Beyond Bricks and Mortar: Rights, Utility and Adaptive Capacity in Peacebuilding

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Abstract

The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon outlined in his address to the Peacebuilding Commission in January 2008 that “peacebuilding is not just about ‘bricks and mortar’”. Instead, contemporary peacebuilding is directed at tackling what is considered to be the root cause of conflict, namely the underdevelopment, or lack of ‘human security’, of people living in post-conflict countries. Hence, peacebuilding missions become engaged in the production of certain types of subjectivities that are seen as being capable of peaceful living. This paper critically examines how the human security approach to peacebuilding calls into being two different types of subjectivities: *Homo juridicus* is the subject that correlates with the aim to establish a democratic political system that enforces the rule of law and protects human rights. Similarly, *homo oeconomicus* is the subject that correlates with the endeavour to build peace by eradicating poverty through entrepreneurial activity. Furthermore, this paper examines how the position of both homo juridicus and homo oeconomicus is changing in an environment that demands ‘adaptive capacity’, the ability to adapt to a rapidly changing socio-political environment. While the former is becoming increasingly marginalised in peacebuilding projects, the latter is being framed in terms of re-inventing and re-investing in ‘indigenous practices’ so as to make them useful for building neoliberal peace. As a result of the two subjectivities’ ‘becoming adaptable’, both ‘right’ and ‘utility’ are being reconceptualised as flexible and fluid, thus enabling the subjects’ inclusion into a system that is nonstandard, complex and uncontrollable.
Introduction

The United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon outlined in his address to the Peacebuilding Commission in January 2008 that “peacebuilding is not just about ‘bricks and mortar’; it is a transformative process involving changing attitudes about how to manage conflict” (Ki-moon 2008). Building peace is not simply a question of the restoration of security and stability but instead calls for tackling various longer-term challenges (ibid.). It is now often stated that “no country can enjoy development without security, security without development, and neither without respect for human rights” (Ki-moon 2010: 4). Consequently, peacebuilding missions are being rethought so as to reflect the interdependency between security, rights and development. While traditional approaches have considered peacebuilding as being essentially synonymous with statebuilding, more critical liberals have associated peacebuilding with human emancipation (Richmond 2010c: 15). Since the statebuilding approach has come up against increasing critique in recent years, the latter is now being proposed – in the form of human security – as a solution to the problems that contemporary peacebuilding is facing. ‘Human security’ has been put forward as the most promising strategy that could encompass human rights, governance and justice systems, local security capabilities as well as poverty reduction, education and health in peacebuilding (Beebe & Kaldor 2010: 196). Hence, post-conflict reconstruction is not only directed at countries affected by war. Instead, with human security and development as their core, peacebuilding missions are directed at reconstructing the people living in those countries.

When human underdevelopment and lack of human security are framed as the root causes of conflict, peacebuilding missions become engaged in the production of certain types of subjectivities that are seen as being capable of peaceful living. In encompassing both a discourse of juridical rights and a discourse of economic development, human security in peacebuilding produces two generic subjects: homo juridicus – human being as a legal subject – and homo oeconomicus – human being as an economic subject. This paper critically examines how the human security approach to peacebuilding calls into being these two different types of subjectivities. Furthermore, as opposed to traditional top-down strategies of building peace, contemporary peacebuilding relies more and more on the language of adaptation and self-reliance. Hence, this paper also examines how the position of both homo juridicus and homo oeconomicus is changing in an environment that demands ‘adaptive capacity’, the ability to adapt to a rapidly changing socio-political environment.

The rise to prominence of the human security discourse after the end of the Cold War is by now well rehearsed and will not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that since it was first coined in the 1994 Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the term human security has attracted both wide support and extensive critique. Human security has been the object of much definitional disagreement and debate which has culminated in the division between the narrow (freedom from fear)

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and the broad (freedom from fear, want and indignity)\(^2\) approaches to human security. While the narrow approach focuses on “violent threats to individuals” (Human Security Center 2005: viii), broader conceptions of human security are based on the view that health as well as social and economic welfare are as important to people’s security as physical and political security. Despite the differences, all understandings of human security share the impulse of shifting the referent object of security from states to individuals, or to people collectively. Although it is the narrow ‘responsibility to protect’ approach to human security that has traditionally focused on individuals in violent conflicts, contemporary advocates of human security in peacebuilding promote a broader conceptualisation of human security that would address the development needs of post-conflict societies and thus better contribute to a sustainable peace.

The links between security, development and peacebuilding have long been established in the UN, and are now gaining increased attention in the European Union as well, particularly through the concept of human security. Mary Martin and Taylor Owen (2010: 212) identify the United Nations human security approach as the first generation of human security that is now being followed by a second generation which is mainly driven by the European Union. In the 2008 implementation report on the European Security Strategy, the European Union referred for the first time to human security as key to the EU’s strategic goals in, for example, its peacebuilding interventions (Martin & Owen 2010: 216). The Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner (2006: 3) states that “the philosophy underlying the EU’s approach to security, as outlined in the Security Strategy, is that security can best be attained through development, and development through security. Neither is possible without an adequate level of the other. That’s why we focus on the holistic concept of human security”. Human security effectively provides a foreign policy narrative that justifies the increased involvement of European armies, lawyers, judges and officials beyond the EU borders, for example in the Balkans, the Caucasus and in Africa (Martin & Owen 2010: 219).

Following the increased attention awarded to the nexus between human security and peacebuilding in the EU, the Finnish Crisis Management Centre (CMC), operating under the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, has launched a special Human Security Training Programme and adopted human security as the leading theme of its work for the years to come.\(^3\) The programme will be accompanied by a series of human security related publications. Alongside other both practical and theoretical material, this paper examines the first publication of the CMC entitled the Training Manual: Human Security in Peacebuilding (2010). In the training manual, the CMC uses principles developed by the Human Security Study Group of the London School of Economics, led by Mary Kaldor, and its trainings are “at maximum conformity” with the requirements of the UN, the EU


\(^3\) Currently, Finnish officials participate in civilian crisis management in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Haiti, The Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic and the Palestinian territories. The great majority of them are deployed in Kosovo, Georgia and Afghanistan (CMC 2011).
and the OSCE (CMC 2010a: 7). Similar types of training are being conducted in several European countries and in the United States (see Beebe & Kaldor 2010: 123).

The CMC (2010a: 6) argues that there has been “a paramount shift” in the development of peacebuilding, resulting from the rise of the human security discourse during the past twenty years. Human security’s added value is said to be the way in which it brings “a moral philosophical aspect” to peacebuilding (CMC 2010b). It is said to combine the “human elements” of security, rights and development (CMC 2010a: 24). As with most other literature on human security, the CMC (2010a: 27) considers human security to represent universal moral values, and sees human security to be interlinked with national and international security in such a way that an “advancement of one type of security can lead to advancements in other types and vice versa”. Much in the way that human security has been presented as a paradigm shift in security studies4, so also the CMC presents it as a paradigm shift in peacebuilding: “It means a fundamental transformation of ways to think, perceive, plan, decide and execute peacebuilding missions” (CMC 2010a: 7). As a result, peacebuilding is now meant to “set the foundations for development to take off” (CMC 2010a: 37).

The incentive to adopt human security as a peacebuilding strategy does not result only from its moral philosophical value but rather arises out of consensus that conflict-ridden societies are a threat to international security and stability (see Futamura et al. 2010: 2). A central motivation for integrating human security into peacebuilding is the fear of conflict and instability spilling over to neighbouring countries and, as a result of refugee flows and transnational crime, ultimately to Western countries. For the UNDP (1994: 24), human security “means responding to the threat of global poverty travelling across international borders”. Following this, Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor (2005: 70) point out that “the whole point of a human security approach is, that Europeans cannot be secure while others in the world live in severe insecurity”. Thus, according to Mark Duffield (2007: 131), human security is fundamentally about bringing stability to the global ‘borderlands’ in order to protect ‘homeland’ security and the West’s way of life. The existence of fragile and failing states somewhere is understood to constitute a risk to people everywhere (ICISS 2001: 5). We now live “in a world more interdependent than ever before” (CHS 2003: 12), which is why “no one is secure as long as someone is insecure anywhere” (UNDP 1994: 39). (In)security is, therefore, contagious.

Despite human security often being described as “a radical, rather optimistic package” (Gasper 2005: 234) and “exactly the paradigm needed for the South today” (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy 2009: 37), the concept has also received a lot of criticism. Yet, much of this critique has not been directed at problematising the assumptions about both ‘security’ and ‘the human,’ which the discourse of human security underwrites.5 Only lately has there been a growing body of works that engage critically with these concepts, many of them

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5 Traditional critiques of human security, such as those by Buzan (2004), Newman (2004), Macfarlane (2004), Paris (2004) and Khong (2001) most often point towards problems resulting from the lack of definitional clarity and analytical precision within human security debates.
originating from Foucauldian points of departure. Critics argue that rather than having been able to challenge existing policy frameworks, human security has been integrated into the mainstream and into existing power structures. The pervasive global governance that surrounds various population-related issues such as health, reproduction, food and welfare has given rise to critiques that see human security as contributing to the disciplining and socialisation of peoples in developing countries.

This paper joins these critical voices in examining the ways in which the human security approach to peacebuilding calls into being certain types of subjectivities. However, instead of examining how human security projects aim to discipline the peoples of post-conflict countries, this paper is interested in the current demand to be flexible, adaptive and ready to change according to the demands of a complex and uncontrollable environment. While homo juridicus (the subject of right) is becoming increasingly marginalised in peacebuilding projects, homo oeconomicus (the subject of interest and utility) is being framed in terms of re-inventing and re-investing in ‘indigenous practices’ so as to make them useful for building neoliberal peace. For homo juridicus, ‘becoming adaptable’ means that the legal-institutional framework is no longer regarded as sufficient for the safeguarding of his or her rights. Instead, people are called upon to be creative in finding new ways to protect their rights and freedoms. For homo oeconomicus, ‘becoming adaptable’ implies an entrepreneurship of the self, a never-ending process of attempting to maximise one’s utility in an environment where utility becomes increasingly elusive. Living in a permanent state of adaptation thus entails a reconceptualisation of both ‘right’ and ‘utility’.

The first section below examines the ways in which peacebuilding projects call into being homo juridicus as the type of subjectivity that correlates with the aim to rearrange society and the political system around democratic governance and respect for human rights. This examination of the production of legal subjectivity and its marginalisation is then complemented in the second section by an exploration of the ways in which policies to eradicate poverty through entrepreneurial activity and investment in human capital produce their own corresponding type of subjectivity: homo oeconomicus. The section after that considers a more recent call within peacebuilding: the necessity of supporting ‘adaptive capacity’ and investment in ‘indigenous practices’. The challenges to both homo juridicus and homo oeconomicus implied by the demand for adaptation are discussed in the final section.

**Homo Juridicus – Rearranging Society and the Political System**

For the past decades peacebuilding has effectively meant building a liberal democratic market state. Those countries that have failed in this have been identified as risks for peace and security both in the affected region and, especially since the beginning of the ‘war on terror’, to international security more widely. Hence, peacebuilding has dealt with ‘failing states’ and the necessity of reshaping them according to the liberal model. There has been an implicit agreement between the United Nations, international financial institutions and

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most NGOs that peacebuilding should aim at constructing a liberal peace that entails focusing on democratisation, human rights, the rule of law and economic reform (Richmond 2010c: 22-23). The UN Secretary-General contends that essential to addressing security threats are “healthy political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together reduce the likelihood of conflicts, help overcome obstacles to development and promote human freedom for all” (Ki-moon 2010: 4). Likewise, the Commission on Human Security, Survival, Livelihood and Dignity (CHS) proposes in its Human Security Now (2003) report that post-conflict situations are to be seen as possibilities for restructuring the social, political and economic structures of affected countries. This would result in the establishment of a democratic political order and an economic system that promotes growth (CHS 2003: 58). Humanitarian emergencies thus become perceived as opportunities for societies to reshape themselves and to transform their systems of governance (Reid 2010: 404).

Shannon D. Beebe and Mary Kaldor (2010: 62) note that one of the fundamental aims of peacebuilding is the establishment of democratic governance and effective institutions of law and order. According to Vivienne Jabri (2010: 45), the human in the context of this kind of a liberal peace project is defined through a juridical understanding of human rights; to be human is to possess human rights. She also argues that “the vehicle for transformation is distinctly institutional, so that the liberal peace is one of design, or put more accurately redesign, of entire social formations so that they are indeed transformed into ‘liberal’ societies” (Jabri 2010: 41). In this perspective, the subject of peacebuilding is homo juridicus: the subject of right. Following Michel Foucault (1990: 136; 2008: 274), homo juridicus is the subject of a sovereign power, the “power of life and death”, which in its modern form has become limited in such a way that the sovereign has a responsibility to protect the rights of homo juridicus. In return, homo juridicus accepts the power of the sovereign and agrees to the limitation of his or her rights within the system of law (ibid.).

According to the CMC (2010a: 26-27), human rights should be recognised in contemporary peacebuilding as exhibiting “common moral values” and the “universality and primacy of a set of rights and freedoms”. However, conceiving of the human as a homo juridicus who takes advantage of his or her rights in a democratic system and whose rights the legal system strives to protect is now considered somewhat outdated. Such a liberal institutionalist approach to peacebuilding is now regarded as, at best, falling short of what is needed and, at worst, resulting in large segments of the population becoming alienated and engaging in “reactionary practices” against the peacebuilding process (Futamura et al. 2010: 3). Although human rights are central to the contemporary peacebuilding discourse, the human security approach to peacebuilding is not limited to what is considered an essentially legalistic human rights approach. Instead, human security is seen as enabling more flexible measures and involving a wider range of actors on local, national and international levels (CMC 2010a: 27). The CMC notes that whereas human rights do not entail any particular duties to the subjects of those rights, human security extends the responsibility for the safeguarding of one’s rights to people themselves (ibid.). Human security thus calls into existence a type of subjectivity that encompasses the subject of right but is not limited to it.
While the power that governs homo juridicus is sovereign, the phenomena emerging from the above discussion is governed by a different modality of power; a power that works on and through life itself. According to Foucault (1990: 139-140), this “power over life” works by using continuous regulatory and corrective mechanisms that subject individual bodies through discipline and control the mass population through biopolitics. In biopolitics, the field of application of power, biopower, is species life and the processes, such as birth, death, production and illness that characterise it (Foucault 2004: 242-243). With biopower, ‘population’ becomes an economic and a political problem, a problem that cannot be accounted for through a juridico-discursive representation of power that is based on rights and law (Foucault 1990: 82).

In The Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault shows how this shift in the rationality of government affects subjectification. The most important subject that arises out of his discussion of liberal governmentality is homo oeconomicus. According to Foucault (2008: 274-283), homo oeconomicus and homo juridicus are not governed by the same logic and they do not have the same relationship to political power. Whereas homo juridicus is a subject in a positive system of law where the sovereign has a responsibility to respect his or her rights, homo oeconomicus is not a subject of the sovereign. When it comes to homo oeconomicus, the sovereign is powerless. (ibid.) Homo oeconomicus is not concerned with his or her rights being respected by the sovereign. Instead, he or she is interested in the usefulness of his or her actions. Although democratic governance and human rights are being repeated over and over in any material concerning peacebuilding, homo juridicus has, in fact, been marginalised and it is homo oeconomicus that has taken centre stage in discourses on peacebuilding. Hence, the next section turns to a discussion of efforts to build peace by eradicating poverty through entrepreneurial activity.

**Homo Oeconomicus – Eradicating Poverty through Entrepreneurialism**

As described in the previous section, liberal peacebuilding entails not only the rearrangement of society according to democratic principles but also the establishment of a market economy. Lifting societies out of poverty is necessary because poverty itself is being framed as a danger. Poverty is not only a problem with regard to the wellbeing of the people, but it is essentially a security question as there is “a chain from poverty and deprivation to violent conflict” (CHS 2003: 7). The CHS (2003: 74) makes direct links between poverty, conflict and terrorism: “terrorism takes advantage of misery, knowing that despair creates favourable conditions for terrorist projects and actions”. Human security, therefore, is “a critical element in achieving national security and international stability” (Ki-moon 2010: 7). Beebe and Kaldor (2010: 202) warn that inability to respond to the challenges of underdevelopment means that “we are creating our enemies for the future”.

Because of the rationalisation that violence is more prevalent among the poor and poverty creates a possible breeding ground for terrorism and future violence, peacebuilding becomes a project of poverty eradication. According to the CMC (2010a: 58), in peacebuilding, efforts to alleviate poverty start from the diversification of agriculture, clarification of property rights, dismantling of illegal economic networks, provision of
micro-finance and the (re)establishment of market economy. This kind of development is considered ‘safe’ and ‘appropriate’ as opposed to forms of survival that exist outside or in opposition to the legal economic framework of established property rights and micro-financed entrepreneurship (see Duffield 2010: 68). Property rights, micro-finance loans and the marketisation of agriculture work together to secure people as economic subjects: as ‘free’, self-interested individuals capable of functioning in the global economy. These processes seek a society that is oriented towards the multiplicity and differentiation of enterprises (see Foucault 2008: 149). Beebe and Kaldor (2010: 185) commend that “contrary to popular Western beliefs, Africans are quite resourceful and entrepreneurial when given the slightest opportunity”.

Hence, although the basic condition of reconstruction is the establishment of a macro-level system of market economy (CMC 2010a: 38), the CMC (2010a: 48) emphasises that the most important reconstruction is done at the individual and community level. People in post-conflict areas are seen to suffer from “diminished human capital” that should be addressed in order to enable sustainable peace (CMC 2010a: 56). Likewise, the UN Secretary-General demands that instead of focusing simply on macro-level economic development, urgent attention must be paid to rebuilding human capital (Ki-moon 2008). Foucault (2008: 232) too points out how the problems of the Third World can be thought of from the perspective of insufficient investment in human capital. When understood through the concept of human capital, the human “appears as a sort of enterprise for himself” (Foucault 2008: 225). This entails a change in the way homo oeconomicus is conceptualised. Whereas in the classical conception homo oeconomicus is a partner of exchange, in neoliberalism he becomes “an entrepreneur of himself, being for himself his own capital” (Foucault 2008: 225-226).

Correspondingly, while in classical liberalism the most important thing about the market was exchange, in neoliberalism it is competition (Foucault 2008: 118). Therefore, the homo oeconomicus of neoliberalism will be most interested in such activity that will give him or her an advantage over others in the competition on the market. To ensure the success of one’s enterprise, one is to make such investments that will make one’s enterprise well-equipped to handle the competition. The enterprise being the ‘self’, the object of investment will be ‘human capital’. Failure to function in the competitive market becomes framed as a problem of insufficient human capital. Thus, neoliberalism “puts the onus of utility and justice on the individual’s capacity to perform in the market” (Prasad 2009: 3). Placing human capital at the core of the life of homo oeconomicus enables the extension of economic analysis into new domains which, in turn, results in the inversion of the relationships of the social to the economic (Foucault 2008: 219; 240). Whereas classical liberalism looked for a free space for the market within a political society, neoliberalism is interested in the modeling of the exercise of political power on the principles of the market (Foucault 2008: 131). Neoliberalism is like an “inverted social contract” where “no-one is excluded from this game in which he is caught up without ever having explicitly wished to take part” (Foucault 2008: 201-202). Both the ‘rights’ and the ‘utility’ of people become dependent upon the market (Prasad 2009: 17). Indeed, one of the consequences of a human security perspective to peacebuilding has been that the basic needs of people in post-
conflict regions have been privatised according to the neoliberal model of enterprise (Richmond 2010c: 28).

The neoliberal economy is in a constant state of enterprise emergency which it does not even try to escape. Instead of trying to shelter itself from the emergency, neoliberal economy spontaneously organises itself in it. (Massumi 2009: 176.) Neoliberal economy thus embraces its ‘creative destruction’. The generalisation of ‘creative destruction’ to non-market relations entails that, to survive in this emergency environment, individuals need to assume the same functioning logic of the economy, and to turn towards the environment and the economy instead of trying to protect themselves from them. Instead of being seen as single destructive events, disasters are now understood as vital for the development of populations (Reid 2010: 403). Self-organisation is not seen to arise despite but because of chaotic post-conflict circumstances. In such a situation homo oeconomicus is the person who accepts reality and adjusts to the modifications in his or her life environment (Foucault 2008: 270).

The economically motivated advocation of ‘sustainability’ and ‘development’ is often such that the consumption patterns of developed countries are left very much intact whereas the underdeveloped are being given new responsibilities to ensure their resilience in the face of various adversities. ‘Poverty’ thus entails new responsibilities for the poor to undertake certain types of behaviour such as changing their agricultural practices or investing in activities that will better enable their integration into the world market. As such the divide between development and underdevelopment is maintained and reproduced rather than overcome through an advocation of sustainability (Duffield 2010: 66). Promising ‘development’ thus no longer means aiming to ensure that all parts of the world might enjoy the same level of economic well-being as developed countries. This aim is not only considered unrealistic but also undesirable because it is now recognised that the environment would simply not endure the extension of Western levels of consumption to the rest of the world (Rist 2008: 226). Ultimately, poverty is a problem for neoliberal politics only so far as it prevents individuals from taking part in the game of competition (Lazzarato 2009: 128).

The CMC (2010a: 12) notes that “it is important to examine the global processes and structures that create, promote and endanger security, to understand how they impact each other, and propose frameworks that can manage their complexity”. This does not, however, extend to any serious critique of contemporary global governance, or to an advocation of any serious systemic change. Although the broader discourse of human security presents itself as a challenge to the material inequality and injustice that the global political economy produces, it actually promotes the kind of conception of the human that is crucial to neoliberal rationality. When seen not only through the lens of a discourse of rights, the discourse of human security can be read as producing the kind of humans that are capable of taking part in the international economy. When, for example, a tribeswoman in South Sudan exclaims that “I feel like a stakeholder now” (The Economist 2011), she is taking on an economised conception of subjectivity and as such becomes secured as a member of the enterprise society.
Roland Paris (2009: 102) argues that while nineteenth-century colonialism was based on extracting resources from the colonised society and thus benefited the imperial states, in contemporary peacebuilding the flow of resources is the other way around. This view obviously disregards the many benefits developed countries get from the integration of new regions into the global economy. However, a critique of contemporary peacebuilding cannot simply be a critique of Western colonialism. Contemporary neoliberalism cannot be reduced to a tool that developed countries may use according to their preference. Rather than a political programme generated by Western states or a dominant class, neoliberalism ought to be examined as a specific understanding of human nature, subjectivity and social existence (Read 2009: 26). At the same time as the neoliberal homo economicus has gained ground as the subject of contemporary peacebuilding, so also discussions of the uncontrollable and constantly evolving environment have given rise to a new discourse within peacebuilding that draws attention to the ‘adaptive capacities’ of both individuals and social systems. The next section will explore this concept and its relationship to the reinvention of ‘indigenous practices’.


‘Adaptation’ is a concept informed by both natural and social sciences. In biology, adaptation refers to “an inherited or acquired modification in organisms that makes them better suited to survive and reproduce in a particular environment” (Collins English Dictionary 2003). In more generic terms it involves “a change in structure, function, or behavior by which a species or individual improves its chance of survival in a specific environment” (American Heritage Science Dictionary 2005). The discourse of adaptation has been widely deployed during the past decades in the changing military strategic doctrines, finding its expression especially in the discourse of network-centric warfare (see Dillon & Reid 2009). Into the everyday vocabulary of international relations, the concept of adaptation has found its way through the increasing recognition of the necessity to ‘adapt’ to climate change. From climate change the scope of adaptation has broadened to include various other phenomena such as environmental degradation, poverty, humanitarianism and conflict.

Although institutional and economic capacities are still considered important for any peacebuilding mission, greater recognition of ‘non-technical capacities’ is now also being called for. The CMC (2010a: 37) notes that in addition to security, rule of law, human rights and socio-economic recovery, the human security approach goes further to addressing the “psycho-social dimension” of peacebuilding. It places “emphasis on reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation at the individual/community level” (CMC 2010a: 48). The capabilities that are seen to promote peaceful coexistence most often include ‘collaborative capacity’ and, especially, ‘adaptive capacity’ meaning “capacity to handle change” and “the ability to adapt to a rapidly changing socio-political environment; the flexibility to re-invent and re-invest in cultural and traditional resources in new ways” (Wiuff Moe 2010: 35). Oli Brown et al. (2007: 1150) understand adaptive capacity and

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Based on its expertise and contacts, the Finnish Crisis Management Centre, for example, provides “matchmaking” services for Finnish companies to invest and market products and services in post-conflict areas (CMC 2010b).
peacebuilding as inseparable because a lack of adaptive capacity is seen to contribute to conflict and, conversely, conflict will undermine adaptive capacity. The object of protection and securing are thus no longer the inherent rights of homo juridicus. A people-approach to peacebuilding does not entail the protection and preservation of a fixed object. Rather, its object is understood to be constantly transforming and changing (see Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero 2008: 283). Furthermore, change and transformation are not simply phenomena to be regulated but, in fact, to be required of subjects. The key question to be asked today is, "how people can best change the way they live" (Smith & Vivekananda 2007: 32).

Karen O’Brien et al. (2008: 26) call for understanding human security as being “closely linked to the development of human capabilities in the face of change and uncertainty. Individuals and communities faced with both rapid change and increasing uncertainty are challenged to respond in new ways that protect their social, environmental, and human rights”. Instead of holding on to a notion of the necessity of building new institutions to protect subjects, it is now considered more important to “start focusing on what is there rather than clinging on to a notion of what ought to be there” (Wiuff Moe 2010: 7; emphasis in the original). Therefore, “flexible adaptation, resilience and the capacity for self-organisation” are the capacities that ought to be at the focus of security and peacebuilding measures (Wiuff Moe 2010: 11). Top-down strategies are recognised as outdated and it is the target community’s self-organisation that becomes key. It becomes more important, therefore, to begin looking at the capabilities for development that can be located within post-conflict societies.

The CMC (2010a: 70) recognises that “peacebuilding initiatives have a weak record with regard to adequately capitalising on the immense knowledge, cultural practices and existing local capacities of target communities and populations”. Top-down approaches to peacebuilding have often resulted in a lack of understanding of local needs, resulting in “value-free” and “apolitical” forms of peacebuilding (Futamura et al. 2010: 2). Therefore, peacebuilding processes should aim at better capacity building among local communities. This means, first, “identifying the skills, resources and knowledge that exist within the community”, second, “utilising those skills, resources and knowledge when undertaking an intervention or programme” and third, building “new skills in areas where they are not easily found locally” (CMC 2010a: 70). Successful peacebuilding “gives expression to something that is there […] and advances an idea, or a potential to be realised” (Wiuff Moe 2010: 28; emphasis in the original). The positive capacities that the CMC (2010a: 56-57) locates within target communities include self-sufficiency, community networks, existing human capital, indigenous practices, local ethical standards and adaptive strategies. Contemporary peacebuilding thus recognises that there are potentially positive capacities and practices within local populations but they will need guidance in utilising and capitalising on those capacities.

For the CMC (2010a: 48), human security is the lens through which to identify the local capabilities and resources that can be mobilised for development and security. This means both mapping the untapped potential and strengthening of the resilience of target communities and individuals (CMC 2010a: 51-52). “For many communities, resilience against daily insecurities and risks depends on social networks and informal care
arrangements”, the CHS (2003: 89) notes. Economic security that is based on informal social networks and self-reliance enables the kind of “privatised social policy” that Foucault (2008: 145) connects to neoliberalism. In that, people come to be understood as social entrepreneurs who need to embrace and manage the risks and contingencies of life. According to the UNDP (1994: 24), human security aims at making people better able to master their lives themselves, instead of them “becom[ing] a burden on society”. Social risks such as unemployment, poverty and illness are to be understood as problems of ‘self-care’ (Lemke 2002: 59). Hence, the promotion of self-reliance is not to be taken to mean that a regulatory biopolitics is absent (Duffield 2005: 147-152).

When ‘self-reliance’ entered the development discourse in the 1960s, it was a strategy of ‘delinking’ from the system (Rist 2008: 130). To the contrary, contemporary ‘self-reliance’ assumes integration into the global economic system but demands self-reliance in case of economic downturns. Duffield (2010: 55) formulates the kind of conceptions of development that are based on household and community self-reliance and adaptation as “the liberal way of development”. Informal care arrangements such as the local community or the extended family are seen as the ‘natural’ social protection systems for underdeveloped peoples (Duffield 2010: 65). For Foucault (2008: 148), a neoliberal politics of life is a matter of “constructing a social fabric in which precisely the basic units would have the form of the enterprise […] This multiplication of the “enterprise” form within the social body is what is at stake in neo-liberal policy. It is a matter of making the market, competition, and so the enterprise, into what could be called the formative power of society”.

Whereas in Western countries, the spread of the logic of the enterprise society is often seen to fragment collective values of care and obligation to the other (McNay 2009: 65), in developing countries it is exactly those “traditional relationships and values” that are considered vital for individuals and communities (CMC 2010a: 57). While these ‘traditional relationships and values’ could be taken as a counter-tendency to the individualism of the enterprise society, they can equally well be susceptible to being used and incorporated by the neoliberal economy. This should not be taken to undervalue or belittle the significance of extended families, social groups or communities for people’s welfare. Neither does this mean arguing that all countries should have the same kind of state-based welfare systems as some Western countries have. However, taking care of one another should not become a necessity inflicted by the neoliberal economy, a necessity that takes advantage of empathy and care only to enable the integration of people into markets that demand them to ultimately compete against one another in every aspect of life.

When the uncontrollable and creatively destructive nature of the contemporary environment is used as the rationalisation for the necessity to adapt and change, what mode of power are we dealing with? The discourses on the adaptability of individuals and communities do not aim at disciplining them. Instead, neoliberalism is linked to techniques that affect the rules of the game rather than the players, implying “an environmental type of intervention instead of the internal subjugation of individuals”. It is therefore distinct from both disciplinary society and normalising society. (Foucault 2008: 259-260.) Neoliberal peacebuilding and developmental practices arguably do not deny difference or wish to
homogenise their objects. Instead, they embrace difference and claim to recognise the multiplicity of “cultural, historical and contextual specificities” of any given country or community that they set out to secure and develop (CMC 2010a: 64). Furthermore, the CMC (2010a: 57) notes that there are “indigenous (often unexploited) coping mechanisms that can be mobilised and further developed”. Hence, what is characteristic of the subject of the enterprise society is not its docility or uniformity with others but instead its active participation in the remaking of the self. A neoliberal enterprise society does not aim to create uniform subjects but instead wishes to differentiate, and to organise individual difference. (McNay 2009: 56.)

Yet, references to ‘local needs’ or ‘social capital’ in the rhetoric of peacebuilding agents do not necessarily guarantee a meaningful engagement with the local (Viktorova Milne 2010: 75-76). In practice, as Mac Ginty (2010) for example shows, indigenous practices are only made use of by modifying them so as to meet the requirements of liberal systems. Similarly, the CMC (2010a: 64) recognises that cultural and contextual specificities may in some cases affect the peacebuilding project negatively. Where ‘local particularity’ involves human rights violations or the perpetuation of gender inequality, it becomes presented as the source of conflict (Viktorova Milne 2010: 78). The toleration that global liberal governance extends towards cultural diversity is limited by the parameters of its own economic and political requirements, thus reducing actually existing diversity to requisite diversity (Dillon & Reid 2009: 94). ‘The local’ is seen to have potential for both good and bad. ‘Custom’ and ‘tradition’ should, therefore, be seen as being “remarkably dynamic and adaptable” (Brown et al. 2010: 102). As mentioned above, the task is, therefore, to further develop indigenous practices in such a way that they contribute to neoliberal peacebuilding.

The shift from ‘top-down’ to ‘bottom-up’ development strategies means building upon “the capacities of affected community(ies) to act on behalf of themselves and their community so as to cope with the identified threats and to strengthen their resilience to withstand future shocks” (CMC 2010a: 62). Participation of target populations is required, firstly, because it “provides opportunities for better data gathering and in-depth analysis of a particular issue, group or area”, secondly, because it “allows for the building upon and building of local capacities and resources,” and, finally, because it “provides opportunities for building longer-term sustainability” (CMC 2010a: 65). The CMC (2010a: 88) continues to advise future peacebuilders that “knowing the local population is also a precondition in order to communicate efficiently to prevent any misunderstandings or negative perceptions of your activities”. As such, ‘the local’ provides, in fact, a merely utilitarian function. The interest in ‘local ownership’, ‘sustainability’ and ‘indigenous practices’ has risen as an attempt to stave off the critique peacebuilding has faced during the past decade. More often than not, however, indigenous practices are modified so as to suit modern Western norms of peacebuilding (Mac Ginty 2010: 352-355). In this way indigenous practices too are adapted to neoliberal peacebuilding.

Although biopolitics – understood as the attempt to rationalise and govern phenomena such as reproduction, health, hygiene and life expectancy (Foucault 2008: 317) – is central to discourses of human security, more recently, especially with regard to the pairing up of human security with peacebuilding, the focus has shifted towards adaptability and
‘indigenous’ knowledge and practices as aiding development and security. In its peacebuilding training manual the CMC (2010a), for example, is not simply concerned with conflict, violence and instability but also includes drug use, poor mental health and obesity on its list of obstacles to sustainable peace. Combating such phenomena can easily be seen from the perspective of a normalising society but, compared to, for example, the CHS’s (2003) approach, the CMC (2010a: 56) places more emphasis on the variety of “indigenous practices” as potential capacities to cope with social, health and environmental problems.

Since its inception in the 1994 Human Development Report (UNDP), human security has participated in making individuals and communities responsible to prepare against various social risks. This is still very much the case but now it is more explicitly recognised that there is a “multiplicity of pathways for change” (Wiuff Moe 2010: 18; emphasis in the original). For Foucault (2008: 260), neoliberal governmentality is an “environmental type of intervention” in which “action is brought to bear on the rules of the game rather than the players”. It entails “an optimisation of systems of difference, in which the field is left open to fluctuating processes” (Foucault 2008: 259). The way in which one changes is, therefore, not very important so long as that change is directed towards a greater capacity to adapt to the changes that peacebuilding in its contemporary forms entails to the environment in which one lives.

‘Becoming Adaptable’ of Homo Oeconomicus and Homo Juridicus

For Foucault (2008: 150), the enterprise society and the judicial society are two faces of the single phenomenon. Although sovereign power precedes biopower and is analytically distinct from it, sovereign power is not replaced or erased by biopower but rather becomes penetrated and complemented by it (Foucault 2004: 241). Often it is in the interest of the economic subject too that certain rights are respected; in the context of peacebuilding the call for the clarification of property rights being a case in point. Although homo juridicus and homo oeconomicus intersect, the conceptions of subjectivity, freedom and social existence related to them are fundamentally different. Traditionally the freedom of homo juridicus has been the freedom to demand the recognition of his or her rights within the legal system. To be ‘secured’ as a subject of right has meant that one does not venture outside of the legal framework in looking for one’s freedom. Clearly, the discourse of adaptation is somewhat alien to the subject of right. Human rights discourse tends to view its object as having something inherent and unchanging that needs to be protected.

As the different ‘generations’ of human rights show, new rights can be conjured up and demanded to be respect. In this way homo juridicus can adapt to its changing environment and attempt to broaden the scope of ‘right’. Utilising the discourse of rights as a strategy of resistance may indeed bring tangible benefits to marginalised groups. The possible range of subversive action should not, however, be allowed to be limited by what can be done within the framework provided by ‘rights’. Louiza Odysseos (2010: 18) shows how – instead of countering the power of neoliberal technologies of government – homo juridicus is complicit with neoliberal governmentality because human rights “provide a framework in which to claim and exercise minimal and often abstract legal entitlements, rather than offering or even approximating radical societal and international change”. The expanding
framework of rights can have the effect of subsuming social discontent in such a way that it will only be expressed within the confines of that framework (Odysseos 2010: 17).

Correspondingly, the freedom of homo oeconomicus has essentially been the freedom to choose between different lifestyles, economic opportunities, and goods and services (Odysseos 2010: 7). Being secured as such means that the subject settles for the freedom to buy and choose. It seems, however, that when understood through the concept of adaptive capacity, the freedom of homo oeconomicus becomes instead the freedom to modify oneself indefinitely. Of course this modification can, and often does, take the form of consumption. In its essence, however, the neoliberal homo oeconomicus “is not the man of exchange or man the consumer; he is the man of enterprise and production” (Foucault 2008: 147). Being secured as adaptive and enterprising means accepting that the environment in which one lives is in permanent crisis and therefore requires constant reshaping of the self. Not only is the subject changing but it has to change.

Whereas an enterprise is by definition an activity that involves willingness to undertake new ventures and risks to achieve the greatest possible profit, utility refers to a measure that is to be maximised in situations involving choice. Homo oeconomicus directs his or her activity in such a way that the choices he or she makes will maximise his or her utility. In neoliberalism, homo oeconomicus’ utility increases when he or she acquires capacities that give him or her an advantage over others in the competition on the market. Doing business is, of course, always surrounded by the necessity of adapting to changes in the market environment. When adaptation is not only conceived of as a successful way of conducting one’s business, but also becomes the definitive feature of being human, then it means that one’s relation to oneself, and to others, succumbs to the logic of the market. To be completely adaptable is not to have anything permanent. Change is the only constant. Thus, being in a permanent state of adaptation means that one is to be nothing but to have the potential for everything. When individuals adopt this rationality in relation to themselves, they become secured as subjects of the enterprise society.

What the necessity of constant adaptation of the subject in a changing environment entails, is that it becomes impossible for homo oeconomicus to determine a fixed utility. As opposed to homo juridicus who agrees to the limitation of his or her rights by the sovereign, homo oeconomicus is “never called upon to relinquish his interest” but instead to maximise it (Foucault 2008: 275). There is no social contract that would define homo oeconomicus’ relationship to power. Whereas rights may be limited, interest is irreducible and inalienable (Read 2009: 29). Yet, when constant adaptability and remaking of the self are demanded, it becomes increasingly difficult for homo oeconomicus to locate the interest he or she ought to be pursuing. In a sense, then, interest ceases to be irreducible and inalienable. Following this, utility too becomes increasingly vague and difficult to reach. Furthermore, when focusing on adaptation and self-reliance, human security channels social and political discontent in such a way that it is not threatening to the contemporary neoliberal political economy. As a result, adaptation implies a political passivity that accepts and takes for granted the inability to challenge the things that demand adaptation.
Following Foucault, Jabri (2010: 49) suggests understanding the liberal peace project as one of security rather than peace. “When the liberal peace project is recognised as a security project, its ultimate remit is to build a security apparatus through the direction of power at the shaping and reshaping of populations”, she (2010: 52) argues. But what happens to security when ‘adaptive capacity’ is what is to be secured? Paradoxically, according to the CMC (2010a: 24), stability is one of the core values of human security. Stability and adaptation are, however, fundamentally incompatibile. Thus, when taking adaptation as a key principle, human security changes too. While human security once claimed to be fighting against the inability of people to control their own destiny, with adaptation as a necessity this inability is, to the contrary, taken for granted. Contemporary peacebuilding widely recognises the futility of top-down approaches to making peace. Nevertheless, its ‘people-centredness’ does not simply imply discipline and normalisation because they cannot be used to govern subjects that have to change. When ‘adaptive capacity’ is called for, the corresponding mode of operation of power is no longer disciplining or normalising. Governing the people of post-conflict reconstruction is therefore not so much a question of normalisation as it is of self-organisation in an uncontrollable environment. There is thus a curious paradox arising for the human security that attempts to secure people through their own adaptation to harsh conditions: The population has to be secured but to achieve this, it needs to be allowed to adapt and change, perhaps even in unforeseeable ways (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero 2008: 271).

Conclusion

With the growing recognition of the links between ‘security’ and ‘development’, the politics of reconstructing post-conflict countries has become a key issue in international relations. Contemporary peacebuilding projects propose to post-conflict regions a combination of human rights, development and security, human security being the generic concept encompassing all this. This paper has examined how the move beyond bricks and mortar in peacebuilding relies on the calling into being of two types of subjectivities: homo juridicus and homo oeconomicus. Furthermore, with neoliberal forms of governance, the entrepreneurship and adaptability of individuals have become the focus of developmental peacebuilding missions. The promotion of adaptation is also paired with calls for ‘indigenous’ practices to be utilised in building peace.

The position of both the subject of right and the subject of utility is changing as a result of the increased reliance on the discourse of adaptation. The legal-institutional framework is no longer regarded as sufficient for safeguarding the rights of homo juridicus. Instead, people are called upon to be creative in finding new ways to protect their rights and freedoms. For homo oeconomicus, becoming adaptable implies an entrepreneurship of the self, a never-ending process of attempting to maximise one’s utility in an environment where utility becomes increasingly elusive. Unlike sometimes suggested, the subjects of this kind of a human security project are by no means passive objects. In fact, they are not allowed to be such. Surviving in the emergency environment demands the active participation of every person. When the need for change becomes perceived as something that the environment necessitates, there is less need to govern the subjects per se. The focus on adjustment in the face of change reverts attention from the possibility of acting in ways
that contest the ways in which one’s life environment is changing. Moreover, in demanding its subjects to be constantly adaptable and willing to reshape themselves according to the requirements of the political-economic environment, human security in fact demands that people accept their being in a constant state of insecurity. Hence, instead of perceiving adaptation as a neutral and progressive practice that depends on people having the right kind of knowledge, this paper has gestured towards an examination of the subjectification entailed by the discourse of adaptation when transformed from an ecological concept to a social and a political one.
Bibliography


