say yes or no to treaties; d) diplomacy requires international leadership, speed, secrecy, and expertise. Normally, the Executive has these characteristics. Congress’s leadership is scattered, its decision process is slow,
leaks information and has little expertise in foreign policy matters compared to the Executive.

The legal framework

The 1917 Mexican Constitution establishes the legal framework of the relationship between Congress and the Executive with regard to foreign policy issues. Article 89 establishes that the faculties and liabilities of the President are: 1) to appoint the ministers, diplomatic agents and general consuls, with the approval of the Senate; 2) to appoint, with the consent of the Senate, the superior officials of the army; 3) to command the whole Army for national security matters; 4) to declare war on behalf of the nation and 5) to direct the foreign policy and celebrate international treaties, subjecting them to the approval of the Senate. In 1987, the Constitution was reformed to include the traditional tenets of the Mexican foreign policy.

According to the Constitution, the powers of Mexican Congress in the foreign policy area are: to declare war, in the light of information submitted by the Executive; to fix and to approve the bases upon which the President of the Republic may borrow on the credit of the Nation; to enact laws with regard to nationality, the legal status of foreigners, citizenship, naturalization, emigration and immigration; to enact laws for the organization of the Mexican Diplomatic Corps and Consular Corps; to grant leaves of absence to the President of the Republic, and to levy taxes on foreign commerce.

The exclusive powers of the Senate on foreign policy are: to analyze the foreign policy that the Mexico carries out, based on the annual reports presented by the President and the Foreign Affairs Ministry, to approve treaties and diplomatic conventions made by the President of the Republic with foreign powers; to ratify the
appointments of diplomatic agents, consuls general, and other superior chiefs of the national army, navy and air force, in accordance with provisions of law; and to authorize the departure of national troops beyond the borders of the country, the passage of foreign troops through the national territory, and the sojourn of squadrons of other powers for more than one month in Mexican waters.

2. The relationship between Mexican Congress and the Executive in foreign policy during president Vicente Fox’s term from a quantitative perspective

During the 2000-2006 administration, the main points of contact between Mexican Congress and the Executive in foreign policy issues were: diplomatic appointments, leaves of absence, approval of treaties, bills to reform legislations, and puntos de acuerdo (points of agreement). This section aims at proving that, in quantitative terms, there was cooperation between the two branches since most of the initiatives sent by the Executive were approved by the Congress.

From December 2000 to November 2006, Vicente Fox presented a total of 114 diplomatic appointments before Congress. All of them were passed by the lawmakers. Thus, the rate of success of the president was 100%. In this area, the cooperation was significantly high. As for approval of international treaties, the Executive sent 181 instruments to the Congress, from which 179 were accepted. The cooperation was high because the rate of success was 99%.

In other topic, Vicente Fox requested 65 leaves of absence, from which 63 were approved. The rate of success was 97%. Only two times Mexican Congress denied the permit to Vicente Fox to make an international visit. One of them was in April 2002 when the Mexican president had plans to visit Canada and the United States. The Congress rejected the authorization arguing that it did not agree on Vicente Fox’s
foreign policy to Cuba. ¹ That was the first time in Mexico’s history that the Congress rejected a leave of absence for the president. The impact in quantitative terms was scant; but, in a qualitative point of view, the impact was high. The second occasion was in November 2006 when President Vicente Fox had plans to attend the APEC summit in Vietnam and to pay a diplomatic visit to Australia. Even though the Senate passed the authorization before, the lower chamber rejected the permit arguing that the political situation in Mexico cannot afford the absence of the president. Angry for the decision, Vicente Fox claimed that the Congress had kidnapped him and had poised Mexico’s prestige at risk.

**Figure 1**

Diplomatic appointments, Approval of Treaties, Bills to Reform Legislations, and Leaves of Absence 2000-2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Presented by the Executive</th>
<th>Approved by the Congress</th>
<th>Rate of Success</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic Appointments</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approval of Treaties</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaves of Absence</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bills to Reform Legislation</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *La diplomacia parlamentaria del Senado durante las Legislaturas LVIII Y LIX*, Coordinación General de Asuntos Internacionales y Relaciones Parlamentarias del Senado de la República and data found in Sistema de Información Legislativa, Secretaría de Gobernación.

One of the key trends of the relationship between Congress and the Executive in foreign policy issues was the constant struggle for them to broaden their powers in this area. On one hand, Fox administration was interested in reforming the Constitution to have more leeway in foreign policy decisions. On the other hand, Congress tried to strengthen its position as a foreign policy overseer. During the six-year term, the federal Executive presented 28 bills related to foreign policy issues. From this total, 22 were passed by the Congress. Therefore, President Vicente Fox’s rate of success was 79%, the lowest compared to the other areas.

As for the lawmakers, they also presented several bills to reform legislation on foreign policy issues to try to balance the supremacy of the Executive in this area. In this period, 2000-2006, legislators from all political parties proposed a total of 108 bills on the subject. However, only 5 pieces of legislation passed. Therefore, the rate of success was only 5% among lawmakers. As one can see, the number of bills presented by lawmakers increased considerably after the end of the PRI’s regime. This amount indicates two things: On one hand, legislators are more interested in participating in the foreign policy decision making process since they have more leeway after the presidentialist era ended. On the other, they also want to have more control on the Executive in foreign policy issues. The scant quantity of bills passed points out that there is little consensus among political parties inside the Congress on foreign policy matters.

Another element that embraces the relationship between these two powers is the Proposiciones con Punto de Acuerdo (propositions with points of agreement). They are a mechanism that the Congress has in order to influence the Executive’s public policy. They are not mandatory for the president since there is not a law that obligates him to carry out them. There are several types of “points of agreement”: simple exhortations, requests of information, solicitud de comparecencias (petitions so cabinet members of the federal government go to the Congress to explain, through hearings, the Executive’s main policies), extrañamientos, (censures), and compliments, inter alia.

In the period between December 1, 2000 and November 30, 2006, the different political actors presented in both legislative chambers a whole of 600 Propositions with Point of Agreement related directly or indirectly to international topics. The number is significant because it is the highest in the legislative history in Mexico. For example, in the LVIII Legislature 176 PPA were presented, whereas in the LIX a total of 389 were
proposed. Of the 600 that were put forward, only 313 were approved. In other words, the rate of success was scarcely 52%. This quantity also shows little consensus inside the Congress in foreign policy.

The political party that presented more PPA in foreign policy was the PRD with a total of 169. But it also was the party that had more not approved: 97. Its rate of success was 42%. The party with more PPA approved was the PRI, since 107 were accepted from a total of 164. Its rate of success was 65%, highest of all the parties inside Congress. PAN presented 78, of which 50 were approved. Its rate of success was 64%.

**Figure 2**
Number of “Points of Agreement” 2000-2006

Puntos de acuerdo por actores 2000-2006

Source: Own elaboration from date obtained in Sistema de Información Legislativa, Secretaría de Gobernación
Most of the “points of agreement” centered on the following topics: U.S-Mexican migration, drug trafficking, security, trade, human rights, Cuba, environment and others. A “point of agreement” approved by the Congress does not mean that the Executive will make it reality automatically. As a rule, the Foreign Affairs Ministry (SRE in Spanish) follows up all the points of agreement approved in the Legislative branch that are related to foreign policy. Nevertheless, the Executive do not follow them to the letter.
In sum, this part has shown that the relation between the Executive and the Congress, in quantitative terms, had a good level of cooperation because the majority of the initiatives (diplomatic appointments, ratification of treaties, leaves of absence, and legal reforms, etc.) presented by President Fox were approved by the legislators. Now it is necessary to evaluate the relation from a qualitative perspective.

3. The relationship between Congress and the Executive: Cooperation or conflict? A qualitative analysis

This part seeks to demonstrate that, from a qualitative point of view, the relationship between the Executive and the Legislative was conflictive during the 2000-2006 presidential term. At the beginning, the problem was originated from the confrontation between the first Foreign Affairs Minister, Jorge Castañeda, and some lawmakers and the lack of consensus between the legislators and the Executive. Afterwards, the principal motivation of the opposite political parties was to attack the president overtly in foreign policy topics to obtain electoral benefits.

Executive-Congress relations in Mexican-US relationship

The relationship between the Executive and the Congress in the US-Mexican bilateral relationships was not smooth at all. In a general way, the opposition parties inside the Congress devoted themselves to criticize Vicente Fox's work in this matter. The principal critique was that Vicente Fox's administration was lining up to the US interests and violating Mexico’s sovereignty. The reality was that leftist parties were alluding to Mexican nationalism to criticize Vicente Fox because that could bring about gains in the
electoral processes. The topics of major friction were the collaboration of Mexico in national security matters after September 11 and the migration issues.

After the 9/11 attacks, President Fox offered his “unconditional support” to the United States and its cause. That declaration caused a stir among Mexican legislators, especially for the use of the word "unconditional". Thinking that Mexico would line up to the US national security policy unconditionally, Congress members demanded that the support was in the limits of national sovereignty.

The acid test of Mexico’s cooperation towards the United States came at the beginning of 2003. Mexico, as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, had to vote in favor or in opposition to the US initiative to invade Iraq. The matter had caused an intense internal debate. Congress demanded that Mexico’s vote was against the use of force, as the Constitution marks it. Publicly, Vicente Fox opted for the pacific solution of the conflict and advanced that the Mexican vote would go in that sense; but privately he had not made up his mind. Fox's lack of definition was causing a crisis between Congress and the Executive. Fortunately for Mexico, there was no need to emit a vote in the Security Council because the United States decided, without the authorization of UN and with the support of Spain and Great Britain, to attack Iraq in March, 2003 to oust Saddam Hussein.

In its security policy in North America, Bush government called for a trilateral meeting among Canada, Mexico and The United States, March, 2005. By US request, the three countries created the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPPNA), which aimed at closing the borders to terrorism, organized crime, drugs, and at sharing intelligent information. The opposition parties inside the Congress criticized Fox's administration because they considered that, with this arrangement, Mexico was lining up to US interests in security topics. For the nature of the agreement, some of
them deemed that the Executive should have submitted the agreement to Congress approval. But Vicente Fox's administration simply did not consider it to be necessary.

Another source of major conflict between the Congress and the Executive during Fox's administration was the migration issue. Each time the US government passed an anti-immigrant measure, Mexican legislators demanded from President Fox a decided action against Washington. PRD legislators even proposed the withdrawal of the Mexican ambassador to the United States as a form of protest. In other occasions, legislators asked the Executive to present diplomatic letters of protest before the US government and to sue it before international organizations.

The passing of Proposition 200 in the state of Arizona, which goal is to avoid the using of funds for undocumented workers in education and health services, and the approval of a migratory reform that allowed the construction of a wall in the border were the principal topics that caused tension between both powers. Most of the times, the opposition parties inside the Mexican Congress considered the Executive's response "weak" before the US government.

Another source of conflict was the violence of US authorities against Mexican migrants, especially the murders along the border and violations to their human rights. In an unusual consensus, the three main political forces inside the Congress, PAN, PRI, and PRD, demanded a firm response before the increasing violence against Mexican migrantes. In sum, the migratory topic, instead of allying the Executive and the Congress to construct consensus and joint solutions, was a factor of division between both powers.

The diplomatic crisis with Cuba and Venezuela

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During Vicente Fox's six-year term, Mexico was involved in several diplomatic crises with Latin-American countries. In this context, the relationship between Congress and the Executive was marked by confrontation and mutual critiques, by differences of opinion regarding foreign policy, and the Congress’ attempt to try to, independently, solve those crises.

The key topic in the Executive-Congress relationship with regard to Cuba was the Mexican vote in the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva. A group of legislators inside the Congress was interested in maintaining the traditional Mexican foreign policy position, which was to abstain in the voting. In 2001, before the meeting in Geneva, the Mexican Congress approved a “point of agreement” requesting President Fox to abstain from supporting the resolution that was condemning Cuba. Due to the pressure exercised by the Mexican Congress, the Fox's administration decided to abstain in the voting that year.

However, there were some incidents with Cuba that caused tension between the president and the Congress. In February, 2002, Vicente Fox visited the island and the SRE assured the Senate that the president had no plans to meet with Cuban dissidents. Nevertheless, the president Fox did meet with leaders of the opposition groups before returning to Mexico. The decision to meet with activists was very criticized by Mexican legislators and they immediately requested Castañeda’s resignation for having lied to them. By the end of March of the same year, Mexico hosted the UN International Conference on Financing for Development. At the end of his speech, Fidel Castro said that he had to leave hurriedly due to a “special situation”. Later on, Mexican legislators requested Castañeda to attend to Congress to explain the issue. Castañeda simply
refused to give explanations, which generated major tension between the SRE and the Legislative branch.

In April, 2002, the Senate again passed a “point of agreement” regarding the Mexican vote in Geneva. In the document, the legislators exhorted the president to emit an abstention vote. It was clear that the representatives were very interested in influencing the decision of the Executive with regard Mexico’s vote in Geneva. Ignoring to the Congress’ “point of agreement”, the Executive voted in favor of the resolution that was criticizing Cuba. Many legislators felt offended because the Executive had ignored their exhortation.

In 2004, the scenario was very similar. The opposition political parties in the Congress exhorted the president to emit a vote of abstention. On April 15 Mexico voted in favor of the resolution that censured Cuban human rights. Political parties, except PAN, were surprised at the decision that the Fox’s government took on the Cuban topic. These expressions confirmed the lack of consensus between the Congress and the Executive on the policy towards Cuba.

After Cuba extradited a businessman accused of fraud in Mexico and Fidel Castro declared that Mexico’s international prestige had turned into ashes, the president Fox decided to expel the Cuban ambassador in Mexico and to withdraw the Mexican ambassador in Havana. The measure caused one of the most serious diplomatic crises between Mexico and Cuba. Opposition political parties in Congress labeled the decision as "lamentable" and "erratic". PAN was the only party that supported the decision.

Afterwards, the Congress passed a “point of agreement” in which called the ministers of the Interior and Foreign Affairs to “appear” before them to explain the decision in a kind of a “congressional hearing”. PAN tried to defend the president’s decision but it could not avoid the approval of the “point of agreement”. Later,
Congress exhorted the president to resume diplomatic relations with Cuba at the highest level. Months later, and thanks to the Congress pressure, Mexico and Cuba re-established diplomatic relationships at ambassador’s level.

By the end of 2005, Vicente Fox’s government again was involved in a diplomatic crisis with a Latin-American country. This time, the turn was for Venezuela. The origin of the conflict is located in the fourth Summit of the Americas celebrated in Mar de Plata, Argentina, between November 4 and 5. The Mexican president insisted that the summit had to encourage free trade among American countries and to revive FTAA. Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela responded that the meeting was not to discuss free trade and that they did not agree in the conformation of the FTAA. After the meeting, Mexico and Argentina entered into a diplomatic crisis due to Vicente Fox's adverse declarations. However, the problem was solved rapidly. After that, some Mexican legislators criticized Vicente Fox for involving Mexico again into a diplomatic crisis with no sense.

After Mexico and Argentina had solved their differences, Hugo Chávez entered the ring and offended the Mexican president. He affirmed that he was sad because Mexico had a president who “kneels down” to the “US Empire”. Then, Venezuela and Mexico withdrew their respective ambassadors and left the relation to a level of “business attachés”. Mexico was again entering to a spiral of diplomatic crisis with Latin-American countries. In this context, some Mexican legislators proposed to limit the abroad trips of the Mexican president to avoid more crises. Obviously the initiative was not approved because of PAN’s opposition. In Mexico, there were varied reactions. On the one hand, a group of deputies of the PRD supported Venezuela. PAN supported the President Fox’s decision.
During the 2006 presidential campaigns, President Fox and the PAN candidate, Felipe Calderon, used the conflict with Venezuela to criticize PRD. PRD followed suit: to criticize PAN for its erratic foreign policy. This demonstrates that, behind the conflict between the Executive and the Legislative branches, there was the struggle for power in the 2006 presidential election.

Conclusions

Vicente Fox's arrival to the presidency in December 2000 modified the relationship between Congress and the Executive in foreign policy matters. The legislators’ interest in taking part in the decision making process increased considerably. This increasing interest was due to the leeway that the Congress obtained after the democratic opening in Mexico. Thus, Congress had direct access to topics that it did not have very much space before, as it was foreign policy. The bulky number of initiatives to reform legislation and “points of agreement” related to foreign policy, principally in the LIX Legislature, are samples of this increasing interest.

Even though from a quantitative point of view there was a considerable cooperation between both actors, the truth was that, under a qualitative criterion, the relationship was characterized principally by conflict. The area in which there was more cooperation was in the appointment of diplomats and ratification of international treaties. The majority of these Executive proposals were approved by Congress. Even though for the first time in history the Legislative denied the authorization of a leave of absence, the rate of success of the Executive in this area was relatively high. The problem was that the impact of those decisions was significant in qualitative terms.
The key characteristics of the relation between the Executive and the Legislative in foreign policy matters during Vicente Fox's six-year term were: 1) a constant clash between both powers in particular topics, such as Cuba, migration, and cooperation with the US in national security policy; 2) a tenacious struggle for extending their legal leeway in foreign policy topics through legislation change and “points of agreement”; 3) a separation of powers that was reflected in the Congress’ attempt to influence the decision making process and to assume independent foreign policy positions from the Executive; and 4) a slightly effective system of checks and balances to oversee each other mutually and to avoid excesses between them.

The reasons that explain the clash between both branches are: the ideological differences among the political parties inside Congress, particularly the PRD, on the conduction of the Executive’s foreign policy; the lack of consensus among the key political actors; the struggles for power among the key actors after the end of the presidentialist era; and the more autonomy that the Congress obtained from 2000.

The checks-and-balance system was not very effective. Though one of his presidential campaign promises was to strengthen the Senate’s role in foreign policy, Vicente Fox simply disdained Congress in several matters, such as the vote in Geneva on Cuba, the request of sending notes of diplomatic protest before the United States for its migratory policy, etc. In this respect, the decision making process was still centered on the Executive branch. In other words, the existence of the Executive’s supremacy on the Legislative branch in foreign policy decisions was confirmed. Rarely, the President Vicente Fox tried to lobby with lawmakers to look for support or to avoid confrontation. Neither did he look for consensuses to project a foreign policy endorsed by the Mexican Congress.
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