Abstract:
Neopatrimonialism provides a heuristic and – if operationalized coherently – analytical lens to assess informal institutions and their relationship to formal state institutions. The paper sets out to analyze the interrelationship between presidentialism and the persistence and change of neopatrimonialism in six different presidential systems in three regions: namely Argentina, Venezuela, Kenya, Zambia, Philippines and Indonesia. Three aspects of the different presidential systems are of particular relevance: (1) executive power of the president, checks and balances provided by (2) the judiciary and (3) parliament. For comparatively analyzing the informal institution of neopatrimonialism, indicators are deducted from three main dimensions of neopatrimonial rule (following Bratton/van de Walle 1997): (1) (informal) power concentration in the hands of a patron, (2) systematic clientelism, and (3) particularistic use of state resources. The six case studies, which all follow the same analytical grid, reveal a complex interrelationship between formal and informal institutions. Yet, as will be shown, a high degree of power formally accrued to presidents fuels neopatrimonial behavior on the three dimensions introduced.
1 Introduction: Presidentialism and neopatrimonialism

Presidential systems are not very popular among political scientists. Most scholars stress the “perils” of presidentialism (see Linz 1990b; Stepan/Skach 1993) and perceive parliamentary systems, which provide for the election of the head of the executive by the legislative, to allow for greater control of the executive than their presidential counterparts (Linz 1990b: 51; Linz 1990a: 84; Lijphart 1991). Institutional restraint is perceived to stronger (e.g. account in Elgie 2005). In contrast, Cameron et al. (2006) briefly state: “Presidentialism is the most widely adopted constitution among democracies where the rule of law is weak.” As presidential systems generally allow for a higher power concentration they might be more easily subverted by personalistic practices (van de Walle 2001: 31).

This article attempts to link “problems of presidentialism” (Linz/Valenzuela 1994) to specific forms of governance, i.e. how rule is exercised. Principally, governance is understood as “the formation and stewardship of the formal and informal rules that regulate the public realm, the arena in which state as well as economic and societal actors interact to make decisions” (Hyden et al. 2004: 16, emphasis removed). Numerous studies have tried to establish the underlying factors causing different expressions of governance, such as centralization of politics, clientelism and political corruption in various world regions (e.g., Johnston 2005; Lambsdorff 2007). A prominent attempt to describe and analyze this kind of rule, i.e. deficient forms of governance, has been the concept of neopatrimonialism. The basic proposition of this post-Weberian concept is that in a lot of states formal state bureaucracies are fused with particularistic politics of the rulers (e.g. Bratton/van de Walle 1997; van de Walle 2001; Englebert 2000; Brinkerhoff/Goldsmith 2002). The separation between the public and the private realm, which stands at the basis of the “modern” state concept, is abrogated. With its universal claim the concept permits comparative analysis, also across different regions. Thus, it has the potential to contribute to comparative area studies (Basedau/Köllner 2007).

There is still lack of knowledge about the factors which drive the creation an impartial form of rule which is based on the basis of “ethical universalism” (North et al. 2009). This paper endeavors to contribute to this literature by comparing six countries from three world regions with different forms of presidentialism as well as different forms of governance. Results from

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1 In contrast, Shugart and Carey (1992) find that presidential do not inherently constitute a danger for (new) democracies. According to them, it is the degree of power accured to the individual at the top, which makes the difference. For Merkel (2010: 117-118), however, presidential systems are on the overall weaker, meaning less stable. Even more unstable are semi-presidentialist systems due to their institutionalized competition between different spheres of the executive.


As colonialism with its “imported” statehood (Badie 2000 [1992]) can be seen as the central variable for the initial fusion of different logics of rule, all cases analyzed are former colonies. Five of them underwent transition processes during the “third wave” of democratization. Their transition years (Argentina: 1983, Indonesia: 1998, Kenya: 1992, Philippines: 1986, Zambia: 1991) are the starting points for the analysis in the case studies, respectively. Venezuela serves as a contrasting case: The election of Hugo Chávez as President in December 1998 marked the transition from elite democracy towards a more centralized mode of government with strong plebiscitary elements. This was codified with the new “Bolivarian Constitution” from 2000. Going by existing literature, this should strengthen the concentration of power, clientelism and corruption.

The key goal of the article is to investigate a diverse set of countries across the regional divide. Within the three regions, the cases share similar GDP per capita and inequality levels. However, it has to be stated explicitly that this design does not qualify as a most different systems design with the experimental rigor envisaged by Przeworski and Teune (1970: 31-46). As a consequence, the explanatory power and the general applicability of the results are far more restricted than that of a pure most different systems design. Yet, as the case studies follow the same analytical grid, they allow for comparison which in turn can stimulate further research.

The main question is: How do different expressions of presidentialism influence neopatrimonialism, i.e. its modalities concentration of power, clientelism and corruption?

The paper proceeds in four steps: First, following some conceptual considerations, the different forms of presidentialism in the six countries will be presented, with special regard to (1) executive power of the president, and checks and balances provided by (2) the judiciary and (3) parliament as indicators of horizontal accountability. Furthermore, the level of democratization will be introduced as the key intervening variable for the analysis. The following section outlines the main characteristics of neopatrimonialism. In addition, it specifies its three modalities concentration of political power, clientelism and corruption. On this basis, section 3 presents the interrelationship of formal institutions (different expressions of presidentialism) and informal institutions (concentration of power, systematic clientelism and corruption) in

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4 Field research included data collection, qualitative interviews and focus group discussions in all six countries. Number of interviews: Argentina 50, Indonesia 66, Kenya 47, Philippines 54, Venezuela 52, Zambia 49. Karsten Bechle conducted field research in Latin America, Nina Korte in Southeast Asia and Christian von Soest in sub-Saharan Africa. In order to improve comparability, indicators and topic guides were established before leaving to the field.
the six country case studies. This serves – in the conclusion – to provide preliminary insights into the mechanisms of how different forms of presidentialism influence the concentration of power, clientelism and corruption.

2 Different forms of presidentialism
The differentiation of several types of political and governmental regimes has been one of the main subjects of comparative politics. The ongoing debate has generated a sophisticated set of indicators and (sub-)typologies, but still fundamental controversies remain (e.g. Decker 2009). This article will only briefly reflect this debate as far as it serves to establish indicators for the (formal) power of the president and its checks and balances as enshrined in the constitutions and further legal texts. As the sample contains only presidential systems, the design is not suited to contribute to the debate of the respective advantages and disadvantages of different government systems. In contrast, it aims at analyzing differences between several presidential systems.

2.1 The traditional government system typology
The principal motivation for dealing with the differentiation of different regime types is that “writers postulate links between different regimes and different levels of social, political and economic performance” (Elgie 2003: 220). A fundamental problem has been that most analyses treat government type as a dichotomous variable, as either parliamentary or presidential (Metcalf 2000: 661). In general, three particular characteristics are common to most classifications:

a) the procedures for electing political leaders;

b) the procedures for dismissing political leaders; and

c) the constitutional and political powers of political leaders (Elgie 2003: 223).

Steffani (1962; 1992) defines a parliamentary system in terms of one feature alone, i.e. that the executive is dependent on the assembly for its survival.5 This has proved inadequate for analyzing and comparing real government types. The debate about “semi-presidentialism” (Duverger 1980) in particular has shown the great variations within and between different categories. Shugart and Carey (1992: 23) for instance identify three criteria for the classification of semipresidential regimes: “The president is elected by popular vote, the president possesses considerable powers, and there exist also a premier and cabinet, subject to assembly confidence, who perform executive functions.”

5 Decker (2009), following Shugart/Carey (1992: 22), suggests to also include the origin of government, meaning the election through parliament, to Steffani’s criteria as an additional “primary criteria”.
Sartori (1997) provides a more complex definition that emphasizes the dual authority embodied in this regime type. The debate of semipresidential regimes is of significance because it has been suggested by some scholars that semipresidentialism “retains some of the advantages of presidentialism, while showing the potential to diminish some of presidentialism’s defects” (Shugart/Carey 1992: 49) For Sartori (1997: 135), semipresidentialism provides a “better” alternative to presidential regimes. Yet, this has remained a minority position as other studies indicate that semipresidential systems with a dual executive are a serious liability for democratic stability (Merkel 2010: 117-118; for Africa cf. Kirschke 2007).

However, semipresidentialism in itself is a contested concept containing a diverse set of different political systems. Shugart and Carey (1992), for instance, developed two subtypes of semi-presidentialism; namely premier-presidential and presidential-parliamentary. Even the semipresidentialism discussion has not resolved the challenge of creating a valid and fine-grained typology of government systems, which can be linked to certain outcomes, such as different expressions of governance or executive power.

2.2 Extent of political power

Principally, “the conventional distinction between presidential, parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes, besides being analytically inadequate, also tells us little about presidential power” (van Cranenburgh 2008: 953). There is the need to further analyze the specifics of different systems. In analyzing different systems, “dispositional” and “relational” approaches can be distinguished. Elgie criticizes that in building regime types, scholars recurrently mix-up dispositional properties (whether certain elements/powers exist or not) and their relational properties (the actual patterns of executive politics in the political system). He argues (2003: 219) that classification of regime types should be made with reference to dispositional properties alone. According to him, there are only three aspects of a regime which need to be considered if a classification is to be made on the basis of dispositional properties:

1. whether there is both a head of state and a head of government in the political system or whether just one institution is to be found;
2. whether or not the incumbents of these institutions are popularly elected; and,
3. whether or not these incumbents serve for a fixed term.

The other major method was developed by Shugart and Carey (1992: 150). It provides a list of presidential powers, each of which is measured on a scale of 0 to 4. The scores are then added for an index for presidential power. In contrast to Elgie, Metcalf (2000: 682) favors this “relational” method of measuring presidential power.

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6 Frye (1997) put forward an even more extensive list of 27 presidential powers.
However, in line with van Cranenburgh (2008), this article applies Siaroff’s (2003) more parsimonious model, which assesses nine criteria to establish degrees of presidential power in different government systems. For him, a presidential system does imply a president who is the central political actor with a ‘guaranteed’ list of powers – popular election, appointment powers, chairing of cabinet meetings, legislative veto powers, central role in foreign policy and central role in government formation – mitigated by a guaranteed lack of dissolution power (Siaroff 2003: 309).

Table 1 depicts the expressions of presidential powers for the six country case studies. As can be seen by the total scores, Kenya and Argentina have the highest presidential power, whereas Indonesian presidents have the lowest powers at their disposal. Against a background of neopatrimonial rule, the question whether the president can make appointments for key high offices, allowing him/her to appoint his sympathizers to important state offices (Siaroff 2003: 304), is of particular interest. All the polities grant considerable appointment powers to the presidents.

Table 1: Presidential power in the six country cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>PE</th>
<th>CE</th>
<th>GF</th>
<th>CM</th>
<th>DL</th>
<th>AP</th>
<th>VT</th>
<th>EDP</th>
<th>FP</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya 1997</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia 1996</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia 2002</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines 1985</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina 1994</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela 2000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Constitutions in English language accessed through Wolfrum/Grote (2007). Kenya and Zambia were cross-checked with van Cranenburgh (2008: 959); Argentina, Philippines and Venezuela with Siaroff (2003: 296-297).

Notes: Following Siaroff, the following nine key criteria are scored dichotomously (no: 0; yes: 1):
PE: president is popularly elected,
CE: concurrent election of president and legislature,
AP: discretionary appointment powers,
CM: chairing of cabinet meetings,
VT: veto power (the right to send legislation back to the assembly for reconsideration),
EDP: long-term emergency and/or decree powers,
FP: central role in foreign policy,
GF: central role in government formation,
DL: ability to dissolve the legislature.

Siaroff mentions the prime minister, other cabinet ministers, high court judges, senior military figures and/or central bankers. For van Cranenburgh (2008: 958), this condition is fulfilled if at least three of the following eleven important political offices are determined by the president: the Auditor General, the Attorney General, high judges (like the Chief of Justice), the Ombudsman, the Central Bank Governor, the Director of Public Prosecutors, the Chief of Police, Regional Commissioners, the Electoral Commission, High Commissioners (e.g. a human rights commission), and high military officers.

The data do not cover the power sharing agreement of 2008 and the new constitution of 2010.
In this article, the interest lies on effect of different formations’ of presidential rule on governance, i.e. neopatrimonialism. That in essence means that Metcalf’s criticism (2000: 683) that the concept of presidentialism through discretionary as well as relational approaches is only measuring formal powers in fact is an advantage: Independent and dependent variables can be treated independently of each other.

A first quantitative analysis of presidentialism in Africa demonstrates that a) the institutional basis of presidential power in these systems in Africa “is on average very high” (van Cranenburgh 2008: 961) and b) that this high presidential power is bad for governance as it induces corruption and abuse of power (van Cranenburgh 2008: 968). This article attempts to build on this insight and further analyze formal-informal institution interaction with a small-N framework.

2.3 Checks and balances on executive actions

An indirect means to comparatively assess checks and balances on the executive by the judiciary and parliament is to use indicators which reflect institutional controls of power or the existence of veto players. These are, for instance, Henisz’ (2000; 2002) “Political Constraints Index”, “Political Constraints” from the Polity IV data set (Marshall/Jaggers 2009) and the variable “Checks” from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (DPI) which measures the number of veto players in government (Beck et al. 2001; Keefer/Stasavage 2003).

Henisz (2000) derives the extent to which any political actor or the replacement for any actor – e.g., the executive or a chamber of the legislature – is constrained in his or her choice of future policies. The indicator estimates the feasibility of policy change (the extent to which a change in the preferences of any one actor may lead to a change in government policy). The main step is the identification of the number of independent branches of the state (executive, lower and upper legislative chambers, judiciary and sub-federal institutions) with veto power over policy change in each country. His series addresses some key issues, such as the number of chambers in a legislature, the degree of federalism, Supreme Court turnover, factionalization of the legislature, and the relative influence of different parties among the executive, legislature, and judicial branches.

The index ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating stronger checks and balances, i.e. less power concentration. Each additional veto point (a branch of government that is both

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9 These concepts were operationalized using Rule of Law and Control of Corruption from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al. 2009).
constitutionally effective and controlled by a party different from other branches) increases the total level of constraints on policy change. Henisz’ “Political Constraints Index III” and “Political Constraints Index V” differ in that the later includes two additional and particularly relevant veto players – the judiciary and „sub-federal entities“. The indicator “Checks” from DPI counts the number of veto players. Figure 1 depicts checks and balances as well as the number of veto players in the six country case studies.

Figure 1: Political constraints and number of veto players

In Argentina, checks and balances were weak until 1980s. Since the political transition in 1983, there have been “substantial limitations on executive authority”. Similarly, in Indonesia from 1957 until 1998 power was concentrated; since 1999 there have been substantial checks on executive action. Kenya shows stronger limitations since the end of the 1990s, yet the number of veto players is lower than in the two former cases. Again, checks and balances in the Philippines and Zambia became stronger following democratic transition. Currently, the restriction of power is on a comparable level in the country cases, only Kenya has a significantly lower number of veto players. Furthermore, Venezuela’s comparatively strong limits of power were not be maintained after President Chávez took over in 1999.

2.4 Intervening variable: Level of democratization

The level of democratization crucially determines how strong the pressure on neopatrimonial processes becomes. Principally, the divide between democracies and autocracies “tells us little about presidential power. However, it is useful to examine more closely the differences between electoral democracies and liberal democracies” (van Cranenburgh 2008: 964).

Most of the case studies are stuck in the “grey zone” between democracy and autocracy (on the discussion of different regime types cf. Köllner 2008; Kailitz 2009; Bank 2010). Table 2
depicts the indicators of political rights and civil liberties in the six countries according to Freedom House. As can be seen, political rights and civil liberties show a high correlation. On both accounts, Argentina has the highest scores, together with Indonesia, which scores slightly lower in respect to civil liberties. These two cases can be categorized as democracies, or in Freedom House terminology, as free. All other countries fall in a middle position between democracies and autocracies (“partly free”), with Venezuela scoring lower in respect to civil rights than the rest of the sample.

Table 2: Indicators of political rights and civil liberties, 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political rights</th>
<th>Civil liberties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: A higher overall indicator denotes a higher autocracy score, with seven as the highest. Conversely, higher scores in the subcategories indicate a better situation. Subcategories political rights: A: electoral process; B: political pluralism and participation; C: functioning of government. Subcategories of civil liberties: D: freedom of expression and belief; E: associational and organizational rights; F: rule of law; G: personal autonomy and individual rights. According to Freedom House, to qualify for electoral democracy, a state must have satisfied the following criteria: (1) a competitive, multi-party political system; (2) universal adult suffrage for all citizens; (3) regularly contested elections conducted in conditions of ballot secrecy, (4) reasonable ballot security, (5) significant public access of major political parties to the electorate. Source: Freedom House (2010).

3 Potential effects of different forms of presidentialism

Going by the most commonly used quantitative measure, the Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al. 2010),

10 governance has rarely improved on a global scale since assessment started in the mid-1990s. This is despite the much-acclaimed “third wave” of democratization.

11 Potentially, increased political space strengthens the ruling elite’s accountability vis-à-vis the population, for instance through elections and a free press. On the other hand, scholars argue

10 Others are the Country Policy and Institution Assessment, CPIA (World Bank), International Country Risk Guide, ICRG; Global Integrity Index, Bertelsmann Transformation Index and general public opinion surveys such as the Latino-, Asia- and Afrobarometer.

11 Critical on these indexes see Sindzingre/Milelli (2009).

12 A comprehensive reflection of the state of research in this regard is beyond the scope of this paper (cf. for instance Pech 2009). As Mungiu-Pippidi (2010) reminds us, taking the experience in Western Europe into consideration, the time span might of about 20 years have been just to induce any progress towards good governance.
that elections increase neopatrimonial exchange relations such as vote buying (cf. e.g. Lindberg 2003; Brinkerhoff/Goldsmith 2002: 28-30).

Assessing the East-European experience, Mungiu-Pippidi (2010: 11) finds that only a minority of transition countries further “evolve to good governance and impartial government based on ethical universalism: but most cases lag behind, as such regimes seem to reach particularly robust equilibria” (cf. also North et al. 2009).

Hence, if the underlying informal institutions and actor configurations, which structure the behavior of actors, are not changed, efforts to improve governance will remain futile. Key variables in this respect are the patterns of economic and political participation (for Mungiu-Pippidi: “resources and constraints”) (Johnston 2005). In a lot of societies a small circle of individuals controls state resources and prevents other actors from competing for political influence (North et al. 2009).

4 Conceptualizing neopatrimonialism and its modalities

Following Weber’s (1980 [1922]) and Jellinek’s (1959 [1900]) conception, the fundamental raison d’être of a state is to provide security and services for every citizen. Its agents act according to laid-down procedures and “shall not take anything into consideration about the citizen/case that is not beforehand stipulated in the policy or the law” (Rothstein/Teorell 2008: 170). Obviously, this quest for universalism is an ideal type, which in its entirety is absent in every real state. However, particularism dominates in most developing countries.

Numerous, often competing, concepts such as state capture, particularism, neopatrimonialism, corruption, clientelism or patronage all deal with systematic deviations (seen from the angle of the “modern” state) of the principle of universalism. However, these different terms do not have share widely accepted definitions and are regularly used as generic terms. Even key terms such as clientelism “are not used in the same manner across areas in comparative politics” (van de Walle 2009: 3).

The concept of neopatrimonialism serves to structure different forms of governance. The term denotes the simultaneous operation of Weber’s patrimonial and rational-legal ideal types of domination.13 In a patrimonial system, a patron treats the state as a personal household and holds economic, political as well as military power (Roth 1968). The provision of gifts on followers serves to strengthen their support (Weber 1980 [1922]: 133-134, 136; Daloz 2003). In a neopatrimonial system, patrimonial modes of operation are fused with rational-legal rule, or laid-down procedures of a “modern” state bureaucracy.

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13 For detailed recent discussions of the neopatrimonialism concept see Erdmann/Engel (2007), deGrassi (2008), van Donge (2008) and Pitcher et al. (2009).
That is of fundamental importance for governance, as to a large degree, politics in a state is routinized through an administrative staff (Möller/Shierenbeck 2009: 12). That is to say, authority predominantly is bureaucracy (Weber 1980 [1922]: 126). Neopatrimonial rule is institutionalized, i.e. it has a rule and a sanction component (Lauth 2000: 24; Faust/Marx 2004: 33). Following Bratton and van de Walle (1997), three informal practices characterize neopatrimonial systems: (1) (informal) concentration of political power, (2) systematic clientelism, (3) corruption.

4.1 Concentration of power
Concentration of power in a neopatrimonial system can be assessed through various indicators. To start with, it is important to note that not constitutional means but informal strategies to concentrate power are meant. This follows the insight that in highly personalized systems, individuals at the top resist “delegating all but the most trivial decision-making tasks” (Bratton/van de Walle 1997: 63). An important expression in the African context is the longevity in power of presidents. In contrast, “big men” in Africa constantly shift members of the political elite in order to prevent any potential opponent from developing own power bases and to extend the clientelist network (Snyder/Mahoney 1999: 108-109; Snyder 1992: 392). A large contrast between the tenure of presidents and of cabinet ministers may point to neopatrimonial power concentration.

4.2 Clientelism
Clientelism can be defined broadly as voluntary exchange relationship between social unequals, typically embedded in a complex social relationship. It is based on personal relations (Boone 1998 [1990]: 189). With van de Walle (2009: 3) political clientelism shall be understood as “the web of clientelistic relationships that structure the relationship between state and citizen.”

Clientelism, denoting relationships between patrons and clients, “logically excludes relationships between equals” (Médard 1982: 171). Normally, patrons and clients are tied in a complex patron-broker-client network permeating whole state structures (Powell 1970). This form of social organization requires relationships based on loyalty and personal interest, and is seldom considered illegal or immoral. Despite the fact that expressions might differ substantially

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14 North, in his much-cited notion, defined institutions as “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, [...] the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (1990: 3).
15 Other, more indirect indicators we looked at were “Political Constraints” from Polity IV (Marshall/Jaggers 2009), the “Political Constraints Index” from Henisz (2000; 2002) and the indicator „Checks“ from the World Bank Database of Political Institutions (Keef er 2007). They rate constraints of rulers on different scales. The idea is that neopatrimonial rulers systematically bypass or reduce institutional checks which can monitor their rule.
on a cross-national level, basic tenets of clientelism are surprisingly similar across different contexts in space and time. For instance, “There is no reason to believe that the level or manner of political clientelism in an African country today is causally related to cultural traditions” (van de Walle 2009: 4).

4.3 Corruption

Scholars stress the ubiquity of corruption in developing countries (see detailed overviews in Andvig et al. 2001; Williams 1999). The encyclopedic definition denotes corruption as “misuse of public office for private benefit” (e.g. Anderson/Tverdova 2003: 92; Andvig et al. 2001: 5-6). A more specific conceptualization focuses on the transaction between private and public sector actors through which collective goods are illegitimately converted into private payoffs. Following this narrower understanding, corruption takes place at the point of interaction between state and non-state actors (Rose-Ackerman 1978: 85-88).

It is common to differentiate between “political” or “grand” corruption at the highest level of political authority and “bureaucratic” or “petty” corruption in the public administration, i.e. at the implementation level of politics. Bureaucratic corruption and political corruption tend to exist simultaneously and to be mutually reinforcing (Andvig et al. 2001: 11). Weak formal institutions make corruption a “high-profit, low risk activity” (Kpundeh 2004: 125).

Substantive research (Anders 2002; Blundo/Olivier de Sardan 2006) has shown that what can be qualified as individual corruption in fact often is institutionalized (and often positively sanctioned) behavior of state agents. If this is the case, any analysis treating informal practices as deviations from the norm or as solely individual “misuses” of authority become inadequate. It is this systemic or institutionalized corruption of political elite members, this paper endeavors to analyze.

4.4 Modalities of neopatrimonialism in the six case studies – the comparative picture

Power Concentration

The power concentration indicator is based on the African experience of elite rotation in order to augment presidential power (see section 4.1 above). The tenure of presidents is contrasted with those of ministers. The analysis is based on two indicators from the Banks (2009) dataset. The first counts the number of presidential changes over the year, the second “major cabinet changes” meaning that at least 50% of the cabinet members were replaced (see table 3).
Table 3: Power Concentration Index / Elite Rotation (1971-2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>Venezuela</th>
<th>Zambia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cabinet Ministers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>average period of office before transition</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>average period of office after transition</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>President</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>average period of office before transition</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>average period of office after transition</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q(period president / period cabinet)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>before transition</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>after transition</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The table uses two sub-indices from the Banks’ dataset; the “number of major cabinet changes”, which notifies when at least 50% of all cabinet ministers are changed. “Executive changes” denotes a change at the head of state. Principally, the number of major cabinet changes is contrasted with those of head of state. In addition, the periods before and after the political transitions are compared, respectively. Source: Own calculation, based on Banks (2009) data.

The cross-regional analysis reveals a clear regional pattern. In Africa, power is most strongly concentrated, and presidents in Indonesia (before transition) and the Philippines (after transition) also change cabinets recurrently. Due to the long-serving founding fathers, which led Kenya and Zambia into independence, power concentration in Africa is particularly pronounced. Comparing pre- to post-transition periods demonstrates that this informal power concentration is quite stable in the African countries (with Zambia in particular), but less stable in other cases. In the Philippines and Venezuela, the frequency of changes vis-à-vis the president’s tenure has become higher, indicating an increased recourse to this means.

Clientelism

Various indicators can be used to assess the extent of clientelism on the macro-level. For instance, the extent of consumptive spending of a state, the size of the ministerial cabinet, public administration or state corporations can be analyzed. However, this is a complicated business, as data is often of low quality and as indicators such as consumptive spending might not be very valid (Gordin 2002). The author opted for analyzing the size of a country’s cabinet, which particularly in poor countries with limited opportunities to provide favors through other means regularly acts as a focal point for awarding personal favors to the political elite. According to van de Walle (2005: 83), the tendency of cabinets to grow is “mirrored by an increase in the size of other national bodies”. As figure 2 demonstrates, the two African countries, despite having comparatively small GDPs, have among the largest cabinets, just surpassed by Indonesia, which on different accounts (economy, population) is a far larger coun-
try (as the data ends in 2006, Kenya’s current large power-sharing cabinet is not even reflect-
ed in the data).

**Figure 2: Cabinet Size, 1971-2006**

![Graph showing cabinet size from 1971 to 2006](image)

Notes: Totals include cabinet ministers and, if applicable prime ministers and vice-presidents, but not presidents, deputy ministers, permanent secretaries and provincial governors.
Source: Banks (2009).

**Extent of corruption**

Table 4 demonstrates that, according to the Corruption Perceptions Index, corruption has in-
creased in all cases over the years with the sole exception of Indonesia. Argentina features as
the country with the strongest perceived increase. In addition, the “control of corruption”
marks in the composite Worldwide Governance Index have decreased for all countries except
Zambia (World Bank 2010). That means that democratic transitions, with the contrasting case
of Venezuela, at least going by these aggregated indicators, has on the overall not lead to a
decline in corruption. This confirms general trends established for a global sample.

**Table 4: TI Corruption Perceptions Index**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>Venezuela</th>
<th>Zambia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>5.24</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>3.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>2.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>2.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The CPI ranges from 0 to 10, with the value 10 denoting the complete absence of corruption. Due to dif-
ferent studies included in the respective Corruption Perceptions Indices, a direct longitudinal comparison of the
CPI scores is not feasible. On methodological issues of the CPI see Lambsdorff (2005). For brevity reasons only
every second year is listed.
5 Case Studies

The macro-indices have by and large shown that corruption has remained stable or even increased in the six case studies (with the notable exception of Zambia (WGI) and Indonesia (CPI)). Going by democratic rights, it is only Venezuela, which has experienced a marked decline as measured by Freedom House. The brief case descriptions shall shed more light on the relationship between political transitions and presidentialism on the one hand and centralization of power, clientelism and corruption on the other hand.

Argentina – “limited centralization”

Background/nature of previous regime: During the second half of the 20th century, Argentina has been an “interrupted democracy”. Since President Perón was toppled by a military coup in 1955, authoritarian governments (1955-58; 1966-73; 1976-83) alternated with semi-democratic periods of electoral competition. The 1983 elections broke the “iron law of Argentine politics”: the Peronist Party was defeated in free and fair elections by the Unión Cívica Radical (Radical Civic Union-UCR), led by Raúl Alfonsín. In this respect, Argentina was an early democratizer compared to the rest of the sample, except Venezuela (cf. Llamazares 2005).

Level of democratization: Several factors have contributed to the strengthening of Argentina’s democracy, such as the end of the cold war, the establishment of democratic regimes all across the region, and the failure (both in political and economic terms) of the last dictatorship (1976-1983) (Scherlis 2009: 1). Today, it is widely accepted that the country counts as consolidated democracy (established also through the indices Polity IV and Freedom House). However, formal power concentration in the hands of the president is significant, as the Argentine Constitution grants the president comparatively strong powers (Llanos 2001). A commonly used provision is, for instance, the power to issue legislative decrees “on grounds of necessity and urgency.” The Presidents Néstor Kirchner and Carlos Menem have used it in particular. In response, O’Donnell (1994: 59) coined the concept of a delegative democracy which suggests that “whoever wins election to the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit.” Yet, despite a comparatively weak congress and judiciary and strong powers vested in the presidency, power of the head of state is restricted in reality: Since 1983, only Carlos Menem (1989-1995 and 1995-1999) and Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) managed to complete their terms in office.

Concentration of power, clientelism and corruption: With a score of 2.9 on the CPI, Argentina ranks comparatively low on corruption compared to the global and a regional mean. However, compared to the rest of sample, it features best, along with Zambia. Political parties are
seen as the most corrupted institutions in Argentina, followed by legislatures, police, and the judiciary. However, clientelism in Argentina does not lead to the expansion of ministerial cabinets. Actually, the number of ministries is established by law and has seldom changed. As can be seen in figure 2, since the restoration of democracy the number of ministries has oscillated between eight and 14. However, as the high corruption ratings indicate, certain governance features have not vanished but changed its form (Teichman 2004; Llamazares 2005). Whereas there is a retreat on the central state level, clientelistic exchange relations are still pronounced in Argentina’s poorer provinces (Stokes 2006; Gordin 2007).

A weak system of institutional checks and balances is to some extent offset by a comparatively vocal civil society, large middle class and substantive education levels. The Argentine example implies that comprehensive democratization (and the reduction of the patronage potential) induces a change of the informal concentration of power, which is the lowest in the sample, and of clientelism, at least in the long-term. This is despite strong formal powers vested in the presidency. In sum, the exercise of domination, at least on the central state level, deviates substantially from the neopatrimonial model. Following Llanos (2001), governing strategies can be better described as „limited centralism.“

Zambia – hybridization of politics and continued personalization

Background/nature of previous regime: The country’s first President Kaunda served for 27 years in office (since independence in 1964) and gained from particular legitimacy as Zambia’s founding president who had led the struggle for independence. In addition, he augmented his control of the political process by promulgating a one-party state in December 1972 (Tordoff/Molteno 1974; Scott 1980). Zambia’s Second Republic can be characterized as a “weakly authoritarian state” (Callaghy 1990: 316) exercising “soft repression” (Burnell 2005: 118).

The United National Independence Party (UNIP) government massively expanded public sector employment. Monitoring institutions such as the Anti-Corruption Commission remained toothless and the party slogan ‘It Pays to Belong to UNIP’ could be taken literally (Szeftel 2000: 212). However, in contrast to other African countries, ethnicity has never been seriously politicized. Instead, the country has been controlled by a small, multi-ethnic elite.

Level of democratization: In the 1980s, the crisis of the copper-dependent and almost completely state-controlled business sector intensified. Finally, President Kaunda backed-down to growing protests and declared the re-introduction of the multi-party system. In the 1991 general election, he was defeated by opposition candidate Frederick Chiluba (Andreassen et al. 1992; Bratton 1992). Yet, despite claims to the contrary, the constitution remained largely
unchanged and the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) and President Chiluba’s rule showed striking continuity of authoritarian tendencies. The presidential system went largely unchanged (Larmer 2009; Simon 2005).

Concentration of power, clientelism and corruption: Autocratic rule went concurrently with clientelist and corrupt practices. As in other African countries, the prime means for the provision of favors has been the expansion of the ministerial cabinet. The Zambian cabinet has grown significantly over the years; from 14 ministers in 1964 to currently close to 30 ministers. Most developed countries, having much larger populations and economies, are governed by cabinets of only 15 to 20 ministers (OECD 2004: 2).

Zambia has since 1998 received low scores on Transparency International’s CPI. The country has always ranked in the worse half, for most of the time in the worst third of countries included in the index. Zambia’s ‘control of corruption’ marks in the World Bank Governance Index have been equally low. Furthermore, the pattern of ‘elite circulation’ has shown a high degree of consistency and has endured during Zambia’s one-party Second Republic (from end of 1972 to 1991) and during the multi-party Third Republic (since November 1991). As shown in table 3, cabinets are still being changed after less than two years on average. However the presidents’ average tenure has reduced significantly compared to the one-party state. On the balance, a truly remarkably feature of Zambian governance is the high consistency of formal institutions (besides the re-introduction of multi-partyism) and of the three informal institutions concentration of power, clientelism and corruption despite the political transition.

Philippines – oligarchs in command

Background/nature of previous regime: Modes of governance in the Philippines were shaped by Spanish colonialism, the emergence of a dominating land-owner class and US colonialism at the turn of the 20th century. With the emerging oligarchic regime, there was a tendency to centralize political power. This was successfully realized by the first President of the Philippine Commonwealth (since 1935), Manuel Quezon, who established the strategies of electoral manipulation, repression, bossism and party patronage (Sidel 1999). Independence in 1946 left these features largely intact. Only following the election of Ferdinand Marcos to the presidency in 1965, the Philippine oligarchy underwent substantive transformations, both in politics and the economy. Faced with the predominance of traditional families in Congress, Marcos successfully resorted to new forms and respondents of clientelism that disrupted the institutional setting (Hutchcroft/Rocamora 2003). Their influence further decreased after the Philippines became an autocratic regime in 1972. Marcos adopted measures of rent allocation,
predation and favoritism on a purely personal basis (e.g. Hawes 1987; Sidel 1999; Sidel 2000).

*Level of democratization:* In 1986, President Marcos was ousted by Corazon Aquino, who proposed a far-reaching democratization agenda, most notably the end of martial law (cf. Thompson 1995). The Congress and competitive elections were restored and a one-term (later two-term) limit was introduced. However, as can be seen by the Freedom House ratings, the political transition has been stuck in between autocracy and democracy (Croissant 2002). Powers of the president are substantial, transparency and checks and balances for political and administrative actions are still largely absent (Hutchcroft/Rocamora 2003).

*Concentration of power, clientelism and corruption:* In some respects, the new era beginning in 1986 “was as much a restoration of oligarchic power and corruption as it was a democratic revolution” (Johnston 2005: 142). The old elite, the powerful families, quickly regained their former influence, revitalizing the Philippines “crony capitalism” and re-establishing their hold over Congress. The indicators all point in the same direction: Ministerial cabinets are very unstable and on average change every 1.8 years. Following the CPI, perceived corruption has also grown markedly. In this respect, the Philippine example confirms Mungiu-Pippidi’s hypothesis that corruption explodes in systems characterized by “competitive particularism”. The number of ministers has also gone up, but that still might underrate the extent to which favors are provided, particularly under the former President Arroyo, who ruled until 2010.

*Kenya: entrenched “big man” politics*

*Background/nature of previous regime:* In the pre-independence era, Kenya was managed essentially as a source of raw materials and as a market for British goods. For its survival, the colonial administration heavily relied on divide-and-rule tactics and political suppression. In consequence, ethnic antagonisms have also strongly influenced politics since multi-ethnic Kenya became independent in 1963. The first President Kenyatta allegedly favored his ethnic community, the Kikuyu, whereas his successor Daniel arap Moi is said to have privileged the Kalenjin (Wolf 2006).

Soon after independence, democratic provisions such as the multi-party system, a dual executive, a bicameral legislature and a quasi-federal system (known as the *majimbo* system) were dismantled. In 1981, Kenya officially became a one-party state, however, it had been run like a de facto one-party state under the Kenya Africa National Union (KANU) before (Widner 1992). The patron-client politics that came to dominate Kenya, mainly in the form of *harambee self-help movement*, has been associated with the ethnically divided nature of the society,
its weak political parties, its rural-urban divide and the establishment of a capitalist class by the British colonial administration (Branch/Cheeseman 2006).

**Level of democratization:** Since independence in 1963, politics and the quest for wealth have revolved around the presidency. Despite the return to multi-party politics in 1992, this fundamental pattern has not changed. Paradoxically, predominately due to the disunity of the opposition, the former autocrat Moi won the first two elections following the transition (Throup/Hornsby 1998).

Various commissions presented fundamental constitutional reform drafts. However, it was only in 2010 that a completely new constitution was passed, which significantly reduces the powers of the president. Up until today, Kenya’s polity must be characterized as a hybrid system between democracy and autocracy; horizontal as well as vertical accountability is weak. The post-election violence in 2008 demonstrates that democratic rules of the game are not yet consolidated, that ethnic considerations still play a dominating part and that violence is a fundamental part of political calculus (Cheeseman 2008; Mueller 2008; Anderson/Lochery 2008).

**Concentration of power (elite rotation), clientelism and corruption:** Patron-client relationships have played a dominant role in resource allocation, particularly in respect to public land. Barkan (1980) argues that there is a four-tiered patron-client structure, the president is the chief patron, followed by the cabinet ministers, members of parliament and the people. The coming to power of Mwai Kibaki in 2002 was accompanied by widespread expectations that his government would bring fundamental changes in governance, including “zero-tolerance” to corruption, rule of law and lean government (Steeves 2006). However, Kenya still features among the most corrupt countries in the world and also is at the bottom of this sample, trailed only by Venezuela.

Despite successive initiatives, there are still clear evidences of misuse of public resources. For instance, the former Permanent Secretary in the Office of the President for Governance and Ethics, John Githongo, fled the country, when he felt threatened after investing high-profile cases such as the Goldenberg scandal (Wrong 2009; Githongo 2008). The ministerial cabinet has always been a main means of providing personal favors. Since the formation of the Grand Coalition government which was aimed at stopping the violence that followed the disputed general elections of December 2007, 40 ministers sit at the cabinet table. The ministers are still changed on a regular basis albeit on a lower frequency than under autocratic rule. The apparent lack of progress in reducing clientelism and corruption has caused widespread disillusionment among ordinary Kenyans (Diepeveen 2010).
Indonesia – corruption and clientelism despite democratic progress

Background/nature of previous regime: With Presidents Sukarno (1955-65) and Soeharto (1966-98), only two men have governed Indonesia, an ethnically and geographically very heterogeneous country, for more than forty years. Robinson and Hadiz (2004: 43) have suggested that during the long period of rule by Soeharto, the autocratic New Order essentially evolved into 1) a regulatory apparatus imposing fiscal and monetary discipline and highly organized political repression aimed at preventing disorder, 2) a system of state and society relations characterized primarily by the disorganization of civil society and the dominance of state-created corporatist institutions, 3) an extensive and complex system of patronage, personified by Soeharto himself, 4) especially during its heyday in the 1980s and 1990s, it became a capitalist oligarchy that fused public authority and private interests (cf. also MacIntyre 1994). Political competition was confined to elites and mass political action was strictly controlled by the military (Crouch 1979: 583-585).

Level of democratization: To a large extent, democratization since 1999 has been successful. It rapidly turned an autocratic regime into democracy characterized by free elections, party competition and parliaments on the national and local levels of the state as well as a free press. Currently, Indonesia is the only country in Southeast Asia which Freedom House has constantly rated as being “free”. The main features of Indonesian politics are the decentralization of power from the presidency to political parties and to parliament and the reduced powers of the president, which are the lowest in the sample. Yet, political parties mainly function as shifting alliances of dominating individuals (Ufen 2006). Actors which were previously entrenched in the New Order’s system have now taken up new roles in electoral politics (Webber 2006).

Concentration of power, clientelism and corruption: Democratization has been the decisive factor for the change of neopatrimonialism in Indonesia. However, as old political and economic elites still have large influence in the Reformasi era, clientelism and corruption have by no means vanished. Indonesia’s democracy continues to be marred by still rampant corruption. However, from today’s point of view, Johnston’s (2005: 181) finding might have been too pessimistic: He states that the “new” more decentralized corruption “is if anything even more disruptive – both an unstable universe of fiefdoms and mini-monopolies.” However, despite little improvements on the CPI, central state efforts to curb corruption have intensified recently. In addition, Indonesia still has the largest ministerial cabinet (apart from power-sharing Kenya). However, it appears that under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono technocratic considerations for ministerial appointments have gained importance.
Venezuela – increasing centralization and corruption of politics and resources

Background/nature of previous regime: In terms of political development, Venezuela serves as the contrasting case in this sample as it moved from multi-party democracy since 1958 to a more centralized form under President Chávez who took power in 1999 (on Chávez’ rule Merolla/Zechmeister 2011). The country has been severely dependent on its oil wealth, which has been exploited by the state-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, PDVSA (for a detailed analysis of Venezuela's oil abundance cf. Mähler 2009).

Historically, there has been a close integration of political and economic interests; the country was dominated by an oligarchy. Accordingly, the stability of the “elite democracy” from 1958 up to the 1980s was due to the generous spread of the oil wealth among large sectors of the society (Boeckh 1997; Karl 1997). These considerable resources allowed to employ a high number of civil servants and to subsidize state-owned companies up to the severe economic crisis in the 1980s. In the 1990s, considerable public distrust and protest developed against Venezuela’s elite democracy, which in essence was dominated by two parties (Hellinger 2000; O’Donnell 1996). When in 1999 Hugo Chávez prevailed with his “Bolivarian Revolution”, he promised the inclusion of former marginalized majority of the population.

Level of democratization: Chávez’ revolution in effect has been a process which is highly controlled from the top, i.e. by himself. As can be seen from the Freedom House data presented above, democratic indicators for the country have deteriorated. Contemporary Venezuela can be equated with an electoral democracy, which does not safeguard the rule of law and horizontal separation of powers (Zagorski 2003). The Bolivarian Revolution has furthermore brought a fusion of the governing party and the state as well as a nearly the complete politicization of the public administration.

Concentration of power, clientelism and corruption: On all three accounts, politics has regressed. Power is strongly concentrated in the hands of President Chávez. When Chávez came to power in 1999, he first reduced the number of ministries from 18 to 14; in the meantime, however, the cabinet has expanded to 26 ministers. Ministers and other government officials are often appointed or removed from office via the president’s TV program “Alô presidente” (source: field research). The members of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, the majority of the National Electoral Council and the components of the “citizen’s branch”, i.e. the Attorney General (“fiscal general”), the ombudsman (“defensor del pueblo), and the Comptroller General are all aligned to the president. Recurrently, the governing United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) is described as a clientelist party which has supplanted the two other clientelist parties, which dominated the Fourth Republic (Merolla/Zechmeister 2011).
Most notably, corruption levels are the highest in the sample; quantitative sources as well as qualitative research indicate that it has become worse and uncontrollable. Apart from the oil sector, corruption today is the biggest business in Venezuela. Informal means of rule have changed from oligarchic to personal control. The removal of institutional checks and balances and independent oversight, the strong integration of business and political interests, a marginalized middle class and the politicization of the state sector have contributed to increased concentration of power, clientelism and corruption.

6 How different levels of democratization and forms of presidentialism shape neopatrimonialism
The African countries\footnote{As outlined in the introduction, generalizations beyond the cases analyzed are not feasible.} are characterized by the highest degree of neopatrimonialism; power concentration around the big men is particularly strong. Yet, there are also strong intra-regional differences. The Philippines and Venezuela show negative governance tendencies recently. In Argentina, governance relations on the central state level appear to be stable and hardly informed by neopatrimonial considerations. In the contrasting case Venezuela neopatrimonialism has changed its form under President Chávez, power concentration has changed from the oligarchic to the personalistic type. The two African cases – despite their political transitions – show the highest continuity in respect to the concentration of power, clientelism and corruption, i.e. in respect to neopatrimonialism. Principally, constitutional change seems to have affected strategies of personal rule very little.

The breakdown of authoritarian regimes usually does not lead to the establishment of functioning democratic institutions. Political transitions have remained incomplete, and there are indications that “competitive particularism” has led to increased corruption and clientelism. As outlined, only Argentina and Indonesia have been consistently rated as free by Freedom House. The majority of cases is stuck in the “grey zone” between autocracy and democracy. The Philippines and Venezuela have even experienced a democratic regression. In that respect, there is no “deep democratization” (Johnston 2005) to speak of.

The relevant reformers are recurrently elites who were active in the former regimes as well. In all cases, potentially except Venezuela, the extent of elite recycling is very high. However, Argentina and Indonesia demonstrate that more comprehensive democratization in the longer run might induce the change, i.e. the reduction of neopatrimonialism. The results suggest that the level of democratization indeed is the crucial variable, which mediates the relationship between different forms of presidentialism and neopatrimonialism.
However, even if transition is incomplete, the access points change to some extent. The emergence of general elections means that electoral clientelism and corruption may become more salient. Following van de Walle’s (2009: 10) argument for sub-Saharan Africa, through electoral processes, clientelism will also become more redistributive and codified. Thus, the electoral process would in the long term lead to more structured and universal, i.e. “milder” forms of clientelism. It is, however, to early to provide answers on this hypothesis on the case studies presented here.

At least in this sample, no clear picture emerges regarding the formal powers accrued to the president and the persistence and change of neopatrimonialism. To start with, checks and balances seem to be similar in the six polities, whereas the number of veto players is lowest in Kenya and, in particular, in Venezuela. These are the cases which, together with the Philippines, have experienced increasing neopatrimonial practices recently. This seems to imply a correlation.

However, the formal powers vested in the president of Argentina are high, whereas in Indonesia they are – compared to the rest of the sample – low. Despite the fact that presidents in Argentina have widely used their decree powers, the counter-forces against neopatrimonialism outside the political sphere are comparatively strong. The outcome cannot be explained by formal powers alone. In contrast, the Indonesian case suggests that low formal power concentration – at least in the medium and long term – might induce a reduction of neopatrimonialism. In summary, even the refined indicators for powers accrued to the presidents might in themselves be insufficient to account for differences in neopatrimonial profiles. Further factors need to be analyzed to account for the complex development of neopatrimonialism in the varying cases.
7 Bibliography


