Changing Indian Democracy?

Party system, Castes and Citizens

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Abstract

Although democratic changes in Eastern Europe and Latin America were responsible for the complete transformation of their political parties, the situation in India seems to be just the reverse. We observe that the evolution of political parties in North India, and particularly the development of parties whose electoral success depends on the support of a small section of the society of a state of the Indian Union, actually produced a change in the functioning of democracy in the late 1980s and early 1990s and a change in attitude and relation between citizens and political parties.

We must therefore ask ourselves the following question: How have the political parties managed to change the way the democratic game is played and the way citizens participate in politics?

A study of changing Indian democracy at the national, regional and local levels of politics will enable us to build an analysis that addresses different aspects of changes, the diversity of situation and the various trajectories of democracy within India.
Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to look from various perspectives at the changing Indian democracy. Then, the interaction between Indian state and society being the main focus of this study, we propose to analyze social and political trends.

Although democratic changes in Eastern Europe and Latin America were responsible for the complete transformation of their political parties, the situation in India seems to be just the reverse. We observe that the evolution of political parties in India, and particularly the development of parties whose electoral success depends on the support of a small section of the society of a state of the Indian Union, actually produced a change in the functioning of democracy in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Moreover, “the general picture of Indian democracy stands as a reminder that there is no linear progression to democracy, [that] the India’s post-transition history has produced multiple trajectories of democratization”.¹

We must therefore ask ourselves the following question: How have the political parties managed to change the way the democratic game is played and the way citizens participate in politics?

In order to answer this question, this paper is organized in three parts, each addressing Indian democratic changes at one specific political level. The first part examines the evolution of the Indian party system characterized from the late 1990s by coalitions as the only serious political alternative to the one dominant party system at the national level. The second part deals with the changing social profile of representatives at the level of a regional legislative assembly. Finally, the third part analyzes the inertia that defines politics at the local level by addressing political parties’ electoral strategies in a slum of the Indian capital, Delhi.

The main objective of a multi-scale/multi-site study is to build an analysis that addresses different aspects of changes, the diversity of situation and the various trajectories of democracy within India. As a consequence, the methodology used for this paper is resolutely combinatorial, associating quantitative analysis of the studied phenomenon as well as qualitative one.

I - Electoral Competition and Coalition Formation

An objective is to give over the last decade a comprehensive understanding of coalition politics in India. In order to do so, we start from some premises: 1) “A participant’s behavior in one coalition has a direct bearing on that participant’s future influence and future access to new coalitions. As a consequence, of this assumption, cooperation with one’s coalition partners is not in the best interest of coalition participants who hope to increase their future influence. On the other hand, extreme competitiveness is not in their long-term interest either, although it is the best strategy for coalition members interested in short-term gains. The ideal strategy for those who seek long-term increases in their influence is shown to be a mixture of competition and cooperation”\(^2\); 2) “The parties’ primary strategic objective is to gain as much support as possible in the various arenas – electoral arena, parliamentary arena and internal arena –, and the three types of support relevant for all arenas are: opinion support, resource support and vote support”. 3 But, as our analysis of coalition politics is relying on electoral data (percentage of votes by parties and winning parties), we focus on electoral arena: hence, on the vote maximization as the most strategic goal a party may have at the expense of program realization and parliamentary influence\(^4\); 3) Due to the nature of the party system in India, the number of parties spread all over India with narrow electoral basis at the national level, non-utilitarian preferences as a key role for coalition formation is not relevant. Coalitions in India are mainly defined by their utilitarian role for actors from different ideological background.

In one of her seminal work, Irina Stefuriuc writes that “Coalition formation is one of the main challenges that political parties face in decentralized political systems”.\(^5\) But, do all political parties face the same level of challenges? Indeed, regarding the party system changes in India and the alliance’s strategies developed by national parties, we may consider that the challenges of coalition formation are more difficult to accept for national parties than for

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\(^4\) In this party, we mainly look at the vote maximization as the main criteria for the formation of a coalition in an electoral context, even if all the states aren’t characterized by a multiparty system. Indeed, we consider that vote maximization is the major determinant of politician’s actions as it drives parliamentary influence and access to a position of power, as “the benefit of votes is their contribution to office and policy benefits”.

\(^5\) STEFURIUC, Irina. “Government Formation in Multi-Level Settings, Spanish Regional Coalitions and the Quest for Vertical Congruence”, *Party Politics*, vol. 15, n°1, p. 93.
regional parties as in the present party system in India, the states where national parties, INC and BJP, fight elections head on only represent one-sixth of the total Lok Sabha seats – Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Uttarakhand, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Delhi whereas, and this mainly refers to the Congress party, they just play the role of junior partner in most part of the other states since early 1990s.

In a multi party system, while competing one against the other for vote maximizing, parties have to decide which partners to accept in a coalition government, then ‘to minimize distances from other parties”. Nevertheless, parties may not compete one against the other by gathering in pre-poll alliances that allow the principal actor to identify before the results of the elections its future partners of a coalition government. Depending on the results of the pre-poll alliances partners, other partners will have to be integrated to the future coalition government or not! Here the risk for a party to be replaced by more competitive rivals leads its leadership to assess the impact on its electoral of joining one coalition partner or another.

“Electoral alliances are not formal coalitions, but reflect informal patterns of cooperation among parties. As a consequence of electoral alliances, political parties tend to devise electoral seat adjustments in constituencies that maximize their probability of electoral success”. Here, seats adjustments are defined as “mutual agreements between parties not to compete against each other in individual constituencies but to share seat contests on an agreed basis”.

The change in the party system we are dealing with is the change from a « dominant party system », that is, a multiparty system, in which free competition among parties occurred but in which the Indian National Congress enjoyed a dominant position, both in terms of number of seats that it held in Parliament in New Delhi and the state legislative assemblies, and in terms of this immense organizational strength outside the legislatures (Kothari, 1964; Morris-Jones, 1978), to a multiparty system in which regional parties have emerged as serious electoral alternative to the dominant party in their own state and aspire to play role at the national level of politics. As a result, the linkages between national multiparty system and states multiparty

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systems have become much more intricate. This increasing complexity of party systems in states has led to the formation of electoral coalitions at the national level as, from then on, no single party is able to get the absolute majority in the Lok Sabha, the lower house. On the other hand, at the state level, national or regional parties are able to win absolute majority in the legislative assembly, the Vidhan Sabha.

From late 1960s, “the dominant party system has started to give way to a more differentiated structure of party competition”. From 1977, the first defeat of the Congress party at the national level as well as in some states, several changes at the grassroots level, mainly in rural areas, occurred among voters. With the emergence of political alternative to the Congress at the state level, rural dwellers started voting for candidates they had chosen from anti Congress defending their own interests, and not according to the wishes of the landowning groups.

Despite this defeat, the Congress party seemed to be the sole incarnation of democracy in India till the late 1980s. Its hegemony over the Indian political scene lasted for almost 40 years partly due to a vote-catching strategy that patronized both the common people and the dominant castes and partly due to the existence of factionalism that made it possible to offset the internal rivalries within the Congress until the 1960s. This factionalism was partially reduced under Indira Gandhi’s leadership of the Congress.

From post-1990s, India is characterized at the national level by a multiparty system where coalition government is the norm and, as a consequence, “ dilemma occurring between votes seeking on the one hand and office seeking on the other”. This situation results from the increase of the number of regional parties, increase resulting from the development of regional parties in some of northern Indian states and the rise of these regional parties to national-level politics – these parties previously confined their role to state politics. These parties played a key role in the formation of the coalition and the stability – or instability, in some cases – of the government of India.

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11 A caste is said to be « dominant » when it has more members than other castes and wields considerable economic and political power. A bigger caste has more chances of being dominant if its position in the local caste hierarchy is not too low.
13 NARUD, P. 499.
In India, coalitions at the federal level emerge from three types of party system’s configuration at the state level: 1) bi-partism characterized by the opposition between the Indian National Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party, the two main national parties; 2) bi-partism characterized by the opposition between two state parties and 3) bi-polarization structured around two coalitions. Then, the changes of the national party system and the formation of coalitions at this level directly result from the evolution of the party system at the state level. As a consequence, as mentioned by Suhas Palshikar, “the theatre for defining the boundaries of political contestation often turned out to be the state. Whether a party will be only anti-Congress or also anti-BJP depended upon the state-level configuration of forces rather than on national-level exigencies or ideological positions”.\footnote{PALSHIKAR, Suhas. “The Regional Parties and Democracy. Romantic Rendezvous or localized Legitimation?” In MEHRA, Ajay K., KHANNA, D.D., KUECH, Gert W., Political Parties and Party Systems, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003, p. 330.}


If coalitions, or alliances, pre- or post-elections, are not a new phenomenon in India as coalition formation took place in some states from the 60s and at the national level between 1977-1980, 1989-1991 and 1996-1998, it had never represented a serious political alternative to the Congress party as it was characterized by strong political and governmental instability as coalitions to oppose Congress could not overcome their differences to unite and last. But, from 1998-1999 onwards, the formation of the Bharatiya Janata Party-led National democratic Alliance represents a landmark as the system moved decisively in the way of stable coalitions gathering national and regional parties. As James Manor mentioned, “Congress dominance was not replaced by competition between two national parties. (…) The Congress party has remained a potent force in most states, but no single national alternative to it has emerged. Instead, each state has bred its own particular type of party system, usually involving the Congress and one or two main alternatives”\footnote{We must mention at this stage that neither of the two main national parties in India, the Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party, characterised for a long time by a strong presence of upper castes in their party apparatus as well as among their elected representatives, can no longer afford to leave of lower caste candidates.}
Besides, with the emergence of coalitions as a serious political alternative to a one dominant party system, the balance of political power between national and state levels has changed with an increased mutual political and electoral dependence between components of the party system at these two different levels.\textsuperscript{20}
As mentioned in the previous part, emergence of regional parties electorally based on narrow sections of a state’s population is one of the main causes for the change in the national party system. But, the political rise of these parties has also had an impact on the state-based politics as the sociological profile of the elected members of the Legislative Assemblies of several north Indian states changed rapidly and radically, and these elected bodies no longer present an inverted picture of the country’s social structure because more than half the elected members belong to the socially and economically disadvantaged sections of the population which are nonetheless more numerous. This caste-based process of democratization has been defined by Jaffrelot as a silent revolution. This process, as we have described it, is characterized by two phases of development in both time and space. In the North Indian states, the rise of the lower castes and their acquisition of political power was slower than in the South Indian states where an organization called the Justice Party set up in the Madras Presidency in the early 20th century as a part of the anti-Brahmin movement won several elections with limited suffrage in which only tax-payers were eligible to vote. After Independence, South India maintained its strong anti-Brahmin stance with the creation of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam in the late 1940s and its rise to power in 1967. However, it was not until the early 1990s that parties capable of challenging the Congress Party’s political hegemony on a long-term basis made an appearance in north India. These parties were dominated by lower castes capable of mobilizing popular support like the Janata Dal/Rashtriya Janata Dal and a Hindu nationalist model represented by the Bharatiya Janata Party.

Although the phenomenon has existed much longer in the south than in the north, its impact on Indian representative democracy became more noticeable after the 1990s, especially in terms of the representation of those sections of the Indian population that had been excluded.

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24 This space is defined for the purposes of this study by the Hindi-speaking belt whose electoral clout plays a significant role in the central government in New Delhi. See Annex 1.
25 In some North Indian states, the 1967 election results led to the formation of non-Congress coalition governments. But the political instability that followed, mainly due to the narrow majority of the parties in power in the state assemblies, did not bring about the total marginalization of the Congress, unlike the DMK in Tamil Nadu.
from politics till then and the inability of a single party to obtain an absolute majority in the Lok Sabha, the Indian equivalent of the French National Assembly.

In 1989, the elections to the ninth Lok Sabha witnessed the rise of the Janata Dal as one of the main political forces in the Indian Union and the decline of the Congress party. At the national level, the Janata Dal was formed in October 1988 from several factions of various political organizations like the Ajit Singh-led Lok Dal (A), the Devi Lal-led Lok Dal (B), the Congress (S) and the V.P. Singh-led Jan Morcha (“people’s front”), all previously part of the Janata Party-led coalition that defeated the Congress Party and grasped the power in 1977 after the Emergency imposed by Indira Gandhi in 1975. Before the 1989 national elections, the Janata Dal joined hands with regional small parties to create the National Front, a coalition that won the elections and formed the government with the external support from the Bharatiya Janata Party and the Communists.

In Bihar, the Janata Dal won in 31 out of 54 constituencies with a tally of 36.4 per cent of the votes cast as compared to the Congress’s tally of 4 seats and 28.1 per cent votes, 44 seats less than in 1984 Lok Sabha elections. All over India, and particularly in Bihar, the Congress under Rajiv Gandhi had managed to alienate the majority of voters – a process that already started during the Indira Gandhi era. Despite the landslide victory won by the Congress in 1985 due to a sympathy wave in its favor following Indira Gandhi’s assassination in October 1984, its political future in Bihar seemed rather shaky. Since its return to power in 1980, the concentration of power in the hands of its national leadership had had a detrimental effect on the working of Congress governments in the states. In Bihar, for example, there were six Chief Ministers and three party presidents between June 1980 and February 1989. This had a negative effect on the contesting candidates as well with a disintegrating network at the grass roots level unable to mobilize a strong support from the local “bosses” who had allowed them to dominate state politics until then. Changes in the Representation of Political Parties and Caste Distribution

The results of the state elections in 1990 testify to this change. The Congress Party was able to hold on to only 71 of the 195 seats it had won in 1985 while the Janata Dal won 122 of the 324 seats for which elections were held. As opposed to the electoral rout suffered by the Congress, the Janata Dal emerged as a force to contend with and the Bharatiya Janata Party acquired greater strength in Bihar. In fact, after a fall in the electoral support for the Congress by about 15 percentage points from 39.30 per cent to 24.78 per cent, the Janata Dal represented in 1990 more than 25 per cent of the votes cast by the Bihar electorate, while the Bharatiya Janata Party registered an increase of about four percentage points rising from 7.54 per cent to 11.61 per cent.

Apart from the number of elected candidates representing different parties, it was also in terms of the representation of different castes in the Assembly that these elections marked for the first time the end of the domination of Bihar politics by the traditional upper caste elite.

Table 1. Caste- and Community-wise Distribution of Members of the Bihar Legislative Assembly in 1985, 1990 and 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Upper castes</th>
<th>Other Backward Castes</th>
<th>Scheduled Castes</th>
<th>Scheduled Tribes</th>
<th>Religious Minorities</th>
<th>Total Number of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
<td>34.9%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>46.8%</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Survey by Cyril Robin

The above table gives us an idea of the specific nature of the caste- and community-wise distribution of elected representatives. For the first time in Bihar, therefore the difference in the percentage of upper caste members and OBC members was therefore not very significant, the number of members belonging to OBCs was higher than the number of members from upper castes in the newly elected Legislative Assembly.

The table 1 shows the increase in the strength of Assembly members belonging to Other Backward Classes. Their number in the Vidhan Sabha has increased by almost 12 percentage points, rising from 34.9 to 46.8 per cent.

This radical change gave them greater representation in the Legislative Assembly which directly benefited the categories that had until then been neglected by the government.

Unlike the OBCs, MLAs belonging to the upper castes were marginalized in the Janata Dal, their percentage being only 16.2 per cent in spite of the 9.8 per cent Rajput members
constituting the second largest group of elected representatives of the JD. Consequently, there were very few upper caste members from the JD in the Assembly, about 21.8%, much lower than the percentage of Yadavs.

The 1995 elections marked an acceleration of change in the social composition of the political class of Bihar, the upper caste MLAs representing less than half of the OBC MLAs in the Vidhan Sabha. The members of the OBC category no longer assume that their lower position in the social hierarchy and that the lack of respect from members of the higher castes are a “given” in their social existence preventing them from grasping the political power.30

But, in the case of Bihar as well as in other northern states of the hindi belt, the political mobilization of the backwards is a mobilization mainly oriented towards bringing about change in the traditional distribution of political power by attacking the monopoly of the upper castes in politics. Therefore, these changes may be designated as “transformative”, as it is not a mobilization oriented towards bringing about revolutionary changes in all spheres of life and in all basic values but rather a mobilization “characterized by middle level structural changes in the traditional distribution of power and the system of differential allocation of resources, rights and privileges.”31

This mobilization does not lead to the disintegration of the traditional caste structure, but on the contrary to its strengthening with the crystallization of the “Backward” identity in order to polarize the political scene and derive from it a large electoral support and finally get political power.

The mobilization in favor of Janata Dal later declined insofar as the goal of its leadership was not “social revolution”, but simply seizing political power which until then had been the prerogative of the upper castes. Although this mobilization created a separate identity for the backward classes, this identity did not succeed in totally overshadowing bad economic conditions peculiar to this category.

In Bihar, we can talk about democratic renewal because of the change in the Assembly in terms of caste representation, i.e. descriptive representation, and because of the way Lalu Prasad has bridged the gap that separated holders of power and ordinary citizens, mainly in altering the official speaking now controlled by people from low social status. But, these two

dimensions of the process of democratic renewal have their restrictions: (1) As the inclusion of more voices in the political arena can suppress other voices, mainly those of less articulated marginalized groups, three Backward Castes, namely Yadav, Kurmi and Koeri, have cornered the representation of the OBC, leaving no space for the subcategory of the Extremely Backward Castes; (2) The way Lalu Prasad has succeeded in mobilizing people was based on identity more than on interest, without denying the material realities that are often central to the agendas of identity movement. What started as a quest for social justice ended as an identity politics movement cultivated and largely controlled by Lalu Prasad! If this kind of identity politics has led to success in the electoral arena, it was not enough to keep the OBCs coalition humming along with leaders of different castes created their own political organizations whose bases were increasingly narrow.
III - Local politics, how much do citizens matter?32

Urban politics, at the municipal level, seems to have only a small place in studies on politics in India. As noted by Oldenburg, “the focus of studies of politics in India has been on national and state arenas in part because it has been assumed […] that the significance of politics is determined by the ‘importance’ of the issues with which it deals. National defense and national integration are more significant for some than the improvement of slum housing”.33

One explanation of the lack of an important literature on urban politics is indirectly given to us by Rosenthal:

“While the Gandhian ideal of political decentralization has resulted in the creation of an elaborate system of rural government, some of the largest urban centers in the nation have been by-passed in this promotion of “grass-roots” democracy. In part, this may be a function of a major political fact: the Congress party is losing ground in urban areas”.34

Increasing urbanization and migration have made urban voters more and more crucial. As a result of the liberalization policies adopted by the Government of India the share of the urban population is expected to increase to about 40 per cent of total population by the year 2021 and to account for 55% of the country’s total population in 2050, according to a 2007 United Nations report. Currently, an estimated 28% of the country’s people live in cities. After delimitation, the number of urban Lok Sabha seats will increase from around 70 to at least 100. This means that before delimitation, 28% of the country’s population translated into 13% representation in the Lok Sabha. But, has this evolution an impact on the way political parties do campaign for elections? It is quite doubtful that the urban poor will have to be given more priority and that, urban necessities like housing, drinking water and employment, will dominate politics.

Starting from two observations: 1) slum dwellers are much more dependent on political parties to access basic amenities than political parties are dependent on slum dwellers to get votes and 2) slums still are characterized by a very poor level of public or private services’

32 This part presents preliminary results of an ongoing research focusing on political parties’ strategies in and outside elections time and the way local residents (individually or collectively) link with political parties and elected representatives in order to obtain access to urban resources (individual or collective clientelism) in a slum of a metropolis, Delhi.
access, urban local politics in slums in a city like Delhi is still structured by main stream political organizations despite the failure of representative democracy in these urban spaces to meet citizens’ claims.

The evolution of party system in India, and particularly in northern India, with the emergence of parties whose electoral success depends on the support of specific sections of the society of a state of the Indian Union, actually produced a change in the functioning of democracy in the late 1980s and early 1990s and a change in attitude and relation between citizens and political parties. These changes have been, on paper, all the more noticeable that by the late 1980s early 1990s, the passage of the 73rd and 74th Amendments gave constitutional status to two elected local bodies, the Panchayats (village council) and the Nagarpalikas (municipal council) and, as a result, “the political competition at the local government level witnessed crucial changes of a positive nature”. These constitutional reforms allowed democracy to locally democratize. With democracy taking root, “any meaningful assessment of the structure, organization and working of political parties in India (…) would necessarily involve an in-depth evaluation of the dynamics of party politics at the grassroots’ level”. 35

In relation to elections, or more specifically electoral participation, John Harriss, in a paper dealing with « Political Participation, Representation and the Urban Poor”36 in Delhi, addressed the issue of patterns of political participation of poorer social groups in a city and difficulties of poor in properly addressing issues due to lack of recognition and organization: Lack of recognition because poorer social sections, and slum dwellers in particular in cities, are not considered to be “proper members of civil society and are not regarded as such by institutions of the state […] as these groups […] transgress the strict lines of legality in struggling to live and work” even if they are “rights bearing citizens in the sense imagined by the constitution”;37 lack of organization because these groups are in competition each other, irregularly backed by political parties then thrown away, trying to make instrumental use of the fact that they can vote in elections, usually their only right.

The slum dwellers are depending on existing power structures, those of mainstream political parties. The rights of slum dwellers, as citizens, is restricted to one sole action, that of voting every five years.

The notion of asymmetry characterizes the relations between slum dwellers and, local political leaders. To gain access to services normally provided by the municipality or the state government, slum dwellers are obliged to maintain good relations with the member’s « representative », if not the member himself, if they wish to obtain his help or simply gain access to him. In an interview with a slum dweller, who was once a middle-man, he told us how he had to openly support the new MLA who had helped him to solve a problem, even though he belonged to the opposite party, or run the risk of not having easy access to ‘water tankers’ which supply water to the slum several times a day.

The majority of slum dwellers remain voiceless and powerless. In addition to poverty, they suffer from severe social exclusion. More than other citizens, particularly those belonging to the middle classes in Delhi’s residential districts, they are extremely dependent on the existing power structures. Here, the concept of a ‘political society’ used by Partha Chatterjee is relevant as it helps us to understand the political challenges faced by marginalised groups like slum dwellers treated as non-citizens or, as they define themselves, “second-class citizens”. This political society occupies an intermediate level between the state and civil society, signifying different political spheres for the marginalised and the elites. This is particularly true in the case of slums and their relations with the outside world. The role of slum dwellers as citizen is restricted to the sole act of casting their vote every five years. The majority of municipal councilors to whom I spoke replied when I asked them if slum dwellers were considered as citizens enjoying the same rights as those living in authorized areas,

«Of course, they are citizens, they vote for us, so they are Indian citizens like all the others. »

Through this statement, it becomes evident that the vote and the level of participation associated with slums (which often spring up in these areas), are used as two criteria to magnify deceptively how « citizens » actually participate in the decision-making process. The vote cannot therefore be considered as the sole clear criterion to indicate participation in governance.

In a country like India and in a metropolis like Delhi, civil society is limited to a small section of the population. It consists of citizens who interact with their government in

38 Interview with Rekha Gupta, BJP Municipal Councillor representing PitamPura North (ward reserved for women), Delhi, on 16.04.2008.
accordance with series of legally defined procedures. As Chatterjee states, slum dwellers do not have any relationship with their government in what is supposed to be civil society, but they are confined to a space defined as political society in which «non-citizens», organized through political parties, trade unions and other organizations, do not seek to exercise their civic and political rights but claim their rights collectively as a community.

Slums are integrated into Delhi’s political, or rather electoral, life mainly because of the population they represent and the «facility» with which this population can be mobilized in a context of asymmetrical exchanges, where the elected representative’s accountability to his/her electors is quite low. On the other hand, slum dwellers are only marginally included, if at all, in the process of deciding urban policies.

According to the Indian Constitution, everyone is a citizen with equal rights. But, regarding slum dwellers, living in illegal settlements, and their social location is characterized by a very low degree of clarity. Then, slum dwellers are, to use Chatterjee’s words, “only tenuously, and even then ambiguously and contextually, rights-bearing citizens in the sense imagined by the constitution”.41

In this metropolis, the people living in slums are not really considered as ful-fledged citizens. They are not members of civil society and are not considered so by state institutions. As Partha Chatterjee rightly points out:

«It is not as though they are outside the reach of the state or even excluded from the domain of politics. As populations within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, they have to be both looked after and controlled by various governmental agencies. These activities bring these populations into a certain political relationship with the state. But this relationship doesn’t always conform to what is envisaged in the constitutional depiction of the relation between the state and members of civil society. »42

For some slum dwellers, election time represent a way to get benefit from opportunities that make them more visible than usual, that make them more “powerful” than they usually are within the slum.

41 CHATTERJEE, op. cit., p. 38
42 CHATTERJEE, Partha. loc. cit.
Conclusion

From national to local level politics, Indian democracy isn’t characterized by the same evolution. If party systems and representation in regional assemblies show some evolution, and may be associated with process of democratization of politics, local level democracy meets some difficulties in deepening and reaching the have-nots.

If changing Indian democracy seems to be an ongoing process at the national and state levels, it appears to be quite limited at the local level as political parties’ strategies in and outside elections time have no other objectives than maintain slum dwellers in very precarious life conditions. At the same time, the way local residents (individually or collectively) link with political parties and elected representatives in order to obtain access to urban resources (individual or collective clientelism) limits their ability to mobilize. Moreover, citizens’ organizations have also failed to redefine slum dwellers’ relations and attitudes towards politics by directly participating to party competition during elections as slum dwellers still carry on voting en masse for traditional political parties.

Finally, democratic processes in India haven’t reduced everywhere and at the same time the political, social, and economic marginalization of India's popular classes.43

43 HELLER, Patrick, op.cit., p. 485