Crisis Management in the EU: International Coordination and Civil-Military Cooperation

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Abstract
This article offers a general overview of civilian crisis management in the EU, its mechanisms and instruments, the nature of civil-military cooperation (coordination), and an overview of civilian crisis management missions. Particular attention will be paid to the EULEX Mission in Kosovo as a case-study of how participating civilian experts judge both the mission itself and the mission preparations (i.e. selection and training of personnel, mission strategy, mission related activities, the problems identified etc.). The article will argue that seemingly trivial operational details, such as personnel selection, the quality of pre-deployment training and advance preparation are important factors which, if not properly coordinated, could jeopardise EU goals in the field of crisis management. The author also presumes that unregulated civil-military cooperation and coordination can lead to the failure of crisis management operations.

Keywords
post-conflict reconstruction, peace support operations, regionalisation of peace-keeping operations, civilian crisis management, civil-military cooperation (coordination), EULEX Kosovo

Introduction

The aftermath of the Cold War has been characterised by a myriad of peacekeeping operations with the intensive participation of national armed forces, international organisations, UN agencies, and other governmental and non-governmental actors. Contemporary peacekeeping operations and missions have increasingly focused on providing sustainable peace and have thus gained in complexity, whilst peacekeeping operations have developed from purely military to joint military and civilian operations, with civilian

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representing the larger part. This has resulted in an increase in the number of actors participating in these operations, with various governmental, non-governmental and intergovernmental organisations taking on important roles not only in the humanitarian field, but also the economic field and the reconstruction of state institutions.

In the post-Cold War era, the UN has frequently mandated the management of peacekeeping operations to regional organisations. Among these, the most important, besides NATO, has been the European Union (EU), which has moved into the management and implementation of peacekeeping and has developed mechanisms for intervening in international crises. Within the scope of EU policy a special emphasis is placed on its capabilities for civilian crisis management and the civilian dimension of peace-building.

Since 1990 there has been an intense development of theories concerning changes to the implementation of peacekeeping operations. The new approach defines them as complex sets of activities involving various international actors in a variety of areas. One important element of change is that peacekeeping operations have become an instrument for the management and conduct of transition. Missions now focus on managing and supervising the transition towards a stable peace, and are consequently multidimensional (complex). A myriad of tasks now relate to the state and, to some extent, the societal transition from war to peace. Operations thus consist of military and civilian segments, where the latter attends to the implementation of various civilian aspects of transition, such as transitional civilian administration, the provision of internal security and functioning police forces, the construction of democratic institutions (reform of the legal and political system is a common feature), the exercise of human rights and the supervision of electoral processes, and post-war reconstruction. Many humanitarian and other civilian organisations usually participate in the mission and their relation to the military structures represents an important aspect of the operation’s implementation.

Research has become increasingly focused on post-conflict reconstruction. Armed conflicts cause substantial societal damage, the consequences of which are often so great that the internal mobilisation of resources for reconstruction will not suffice, hence the international community must intervene. An international approach to reconstruction is of the utmost importance.


importance in intra-state conflicts which generally break-out in poorer countries, incurring the suffering of the civilian population and exposing the incompetence of internal political authority.

Another indicator of the complexity of contemporary international peacekeeping operations is the concept of peace support operations – a constituent element of which is the awareness that the military aspect represents only one of many factors which make the formation of a stable liberal-democratic social system possible. The military aspect must be aligned with the operation’s broader goals and must cooperate with the civilian segment which is composed of various international organisations, structures and national entities. Contemporary peacekeeping operations also include economic reconstruction, which primarily implies the transition to a market economy, the separation of warlords from economic resources and the channelling of resources to provide welfare for the population. Such goals require the cooperation of the widest spectrum of civil experts in areas such as law, policing, administration, health and education, and the use of force should be an exception and not the rule.

With the EU becoming more involved in peacekeeping operations by combining military and civilian crisis management, this article will argue that the EU’s ability to achieve its goals in the field of crisis management could be jeopardised by such seemingly trivial operational details as personnel selection, the quality of pre-deployment training and the advance preparation required to accomplish the operational goals. We can also presume that unregulated civil-military cooperation and coordination can lead to the failure of crisis management operations.

Key Actors in Peacekeeping Operations

The need for peacekeeping operations has steadily increased, particularly the need for various forms of international intervention which go beyond the conventional conceptual framework of peacekeeping operations. The transformation of operations has been mainly conditional on the nature of conflicts and on the changes in the international post-Cold War environment.

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This has led to the so-called triple transformation of peacekeeping. The first transformation was quantitative and was reflected mainly in an increased number of peacekeeping operations. This was followed by a qualitative transformation, which was reflected in the increased complexity of operations (a wider mandate, an increased number of governmental and non-governmental actors, the process of regionalisation and the delegation of peacekeeping operations, and a predominance of intra-state conflicts etc.). The third transformation was of a normative nature, namely the prevailing perception among influential UN members, particularly those western states who have become the key implementers of peacekeeping operations, that the foundation for a durable and stable peace requires the inclusion of liberally democratic values and norms.  

The normative transformation of peacekeeping operations helped overcome the crisis in peacekeeping operations which had lasted since the 1990s. The initial enthusiasm, notably among western states, for participating in peacekeeping operations had declined due to the failure of operations in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and led to a decrease in the total number of peacekeeping operations, and to a preference to participate instead in operations backed by the concerted efforts of the UN and NATO. Some states, such as the USA, Canada, and Belgium even went so far as to completely withdraw from UN controlled peacekeeping missions. The regionalisation appeared together with the UN’s delegating of peacekeeping operations to various regional organisations, with a central role played by NATO and later also by the EU. The normative transformation has influenced regionalised peacekeeping operations under the aegis of NATO and later the EU, but has not influenced most UN led operations.

The report of the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali, pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31st January 1992, forms the basis for the regionalisation of peacekeeping operations. In the chapter entitled “Cooperation with Regional Arrangements and Organisations”, Ghali reminds us that regionalisation had already been formulated in article 21 of The Covenant of League of Nations, which “noted the

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6 Bellamy et al. Understanding Peacekeeping, pp.91-92.
validity of regional understandings for securing the maintenance of peace.”¹¹ Furthermore, the UN Charter devotes Chapter VIII to “regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action and consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.”¹² The EU and its member states, together with OSCE, are mentioned in the report as being of central importance in dealing with crisis in the Balkans and its neighbouring areas. The report did not set out any formal pattern of relationship between the UN and regional organisations, but simply recognised that regional agencies often possess a potential that can be utilised to serve the functions covered by the report: namely, preventive diplomacy; peace-keeping; peacemaking; and post-conflict peace-building. The Security Council should continue to take on the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, however, regional action as a matter of decentralisation, delegation and cooperation with the UN could unburden the Security Council and contribute to a deeper sense of participation, as well as achieve a greater consensus and democratisation in international affairs. When the Security Council chooses to authorise a regional organisation, the organisation should take the lead in responding to the crisis in its region.

A number of international peacekeeping arrangements and agencies have since been involved in delegated and other international operations and missions: the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Chechnya, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo; NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Afghanistan; the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Congo, and the Middle East; the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Ivory Coast; the Organisation of American States (OAS) in Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Haiti. In addition to these, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the South-African Development Community (SADC), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have also been active in their own regions.

Analysts have still to reach a consensus on the reasoning behind delegated peace operations and on their effectiveness. Fawcett asserts that the regionalisation of peace operations was demand-driven: the international environment was not in favour of various interventions, the concept of security and peace had become more complex and thus beyond the capabilities of a single organisation, whilst the increasing number of peace operations required regional actors

¹¹ An Agenda for Peace, p. 6.
¹² An Agenda for Peace, p. 6.
to play a greater role.\textsuperscript{13} Many agree that the regionalisation of peace operations is also conditioned by the interests of global and regional powers.\textsuperscript{14} Some authors have had second thoughts about the prudence of regionalising peace operations. They see both the positive sides (a higher level of legitimacy, sensitivity, knowledge, geographical vicinity, and acceptability to the warring factions) as well as the negative sides (partiality, the lack of experience of complex peace operations, the lack of capabilities for sustained engagement, the lack of moral authority, the danger of creating quasi-imperialist spheres of interest).\textsuperscript{15} This view stems from the analyses that Euro-Atlantic organisations enjoy a preferential status in the UN Security Council whilst other international organisations do not share the same conditions of cooperation. It also appears to be the case that the latter are restricted by limited budgets, and poor logistical and administrative support. In addition, some regions in the world do not possess the appropriate organisational structures to deal with severe and complex crises. These apparent shortcomings of delegated peace operations compelled the UN to formulate the following principles of cooperation with regional organisations: a) primary responsibility for international security and peace remains in the hands of the UN Security Council; b) cooperation with international organisations is a dynamic process based upon a realistic mandate and a fixed operation time-span; c) cooperation is based on consultations and the effective exchange of information; d) all actors share an understanding of the basic doctrine and rules of engagement; e) peace operations personnel should be sufficiently trained and equipped; f) efforts to achieve a sustainable peace and security include long-term measures to strengthen civil society, democracy, human rights and the rule of law in the post-conflict country.\textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{Involvement of the EU in International Operations and Missions}

The EU’s involvement in peace construction abroad remains one of the biggest challenges for its external agenda. The experience of war and other armed conflicts in the aftermath of the Cold War has led the EU to develop its capabilities for crisis response within the framework

\textsuperscript{15} Bellamy et al. \textit{Understanding Peacekeeping}, p.214.
of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and to adopt a political commitment to prevent violent conflicts. As early as 1992, the EU indirectly expressed its intention to collaborate in international operations and missions, using the Western European Union, albeit to a limited extent, in the former Yugoslavia and in the Persian Gulf. An important incentive that enhanced the EU’s role in peacekeeping was the signature of the Berlin Plus agreement between the EU and NATO in 2001. The agreement stipulated that, in certain circumstances, NATO would lend its capabilities to EU missions. This was the basis for the transfer of NATO-led missions in Macedonia (2003) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (2004) to the EU. In addition to this, the EU also performed military missions in the Congo (2006), Chad (2008) and Somalia (2008).

Civilian crisis management is one of the features of the EU’s external agenda, although it lacks a proper theoretical definition within the organisation, as well as a complete consensus on what kind of role the EU ought to play in the international arena. “The Petersberg Tasks” provide a foundation for the EU’s security policy, which, it makes clear, is not restricted to military action only, but also includes civilian tasks. The military dimension of crisis management has been evolving within the framework of the ESDP since 1999, and has acquired a clear intergovernmental character, whereas the civilian dimension of crisis management has remained less defined, potentially encompassing a wider spectrum of policies and instruments in intergovernmental and European Community related processes. Nevertheless, civilian crisis management has also been developing since 1999, congruent with the Civilian Headline Goal 2008. The first EU civilian missions were police missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia in 2003. These were followed by several other civilian missions in Georgia (2004), Kinshasa, the Congo, Iraq, Darfur, Aceh, the Palestinian Territories, Rafah, the border between Moldova and Ukraine, and Macedonia (2005), Afghanistan, the Congo and Kosovo (2007), and Guinea Bissau and Georgia (2008).

Civilian Crisis Management

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17 The Treaty of Lisbon introduces the syntagm Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).
As discussed above, the EU deals with peacekeeping operations within the framework of the crisis management concept; therefore, we should first touch upon the problem of defining ‘crisis’ and ‘crisis management’ as a constant of European security efforts. This article takes ‘crisis’ to mean a situation endangering the fundamental social values, norms and structures, characterised by a limited time for decision-making, as well as insecurity, stress, and often surprise.  

‘Crisis management’ is defined as the formulation of procedures, agreements and decisions which influence the nature of a crisis and encompass the organisation, the preparation, the measures and the allocation of resources for its management and control. As far as the EU is concerned, this article mainly focuses on civilian crisis management. Nowak refers to an EU report which implies that civilian crisis management includes the intervention of non-military personnel in a crisis, which may be violent or non-violent, with the purpose of both preventing a further escalation of the crisis and facilitating its resolution.

This however does not solve the definition problem. Civilian crisis management is a broad concept which defies an easy definition. It potentially denotes every non-military policy or instrument directed at crisis management. In addition, civilian crisis management is endemic to the EU and has no adequate parallel in the UN, OSCE and non-European regional organisations.

The EU report on civilian crisis management (2007) defines the concept as civilian involvement in a humanitarian crisis that threaten or evolves in a state, region or society as the consequence of a conflict or environmental disaster.

In practice, civilian crisis management implies the contribution of personnel from the civilian institutions of EU members for the prevention or resolution of crises. It encompasses policing, humanitarian aid, protection, security and rescue operations, demining, reconstruction, support for human rights and democratic standards, assistance in the setting up of institutions, providing legal protection, ensuring freedom of the media and strengthening national awareness. However, it remains an open question whether the situations in which the EU intervenes with civilian capabilities can always and beyond doubt be defined as a ‘crisis’.

The EU has a wide spectrum of civilian instruments at its disposal of an economic, social or diplomatic nature, therefore its focus on preventative activities is not surprising. By contrast, military operations represent a last resort, when all other instruments have already failed, and

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20 Nowak, Civilian Crisis Management: the EU Way, p.16.
21 Nowak, Civilian Crisis Management: the EU Way, p.17.
in such situations, questions arise concerning the operation’s legality, its mandate, invitations of relevant states, its legitimacy, and the role of other international organisations, such as NATO and the UN.

The civilian instruments of crisis management are enshrined in the Civilian Headline Goal, which supplemented both the Military Headline Goal (“Helsinki Headline Goal”) adopted in Helsinki in 1999, and the revised “Military Headline Goal 2010”, adopted in 2004. As noted above, the Civilian Headline Goal has the fundamental task of developing crisis management capabilities in the field of policing, the rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection. The goal is to form a pool of approximately 6,000 policemen, a couple of thousand judges, civil servants and other civilian experts, who are at the disposal of EU operations. The formulation of civilian crisis management capacities incurs certain problems, since the potential areas of remit of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the ESDP seem to be spread across EU structures, thereby causing coordination difficulties. Another problem stems from the fact that support for the different civilian missions varies according to member state interests, with, for example, some members even wishing to settle their post-colonial legacy through the ESDP’s operations.

**Mechanisms and Instruments for Providing Efficiency of Civilian Crisis Management**

In parallel with the creation of mechanisms and instruments which enable it to undertake international security activities, the EU has taken part in 23 peacekeeping operations, 6 being military and 17 civilian. These operations have been carried out across the globe. Due to the increase of civilian crisis management operations and their geographic scope, new mechanisms and instruments have had to be created for the organised planning of these missions and the training of personnel. These included the planning of civilian and military operations, the realisation of fundamental goals, the development of rapid response teams, and the development of new concepts stemming from the EU’s security reform.

The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management is an important instrument developed by the EU to formulate proposals for civilian crisis management missions, supervise their implementation and prepare programmes for the general and specialised training of personnel. The Committee reports to the Permanent Representatives Committee of the EU (COREPER). In addition to its aforementioned duties, the Committee also deals with the integration and cooperation of EU member state activities with related activities conducted by the European Commission. It also provides a link between the Council of the
EU (through the Political and Security Committee), the European Commission, and member states in developing civilian capacities. Congruent with its principles and powers within the single institutional framework of the ESDP, the Committee also coordinates various EU measures pertaining to crisis management.\textsuperscript{22}

Another important instrument in this field is the European Security and Defence Academy, whose task is to teach the theory and culture of the European security and defence policy. The European Group on Training, which prepares and conducts educational programmes across the member states, is also involved in the promotion of these principles. Training programmes are also organised by the European Police Academy, the EU project for the implementation of civilian aspects of crisis management, the European diplomatic programme and EU member states, within their respective educational and training institutions.\textsuperscript{23}

The Civilian Headline Goal 2008 is the key instrument in the area of civilian crisis management. It emphasises the importance of developing civilian capabilities for the implementation of crisis management to enable the following:\textsuperscript{24}

- the development of integrated civilian crisis management teams (their composition and tasks should arise from the nature of operations and should take into account the full range of EU crisis management capabilities),
- the concurrent management of civilian missions at different levels of engagement (the EU should be capable of concurrently conducting a number of operations),
- the development of civilian capabilities for rapid reaction (the EU should adopt a decision to start an operation within five days of the approval of its concept by the Council of the EU, whereas special civilian capabilities should be developed within 30 days of the decision to partake in the operation),
- cooperation with military crisis management (if necessary, civilian operations are developed jointly and in close cooperation with military crisis management, if not, they can be developed autonomously),
- the coherent operation of EU activities and the smooth transition from ESDP operations to longer term (developmental) EU programmes,
- a timely response to requests from other international organisations, in particular the UN.

\textsuperscript{24} Civilian Headline Goal 2008, pp.359-361.
Civil-Military Cooperation in the EU

According to Gourlay, the question of how to combine different instruments and capabilities has become a key challenge for contemporary international organisations.  

This is a multi-layered problem, encompassing national and international levels, relations among civilian actors, and relations between civilian and military actors, whose functioning in military actions is based on their own principles, mechanisms and capabilities. According to the author, one of the key challenges of introducing civilian capabilities into military operations, within either a military or an entirely civilian framework, is the establishment of a single and coherent system of management to conduct activities. It is particularly difficult, if not impossible, to demarcate the competences of civilian and military actors without their duplication or reciprocal interference. Another important challenge is the formulation of a system of co-ordination, enabling the pursuit of short-term operational goals, as well as the long-term strategic goals of peacekeeping operations, both at the national and international level. However, it is important to point out that, civilian actors, more than their military counterparts, influence the co-ordination and management of activities. This is due to a variety of different reasons, in particular the fact that their numbers have increased, and that they are dispersed and are quite autonomous in their operation.

Two key forms have developed within the framework of civil-military cooperation: Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Civil-Military Co-ordination (CMCO). There are substantial differences between the two, with CIMIC being defined as cooperation between civilian and military actors at a purely operational-tactical level, where the idea is to protect participating military units through increased cooperation with the local population and authorities. This has been confirmed by Khol, who says that CIMIC stems from the military perspective, and is mainly concerned with the protection of armed forces that need to cooperate with local authorities and civilians. CIMIC is thus part of a complex military operation. There are two aspects of cooperation: civilian actors provide certain capabilities which the military do not possess, and, through cooperation with the local population, they provide information to the military commanders and consequently help them improve the

26 Gourlay, ‘Civil–Civilian Coordination in EU Crisis Management’, p.124.
safety of their military operations. CIMIC is thus based on a broad understanding of civil-military cooperation, covering areas such as civilian crisis planning, military assistance, humanitarian assistance and host nation support.\textsuperscript{28} Generally speaking, the divide between CIMIC and CMCO could be understood as follows: CIMIC provides support to a military mission (also covering cooperation with external actors at an operational-tactical level), whilst CMCO was originally developed for internal co-ordination (to cover planning, political decision-making and the implementation of EU crisis management operations). Recently, CMCO has also come to mean the relationship and co-ordination between civilian and military actors within EU crisis management.\textsuperscript{29}

In 2002, the EU adopted the CIMIC Concept for EU-led Crisis Management Operations, defined as: co-ordination and cooperation between military components and civilian actors, including national populations and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies, in support of the mission. According to Mustonen, the EU’s definition of CIMIC partly reflects NATO’s concept, although the EU’s definition is broader and implies a possible use of various instruments, military and civilian, in crisis management. The EU is thus interested in a comprehensive and coherent approach to crisis management, based on a broad spectrum of civilian and military instruments. Its emphasis on civilian instruments is substantially different from the interpretation offered by NATO, however, NATO’s perception of CIMIC as a doctrine for tactical operations, which provides externally oriented mechanisms for contacts with the civilian environment is enshrined in the EU’s concept. As such, the EU’s CIMIC has been focused on the operational-tactical level, with the strategic level being mostly absent.\textsuperscript{30}

Within the scope of CIMIC, EU crisis management operations developed two types of interaction. Firstly, they are, at least in part, dependent on civilian institutions and the local population for resources, information and security. Secondly, military forces cooperate with other international and non-governmental organisations. CIMIC is thus the internal military support function, as well as a feature of EU crisis management operations, which aims at enhancing the efficiency of those operations.\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{28} Gourlay, ‘Civil–Civilian Co-ordination in EU Crisis Management’, pp.124-126.
\textsuperscript{30} Mustonen, ‘Coordination and Cooperation on Tactical and Operational Levels. Studying EU-ESDP Crisis Management Instruments in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, pp.21-22.
Due to the EU’s commitment to develop both military and civilian capabilities for crisis management, the CMCO concept has been developed for the purpose of internal co-ordination. The EU Council adopted CMCO\textsuperscript{32} in November 2003, although the importance of developing civil-military co-ordination had been emphasised since 1999. The European Security Strategy (2003) also highlighted the imperative of integrating military response within the scope of a mainly civilian framework. Some have interpreted the assertion of military capabilities since 1999 as a step away from the EU’s identity as a civilian power. It would, however, be more appropriate to view this as an assertion of a multi-dimensional approach to crisis response and conflict prevention.

More than simply emphasising and developing exact structures and procedures, the idea of the EU’s CMCO is guided by the need to develop a culture of co-ordination, which should be integrated with its other activities. Khol states that the various national cultures of civil-military relations among EU members further complicate the creation of a joint model of civil-military cooperation. There are also other problems, such as the different institutional cultures of soldiers and civilian personnel, even though a common work location facilitates contact within the Directorate of the Secretary General of the Council. The unbalanced ratio of military personnel over civilian within the Secretariat is another important issue. For Kohl, the EU’s crisis management framework was created by the military, while the civilian contribution came much later and did not substantially change the approach to strategic planning. The civilian side also lacks access to the chain of command, and the difference between the military and civilian approaches is also reflected in the attitude (proximity) to the local population: military forces are trained to reduce contact with the local population to a minimum and are isolated in military bases, while civilian personnel operate in constant interaction with local authorities and are more integrated with the local population. Another difference can be found in the process of recruitment. In most EU countries, the deployment of armed forces abroad is a standard procedure for which armies have been trained; it is therefore relatively easy to provide soldiers for military operations. This is more difficult in civilian operations, which are subject to the voluntary decisions of individual civilian experts; moreover, experts from specific professional areas are quite difficult to find in domestic structures since they are usually employed by state or local authorities.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{32} Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO), Council Document 14457/03, 7 November 2003.
According to Stuart, CMCO was initially concerned with institutional adaptation at the politically strategic and operational level, although the process was also supported by a so-called “cultural” adaptation. At the institutional level, CMCO was presumed to have the support of the Political and Security Committee, which conducts political supervision, strategic guidance and co-ordination on the basis of decisions adopted by the Council. At the operational level, co-ordination was to be conducted by the EU’s Special Representative. Although CMCO was primarily intended for vertical and horizontal co-ordination within the EU, it eventually expanded its scope of activities to other international actors, whose institutional solutions are supported by formal procedures of crisis management and by an emphasis on the importance of “cultural co-ordination” at all levels of operation. This is of utmost importance, considering the different operational environments and the consequent inability to formulate universally applicable organisational solutions. It seems that the aforementioned adjustments and efforts have not yet managed to overcome deeper systemic co-ordination problems. Among these is the institutional separation of the Commission from the Council’s structures within the CFSP and the ESDP.\(^{34}\)

In order to overcome inter-institutional obstacles, the EU decided to set up the Crisis Response Co-ordination Team (CRCT) and the Civil-Military Cell (CMC). The CRCT is an ad-hoc team made up of director level officials from both the Council’s Secretariat and from the Commission whose task is to draft a comprehensive crisis management concept, based on the political interests and goals of the EU, and to suggest various options and the means of implementation. They strive for a coherent civilian and military strategic selection and cohesive planning, as opposed to simply sharing information, as was previously the common practice. The CMC was established as part of the EU’s Military Headquarters in December 2003. Among its strategic planning tasks is also the planning of joint civil-military operations.\(^{35}\)

The CMC was a response to three types of pressure: firstly, the question of whether the EU should develop its own capabilities for military action; secondly, the need to legitimise the ESDP as added value; and thirdly, the pressure to increase the operational demands of the EU, in particular the ability to manage and evaluate proper operational actions. There are many CMC tasks that should generate strategic civil-military plans and

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choices within the contingency plans and options for the implementation of autonomous EU operations within the framework of military, civil-military and civilian activities. The following are concrete CMC tasks: to link crisis anticipation work in the EU members, in particular through assistance in the planning and co-ordination of civilian operations; to develop the knowledge to manage civil-military cooperation; to conduct strategic planning for joint civil-military operations; and to strengthen the national headquarters intended for autonomous EU operations.\(^{36}\)

The CMCO concept is thus substantially connected to the EU.\(^{37}\) It addresses the question of leadership and command, in particular the challenges of integrating the military system of leadership and command on the one side, with the civilian on the other. It underlines the fact that civilian structures usually do not possess a comparably hierarchical system of command and leadership, but also that civilian structures interact more closely with the local population than the military does. The contrast between the conventional operations of armed forces and the civilian organisations with their wide array of additional activities, in which some civilian experts are required to undertake extraordinary activities beyond the usual scope of their work, further adds to the complexity of civil-military cooperation in overseas missions. CMCO should thus, above all, present a general strategic framework for the operation of civilian and military actors at the national and supra-national level.\(^{38}\)

CMCO is still in the process of development and it is likely that practical experience will contribute to this process. One priority should be the integration of various crisis management capabilities within the EU in order to overcome the greatest obstacle to the efficient and coherent functioning of the instruments at the EU’s disposal.

**General Assertions on (Civilian) Crisis Management in the EU**

An analysis of the 17 EU civilian crisis management operations undertaken to date\(^{39}\) reveals that 7 of them have been conducted in Europe, 5 in Africa, 4 in Asia and 1 in Australia and Oceania. The average mission duration is about three years. The longest is the EUPM in

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37 The syntagm Civil-Military Coordination (UN CMCoorD) is used also by the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA) for the programmes which prior to 2001 had been listed as CIMIC.
Bosnia and Herzegovina which is now in its eighth year, and the shortest was EUPAT in Macedonia which only lasted six months. The mandate of EU forces in such operations generally does not render the implementation of executive tasks feasible, since they only received a partial executive mandate in three cases (EUPM BIH, EUPOL Proxima Macedonia and EULEX Kosovo), while their tasks in other operations mostly consisted of training, counselling, organising, and the supervision and guidance of local structures and forces. Data also reveals that the average number of police and other EU forces per operation is about 200, however, there are considerable differences among participating states. The most numerous three have been EULEX Kosovo with 1710, EUMM Georgia (340) and EUPOL Afghanistan (255), while the least numerous were EURVS Guinea Bissau (19), EU BAM Rafah (20) and EUPOL Kinshasa (29), or EUJUST LEX Iraq (29).  

As regards operational costs, we can establish the average cost of a civilian crisis management operation at around 70 million EUR, however, there are substantial differences across missions, with the most expensive being the operation AMIS in Darfur at about 500 million EUR, followed by EULEX in Kosovo (approximately 205 million EUR for its first 16 months) and then EUPOL in Afghanistan (107 million EUR). The least expensive operations have been EUPAT in Macedonia (1.5 million EUR), EURVS in Guinea Bissau (5.5 million EUR) and EUPOL Kinshasa (6.5 million EUR).

In one decade, the EU has achieved noticeable success in the area of (civilian) crisis management and has established adequate mechanisms and instruments (crisis management procedures, civil-military co-ordination, the Crisis Response Co-ordination Team, the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, the Civilian Response Team, the Civil-Military Cell…); however, the concept has not yet been implemented as planned. Schroeder claims that only joint planning and coherent operational activities can attain sustainable goals in the pursuit of peace and democratic standards.

The EU’s first experience of a civilian operation, in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM, 2003), revealed a number of deficiencies, particularly of an operational nature. They pointed to the importance of adaptability of procedures and concepts of crisis management, where the generic planning and conceptual documents should provide guidelines and not obstacles to

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40 There is no data on the number of participants in the operation EUJUST THEMIS in Georgia.
41 These figures are based on rough data and are not necessarily complete, since the cost is partly covered by the EU and partly by participating member states. In addition, not all these operations have yet been concluded and the cost estimate provided for the entire period of the operation can still change.
43 Nowak, Civilian Crisis Management: the EU Way, p.25.
the planning processes. It was also established that fact-finding missions are crucial, and that
lists of experts to train mission planners should be drawn up, and that states should only
commit to the deployment of skilled and experienced experts. Furthermore, the administrative
side of operations proved to be just as important as the operational side.

In addition to the operational deficiencies already highlighted, two general deficiencies should
also be considered. Firstly, the deficiencies in the method of increasing civilian capabilities
in the four priority areas (policing, the rule of law, civilian administration, and civil
protection) were considered in isolation, thereby revealing a limited approach. Instead, a more
integrated method should be applied, since, for example, it is essential for the success of a
police mission that it be accompanied by reform of the legal system. The rule of law is the
framework within which police, judicial and penal experts operate together with public
officials and human rights experts. Secondly, there is a conceptual problem related to the
understanding of civilian capabilities, which are supposed to support military capabilities in
the aftermath of a crisis, whilst civil authority is re-established. This represents a limited
perception of civilian capabilities and their importance, since they represent much more than
just a post-crisis instrument, and should be proactively used in all phases of crisis
management. In addition, short-term civilian interventions should be linked to long-term
reform and developmental processes.

A preliminary analysis of the operations shows a tendency for the EU to opt more frequently
for civilian rather than military operations; this is supported by the data and the fact that the
EU has so far only sent military forces to the Balkans and Africa. Even when the EU
participates in military operations, the focus is placed on less complex military tasks, such as
the maintenance of a safe environment (operation CONCORDIA in the Republic of
Macedonia, 2003) and the stabilisation of conditions (operation ALTHEA in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, 2004). At first glance, this appears to demonstrate cooperation involving
important military capabilities; however, they are not always prepared and ready for
deployment. Another problem is the state of mind, since expeditionary warfare and
counterinsurgency activities fail to meet the general acceptance of decision makers in the EU.

We could say that the modest military activities of the EU somehow counter its ambitions, as
enshrined in the ESS, which envisages the greater co-ordination and coherence of policies and
instruments across various areas and among different actors. The strategy also envisages the
concurrent implementation of more operations, including those with joint military and civilian

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44 Nowak, Civilian Crisis Management: the EU Way, pp.27-28
features. It also calls for a more preventative approach to operational cooperation with the UN, and for increased diplomatic engagement, including a reform of the security sector, disarmament, demobilisation and the reintegration of former soldiers into the civilian environment.\textsuperscript{45}

The research project behind this article provides some explanations for the inconsistency between EU’s ambitions and its de facto participation in peacekeeping operations. The first finding reveals that EU operations still largely depend on the three largest member states, namely Great Britain, France and Germany. If they happen to disagree, the operation is not likely to take place. These countries may also pursue national interests through EU peacekeeping missions, the notable examples being France in Ivory Coast and Great Britain in Sierra Leone. Furthermore, new EU member states tend to be more prone to military operations within NATO frameworks. Lastly, the more complex an operation, the more important NATO support actually becomes. None of these concerns would seem to favour the idea of EU-led military operations.

At a practical and an operational level, there are other problems connected to the vague definition of tasks and competences, such as the lack of executive powers, the difficulties in civil-military understanding of authority, cooperation and co-ordination, the inefficiency and incoherent activities in various fields of civilian crisis management. It is clear that a coherent and joint command of civilian and military components of a mission will be a requirement of future EU missions.

The main question at this point is whether any progress has been made in terms of learning from past experience. According to Nowak, the EU initially wanted to coordinate member state resources and to synergise these with those of the EU. As it turned out, this was too simplistic an approach, since it was only necessary to provide and coordinate the capabilities required for certain crisis situations. This can undoubtedly be considered progress, even though it appears that nothing new has been added, since it is hard to imagine the planning and implementation of an operation which does not stem from the actual circumstances of a crisis area and its respective needs. The EU approach was initially more reactive, in the sense of being focused on the building of rapid reaction capabilities and short-term operations in post-conflict areas. Lately, however, it has become more proactive and has focused on preventative engagement, or on the entire cycle from conflict to prevention and from

management to reconstruction. Civilian crisis management was initially conceived within the ESDP as an autonomous instrument, but today, based on the ESS, we regard this activity as just one of the tools at the EU’s disposal. This implies a greater emphasis on the relationship between short-term crisis management operations and the longer-term developmental programmes of the EU.\textsuperscript{46}

Civilian goals in four fundamental areas (policing, the rule of law, civil administration and civil protection) have been accomplished and extended to other areas, and they have become more adjustable and can be organised and formed into multifunctional groups of experts on a case by case basis. The funding of civilian operations is still quite problematic. Even though the budget has more than doubled since 2002, the number of operations has increased. Bentick and Bruijne seem to agree with the view that the EU does not earmark enough resources for civilian crisis management. There is a danger of a non-productive dispersion of attention and energy among different operations and missions, and institutional fragmentation in decision-making between the European Commission and the Council.\textsuperscript{47}

The establishment of democracy and security requires a comprehensive approach to crisis management, which has to deal with the complex threats and the use of instruments based on political, economic, security and historical analyses of crisis circumstances. Implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon could bring certain improvements to the field of EU’s military and civilian crisis management and lead to a greater synergy, co-ordination and consequently an improved efficiency in the field.

**Concrete Findings: the EU and States’ Activities in Kosovo (EULEX)**

As regards Kosovo, the research\textsuperscript{48} examined the practical realisation of the normative arrangements of national states and the EU’s goal of integrating civilians into international operations and missions in crisis zones.\textsuperscript{49} Through analysis of the latter, the project identified the weaknesses and strengths of these normative arrangements, and the advantages and

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\textsuperscript{46} Nowak, *Civilian Crisis Management: the EU Way*, pp.36-37.


\textsuperscript{48} The research was conducted in August and September 2009 and is based on data gathered in the field in Kosovo in the form of interviews with individual civilian experts participating in international missions. Two research methods were employed: the method of a partly structured interview; and the method of participant observation. The goal was to conduct interviews with individual civilians involved in either military (e.g. KFOR) or civilian (e.g. EULEX) missions. In addition, interviews were also conducted with those members of military personnel who most commonly cooperate with civilians, particularly within the scope of military missions. These were mostly members of CIMIC groups. Altogether 16 interviews were conducted.

\textsuperscript{49} Jelena Juvan, Sara Arko and Petra Fras conducted the fieldwork research in Kosovo.
failings of pre-deployment training; fieldwork problems and options for improvement were also identified.

Kosovo was chosen as a case study due to the complexity of the EULEX mission, involving numerous actors, with the UN, EU and NATO still occupying a central role. The United Nations Organisation was present through UNMIK («United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo») and UNKT («United Nations Kosovo Team»). UNKT comprises 14 UN agencies, programmes and funds, such as the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), UNICEF, UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund), WFP (World Food Programme), FAO (Food and Agriculture Organisation), ILO (International Labour Organisation), IOM (International Organisation for Migration), OHCHR (Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights), UNIFEM (United Nations Development Fund for Women), UN HABITAT, UNHCR (Office of High Commissioner for Refugees), UNOPS (United Nations Office for Project Services), WHO (World Health Organisation), and two international financial institutions: the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the WB (World Bank). The OSCE also has a mission in Kosovo, and it functions as the third pillar of UNMIK, responsible for the strengthening of institutions and democracy and the promotion of human rights and the rule of law.

The EU has been involved through EULEX50 (EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo) with the goal of assisting Kosovo’s institutions, judicial organs and law-enforcement agencies in the pursuit of sustainability and accountability, and in the further development and strengthening of an independent multinational justice system, a multinational police force and customs services. Ensuring that these institutions are independent from political interference and that they adhere to internationally recognised standards and European best practices is also a key part of the plan. In addition to these general goals, the EU in Kosovo has set itself some quite specific goals:

- to ensure that war crimes, cases of terrorism and organised crime, corruption, inter-ethnic crimes, financial/economic crimes and other serious criminal offences are adequately investigated, prosecuted, adjudicated and enforced in accordance with the applicable law;
- to strengthen and promote co-operation and adjustment during the course of judicial process, in particular in the area of organised crime;
- to contribute to the fight against corruption, fraud and financial crime.

50 The Council mandated the mission on 16 February 2007, initial operational capability was achieved in December of that year, and full operational capability in April 2008.
The EULEX mission implements its mandate through monitoring, mentoring and counselling, in cooperation with the European Commission Assistance Programmes, while maintaining certain executive powers.\textsuperscript{51}

A safe environment for the functioning of these international institutions, along with a host of non-governmental organisations is provided by NATO via its KFOR forces which are responsible for providing a secure environment and the freedom of movement for all citizens, regardless of their national origin.

\textit{Recruitment, Training and Mission Deployment}

EU member states select civilian experts and mission candidates through different procedures: internal tenders; prior inclusion in reserve military units and later engagement; or through direct contractual arrangement. In some states, recruitment is limited to the state administration, whilst others are open to experts from the civilian world. The EU launches a Call for Contribution, where individuals can apply for a position, while the final selection decision is taken in Brussels.

All selected candidates receive training, although this varies from state to state, even though states tend to cooperate and some experts are trained in EU institutions. It would be useful to create a list of trained, qualified and ready to serve experts from the various fields that could be engaged at short notice. One of the recruitment problems is the so-called “negative cadre selection” in which employers are not willing to let their most valued experts serve in a mission, since they cannot get a substitute worker and there is the potential danger of not getting the expert back to his original working position. Another problem is the duration of the mandate, which tends to be extended, and which can lead to additional complications of human resources planning at home. Meanwhile, instead of civilian experts, some states send diplomats who possess some general knowledge but are not experts in the specialist fields of policing, judiciary, administration or civil protection.

\textit{Work in the Mission and the Identification of Potential Problems}

Civilian functional experts employed within the CIMIC group are professionally autonomous, but are subject to the commander of CIMIC from an organisational perspective, and soldiers are often sceptical of the mission and the work of civilians. Civilians are only permitted to

\textsuperscript{51} In April 2009 there were 1710 international experts engaged in the mission (the highest permitted number is 1950), and 285 of local personnel (the highest number allowed is 1200).
leave the base accompanied by armed military personnel, which can lead to logistical and human resources problems. The deployment of civilian experts in a mission solely for the purpose of fulfilling international obligations is pointless. Due to the increasing number of missions, there has been an increase in the competition among different international organisations, non-governmental organisations and governments, all trying to recruit the best experts. This is one of the reasons for the extensive advertising of tenders in the mass media and for transparency in the process of candidate selection.

It is of great importance that civilian experts are qualified to observe, mentor and advise, local officials rather than simply assuming the role of local authorities. Local authorities must accept their own share of responsibility otherwise the task cannot be accomplished. Entities such as Kosovo that are faced with post-conflict reconstruction have been accustomed to the help of the international community for too long, and have for the most part let the international community solve its problems for it.

In the implementation and realisation of concrete projects in the field, civilian experts are often faced with complex procedural demands which require them to comply with domestic legislation on public procurement. This research project emphasises the need for strategic reflection on potential projects anticipated, so that an analysis is prepared prior to the civilian experts’ actual arrival at the mission, rather than leaving civilian experts to figure out their role in the field. Financial resources for the implementation of projects should also be guaranteed in advance.

**Conclusion**

Post-Cold War peacekeeping operations and missions have aimed to provide lasting peace, and therefore their tasks tend to have become ever more complex and to comprise civilian as well as military elements. One of the consequences of this is the expansion of the role and number of the various governmental, non-governmental, and inter-governmental organisations operating in the humanitarian, social and economic field and in the reconstruction of state institutions. The UN occupies a primary role in the conduct of peacekeeping operations, although the mandate for their implementation is often assigned to regional organisations, in particular in the field of civilian crisis management and civilian aspects of peace enforcement, where the EU has increasingly started to take on the burden.

Peacekeeping operations have lately experienced a triple transformation. The first was of a quantitative nature and was reflected particularly in the increased number of missions. This
was followed by a qualitative transformation, reflecting the increased complexity of operations and thus an expanded mandate, the greater number of governmental and non-governmental actors, the process of regionalisation and the delegation of peacekeeping operations, and the predominance of intra-state conflicts. The third transformation was of a normative nature and was based on the belief of the major players in the international community that peacekeeping operations must establish a liberal democratic system as the foundation of a permanent peace.

Parallel to the transformations of peacekeeping operations and the strengthened civilian role in their mandates, the question arose of integrating the various military and civilian mechanisms and instruments: how can the instruments available to the international community be merged, integrated, and harmonised? Different forms of civil-military cooperation have emerged, such as CIMIC, CMCO and CMCoorD. The EU developed CMCO, conceived as a mission support in the form of cooperation and harmonisation among the military components of the EU crisis management operations and civilian actors, including the national population and local authorities, and international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies. To affirm the concept of civil-military cooperation, the EU has also created the Crisis Response Co-ordination Team and Civil-Military Cell, with the purpose of contributing to the development of a coherent functioning, based on the principle of reconciliation, which should surpass cultural differences that are nationally, institutionally (civil-military) or functionally dependent.

In the last decade, the EU has made great progress in the field of (civilian) crisis management, particularly at the structural level (the establishment of crisis management procedures, civil-military co-ordination, the Crisis Response Co-ordination Team, the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, the Civilian Response Teams, the Civil-Military Cell); however, at the functional level the concept still faces some problems. The latter could be mitigated if fact-finding missions were conducted prior to the deployment of each operation, if the EU were to plan better operational guidelines, and if experts were involved in their preparation, if capabilities were better adjusted to the needs of the operational environment, and if adequate synergies between the military and civilian dimensions were sought and ultimately integrated with the long-term developmental needs of post-conflict areas.

Civilian crisis management actors involved in EULEX who have noticed a negative cadre selection, since states seem to be reluctant to send their top experts and the expertise of sent civilians often fails to meet the required level, have also addressed some of these problems. Soldiers are subsequently sceptical of the role of civil functional experts in missions, and this
provides a weak basis for the potential success of civil-military cooperation. Civilian experts do not trust local authorities and often take on their competences and responsibilities, instead of performing the function of observing and advising. Projects, where the role of civilian experts is not strategically considered and analysed prior to their deployment in a mission, are not likely to succeed. These findings have at least in principle confirmed the initial premises of this article.