Lands of Patronage?
Southern European Party Patronage in Comparative Perspective

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ABSTRACT

The paper is part of a cross-national expert survey designed to explore various aspects of political patronage in contemporary European democracies and it reports specifically on Southern European countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain). The four democracies under study shared an extended and deep politicisation of administrative bodies as a key-structural feature that distinguishes their public bureaucracies from the rest of West European systems, yet they have travelled variable distances from the original Mediterranean model. Thus, the paper aims to assess the commonalities and differences which are found in the four cases with respect to party patronage, defined as the power of political parties to appoint people to positions in public and semi-public life. We posit that party system institutionalization in these four countries left genetic imprints on the nature of the party systems, generating path-dependencies that explain the present-day nature of patronage. Where party patronage played a greater role in party system structuring, the existence of a competitive, institutionalised party system actually serves to make patronage flourish, rather than fade.

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Introduction

In the voluminous literature on political patronage, Southern Europe holds prominent position. Whether examined as a whole or at individual-country level, this region is commonly thought of as an exemplary case of patronage politics, as well as a showpiece for demonstrating the effects of patronage on the function of markets, states, and party systems. In the past, such interest has produced a number of excellent studies focused on explaining patronage in relation to the region’s pre-modern social and economic structures (e.g., Pitt-Rivers 1961; Campbell 1964; Malefakis 1970). Back then, the patronage function was as simple as the social and political conditions that produced it: in the predominantly agrarian Southern European societies, insecure individuals, or communities, naturally tended to look for powerful patrons for protection.

Since then, these four countries have developed economically, progressed socially, and turned fully democratic but, still, they are all assumed to display high rates of patronage – an assumption that, besides historical antecedent, is supported by the idea that all Southern European countries have converged by following essentially similar paths of socio-economic modernization and political development in the post-war decades (Malefakis 1995). Observers still argue that patronage in Southern Europe has not “diminish[ed] with time, but either retained or actually increased its strength” in recent years (Diamandouros et al. 1995: 17).

This paper, based on detailed comparative empirical evidence on the dynamics of patronage in the four Southern European countries, has two central goals. First, it seeks to empirically evaluate the perceived ‘Southern European model’ of patronage. Second, it will consider what new light the experience of the Southern European countries sheds on the contemporary explanations of patronage.

In terms of our first question, we find that substantial differences exist across these countries with respect to patronage – confirming Müller’s (2006) more general assessment, Southern European democracies present different patterns of patronage, be it in terms of its pervasiveness, logic and mechanics. As for the second, we find that neither ‘traditional’ accounts of patronage, focussing largely on state and bureaucratic traditions; nor their contemporary counterparts, centered largely on party system institutionalisation and competitiveness, fully account for the divergent patronage paths of these four Southern European democracies. The analysis of these countries suggests that – at least in these four countries – it is the process of party system
institutionalisation during democratic consolidation that accounts for the differences in patronage practices, not the nature of the party system *per se*.

The paper is structured as follows. The following section examines previous research on patronage and how it generates expectations of a Southern European model, as well as more contemporary accounts of the phenomenon and the predictions they generate for the Southern European countries. The third section defines the concept of patronage used in this paper and outlines the methodology adopted for the empirical analysis. The fourth section presents the empirical evidence on patronage in Southern Europe, exploring this in terms of its overall patterns, but also its range, depth, motivation and mechanics. We then assess how the process of party system institutionalisation during democratic consolidation decisively shaped the very distinct paths these countries subsequently took, before presenting a brief summary of our conclusions.

**Southern Europe: fertile ground for party patronage?**

Why does Southern Europe hold such a prominent position in the accounts of patronage? We can identify three main traditional explanations for both the persistence of patronage and the alleged similarity in its manifestations in Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal. These pertain to the nature of political parties; state traditions; and the nature of public bureaucracies in Southern Europe.

With regard to the first, political parties became the dominant actors of democratic processes across in Southern Europe after authoritarianism (Morlino 1998; Matuschek 2003). Yet this dominance was more centered at the level of the state than of society. Thus, parties’ dominance was to a large extent predicated on their access to – and monopolistic control of – state resources rather than on deep societal ties, with parties developing ‘state roots’ over social ones, with patronage featuring prominently. In Italy, *partitocrazia* constituted a regime at first characterized by the substantial monopoly of parties over political activity and, later, by the progressive expansion of their power into the social and economic spheres. Eventually, as put by Pasquino (1995: 334), political parties “imprisoned institutions and … encapsulated society”. Similar developments occurred in the other three Southern European countries soon after their respective transitions to democracy. In Greece, the new regime has been dubbed a “party democracy” (Pappas 1999) As the other pillars of the post-war Greek state such
as the army or the monarchy weakened, political parties became the focal points of new
democratic politics that, now vested with new legitimacy, were to organize the polity
almost single-handedly. In Spain, parties were similarly able to penetrate both the state
and society. Having assumed a gate-keeping role towards interest groups, thus
controlling their access to the decision-making area (Morlino 1998: 227), political
parties have virtually monopolized the position of intermediary actors between the
political system and society (Matuschek 2003: 349). The pattern in Portugal is not
dissimilar, with parties “the key political institutions” (Bruneau, 1997: 19), largely
thanks to their monopoly of political representation and their capacity to tap and
distribute state resources. Thus, under-institutionalised, weak parties took advantage of
an over-institutionalised administrative state to entrench themselves (Opello, 1985, esp.
pp. 59, 139, 192).

Similarities are also found in analyses of the state in Southern Europe. Thus,
Southern European states are largely perceived as undistinguished on the basis of
several empirical parallels: widespread state capture by private interests; low public
trust in state authorities and their personnel; the existence of informal shadow
governance structures that complement formal institutional frameworks; institutional
fragmentation and insufficient mechanisms for policy co-ordination at the central level
of government (Goetz 2001). Similarly, all four countries share influences from the
Napoleonic tradition (Peters 2008). Moreover, the emphasis on state power over the role
of society that distinguishes this tradition conforms to the role of the state in Southern
societies of “assisted capitalism” (Giner 1985). The State in Southern Europe has
traditionally promoted economic development through strategies and instruments
(protectionism, transfers, subsidies, control of industries) used in a very particularistic
fashion. This pattern rebounded also on welfare systems, leading to the provision of
very fragmented and uneven social protection, captured in the “Southern Model of
Welfare” of Ferrera (1996) and Esping-Andersen (1991). Once again, these shared
characteristics are seen as accounting for pervasive patronage in Southern Europe, with
the state perceived as delivering selective benefits to supporters rather than
universalistic services in hierarchical and individualistic societies.

Related to this, we can also identify administrative practices and bureaucratic
traditions as common explanatory factors for patronage practices in Southern Europe.
Thus, all four are seen as featuring an uneven distribution of human resources;
formalism and legalism; and, with the exception of Spain, the absence of a typical
European administrative elite (Sotiropoulos 2004). Such conditions are seen as fostering party patronage, generating patterns of extensive politicisation of higher administrative ranks; patronage at the bottom, and enduring clientelistic patterns in the recruitment of low-ranking public sector personnel (Sotiropoulos 2004). Shefter’s influential account explains this in terms of the sequencing of the adoption of universal suffrage and administrative professionalisation, with all four countries fitting in the “high patronage” type as suffrage preceded bureaucratic professionalisation. Ignazi and Ysmal’s (1998) extend this to the impact of the transitions to democracy in Southern Europe, which did not emphasize administrative modernisation in any of the four countries, thus facilitating processes of party permeation of public bodies and patronage (Ignazi and Ysmal 1998).

While the traditional focus of patronage has been on parties, state and administrative traditions, a more recent strand of research has linked patronage to the characteristics of a country’s party system. Analysing post-communist democracies, Gryzmala-Busse (2007) posits the different degrees of discretionary partisan usage of state resources on the degree of party competition in these countries. According to Gryzmala-Busse (2007), it is the presence of “robust competition” in the party system – generated by the existence of a clear opposition that also constitutes a plausible governing option and is willing to denounce incumbents’ runs into the state – that constrains partisan exploitation of the state. This notion of “robust competition” is also to be found in the work of O’Dwyer (2006), again focusing on the new democracies of Eastern Europe. As with Gryzmala-Busse, the extent of patronage in public administration is also accounted for by the degree of competition in the party system. However, O’Dwyer (2006) extends the causal link to the degree of party system institutionalisation, with underinstitutionalised party systems unable to generate the necessary degree of competition in the party system.

In both these accounts, then, it is the lack of partisan ‘checks-and-balances’ within the party system that explains the prevalence of patronage. These ‘checks and balances’ are mostly analysed in the terms of the vertical accountability that is enabled through the existence of viable and clear alternatives – a reflection of party system institutionalisation. However, Gryzmala-Busse’s study hints at the relevance of horizontal accountability, provided by an opposition that denounces patronage. While appealing, this argument is not uncontested. Meyer-Sahling’s (2006) examination of the Hungarian case finds that patronage is actually sustained and positively associated to
the existence of a vocal opposition and strong parties – in short, to the degree of political competition. This account finds echo in older literature on patronage (viz. Scott, 1972). Here, the conclusion is – much like Meyer-Sahling – that the incentives for patronage are strongest where political competition (ultimately through elections) is effective (Scott, 1972: 112).

How does Southern Europe fit in with these very distinct accounts of patronage? All four countries have tended to bipartism or to a bipolar political competition. This is particularly evident in Greece where, since the critical 1981 election, the old multiparty system that had existed in that country for three decades transformed into classic two-partyism (Pappas 2003), that is, a system in which “the existence of third parties does not prevent the two major parties from governing alone, i.e., whenever coalitions are unnecessary” (Sartori 1976: 186). Since 1981, PASOK and ND have competed against each other for the absolute majority of seats and the winner has always been able to govern alone. With only two exceptions (in the 1993 and 2000 elections), alternation in power has occurred regularly after each party has served two terms in office. Political competition thus takes the form of a zero-sum game between the two rival parties over the spoils to be gained from capturing the state. In Spain, despite some regionalist-nationalist parties represented in the Cortes, there are two main nation-wide parties, the socialist PSOE and the conservative PP, which between them collect about 90 percent of the seats at the national lower house. This has always led to single-party cabinets headed by one of the two main parties, which have thus alternated in power since 1982, occasionally supported by some of the minor parties. Similar developments have occurred in Portugal, where the party system has been essentially defined by the alternation between the centre-right PSD and the centre-left PS in office, and the exclusion of the Communists and the radical left from government. The two-party nature of the party system has been particularly pronounced since the mid-1980s – over this period, only briefly did a third party, the right-wing CDS-PP, enter government, for less than three years, and then only as the junior coalition partner. This has been accompanied by a greater majoritarian focus in the Portuguese party system. Whereas no single-party majority governments emerged in the first 11 years of constitutional governments in Portugal, since 1987 these have been the most frequent type of

1 Although the logic of patronage is not necessarily the same, with Scott focussing on a distributive and reward nature of patronage that is not coincident with Meyer-Sahling’s, where policy-control replaces reward as the motivation of patronage.
government, with over 12 years of majority governments. In Italy, at the beginning of the 1990s, the collapse of the old partitocrazia caused the end of the previously tripolar structure between the parties representing the right, the center, and the left respectively. After 1994, the party system assumed the features of “fragmented bipolarism” (D’Alimonte 2001; 2005) based on two broad coalitions, one representing the center-right and the other the center-left (Cotta and Verzichelli 2000).

Overall, we find evidence of institutionalized party systems in Greece, Portugal, and Spain, with high degrees of political competition between parties and the existence of clear, identifiable and viable governing alternatives (Jalali, 2007; Linz and Montero, 1999; Pappas, 1999). The nature of governmental coalitions is still fragmented and heterogeneous in Italy, where only the bipolar mechanics has been stabilised while the underinstitutionalisation of party organisations persists. As such, the Southern European case becomes an interesting one in which to assess the wider applicability of the conclusions of O’Dwyer, Gryzma-Busse and Meyer-Sahling. On the one hand, the four countries present very similar features in terms of the nature of the state and administrative traditions, as seen above; on the other, most of them are characterised by competitive, institutionalised party systems and viable oppositions. All this leads us to expect similar levels of patronage across Greece, Spain, and Portugal; Italy, as a case of less institutionalised party system, is expected to present a broad scope of patronage practices; and the comparative assessment of the scope of patronage will help us test the competing predictions of Gryzmala-Busse and O’Dwyer, on the one hand; and Meyer-Sahling, on the other. In the next section we present the methodology used for our study, before presenting the empirical results.

**Methodology and data**

Building on previous research, we define patronage as the power of political parties to appoint people to positions in public and semi-public life (Kopecký and Mair 2007). This definition allows distinguishing patronage from other more penetrating practices such as clientelism, pork-barrelism, nepotism and corruption. Unlike these practices, patronage needs not necessarily be illegitimate, illegal or related to the allocation of public funds intended to favour specific constituencies. So, in this sense, our definition only points at the possibility for parties to make appointments. Thus, although
patronage may sometimes appear as a necessary condition for the other practices, it in no case is sufficient.

We are mainly concerned about patronage as the ‘reach’ of parties within the state (Daalder 1966), without presuming the motivation that leads them to make appointments. Patronage does by no means exclude merit, nor does it even imply lack of transparency. Besides, it may be guided by several reasons, be they professional, political and/or personal.

The most problematic issue is how to measure patronage systematically and capture its full content while, simultaneously, undertake cross-country comparisons. Following Kopecky et al. (2007), we scrutinize patronage practices by analyzing the constitutional and the state legal framework and comparing it to the responses given by experts about parties’ effective capacity to reach institutions, both horizontally and vertically, and what are the parties’ motives when appointing. Our aim is to solve some of the shortcomings previous research on the topic, which has sometimes made a good job in identifying patronage practices but, nevertheless, lacked comparability (Burstein 1976; Müller 1989), or has been restricted to the higher echelons of the public administration (Geddes 1994), or, in other cases, has made use of proxies such as personnel spending which might not exactly reflect the extent and nature of patronage (Gordin 2002; Brusco et al. 2005; O’Dwyer 2004, 2006).

This approach requires looking into two dimensions of patronage appointments, namely its range and depth. While range refers to the number of institutions that are actually reached by political parties, depth is related to how deep political parties go. The two dimensions can yield combinations. Patronage practices may be extensive but not pervasive, that is parties may reach almost all institutions but only at the very top level, or patronage practices may be limited, only affecting a small number of institutions, but involve all their personnel. Combinations of either high or low levels of both range and depth are also possible.

Our data were collected in the context of a broader project on Party Patronage in Contemporary Democracies, following the steps described by Kopecky et al. (2007). The state was divided into nine different policy sectors, leaving aside those political institutions that are by definition subject to patronage (i.e., Cabinets, Parliaments, Presidential staff, etc.), but including regional and local institutions in order to assess patronage at all layers of government. The selection of classic state sectors ensures comparability. These are: Economy, Finance, Judiciary, Media, Military and Police,
Welfare, Culture and Education, Foreign Service, and Regional and Local Administration. In order to obtain more detailed information, these policy areas were subsequently divided into three different types of institutions, namely Ministerial Departments (i.e. core civil service), Non-Departmental Agencies and Commissions (i.e. regulatory and policy advising and devising agencies) and Executing Institutions (i.e. institutions involved in delivering services and provisions, and in production)

Next, the opportunity for patronage was codified for every single institution based on the constitutional and legal legislation each country established. We then proceeded to carry out several face-to-face expert interviews with respondents familiar with each of the nine policy sectors. We interviewed academics, top level bureaucrats, journalists, NGO experts and politicians. Table 1 displays the number and distribution of interviews.

Table 1. Number of interviews by country and policy sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy sector/Country</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judiciary</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military and Police</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture and Education</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Service</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional and Local Administration</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>45</strong></td>
<td><strong>45</strong></td>
<td><strong>47</strong></td>
<td><strong>45</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Experts were generally circumscribed to one sector, although some of them only provided information for some institutional type while others could do so for more than one sector. They were asked about whether parties make appointments to positions that include the civil service, public sector companies and their governing boards, advisory committees and commissions, universities, quangos and other regulatory bodies. Then, we asked about the range of patronage practices – i.e., the number of institutions for every institutional type and sector that were subject to patronage – and its depth – if appointments were made at the top, middle or low level. Other questions dealing with
the nature of patronage were open-ended and were codified at a later stage. These included questions on the persons who make the appointments within the party, the motivations and criteria they follow, changes of patronage practices over time and the consensual or majoritarian nature of appointments (see the questionnaire in Appendix 1). In the next section, we present our empirical data on patronage in Southern Europe.

**Is there a Southern European Model? Scope, logic and mechanics of patronage in Southern Europe**

As posited at the outset, we are first of all interested in assessing whether there is a single Southern European model of patronage. The expectation is that Southern European parties across all four countries distribute a large quantity of posts stretching well beyond top bureaucratic positions. The broad scope of patronage as reward is assumed to distinguish the Southern region from the extreme opposite of the Nordic democracies, where reduced patronage practices at the top exclusively support party government.

The analysis of the formal opportunity for party patronage confirms that patronage is a ubiquitous and enduring feature of South European polities. Political appointments are actually allowed by the legal framework for most institutional types of all policy sectors in all countries and parties make use of existing opportunities to fill in positions with political appointees. The only institutional sub-type that remains formally unaffected by party patronage is the executing level for the Judiciary in Greece and Italy.

Nonetheless, differences emerge when it comes to the scope of party patronage practices. Combining the range and depth of patronage by policy area and institutional types we can provide a synthetic index of patronage for each polity (see Appendix 2 for a description of how the index was created). Table 2 shows that Ministerial Departments are the institutional type where patronage is more pervasive in the four countries. It is followed by Non-Departmental Agencies and Commissions (NDACs) and executive institutions which remain less penetrated by patronage practices. The policy area total score allows us to evaluate the scope of patronage throughout the nine policy sectors under study. Two dyads of countries have been identified: on the one hand, Italy and Greece with high levels of party patronage, and, on the other, Portugal and Spain with medium levels of party patronage. This is consistent with the findings of Müller (2006), with Spain and Portugal classified as medium-level patronage countries.
– alongside the US, but also France and Germany – while Italy and Greece are classified as high-patronage countries.

Table 2. Scope of Patronage, by Institutional Types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Ministries</th>
<th>NDAC</th>
<th>Executing Institutions</th>
<th>Policy Area Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration.
Values standardized to 0-1, based on the median scores of range and depth of patronage.

Table 3 presents data on the range and depth of patronage practices. It offers a more differentiated picture of patronage across the four South European countries. Greece stands out as the country in which patronage practices are more pronounced. The grip of parties on the Greek state is both extensive and deep, as shown by the equally high score (0.78) for range and depth. Greece is followed by Italy, in which patronage practices are wide (0.89) but tend to be contained at the top level of most public organizations as shown by the score for depth (0.44) which is affected by the deep penetration of patronage practices in the local administration sector and in the Media executing institutional sub-type at the national level. The presence of patronage practices restricted at the top state levels emerges clearly in Spain, as shown by the score for depth (0.33), in which parties, as in Italy, expand their control to most of public institutions, as shown by the high score for range (0.89). Portugal comes last, since the medium pervasiveness of patronage practices is due to the control of only top levels in a universe of politicized public institutions which is the narrowest in Southern Europe. Overall, all four countries present relatively a pattern of relatively wide patronage, with Italy and especially Greece presenting deeper patronage whereas in Portugal and Spain patronage is comparatively shallow.
Table 3. Range and Depth of Patronage Practices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Depth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration.

Note: Data represent median values of all policy sectors for each institutional level. Values range from 0 to 1.

Range: 1=In a few institutions; 2= In most institutions; 3=In all institutions.
Depth: 1=At one level; 2=At two levels; 3=At all levels.

As the analysis of the scope of patronage practices proved, political appointments are less widespread than assumed by literature on politicization of the State. Therefore, South European countries cannot be simply lumped together. Let us now turn to the analysis of the logic of patronage, which helps us to explain where the main differences stem from. As Figure 1 highlights, reward is not the main motivation behind patronage across Southern Europe.

Figure 1. Motivations of patronage across Southern European countries (percentage of answers)

The high scores for “control” and “both reward and control” indicate that the logic of personnel policy in southern Europe is mainly guided by the desire to reinforce the
policy-making capacity of the government as well as to control the flow of public resources in all sectors of the administration. Following Meyer-Sahling (2008) for Central and Eastern Europe, the bipolar structure of political competition present in the four countries appears to explain the politicisation of top state posts. The wholesale alternation in government creates strong pressures to control institutions: parties nominate loyal individuals to strategic positions (senior executives, boards, public corporation managers) in order to render the administrative structures more responsive to changes in policy priorities.

Patronage as control at top state level is pervasive, as shown by the high scores for range in all countries, and has not been eradicated by the administrative reforms that aimed to rationalise the functioning of the State. The reforms reduced the scope of patronage at the top through processes of privatisation, but they did not trigger a paradigm change (Ongaro 2008; Rocha e Araújo 2007; Spanou 2008; Parrado 2000). Administrative reforms were rather used as strategies for introducing more flexible mechanisms of political control over the administration through the diffusion of disaggregated agencies in Portugal and the introduction of fixed-term contracts for senior executives in Italy. In Spain, the reform was basically aimed at undermining the power of different autonomous bodies of civil servants, the so-called corps, which had self-financing and self-management capacity and could veto proposals of politicians in personnel matters.

Generally, control of the administration has not only remained widespread, it has become even thicker. The swarms of policy advisors and consultants that crowd ministerial cabinets offering specific expertise, flexible support and unconditional loyalty in the development of policies have expanded in all the four countries. The growth of ministerial cabinets as centres of power and communication in the machinery of government increases the imbalance between political control and professional policy advice that marks the countries of southern Europe, where ministers avoid the rigidity of bureaucracies through informal mechanisms of politicisation that allow a faster and more efficient political control of public institutions.

The lower score for patronage as control and the higher score for patronage as reward highlight the relevance of the logic of reward in Greece. As far as patronage as reward is concerned, this is particularly diffuse in Greece. Of the four cases, Greece is the country where the persistence of the logic of bureaucratic clientelism is most evident, since patronage at the bottom is very diffuse, as the high score for depth confirms.
Patronage as reward cements the position of Greek parties in the electorate. The use of patronage as a strategy of mass political mobilisation in Greece does not confirm O’Dwyer’s (2006) hypothesis on the scarcity of patronage as reward in party systems characterised by robust competition between few stable parties that alternate in government. In Greece a two-party system is coupled with patronage practices typical of the “runaway state building” that O’Dwyer associates with the “weak governance logic” of dominant party systems and multi-party systems with under-institutionalised competitive dynamics.

Patronage at the bottom is not diffused in all of the systems, but this does not mean that patronage as reward is not a characteristic trait of Southern European systems. Parties in southern Europe also use patronage as reward as an instrument to service party organisations. The high value of “BRC” as a motivation for patronage shows that both logics can coexist. Thus, parties seek to control not only strategic high-level posts, to expand the grip of party government beyond the cabinet, but also some marginal posts, that can help sustain party organisations.

In Spain, Portugal and Italy, the sub-national levels of government are the institutional arenas where patronage as reward is most common. In Spain and Italy, in particular, subnational parties have been able to exploit the opportunities offered by the implementation of decentralisation through the creation of new administrative bodies lacking a tradition of public service, whose increased organisational flexibility has facilitated party control. In all four cases the rise of municipal/regional companies in the semi-public sector has provoked the expansion of networks of patronage at this level of government. Overall, it presents a considerable “organic inflation” irrespective of range of devolved competences, civil service size and governing party (Matas, 1995: 6; Ramió and Subirats, 1996: 158).

This is not, however, to say that patronage as reward only occurs at the sub-national level. At the central level, patronage as reward is very much in evidence in institutions of the media sector, where ex-elected politicians and professionals of parties as campaign organisations obtain positions as a reward for services offered to parties.

Previous literature has claimed that partisanship has a strong importance for appointments to both civil service positions and the management of state enterprises in the four Southern Europe democracies (Strom et al., 2008: 661; Müller, 2000). Nonetheless, a detailed picture of the mechanics of patronage clearly refutes this assertion. Figure 2 reports the criteria parties use when distributing posts. As it can be
seen, appointees’ professional qualities are the most salient feature in South European countries.

Figure 2. Appointees’ Profile (percentage of answers)

Source: Own elaboration.

Professional qualities rank first. The high values of political connections and personal relations highlight how professional qualities are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for obtaining posts, since they must often be accompanied by loyalty. A large share of the individuals nominated to high-level positions have the technical abilities required for their job, but they are selected on the basis of having demonstrated their loyalty to the party actors that distribute appointments. The relevance of expertise is due to the prevalence of control as a dominant motivation behind patronage. Parties recruit personnel that combine expertise and loyalty both to design and implement policy change and to control the particularistic distribution of goods and services – patronage in the widest sense – to their own supporters. The format of the party system affects the formation of links of trust between professionals and parties, as shown by the low values for political links in Italy. After the crisis of polarised pluralism, catch-all coalitions composed of numerous and fluid parties have alternated in government in Italy (Forestiere 2009). The fragmentation and instability of the format of the Italian party system, resulting from the absence of consolidated loyalties towards the new parties, increases the role of personal ties in the patronage practices of new parties as pro tempore clusters of office holders gathered in
catch-all blocs. In the other three cases, where a stable two-party format is present, political links play an important role, especially in Greece and Spain where the adversarial nature of political competition is more evident (Field, 2006; Hopkin, 2005).

In these cases, however, political connections are not synonymous with partisanship. In fact, party membership is not a necessary condition for obtaining posts, while the absence of links with opposition parties and ideological affinity are relevant, acting as substitutes for membership as indicators of shared objectives and policy priorities. As the high values for personal links in Greece, Portugal and Spain show, in these countries the stable two-party format has created two alternative recruitment pools of professionals linked to the parties, from which politicians select appointees, privileging their personal connections. Personal trust matters because it offers more certainty on the loyalty of nominees and more freedom of manoeuvre with respect to nominations rigidly controlled by parties on the basis of membership. The difficulty in distinguishing between political and personal loyalties shows how connections between politicians and professionals are not made through party organisations: patronage is managed autonomously by office-holders who assign positions to individuals rooted in personal power networks informally connected to parties.

The relevance of personal relations is an indicator of the incapacity of parties to manage patronage as unitary collective actors. The analysis of patronage practices, in particular in Italy, Spain and Portugal, confirms the recent literature on the organisation of parties in southern Europe (Biezen 2003; Bosco and Morlino 2006). South European parties are controlled by a narrow nucleus of power composed by leaders placed at the intersection between the party in government and the party executive. In this context, party patronage should be seen as part of party government, as Kopecký and Mair (2007: 7) put it, as “a way of governing rather than as a way of generating favours”. In other words, party patronage must be regarded as an instrument of governance which helps political parties implement public policies.

The dispersion of patronage processes is very high in the loose organisational structures of Greek parties. National leaders offer patronage at the central level of government in exchange for the loyalty of patrons who build networks organising the circulation of resources between centre and periphery (Pappas 2009). The comparison of Greece and Portugal, which share a centralised administrative structure, shows how the logic of patronage weighs on the configuration of intra-party power relationships. In Portugal, in fact, the absence of the electoral patronage strategies typical of the Greek
case and the prevalence of policy control over reward as the dominant motivation of patronage mean that parties assume a stratarchical configuration. Office-holders at the subnational level have autonomous control of local patronage to satisfy local party networks, offering the national leaders, who dispense patronage at the central level, an organisational base in exchange for lack of interference in the implantation of the local party structure. The stratarchical configuration is yet more pronounced in Italy where the low presence of patronage as electoral reward is accompanied by the decentralised structure of the State, which increases the stock of resources managed autonomously by subnational party bosses. In Spain, at every level of government the party in public office is the sole responsible of patronage appointments. Nonetheless, this does not imply a stratarchical configuration of the party organisation. Actually, the main parties present a high vertical integration and the central level supervises electoral strategies and coalition choice of the lower levels (regional and local).

Finally, the bipolar structure of political competition in southern Europe penalises the diffusion of consensual patronage practices. Despite the relatively high values for spoils sharing present in figure 3, majoritarian patronage practices prevail. Opposition parties have access to a narrow quota of positions that tend to be concentrated outside the ministerial domain, in particular in non-majoritarian institutions. The main exception to this pattern is Portugal, where the cooperation and consensual politics between the two main parties that predominated during consolidation of democracy has endured, a confirmation of the oft-used expression of a “grand coalition” in Portuguese public administration. Besides institutions and agencies where appointments are legally required to be made consensually (usually by the lower house), media and sub-national administration are the sectors where collusion between parties over the division of posts is most pronounced. The prevalence of majoritarian dynamics of patronage is confirmed by the flexibility of the legal framework which is often altered by parties in government to satisfy their needs for political control of the state. The majoritarian alteration of the legal framework reveals that this does not constitute an obstacle but a means of widening the discretionary powers of nomination of parties in government.
Democratization, party system institutionalization and party patronage

As the above analysis highlights, patronage is a relevant feature of Southern European countries. However, there is no single “Southern Model” of patronage. The patterns, pervasiveness, extent and logic of patronage differ across these four countries, despite sharing bureaucratic traditions and all having competitive party systems. As such, the current emphasis on the institutionalisation of a competitive party system to explain patronage appears misguided, at least in the case of Southern Europe, where this explanation is unable to account for the substantial variation in terms of patronage evidence above.

We thus propose an alternative explanation: that it is not the mechanics of the party system – more specifically, its current degree of institutionalisation and competitiveness – that explain the divergent patterns of patronage in Southern Europe, but rather the process of party system institutionalization during democratic consolidation in these four countries. We argue that this left genetic imprints on the nature of the party systems, generating path-dependencies that explain the present-day nature of patronage. This imprint is related to the role that patronage played in the process of party system structuring. Where patronage played a greater role in party system structuring, the existence of a competitive, institutionalised party system actually serves to make patronage flourish, rather than fade.
Our argument is thus centred on the process of party system institutionalization. As Mainwaring (1999: 25) puts it, institutionalisation requires not only predictability with regard to which are the main parties, but also with regard to their behaviour. In other words, a party system reaches an “equilibrium” (Mair 1997: 7), in terms of a stable pattern of interactions, with “actors develop[ing] expectations and behaviour based on the premise that the fundamental contours and rules of party competition and behavior will prevail into the foreseeable future” (Mainwaring, 1999: 25). Our hypothesis is that how an equilibrium is reached will also impact on the nature of the ensuing equilibrium, shaping parties’ expectations and behaviour – in this case, with regard to the scope and reach of patronage. Following Pappas (2009), we posit a central role to the strategic actions – and constraints on these actions – of political actors in this period of consolidation.2

In Portugal the revolutionary context of 1974-5 under which party system consolidation took place impacted directly on the party system by setting patterns of party interaction that have remained since, and generating a moderate patronage equilibrium. The movement that brought down the Estado Novo dictatorship on the 25th April 1974 was far from being a coherent or cohesive one. Its primary grievance had to do with the regime’s intransigence to negotiate over the decade-long African wars. Unable to alter policy from within, the army was finally to dismantle the Estado Novo, but there was little forethought (and much less agreement) on what should succeed it (Carrilho, 1985: 467). The coup thus quickly gave way to a convoluted revolutionary period, where the main goal was the definition of regime-type, of how Portuguese society should be organised and governed. Regime-choice thus became a central conflict in Portuguese politics, encapsulating electoral support and providing the basic shapes of the party system. This dimension centred on regime-choice – on how Portuguese society and state should be organised – and was settled and gradually defused by the mid-1980s, after reaching its peak in the revolutionary period of 1974-5.

The increasing polarisation of the revolutionary period, culminating in the ‘Hot Summer’ of 1975, when civil war appeared possible, had three effects in terms of the use of patronage. First, the central arena of this conflict was the armed forces, not the electorate. All the key moments in the revolutionary period were marked by military intervention. With parties centred on ensuring their regime-choice prevailed, they

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2 While the focus here is on the period of party system consolidation, we are aware that in most of our cases party system consolidation coincided largely with democratic consolidation.
inevitably focussed their strategic attention more on their linkages with the armed forces rather than on electoral mobilisation.

Parties sought to occupy the central structures of government during the revolutionary context, helped by the *transición por ruptura* of 1974, and the ensuing purges of the Salazarist sectors of public administration, which mostly took place at the upper echelons only. Second, the polarisation of 1974-5 generated substantial partisan support and defined the party system’s essential outline: notably, the exclusion of the Communist Party from national government, consigning it to an anti-system position; and the PS and PSD as the main governing alternatives. Third, the regime-choice conflict of 1974-5 – which was only gradually settled, its effects still evident in the mid-1980s – placed the two main governing parties on the same side of the ‘barricades’.

While the period of 1974-5 was marked by a ferocious competition to occupy public administration between the Communists and the parties supporting a liberal democracy regime-type – notably the PS and the PSD, this was to die away with the endgame of Portugal’s revolution. As the electoral legitimacy replaced the revolutionary one, the Communists were no longer able to make inroads in public administration, and sought primarily to entrench their positions rather than acquire new ones. For the PS and PSD, the initial decade of Portuguese democracy was marked by substantial cooperation – culminating in the grand coalition government of 1983-5 – as both parties collaborated to complete a fraught and complex process of democratic consolidation. This required removing the military remnants of the revolution from the political system – which, inter alia, meant that Portugal had no Constitutional Court until 1982, having in its stead a military Revolutionary Council – whilst containing the Communist Party and dealing with the economic aftermath of not only the oil shocks but also of the Portuguese revolution. This cooperation between the PS and PSD helps explain the comparatively moderate levels of patronage, as neither party sought to generate an escalating “patronage race” that might ultimately undermine their common position on democratic consolidation. In this context, the cooperation to consolidate the new democracy carried over into the practice of patronage, constraining its use at lower levels, and these patterns were to subsist over time, helping explain not only the lower levels of patronage in the Portuguese case, but also their more consensual nature seen above.

In Spain, the anti-Franco opposition was unable to overthrow the dictatorship. The authoritarian regime transformed itself by legal means through the approval of a
Law for Political Reform and through the convocation of constitutional elections to delimitate the number and the relative strength of the political actors intervening in the new setting, which, simultaneously, limited the influence of the non-political actors (Linz and Stepan, 1996). Opposition parties thus accepted a negotiated transition brokered by Francoist insiders and agreed to the incorporation of the monarchy into the political architecture of the new democratic regime. Following the first democratic elections of 1977, pact making became an institutionalized form of elite interaction and national policy-making (Encarnación, 2003; Gunther, 1992).

The politics of consensus assigned an extraordinarily important role to the new political elites, who directed from above a gradual and negotiated process of political change through multilateral negotiation and compromise (Gunther 1992; Linz 1993b). Both the government and the democratic opposition needed each other to successfully carry out democratizing reforms against those who advocated the continuance of Francoism without Franco or a revolutionary alternative. Besides, a potential military intervention dampened overt partisanship and tempered the demands of the left-wing opposition.

Parties consensually negotiated the Moncloa Pacts (which encapsulated a broad agenda of economic and political reforms), the 1978 Constitution, the decentralisation of the state and a new electoral system designed to avoid excessive parliamentary fragmentation and to grant governmental stability. Parliamentary rules also tilted power in favour of the executive vis-à-vis the parliament. So, the very same constitution paved the way for adversarial politics once democracy consolidated (Field, 2006).

As these accords were reached by politicians from the entire ideological spectrum, pact making ensured that reforms would serve the national interest. The continuity of political elites between the transition and post-transition periods facilitated the maintenance of a consensual political style up to 1982 (Encarnación, 2003).

The heterogeneity of the opposition to the regime as well as the representation of this diversity along the constitutional process ensured a high horizontal accountability. Political parties also found a state bureaucracy usable by the new democratic governments in spite of its authoritarian tradition, and a reasonably strong recent tradition of rule of law (Linz and Stepan, 1996). The Weberian-inspired model of bureaucracy installed at the onset of the XX century (tenure-of-office logic, an administrative career and the predominance of autonomous bodies of civil servants) survived different governments and regimes. Indeed, Francoism sought its own
institutionalization by turning into a bureaucratic regime following the Weberian ideal of hierarchy and neutrality of the bureaucracy which avoided the expansion of clientelism to a large extent (Villoria Mendieta and Huntoon, 2002; Parrado, 2000). These two elements limited the use of patronage for partisan goals.

Besides agreeing on the basic institutions and rules of the new regime, political elites had to institutionalize and develop their own parties (Morlino 1998). Spanish parties did not benefit from the conditions which their European colleagues had enjoyed for decades to establish a solid territorial structure, recruit activists, organize a mass membership, or establish close relationships with social groups affected by the cleavage structure, so catch-allism became the predominant electoral strategy (Linz and Montero, 1999). Parties’ weakness in terms of membership may have initially contributed to the use of public administration patronage resources in order to extend their rank and file and to guarantee activists’ loyalty. Yet, although public employment contributed to parties’ organisational development it was not a significant feature of their electoral mobilisation nor did government spending follow clientelistic patterns (Hopkin, 2001).

Ever since Greece’s transition to pluralist politics in 1974, parties have played crucial roles in organizing the public space, aggregating social demands, socializing the citizens and, in short, creating what has been termed a “party democracy” (Pappas 1999; also cf. Voulgaris 2001). As the remaining pillars of the pre-authoritarian regime became either discredited (i.e., the army after the folly that led to Turkish invasion in Cyprus) or effectively neutralized (i.e., the monarchy, which was abolished by referendum shortly after democratization), political parties became legitimised as the central elements of the new regime and organized the polity in a both democratic and rationalized way. The major parties that emerged in the new pluralist environment were the center-right New Democracy (ND) and the (initially Marxist that was soon to metamorphose into) center-left Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK). The turning point was the elections of 1981, which PASOK won by landslide, thereafter creating the conditions for an almost uninterrupted rule for two decades. That election also signified the transformation of the multiparty system that had existed in Greece for three decades into a classic two-party system (Pappas 2003), that is, a system in which “the existence of third parties does not prevent the two major parties from governing alone, i.e., whenever coalitions are unnecessary” (Sartori 1976: 186). Since 1981, PASOK and ND have competed against each other for the absolute majority of seats and the winner has always been able to govern alone. With only two exceptions (in the 1993 and 2000
elections), alternation in power has occurred regularly after each party has served two terms in office. The predominance of parties in conjunction with the solidification of two-partyism has given rise in recent decades to political polarization which often peaks around election times (Kalyvas 1997; Pappas 2009). Political competition thus takes the form of a zero-sum game between the two rival parties over the spoils to be gained from capturing the state. In such a game, the winner takes it all; the loser must simply wait for its turn in office.

Polarized competition in a two-party system is, of course, only one side of the patronage coin; the other side is statism, that is, the expansion of the state in all areas of public life, which thus becomes “a major aspect of Greek political culture, not only as an ideology and practice (dirigisme) … but also as a core social expectation” (Spanou 2008: 152). The Greek state, far from resembling Weber’s rationalized public administration system based on universalistic rules, has to this date four characteristics that, put together, create ideal environment for the development of patronage politics: a tradition of state centralism; large size and extensive control over key sectors of the national economy; the overt politicization of its functions; and lack of autonomy of the bureaucracy which this way becomes subordinated to political authority. State centralism, first, has in Greece a long pedigree as is associated with the preindustrial pattern of development in this largely homogenous country that was motivated by a large public sector. This tradition has deeply affected politics which, to this date, is characterized by centralism, bureaucratization, and legalism. Second, with regard to size, around the mid-1990s the Greek public sector provided employment to 408,992 employees, which amounted to 11 percent of the entire Greek labor force (Sotiropoulos 2004: 15). This number however reached in the area of 600,000 to 700,000 employees if one added “the short-term contracts and public employees hired for the duration of a project, as well as the military, elementary and high-school teachers, priests and doctors working in the public health system” (ibid.). Besides being the largest employer, the Greek state has always aimed at asserting economic control over strategic sectors of the economy. Such state expansion has slowed down since the early 1990s when privatizations were initiated by the then ND government and continued under both PASOK and ND, thereafter alternating in power. Even so, to this date “government control on public corporations remains the heart of the matter” (Spanou 2008: 157). The third characteristic of the Greek state is the predominance of party political loyalty rather than individual merit for both recruitment and promotion in the civil service
hierarchy. As an author specializing on the topic asserts, “Greek public administration is top-heavy and politicized. Every ministry has an overabundance of political appointees who aid the minister and who supervise and, at times, supplant top civil servants” (Sotiropoulos 2004a: 15, 14). The fourth characteristic of the Greek state is the lack of autonomy of the bureaucracy and the latter’s subservience to political elites. A wave of creating “independent authorities” that began in the 1990s and continued into the following decade was intended precisely to reinvigorate the status of civil service vis-à-vis central political authority.

Finally, a bipolar pattern of competition spread in Italy. Since 1992 the Italian party system has changed significantly. Italy has been undergoing a transition from a democratic regime, correctly defined as a partitocrazia (one dominated by political parties), to a different kind of democracy less grounded on political parties. From 1947 to 1992, Italy has been the only case of democratic consolidation in Southern Europe characterised by the exclusive legitimacy of the regime (Morlino 1998). The old Italian party system was classified among the cases of “polarized pluralism” (Sartori 1976) whose key features where extreme pluralism, the existence of anti-system parties (the neo-fascist MSI and the communist PCI), tripolar competition, bilateral opposition, centre occupied by the DC (Christian Democrats) crucial to the survival of Italian democracy. The legitimacy deficit of the Italian democracy has been compensated by the organisational strength of its political parties. The affirmation of partitocrazia was characterised by the substantial monopoly of parties over the political activity of a weak civil society, while its reproduction was based on the strategy of colonisation which has increased the proportion of social and economic power exercised by parties. The DC, as a dominant party obliged to govern, developed progressively a symbiotic link with the weak Italian state. Exercising patronage over a fragmented and extensive public sector, the DC and its peripheral allies transformed the pervasive public sector into a intermediary that connected party organisation to the civil society. The overgrown State has became the agent of the Italian parties whose tight control over civil society was based on the selective distribution of public resources.

At the beginning of the 1990s changes in the international environment shook the foundations of partitocrazia: the end of the two bloc system of international relations sanctioned the definitive erosion of the bases of systemic polarisation; the parties in government also saw the growth of constraints imposed by the process of European integration on the irresponsible particularistic distribution of material resources. The
exhaustion of symbolic and material resources that had fed competition accentuated the turbulence in the internal environment, facilitating the launching of challenges to partitocrazia by various actors that provoked the increasing destructuration of parties and the party system. Between 1992 and 1994, “atomisation” was reached, characterised by exceptional fluidity and uncertainty as much in party organisations as in their systemic interactions. The old party system of polarized pluralism did suffer a collapse. Not only were all its components affected by this collapse, but the system too stopped working.

The introduction of a new electoral law as a majoritarian institutional arrangement precipitated the dealignment and stimulated the consolidation of a new party system. The party system assumed the features of “fragmented bipolarism” (D’Alimonte 2001; 2005). The alternation in government between pre-electoral coalitions has became the new predictable structure of competition. Notwithstanding the bipolar pattern of competition, what distinguishes contemporary Italy from the other South Europe democracies is the fragmentation of the system and the weakness of parties as organisations with scarce or absent levels of institutionalisation. The new party system has witnessed a marked fluidity in terms of new parties, movements, splits, mergers and new electoral coalitions. The nature of governmental coalitions is still fragmented and heterogenous, heightened by the uncertainty of a system where only the bipolar mechanics has been stabilised while the underinstitutionalisation of party organisations persists.

Overall, then, there appears to be a correlation between the role of patronage in party system consolidation and its subsequent prevalence. In Italy and Greece party system consolidation was largely predicated on patronage; in the Iberian countries patronage was important but not decisive. While patronage networks were activated for electoral purposes in Portugal and Spain, these were not essential at the crucial moment of party system consolidation, a pattern that helps explain the comparatively moderate levels of patronage. Equally, this also helps explain why patronage occurs mostly at the top of the public administration, as parties sought to occupy the central structures of government during democratization, as opposed to Italy and particularly Greece, where patronage appears to be pervasive at all levels of public administration.
Concluding remarks

As expected, patronage is a relevant feature of Southern Europe. However, this does not mean that the political-administrative trajectory of South European countries after democratisation can be reduced to some “Southern Model” characterised by a pervasiveness of patronage practices. Rather, what we find is a more nuanced picture. While patronage covers a fairly extensive range in all four countries, its depth varies considerably, as do its mechanics, rationale, criteria and partisan nature. Overall, we find patronage to be substantially higher in Greece and Italy than in Portugal and Spain.

What explains the differences in patronage across these four countries? We find that neither traditional accounts – focussing on state and bureaucratic traditions – nor more contemporary ones – centering on the existence of competitive, institutionalised party systems – are able to explain the divergence across Southern Europe. This paper rather argues that the differences derive from the patterns of party system consolidation, most notably during the period of democratic consolidation, in each of the four countries. These entrenched more cooperative and consensual dynamics in Portugal and Spain, helping defuse the potential politicisation of the intermediate and lower levels of public administration. Conversely, they established a pattern of competitive patronage in Italy and Greece, where the combination of statism and polarized competition proved a powerful recipe for patronage. In a sense, then, the process of consolidation of the party system itself acted as a mechanism of legacification (Meyer-Sahling 2009), with the different patterns of consolidation fragmenting the Southern Model and increased the range of legacies.

Our analysis thus partly concurs with recent research on post-Communist Europe – party systems do matter in explaining patronage. However, what the comparative analysis of the Southern European countries suggests is that the focus has to be placed on the process of party system consolidation. The application of this framework to other contexts will help shed light on its wider validity. At the same time, further research is needed to expand on some other dimensions that emerge from the analysis here. For one, the analysis of the Greek and Italian cases certainly point to the relevance of state dynamics in explaining patronage, both in terms of its level and in terms of how it can change over time. As such, more research is also needed on how the nature of the state interacts with party system consolidation in generating higher or lower levels of patronage.
Appendix 1. Experts’ questionnaire

Q2. In your opinion, is the this institution formally reachable by “political parties,” i.e. in general, do people linked to political parties have legal power to appoint individuals to jobs in these institutions?

Q3. In your opinion, DO such individuals (ministers, PM, President, party chairman) actually appoint individuals to jobs in this institution.

Q4. What role do political parties play in these appointments? Small or large?

Q5A. If yes, would you say that “political parties” appoint in a few institutions, in most institutions or in all of them?

Q5B. If yes, would you say that “political parties” appoint at the top managerial level, at the middle level (employees) or at the bottom level (technical and service personnel)?

Q6. In reality, who within the parties is responsible for making these appointments?

Q7. Do you think that the current practices of appointments differ substantially from previous periods? If so, how and why?

Q8. In your opinion, why do “political parties” actually appoint people to these jobs? Are they interested in rewarding their loyal party activists and members with state jobs or do they want to control these sectors by having personnel linked to the party appointed in them?

Q9. Now, we want to ask you a question about the people appointed to these positions. Would you say that they have gotten their jobs because they are professionally qualified for them, or because of their political link, or because of their personal allegiance, or any other allegiance?

Q10. In general, do government parties share appointments with the opposition? Yes or no?

The questions Q2–Q5B are repeated for the three institutional types (Ministerial level, NDACs and executing institutions).

Appendix 2. Scope of party patronage: Index

The composite index of patronage is calculated based on the median values for the range and depth of patronage in each of the nine policy areas and three institutional types and following these steps:

a. The two values are multiplied to produce a value with a maximum of 9 that reflects the extent of patronage in each institutional type in each policy area (a total of 27 values for each country).
b. The values are added across the three policy areas to produce a value reflecting the extent of patronage in that policy area with a max score of 27 (nine value for each country).

c. The values are also added across institutional types to produce a value for each of the three institutional types with a max score of 81 (3 values per country).

d. A total score for each country is calculated by adding the three to produce a value with a max score of 243.

e. As final output the index is presented in standardized values with a range of 0 to 1.
References


