Governmentality of US-Chile Relations from 1973 to the Present: Successes and Discontents analysed through Regimes of Truth and Technologies of the Self

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ABSTRACT. Chile has a long and complex political history that has seen a number of political coups culminating in the 1973 overthrowing of President Allende. This coup was especially significant due to the involvement of the United States in its fight against communism and socialism, enemies of free market capitalism. This paper looks at the political technologies and regimes of truth evident in US-Chile relations. Although reference will be made to pre 1973 events, focus will be on US-Chile relations from circa 1973 to the present including the 2004 US-Chile free trade agreement and the recent enhanced partnerships between Chile and the US state of California. Analytic techniques employed from philosopher and historian Michel Foucault will include a focus on regimes of truth and governmental rationalities. The Chile case is especially interesting as it presents a more sophisticated form of governmentality. Instead of a colonial style conquest, a dual form of governmentality is present; that is, a form of ‘governing’ of Chile politics by the US and a governing of the population by the evolving Chile political machine. Furthermore, forms of governmentality can not be fully comprehended without considering technologies of the self. Technologies of the self look at how individual citizens construct and transform themselves, their goals and purpose. Influences on how individuals construct themselves will be discussed, including the Catholic Church, early influences of communism and socialism and later influences of capitalism. Clearly, these intersect with technologies of governing, resulting in both moulding and resistance. The paper will conclude with a discussion on the successes of US policy with Chile (stability, growth and strong relations) and discontents (inequalities, exploitation).

In studying the governmentality of United States (US) – Chile relations, it is interesting and perhaps even ironic that they both share the same day of the year to represent a day of darkness, a day that freedom and democracy are attacked. That day is September 11, for Chile it was 1973 with the overthrow of the democratically elected Socialist Government of Allende, for the US it was 2001 with the infamous terrorist attacks. Both actions involved carefully planned and covert tactics with the US helping to instigate the 1973 military coup that led to the torture and death of thousands, and then in 2001 being on the receiving end of an attempt to undermine its government resulting in thousands of tragic deaths. Many readers, I’m sure at this point would like to jump in and say that this comparison is both unjustified and unfair, others may agree with it. My point is not to make an argument about such a comparison, merely to point out that history can be painted in many ways, each artist with their own canvas, their own choice of colours and their own unique perspective. Traditional historians view history as a series of facts or events and this paper is not a traditional historical study of Chile from 1973 to the present. There are those more
infinitely more qualified to write such histories (such as Collier & Sater, 2004). Instead, this paper is an attempt to examine the governing of US-Chile relations in the complexity of their power relations using analytical techniques from philosopher Michel Foucault.

**Michel Foucault, truth and governmentality**

Social power is maintained by a network or matrix of rules and codes of practice known as ‘regimes of truth’ (Gruenewald, 2005). The political context in which knowledge is constructed is termed by Foucault 'regimes of truth' or 'games of truth' (Foucault, 2000b). Foucault (2000b) conceptualises a ‘regime of truth’, not as a series of propositions, but as a system or matrix of procedures in which statements are formed, suppressed, regulated and distributed in a context of power relations. In other words, Foucault was not interested in whether the dominant discourse is true or false, which is often indeterminate in modern political debate; instead the issue is how this discourse is formed, what rules governed their formation, what words or ideas were encouraged; which were prohibited or discouraged (Foucault, 2000b). Therefore, truth according to Foucault (2000b) is not an ideal or ideological notion but the outcome of political debates and struggles.

Governmentality addresses the need to manage populations, a goal achieved through a combination of disciplinary power (governing others) and engendering the population to manage themselves (governing self) (Foucault, 2000a). In order to conceptualise this link, Foucault uses a three fold concept triangle of power, truth and the self (Dean, 1994). These form the three general dimensions of government, that is: what techniques or tactics are used to achieve governmental goals (power or techne); what forms of knowledge are used about who and what is to be governed (truth or episteme); and how are identities established for the governed and governors (self or ethos) (Dean, 1999). These three dimensions form a framework for studying governmentality and analysing its aspects. Foucault (2000a: 230) outlined his focus in studying governmentality as: “My problem is to see how men govern (themselves and others) by the production of truth.” As a historian, Foucault was interested in how governmentality practices have come to be thought of as acceptable or the norm (Gruenewald, 2005). Consequently, governmentality does not focus on what or why but rather how things are done, and so can be thought of as "an assemblage of discourses and governmental techniques and strategies." (Simons & Masschelein, 2006: 424).

Foucault’s notion of governmentality represents a shift away from more traditional views, that is, a shift from the intentions of government to examine its operations of often contradictory operations of power (Pennycook, 2002). Governmentality is not just about imposing law but also about allocation of resources using a variety of tactics or technologies that may even include the use of laws (Foucault, 2000a). Dean (1999: 3) makes it clear that the governmentality of human conduct involves “invoking particular forms of truth, and using definite resources, means and techniques.” A case in point is the use of these techniques in their more disciplinary forms being called the *dispotif* by Foucault, and referring to the matrix of apparatuses, tactics, technologies of control which operationalise governmentality (Jackson & Carter, 1998). The aim of the dispotif is to create a certain disposition among subjects (Jackson & Carter, 1998).
In analysing these technologies, Foucault rejects the binary divisions that are a legacy of the enlightenment such as rational/emotional, control/autonomy, freedom/domination, consent/coercion or bargaining/welfare concerns (Dean, 1999; Townley, 1998). Instead Foucault focuses on concepts such as social practices (techniques or technologies), discourse formation, and governmentality which are foundational in structuring social relations both within institutions as well as society at large (Townley, 1998). These concepts are fundamental in viewing how governmentality is constructed in the in-between region that displaces residual dichotomies of the enlightenment (Dean, 1999).

Governmentality according to Dean (1994; 1999) is essentially a political rationality, or a critique on political reason. This notion of rationality refers to any ways in which those who govern attempt to use any forms of rationality in their decision making process (Dean, 1999). Consequently, forms of rationality reflect forms of thinking that aim to be systematic and clear about how things actually are or how they should be (Dean, 1999). Furthermore, political rationalities are more complex and as a result should not be seen as just binary oppositions or ideologies. An important aspect of this complexity is the fact that forms of rationality are historically dependent and therefore not just founded upon interests or rational choice (Dean, 1994). This has important implications as many old beliefs and modes of practice may still influence current practices even though they may be irrelevant or even a hindrance (Dean, 1994).

Another important aspect of governmentality is that it seeks to act on self government, i.e. technologies of the self (Simons & Masschelein, 2006). In point of fact, Foucault’s notion on governmentality involved a greater emphasis on technologies of the self (Dean, 1994). In particular, neo-liberalism with its associated freedom uses self government as one of its important technologies (Simons & Masschelein, 2006). Individuals problematize forms of government; they question and interact with these forms (Dean, 1999). Therefore, since governmentality is concerned with both practices of government and self, it provides a valuable framework for linking government with identity and self (Dean, 1999). In fact, Foucault looks at the continuities as opposed to the juxtapositions between microphysics of power of self government and the macrophysics of power of institutional or nation state governments (Dean, 1994). Linking the government of others with self government means an important balancing act. Dean (1994) terms this striving for equilibrium the welfare state problem, in which an adjustment of political power must be made over human subjects and simultaneously self governing individuals.

An important dimension of regimes of practices that needs clarifying is that they are not reducible to expressions of values or any other single component (Dean, 1999). While values form an important part of governmental rhetoric, regimes of practice are a complex mix of knowledge, values and techniques (Dean, 1999). To put it another way, regimes of practice involve: practices that produce knowledge and truth, multiple forms of technical and practical rationality, and being subject to transformation through specific programmes (Dean, 1999). All these exist in a complex milieu of mentalities, and as such, cannot be reduced to specific parts in isolation (Dean, 1999). As a corollary, the mentalities of regimes of practice involve a complexity that is beyond the intention of a single actor (Dean, 1999). Instead
regimes of practice must be conceptualised in terms of a matrix of specific purposes and ends (Dean, 1999).

Extracting the purpose or goal of practices is an important part of the analytic of governmentality. Governmentality according to Dean (1999) is irreducibly utopian, that is, holding a belief that there is a perfect match between intention and outcomes, that we can reshape human subjects and apply forms of knowledge to achieve a given end. In reality of course, governmental practices do not lead to utopia despite their intention, because attempts to liberate or help one group may in turn oppress or disadvantage another group (Dean, 1999). Nonetheless, extracting this utopian element, this telos of governmentality, is an essential step in making intelligible the regimes of practices within an institution (Dean, 1999).

The analytics of governmentality, therefore, examines the conditions under which regimes of practice arise, are sustained and transformed (Dean, 1999). Thus, what appears as self evident is challenged and the techniques, instruments and mechanisms by which practices operate and reach toward their goals are exposed (Dean, 1999). In essence such practices are NOT viewed as arising from hierarchical direction but instead are viewed in an autonomous way:

...an analytics of government grants to these regimes of practices of practices a reality, a density and a logic of their own and hopes to avoid any premature reduction of them to an order or level of existence that is more fundamental or real...

(Dean, 1999: 22)

Governmentality also focuses on the link between the how of government, in other words, governing others using political economy as well as the constitution of the self. Having outlined the importance of regimes of practices, it is now time to turn to the key issue of how to analyse these regimes of practices. Dean (1999) outlines four dimensions based on Deleuze on which to analyse regimes of practices.

The first dimension is an examination of the fields of visibility of government (Dean, 1999). This dimension describes the fields of visibility that characterise certain regimes of governmental practice including metaphorically, light that illuminates objects, shadows, darkness and obscurity (Dean, 1999). The second dimension addresses the technical aspect of government or techne (Dean, 1999). This dimension identifies how authority is constituted, that is, the means, techniques, discourses, instruments and tactics (Dean, 1999). The third dimension is the rational aspect of government or episteme (Dean, 1999). Not only does this dimension explore forms of knowledge, thought and truth involved in the practices of governing, but also how practices give rise to forms of knowledge and truth (Dean, 1999). The fourth dimension pays attention to the formation of identities (Dean, 1999). Both individual and collective identities are important, as are how practices seek to transform and create identity (Dean, 1999). Furthermore, forms of conduct expected, rights and duties of individuals, as well as how capacities are fostered, are all important features of this dimension (Dean, 1999). These four dimensions reflect an important approach for analysing the question of how regimes of practices interrelate with governmentality.
US-Chile governmentality leading up to Salvador Allende’s presidency and the subsequent 1973 coup

The first major event that needs inspection is the 1973 coup; not just the event itself, but also the lead up to the event. Castiglioni (2001) points out that in the lead up to 1973, Chile was a pioneer of social policy and democracy. Nevertheless, not all was well with the democracy. In particular, lay the underlying problem of inequity (Torche, 2005). This was a Chile with a top end concentration of wealth, with only a few benefiting from Chile’s rich natural resources, especially copper. Poverty was widespread and a sharp decline in military spending had also created tensions (Collier & Sater, 2004). US observers expected right wing Alessandri to win even though he was viciously attacked by the opposition as being a candidate of the rich (Collier & Sater, 2004). Many Chileans were both aware and tired of such exploitation. A ground swell of change was occurring, led by a rationality of socialism promoting equity in a fight against exploitation. Extracting the telos, the utopian ideal was to create a more equitable society and reduce the critical levels of poverty within society.

Simultaneously, in the US there were grave fears, fears of a second Cuba in the global context of a cold war (Church, 1975). Fortunately, following declassification and opening up of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) archives and the National Security Archive we have a more complete understanding of the US role in Chile during these events. Documents from the National Security Archive (Kornbluh, 2004a) reveal president Nixon’s concerns not only regarding a socialist state but also in the potential loss of one billion dollars in US investments in Chile. In relation to socialism, national security advisor Henry Kissinger, advised the president of the dangers of socialism and its virus like potential saying:

\[ \text{The example of a successfully elected Marxist government in Chile would surely have an impact on-an even precedent value for-other parts of the world, especially in Italy; the imitative spread of similar phenomenon elsewhere would in turn significantly affect the world balance and our own position in it.} \]

(Kornbluh, 2004a: 3)

Kornbluh (2004a) further reveals that Nixon gave his ambassador to Chile, Edward Korry instructions to do everything in his power to prevent Allende gaining power. In addition, the CIA were also performing covert operations to prevent Allende from gaining power, these were kept from the ambassador. These dual actions highlighted the US rationality involving a two pronged approach. The Church Report (Church, 1975) further revealed that most of the initial CIA action was propaganda based using media and support for other political parties. These actions indicate a desire by the US, rightly or wrongly, to invest in the political future of Chile. In using Dean’s (1999) aforementioned analytic of governmentality, there are several key points worth highlighting.

Firstly, in the visibility of government, threats to US interests, security and world power were illuminated. In addition, shadows of potential darkness were cast over the risks of a socialist government. Secondly, it is clear that a rationality of active and covert intervention by the US as a technology of governing existed. Multiple approaches were taken with some veiling of covert CIA actions from the US ambassador. Thirdly, regimes of truth as the foundation for government technologies were heavily influenced by secretary of defence Henry Kissinger, who emphasised that there was too much at stake in relation to US economic and strategic (locally as
well as the wider cold war context) interests (Kornbluh, 2004a). Suppressed were rationalities allowing democracy to take its course or faith that the political system in Chile would eventually sort itself out. In fact, Dallek (2007) argues that the Nixon/Kissinger partnership was very much interventionist in its approach to many world affairs.

In culminating the intersection of these governmentalities; in the collision of these two rationalities, that is, the Chilean people in their fight against exploitation and for equity, and the US fight against socialism and all that it represents; such a collision can be summed up in one word – “shit!” This one simple, yet some may say crude word, is a word of the common people. More than this, it is also a word used in response to an event, an event that shocks or surprises. In Chile, after Salvador Allende was finally confirmed in congress with the victory of his Popular Unity (UP) coalition, Socialist deputy Mario Palestro was heard on the radio as saying “Viva Chile, mierda!” (‘Long live Chile, shit!’) (Collier & Sater, 2004: 329). The usage of the word “shit” denotes a pleasant surprise of - shit, we did it! In the US a similar sentiment was shared and most likely the word “shit” was used. Nixon was angry at his ambassador: “…but he just failed, the son of a bitch…He should have kept Allende from getting in” (Kornbluh, 2004a: 2). Here we have the opposing usage of the word “shit”, this time it’s – shit, we failed, shit, they did it, Allende got in. This collision resulted in a major setback for US attempts to govern and protect its strategic interests in Chile.

Yet despite the failure of various US technologies of intervention, the underlying epistemological regime of truth remained strong, that is, Chile is too important to the economic and strategic interests of the US to leave a socialist in power. Kissinger is quoted as saying “We will not let Chile go down the drain.” (Kornbluh, 2004b: 1). Furthermore, the overall covert tactical approach remained, especially regarding concerns if revelations ever got out about the US undermining a democratic government just because of its differing ideological position would in turn backfire with major political ramifications (Kornbluh, 2004b).

The CIA closely monitored activities in Chile after Allende’s victory. In fact, the US used various forms of what Foucault (1975) terms disciplinary power. Although disciplinary power is a form of surveillance used to normalise the behaviour of individual bodies, Foucault (1975) also argued that it could be widened to form political technologies. The first of these used by the US in relation to Chile is that of surveillance. Declassified CIA documents reveal an ongoing monitoring of activities in Chile subsequent to Allende’s victory, with greater focus on events closer to the 1973 coup. Collier and Sater (2004) point out that the early years of Allende’s government solidified his position with a rise in living standards and reductions in poverty. Nevertheless, the same reforms that led to an initial rise in living standards and prosperity removed incentive and thus were unsustainable, resulting in an economic implosion (Collier & Sater, 2004). Furthermore, reform policies were creating tensions within Chile (Collier & Sater, 2004). These are confirmed by CIA documents (CIA, 11/4/1973) that report on Allende’s concerns about the “climate of tension” building within the country following strikes. Moreover, the CIA (CIA, 11/4/1973) reported tensions on multiple fronts for the Allende Government, that is, with the church, Chilean educators and the armed forces. The document also outlined Allende’s diplomatic efforts to alleviate such tensions.
This surveillance was of vital importance in the lead up to the coup d’état. The CIA (CIA, 30/6/73) suffered an important setback when an attempted coup by the Second armoured battalion failed with the bulk of the army and the police supporting the UP government resulting in a reinforcing of governing power. Despite this setback, two important CIA surveillance documents highlight the importance of this surveillance to the coup. Clearly in any coup, the loyalties of the Carabineros (national police) would be vital. The CIA (CIA, 18/5/1973) determined that there was widespread discontent by the Carabineros at the ground level with the UP government, but that the higher ranks held a more neutral attitude toward the government. However, the most crucial finding of this document (CIA, 18/5/1973) was that the Carabineros would not confront the armed forces or support the government in the event of a military coup d’état.

These examples of CIA documents highlight the importance of surveillance by the US government as a political technology in choosing the right moment to help overthrow the UP government. Clearly, the US had to wait for the initial economic gains to subside and the subsequent economic collapse which led to widespread internal tensions. Hence the governments strengths and moments of vulnerability were carefully and constantly under surveillance.

Another important political technology used by the US government is that of normalising sanctions. Foucault (1975) used the term to normalise the behaviour of individuals. The US government had decided that normalisation in Chile was the removal of Allende’s UP socialist government (Kornbluh, 2004b). The US used two main forms of sanctions: economic and covert CIA actions to destabilise the government. Economic sanctions were initiated through a credit squeeze. Not only did the US cut aid and loans to Chile, but also used its power to prevent Chile gaining loans from international banks (Collier & Sater, 2004). Despite US tactics of an economic squeeze, Chile still managed to get foreign loans from many other sources such as: Western Europe, China, the Soviet Union and other Latin American countries (Collier & Sater, 2004). Even with such credit the economic collapse was inevitable.

Covert CIA actions according the Church Report (Church, 1975) totalling $6.5 million in “spoiling operations” were also conducted. Also increases in military funding and close ties between the CIA and Chilean military as well as with US military officials were developed. CIA documents (CIA, 28/8/1973) also reveal US funding for paramilitary groups that could aid in the overthrow of Allende. Additionally, close ties with the Chilean military would have clearly indicated strong US support for a military coup (Church, 1975). These sophisticated and persistent forms of disciplinary power; that is, surveillance and normalising sanctions were finally successful in bringing about the September 11 coup d’état in 1973. As a result, Chile was governed by a new military Junta led by General Augusto Pinochet.

**US-Chile governmentality during the Pinochet Years 1973-1990**

With the US government successfully using techniques of disciplinary power in helping to overthrow Allende and create a military regime, this regime in turn also used techniques of disciplinary power to establish itself. Firstly, was the use of monitoring and surveillance techniques. This was done through the Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA) – the Chile secret police (Collier & Sater, 2004). This
organisation was responsible for surveillance especially of any forms of opposition that could potentially undermine the regime. Secondly, the use of normalising sanctions to ensure that citizens complied with the new regime. Techniques such as banning political parties and gaining censorship over the press helped the regime propagate and reinforce their own discourses of truth. Thirdly, the examination which Foucault (1975) views as combining the above techniques of surveillance and normalising sanctions. Examination was conducted by the DINA through brutal means of intelligence gathering, interrogation, torture and murder. US military intelligence saw DINA as comparable to both the notorious Soviet KGB and the Nazi Gestapo (Chomsky, 2006).

In response, in Washington, there were battles between competing discourses of truth, on the one hand is a dictatorship that is responsible and must be accountable for repression and atrocities, on the other is a dictatorship immune from the deadly infections of communism and socialism. The US decision did not come down to a dichotomy of ideologies – support or oppose Pinochet; rather the relative weights of these competing discourses would determine the level of support and the way the nations would relate. Leading the human rights advocacy and advising the curtailing of aid to Chile was Senator Edward Kennedy with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger strongly supporting the Pinochet government (Kornbluh, 2004a). Kissinger was very concerned over the stability of the new military regime especially if it did not have US support. While not supporting the actions of the regime, Kissinger states: “But I think we should understand our policy - that however unpleasant they act, the government is better for us than Allende was.” (Kornbluh, 2004a: 5). Yet Kissinger had resistance from his own department and others in his government who reminded him that Allende did not close down political parties and the press (Kornbluh, 2004a). Other transcripts also reveal Kissinger’s attempts to improve the image and status of the military regime with human rights abuses addressed from this angle, simultaneously strong US support of the regime was also reinforced (Kornbluh, 2004a). Consequently the discourse of support for the regime became the dominant discourse of truth due to strong support from Kissinger.

In examining the US-Chile relationship during the Pinochet years, it is also important to assess the key rationalities or ideologies of the military regime. Castiglioni (2001) points to three main ideologies that guided government rationalities. These ideologies were not always harmonious in forming unified rational policy. Firstly, there was the emphasis on national security (Castiglioni, 2001). A number of tactics and dispositifs were set up such as the formation of DINA, banning of political parties and gaining control over the press. By suppressing alternative discourses and maintaining a strong system of disciplinary power, especially through the institution of the DINA as well as the armed forces, Pinochet’s government was able to establish internal security (Castiglioni, 2001). Unfortunately these mechanisms used to ensure the governmentality of national security were also responsible for the torture and abuse of many Chileans.

The second fundamental ideology was the right wing thinking of the gremialismo (Castiglioni, 2001). Gremialistas were linked to a right wing upper class Catholic group that proposed anti-state and anti-liberalism policies and advocated a medieval type society based on classes that would achieve the common good. While the ideology of national security was a rationality that was associated with a variety of
tactics, techniques and institutions, the thinking of the gremialiso was more an ideology that could only potentially influence rationalities and hence techniques of governmentality. Although anti-liberalism was in direct contradiction with the third fundamental ideology of monetarism, the centralised control and class system was consistent with the rationalities of the Pinochet government. Moreover, conflict between monetarism and gremialiso thinking was also reduced because much of the wealth was tied up with the upper class, which the subsequent free market policies were to benefit.

In examining the third key ideology of monetarism, it is imperative here to reiterate a key notion of Foucault’s governmentality. Governmentality is not just about top down decision making but includes all tactics, techniques, procedures and instruments used to guide or form policy (Dean, 1999). The role of the Chicago boys in guiding Chile’s economic policy illustrates well the complex and multifaceted instruments of governmentality of US-Chile relations. Links between the Catholic University in Chile and the University of Chicago in the US allowed students from Chile to undertake graduate studies in economics in Chicago (Dean, 1999). This exchange was very significant in exposing Chile to US economic rationalities, strategies and techniques. The Chicago boys managed to have a great deal of influence as monetarism became a central focus which enabled them to provide a comprehensive plan for solving the countries economic problems (Castiglioni, 2001). Further, US economic influence was also provided when the Chicago boys brought economist Milton Freidman to Chile to convince Pinochet of speeding up economic reforms (Castiglioni, 2001). Not only did the Chicago boys heavily influence monetary policy, they also were instrumental in shaping social policy (Castiglioni, 2001).

Despite the highly centralised control of the regime in monetary policy, Silva (1996) argues that this in isolation was not sufficient in ensuring success, thus pointing toward a broader notion of governmentality. Specifically, tactics and techniques of policy would have to be implemented through a complex network of relations. Silva (1996) argues also for a bottom up influence of power networks through business, noting that better economic outcomes are achieved when business and private sectors are consulted on policy. In Chile this interaction was made easier by the concentration of both central decision making power of the government as well as the concentration of wealth in the Chilean economy at the time (Silva, 1996). As a result of economic policies and networks with business, Chile was transformed from a heavily state regulated closed economy into an open and deregulated economy that privatised many enterprises (Silva, 1996). Notwithstanding the relative successes of the economic reforms, there were still major challenges that the Pinochet regime had to face including the 1982 world oil shock, and diplomatically in 1976 with the Letelier assassination.

**Crisis of governmentality: The 1976 Orlando Letelier assassination**

The 1976 assassination of Orlando Letelier, foreign minister under the Allende government in Washington was a critical event that marked a turning point in US-Chile relations. Chile’s system of disciplinary power under DINA had encroached onto US soil causing a straining of US-Chile relations (Collier & Sater, 2004). Up until this time the regime had enjoyed strong support from the right wing Nixon and Ford Administrations. US justice department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) linked the assassination to DINA and carefully secured the extradition of a chief
DINA agent who also happened to be a US citizen (Collier & Sater, 2004). Further compounding the Letelier affair, was the new president Jimmy Carter who took office early in 1977. Carter was a much stronger advocate of human rights than his predecessors which also added to the strained relations (Collier & Sater, 2004).

One of the fallouts in Chile from the Letelier affair was the disbanding of DINA which was replaced in August 1977 with a more modest secret police – National Information Center (CNI) (Collier & Sater, 2004). Achieving this change required pressure through many networks of power since DINA was a fundamental institution in Chile’s governmentality, being one of the key instruments of disciplinary power for the regime. Nevertheless, pressure from the US and the wider international community coupled with internal pressure particularly from within the armed forces (another key instrument in Pinochet’s governmentality) prevailed (Collier & Sater, 2004). Notwithstanding this concession, it is important to realise that maintaining its instruments and mechanisms of disciplinary power was critical for the Pinochet regime. Tragically, cruel methods of surveillance, normalisation and examination continued periodically following a brief respite after the formation of the CNI (Collier & Sater, 2004). Further to this, according to Castiglioni (2001) the neoinstitutionalist perspective views concentration of authority as implacably intertwined with concentration of accountability. Following this argument, under a military regime there is no bureaucracy or red tape on which to lay blame, making the Pinochet regime solely responsible for all human rights abuses. Despite these tensions, relations improved again during the return to the right wing administration of Ronald Reagan in 1981. Relations were also strengthened during the 1982 Falklands war where Chile gave secret help to the British (Collier & Sater, 2004). Here we see strong relational networks between right wing governments US-Chile, US-Britain (Reagan-Thatcher) and Chile-Britain. However, tensions remained until the return to democracy in 1990.

The return to democracy

In 1990 Chile finally returned to democratic rule under President Patricio Alywin. Instruments and tactics of governmentality were set up on a military model, consequently in the return to civilian rule; a complexity of government arose where new tactics and policy instruments had to be developed and transferred from the military to the civilian government. The transition to democracy was generally smooth with the exception of some civilian-military tensions (Sullivan, 2003). The primary source of tensions was the 1980 constitution set up by Pinochet that carefully protected military interests. Consequently, although the military was under the president, it still acted with considerable autonomy (Sullivan, 2003). Transition was also helped through the continuation of Pinochet as military commander, a position which he resigned in 1998 only to be sworn in as a lifelong senator (Sullivan, 2003).

Apart from human rights atrocities, high levels of inequity were another of the Pinochet regimes bad legacies. Despite achieving democracy, the techniques, instruments and tactics of governmentality under a military regime were still present. Such instruments had to be dismantled through a systematic process of decentralization. In understanding decentralization, it is important to understand that Chile was already highly decentralized in a limited sense. That is, in order to achieve its macroeconomic reforms of a free market economy, administrative responsibilities were highly decentralized to lower levels of government (Posner, 2004). Even so, power and control over resources were highly centralised. This was in stark contrast
to the highly decentralized politics of the 1960’s where local democracy thrived (Posner, 2004).

President Aylwin’s coalition of leftist and centrist parties showed strong support for decentralisation as a means of altering the entrenched systems of governmentality present under the Pinochet regime (Eaton, 2004). Nevertheless, despite the success of these measures and strong economic growth associated with decentralization in a fledgling democracy, Chile’s governmental system still retained the strong role of the central government in both funding and governing the municipal governments (Eaton, 2004). Clearly then, the rationalities of central government set up during the Pinochet regime still remained to a large degree. Eaton (2004) argues that decentralization is risky in the sense that once reforms are started they can continue with a momentum of their own that may deviate from original intentions. This notion is confirmed by Posner (2004), who observes that a constrained local democracy was deemed necessary to ensure internal political stability. Hence a more prudent form of governmentality was adopted that was designed to break the military regimes instruments of governmentality while still maintaining a strong tactic of central control.

In gaining insight into the transition government, it is valuable to look at a presentation in the US given by Chile’s finance minister Alejandro Foxley for the first democratic government since the regime. Foxley (1991) made it clear in his presentation that the new democratic government faced many challenges, nevertheless, its focus would be on two strategic areas: internal stability and economic stability. In addressing internal stability, Foxley (1991) outlined that Chile had been politically polarised as a result of the regime, and now it was time to bring together political parties to work toward common future goals. On the economic front, the government had two issues to address. Firstly, the problem of high inflation and secondly, the rising levels of inequity in Chilean society under the Pinochet regime (Foxley, 1991). Although the government increased taxes, it did so for the purposes of improving social policy in the areas of health, education and housing, especially for the poor. Foxley (1991) encouraged investment in Chile’s private sector and referred to president Bush’s Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, which he encouraged as an important instrument of governmentality in broadening capital markets and opening up private sector investment. Still, Foxley (1991) was candid about the government’s role in that it should not be expected to provide guarantees for private sector investment. Foxley (1991) concluded with a sense of optimism and called for partners and friends to help rebuild Chilean democracy, prosperity and equality.

The notion of concentrated forms of rationality, that is, internal social and economic stability has also been echoed by Garreton (1999). However, Garreton’s (1999) perspective of these concentrated rationalities is critical, arguing that a true consensus cannot be expected to be achieved on such a narrow front. More precisely, Garreton (1999: 260) states:

…the transition was an incomplete one, resulting in a low-quality restricted democracy, full of authoritarian enclaves.

In other words, serious changes were needed to create an authentic democracy. While Garreton’s (1999) observations were certainly correct, they may fail to consider the full weight of the many complex instruments of governmentality engrained in Chile’s political system by the military regime. In consideration of a pragmatic perspective, a
limited and focussed rationality and the ability to still govern within the parameters of an institutionalised system of centralisation was most prudent.

In achieving internal stability, a key issue was addressing the key instrument of governmentality set up during the Pinochet regime, namely the military. Owing to the centrality and strength of this instrument of governmentality during Pinochet’s rule, it is no surprise that the military’s strong position in the transition government persisted (Hunter, 1997). Not only did the new government have to contend with the entrenched military institution, but also the1980 and 1989 juridical constitution and laws of the armed forces that were drafted specifically to hamper any future civilian governments (Hunter, 1997). This meant that Aylwin’s new government was bound by many military prerogatives. Even so, small but impressive gains were made in reducing the institutional powers of the military (Hunter, 1997). These included the use of a US governmental tactic of president Aylwin invoking his powers as commander-in-chief by blocking the advancement of key military officers suspected of financial irregularities or human rights abuses (Hunter, 1997). Moreover, internal security was transferred from the military to the police.

It comes as no surprise that the return to democracy was welcomed and strongly supported by the US. Such support is evident in the Support for Democracy in Chile Act of 1990. This Act welcomed the new democracy, acknowledged human rights abuses under Pinochet and pledged both financial and technical assistance to the new government. It also provided further assistance to the Chilean economy by providing investment guarantees. Despite these positive gains in US-Chile relations, the coerced necessary appointment of Pinochet as a lifetime senator and his later subsequent arrest, undermined the evolving Chile political machine’s ability to deal with its own problems (Garreton, 1999). Following this further, justice was a key issue in the new democracy.

**Justice during democratic years and the evolving political machine**

During the Pinochet years the role of the Catholic Church became very important. While initially unopposed to the military takeover, relations between the Catholic Church and military junta soured as revelations of atrocities surfaced (Collier & Sater, 2004). Despite these differences, the Catholic Church was the only body able to escape the disciplinary power of the military regime (Collier & Sater, 2004). The Catholic Church not only resisted this power but developed its own form of counter power, namely, surveillance and monitoring of disappearances, tortures and other human rights abuses (Collier & Sater, 2004). Even after the Pinochet regime and democracy had been restored, the Catholic Church was active in seeking justice (Garreton, 1999). Following the arrest of Pinochet in London, the Archbishop of Santiago argued that the subsequent tensions in Chile’s political system were the result of a failure of this system to achieve justice (Garreton, 1999).

In the transition from the military regime of Pinochet to Aylwin’s democratic government, there were conflicting obligations of bringing the military to account for human rights abuses, in addition to ensuring the stability and not jeopardising the fledgling democracy (Hunter, 1997). Ready to achieve these goals, the Aylwin government took a firm yet cautious approach. Although willing to uphold the amnesty, the government made sure that human rights abuses were investigated and acknowledged (Hunter, 1997). Such a move had the full support of the US
government who in their act of congress had acknowledged the repression and abuses that the Chilean people had suffered. Sullivan (2003) agrees that justice for human rights was initially slow; nevertheless, the judiciary of Chile investigated many cases of human rights abuses by the military. Some compensation has been dispensed since 1992 by the government in an attempt to atone for the past.

In 1995 US-Chile relations took a step forward with the imprisonment of two high ranking military officers over the 1976 Letelier assignation. While creating positive inter governmental relations with the US, this development also created intra governmental tensions with the military that feared a much wider scale ‘witch hunt’ (Hunter, 1997; Sullivan, 2003). Despite the intra governmental tensions, the conviction of DINA chief Manuel Contreras and his second in command Pedro Espinoza, marked a precedent in the conviction of high ranking military officers which was strongly supported by the Chilean people (Hunter, 1997).

Another event causing intra governmental tensions in Chile was the 1998 arrest of Pinochet in London and the subsequent ruling that he could be extradited to Spain on charges of human rights abuses (Sullivan, 2003). However, due to ill health, Pinochet was allowed to return home in 2000. This action brought to the surface political tensions between parties that were previously seen as forgotten (Sullivan, 2003). For example, Garreton (1999) argues that the political right was really a form of neo-Pinochetism. These schisms caused contradictions and perceptions of weakness within the Chilean political machine in failing to address issues of justice. Perhaps fortunately for Chile’s evolving political machine, international justice failed to bring Pinochet to justice, nevertheless the momentum had begun. This gave Chile the opportunity to bring Pinochet to justice in its own courts in August of 2000. Despite Pinochet’s ill health as a barrier for him to stand trial, he was stripped of his immunity as a lifelong senator, a position he resigned in 2002. This was especially important for the Chilean people who had long felt a sense of frustration in the failure to bring Pinochet to justice over human rights issues.

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The removal of Pinochet from Chile’s political system had a significant impact on governmentality within Chile. Many of the previous instruments of governmentality, namely military influence in government had been broken down, now there was a symbolic change, a change in the identity of the government. Even after the return to democracy in 1990, Pinochet still formed some part (although diminishing) in the identity of the Chilean government, like a thorn in the side. Yet in 2002, the Chilean governmental identity was for the first time Pinochet free, marking the final link in a symbolic evolution from repression to frustration to justice. Despite this major milestone in justice, Chile’s political machine still had major challenges to face. In 2002-2003 the Lagos government faced a series of corruption scandals (Sullivan, 2003). At the same time, the negative impacts of these scandals did have a positive affect of exposing corruption and making changes in Chile’s political system.

**Free trade, economic growth and international issues**

Chile’s return to democratisation resulted in a lifting of all restrictions imposed as a result of the Letelier assassination as well as human rights abuses (Wilson, 1991). Normalisation of US-Chile relations returned with increased aid and support, with Chile once again cited as a leader in Latin America in terms of its economic free
market reforms and growth (Wilson, 1991). Subsequently, US aid and support for Chile increased significantly coinciding with the democratisation process.

Equally important to the strengthening of economic connections, there was also a strengthening of US-Chile security ties which were severed in 1976 due to Chile’s human rights record (Wilson, 1991). Strengthening internal security meant addressing two major problems, terrorism and drugs (Wilson, 1991). The Aylwin government was aggressive in its stance against terrorism, citing large spending increases for both the Carabineros (police force) (150%) and its Department of investigations (400%) (Wilson, 1991). Further to this, Chile under Aylwin also adopted tough anti-drug polices which were supported by the US both in principal and by means of financial assistance (Wilson, 1991).

Given these strong affiliations it was not surprising that many were talking of a US-Chile free trade agreement in the early years of the Aylwin government (Wilson, 1991). Though this may be, formal negotiations did not start until much later (December 6, 2000) (Hornbeck, 2003). After 14 rounds of negotiations Chile joined a select few countries to have a free trade agreement with the US that was signed June 6, 2003 and took effect on the first day of 2004 (Hornbeck, 2003). Underscoring the free trade agreement were a number of rationalities in addition to competing discourses that need to be brought to the fore.

Opponents of the free trade agreement cite bilateral relations as inferior to multilateral relations with a risk of trade diversion (Hornbeck, 2003). Moreover, there is the impact of trade on labour as well as environmental issues, and whether these actually improve the social welfare of the countries involved (Hornbeck, 2003). Others, while not necessarily opposed to a free trade agreement saw it as redundant given Chile’s small role in US economy and its already open and free market economy (Hornbeck, 2003).

Proponents of the free trade agreement saw it not only for its economic benefits in expanding Chile as an export market, in addition to gaining high value for money imports, but also as a strategic platform for the entire South American region (Hornbeck, 2003). In fact, it could be argued that the US-Chile free trade agreement is more an instrument of governmentality than an end in itself. Such an instrument would help cement US influence in South America, and as Hornbeck (2003) indicates, would in addition encourage Chilean, and by extension, wider South American support of US initiatives. To further support this assertion is the fact that in economic terms, Chile would be the greater benefactors since the US is their biggest export market. Further, a free trade agreement would encourage greater foreign investment in Chile, especially given its economic and political stability (Hornbeck, 2003). Consequently, the free trade agreement was a strategic instrument of the US which could cite Chile as a model to the rest of South America of both economic and political stability and in turn engender support for its own policies.

Economic and strategic links were further strengthened in 2008 with the signing of two memorandums of understanding between the University of California, Davis and Chile (Thomas, 2008). This understanding strengthens ties that have been forged back in 1965 between the University of Chile and the University of California and have played a significant role in the development of Chile’s agricultural economy (Thomas,
California and Chile have many geographic similarities in addition to corresponding agricultural industries. President Michelle Bachelet’s discourse made it clear that Chile was looking for equality as a partner rather than a nation in need of aid (Thomas, 2008). Clearly, we have another instrument of US-Chile governmentality by using university partnerships. These wider university partnerships have helped California, and by extension the US, to both develop Chilean agriculture and influence both policy as well as social and economic development.

Chile has demonstrated that while being heavily influenced by the US in terms of policy it still maintains a strong independent rationality in terms of its policies, while maintaining strong ties with the US. Two events in particular highlight this aspect. Firstly is the refusal of Chile to support the US resolution on the invasion of Iraq. Sullivan (2003) concedes that while this lack of support did create some tensions, it did not ultimately affect US-Chile relations which remained strong. A second example in April 2005 was the appointment of Chile socialist, Interior Minister José Miguel Insulza to the Organization of American States OAS (Rohter, 2005). Initially, despite strong relations with Chile and while viewing Chile as a model for other Latin American nations, the US opposed Insulza’s appointment in order to press Latin America to get tougher on Cuba and Venezuela. Even so, Latin America pushed for its candidate and for the US to avoid embarrassment, a deal was brokered in Santiago to accept Insulza’s appointment. Rohter (2005) reports that this is the first time in the history of the OAS that a candidate initially opposed by the US will lead this important regional group.

This development marks an important development in governmentality of Latin American politics where key political rationalities are being challenged by Chile and other Latin American States. Notwithstanding this resistance, the key instruments of the OAS including its budget still gave the US a strong influence in governmental rationalities, particularly in relation to Cuba and Venezuela. This was evident in the discourse of Insulza who echoed Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s sentiments to ensure accountability of all Latin American governments include the non democratic ones (Rohter, 2005).

**Technologies of the self: Chilean identity**

Prior to concluding with discontents and successes of US-Chile governmental relations, it is imperative to briefly examine the issues of identity which relates to what Foucault (1997) terms technologies of the self. Individuals do not form their identity in isolation, rather they are formed with a framework and discourse of power. Having outlined the framework, from within which the Chilean people have had to construct their identity, our attention must now be turned to the ways in which these events have impacted Chilean identity.

Despite Chile’s success in achieving an economic miracle and a return to democracy, Morales (2002) argues that Chileans are fractured in their identity, on the one hand, feelings of national pride in what they have achieved as a nation; on the other, feelings of disillusionment and depression linger from years of repression. What many other nations have taken for granted, Chile has had to fight for, in particular equity and justice. Post regime Chile, while pragmatic in its means of ensuring stability also created a sense of frustration in its lack of progress at achieving justice (Garreton, 1999). This lacklustre progress in achieving justice caused an ongoing sense of
tension in Chilean identity. Although, bringing of Pinochet to trial and his subsequent resignation as a lifetime senator was a major victory, many were still disillusioned that he failed to stand trial (Garreton, 1999). Morales (2002: 3) views Pinochet’s escape from justice as “an act of collective amnesia” that seemed to sever Chileans from the past. Still, the past has fractured the identity of Chileans and will forever remain, however distant, as a dark cloud.

Another major adjustment that Chileans have had to make from 1973 to the present is the sharp transition from socialism to a free market economy. In response, Chileans have been innovative and entrepreneurial with the economic model driving many Chileans to seek identity in their work (Morales, 2002). Furthermore, this work addiction has caused conflicts with personal and cultural values. Chileans, especially the poor are doing what they can to get by. Given this fact, many social reforms are still needed to address equity issues in a country long plagued by inequity. Competitive individualism dominates the lives of many Chileans who view access to private systems such as education and health care as a measure of success (Morales, 2002). Of course, at the other end are the disillusioned, the entrenched poor. Chile has continued to make progress in social reforms to the present day under left wing governments targeting especially the problems of the extreme poor.

As a technology of the self, Chileans have been invited to construct themselves as entrepreneurs, workers and consumers in a free market economy. Moreover, Chileans have been invited to have a sense of national pride which they have much to be proud of from their transition to democracy, to their growing and developing economy; to their increasingly equitable society that has been a product of specific government social reforms.

Given the US role in Chile’s governmentality, it follows that US-Chile governmental relations has had a significant impact on Chilean identity. Under the influence of US macroeconomic free market policies, Chileans have had to transform their identity, to learn to adapt and compete in the challenges of a free and open market place. Although the US cannot be held responsible for the actions of Pinochet, they share complicity with helping to create a regime and then playing down abuses during its early years which has taken its toll on Chilean identity.

**Conclusion: discontents and successes of US – Chile governmental relations**

When scrutinising discontents of US policy with Chile, an important starting point is discontents within Chile itself. While Chile’s development has been equated with an ‘economic miracle’ it is still continuing to overcome a number of challenges, primarily the interrelated problems of high unemployment in addition to social and economic inequity (Hornbeck, 2003; Torche, 2005). Torche (2005) reported that despite significant improvements in social equity, Chile has a much higher Gini index for income inequity in comparison with the developed nations. In particular, during the Pinochet years income inequity grew significantly (Torche, 2005). Relating this to discontents of US policy with Chile, it was the US backed military regime that played a key strategic role in ending democracy in Chile and resulting in economic policies that were heavily influenced by the US. While these economic policies were successful in achieving economic growth they were also unsuccessful in addressing social equity issues within Chile. Resultantly, US economic rationalities were in fact a double edged instrument, of both growth and inequity.
Another major discontent is the fact that US actions in Chile were based on US strategic interests in the cold war context in addition to the protection of its own economic interests without regard for the welfare of the Chilean people. While it is not wrong for a nation to protect its own interests; it becomes problematic when protecting those interests results in a kaleidoscope of dangerous possibilities for another nation, and this was the case in Chile. In particular, the blindsiding of human rights abuses during the early years of the Pinochet regime most notably by Kissinger. Metaphorically, it was a case of creating a monster that unfortunately got away and came back to bite the US in the form of the Letelier assignation. While the US has not made any formal admission of responsibility directly, it has in a sense indirectly through its declassification of CIA documents and National Security Archives from the Pinochet years, opening up regimes of truth for public scrutiny. Considering that the US put very little pressure on the military regime regarding human rights abuses, especially during its initial stages, being more concerned with appearance and status than political realities created a dangerous precedent. Only following the Letelier assignation and with the inauguration of Democrat President Jimmy Carter did human rights become a major source of tension in US-Chile relations. It is perhaps not surprising that at the end of the Pinochet regime, Chile led the world in terrorist attacks against the US due to its initial support of Pinochet which led to such high levels of inequity and tragic human rights abuses.

There are many critics of US foreign policy in general and specifically the US intervention which led to the demise of Chile’s democratic system, most notably Noam Chomsky. While many of these criticisms are justified, the US should not be held solely responsible for the actions of the Pinochet regime. It must be remembered that under Allende the socialist dream resulted in economic collapse. Although this economic collapse was exacerbated by the US, it was not caused by the US, and Chile was still able to source loans from elsewhere. It is difficult to hypothesise whether no CIA intervention would have still led to a military overthrow given the economic problems faced. Another interesting hypothetical is the fact that the return to democracy in Chile coincided with the end of the cold war, where communism was collapsing and no longer seen as a serious threat. If a return to democracy was done before this point when the cold war was still a major threat, and if it was likely that a government similar to Allende’s would be elected, would the US have supported a return to democracy? Fortunately this was not the case. Further, given the high tensions between the Pinochet regime and the US, the return to democracy was welcomed.

Even considering Chile’s dark past under a military regime, overall US policy with Chile has been very successful. A large part of this success stems from the governmental relations between the two countries that have stemmed from a much broader base than just top level governmental exchanges. Perhaps one of the most long term and pervasive instruments of US-Chile governmentality has been the US-Chile university partnerships. From the Chicago boys and visiting economist Milton Freidman that initiated the path of free market economic reforms when the country was on the brink on economic collapse; to the University of Chile and California partnerships that have boosted Chile’s agricultural economy and set a firm foundation for future research and development. These long lasting partnerships have enabled the US to positively but indirectly influence Chilean policy development.
In addition to university partnerships, governmentality has been influenced by US business and investment in Chile. These huge investments, which were under threat from Allende’s socialism, have prospered and thrived under free market economic policy helping to create a platform for Chile’s economic miracle. Furthermore, Chileans have been invited to construct themselves as entrepreneurs, a technology of the self, in response to a radical change in policy from socialism to economic neoliberalism. Security ties and military training links have also been a key instrument of governmentality. These have generally remained strong with the exception of the later Pinochet years especially under Jimmy Carter’s presidency. In essence then, there has been a close interweaving between the US and Chile on many levels. At the top government level, the US has demonstrated very strong support and assistance to a democratic Chile in many forms as previously discussed, citing Chile as a leading Latin American nation and economy, a beacon for other Latin American states to follow. Thus Chile as a strategic beacon has been rewarded with a free trade agreement with the US and the ability to purchase US military fighter aircraft.

Chile’s democratic emergence has been slow and steady and certainly not without incident, yet this slow transition from a repressive military regime has been successful and carefully supported by the US to ensure continued stability throughout the transition. While US support is certainly an indication of success, so are differences between the two nations. Since Pinochet extreme right wing government, Chileans have, not surprisingly, elected more left wing socialist governments in a fight for a fairer, more equitable Chile. These governments while retaining strong US relations have not always, or felt the need to, agree with US foreign policy as indicated by the aforementioned examples.

In finishing, US-Chile relations are unique given the high level of US intervention in overthrowing a threatening democracy and then examining the key events that have helped to shape the now positive relations that exist between the two nations today. These relations have been complex and multifaceted and this paper has been a humble attempt to highlight these complexities. The Chilean political machine has emerged and slowly rebuilt itself after years of banishment and repression and will no doubt continue to guide Chile through the challenges ahead with the aid of instruments of governmentality from the US at many levels.

**Endnotes**

1 Refer all enquiries regarding this paper to Robyn Torok at the University of Southern Queensland, Australia (torok@usq.edu.au).


2 Socialism is used here in the context of the Popular Unity (UP) that was based on radical Marxist principles that incorporated communist elements and sought to nationalize assets and redistribute wealth.

3 These sanctions can be summed up in the tactic outlined by Richard Helm (CIA director) “Make the economy scream” (Church, 1975: 14).
Figures from the Church Report (Church, 1975) show an increase over 100% in military assistance in 1972 compared to the previous year.

Under Pinochet the armed forces were given division of governmental responsibilities as follows: Navy looked after the economy; The air force was in charge of social policy; Police were responsible for agriculture and labour; and the army ensured internal security (Castiglioni, 2001).

The gremialistas were led by Jaime Guzman who was a top advisor to Pinochet.

In 1972 Roberto Kelly with key links to the Chicago boys proposed a draft plan to the navy Commander in Chief Merino to solve Chile’s economic woes (Castiglioni, 2001: 49).

Many funds for municipalities were brokered at the central government level. In addition, central government controlled taxes and tax rates allowed to be charged by municipal governments (Eaton, 2004).


From the Library of Congress. Retrieved from http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c101:S.2303.IS:65.8% of Chileans supported the imprisonment of Contreras and Espinoza. This event also marked a high degree of symbolic significance (Hunter, 1997).

Specifically, Garreton (1999) reports that 70% of Chileans felt that violations of human rights abuses should be brought out into the open and punished through the justice system.

These scandals involved the theft of $110 million from Chile’s development back as well as high level corruption on government contracts that involved kickbacks.

In 1991 Chile ranked third in Latin America (behind Columbia and Peru) as South American Countries with terrorist threats. More alarming is that a 1990 report (State Departments Pattern of Global Terrorism Report: 1990) was the nation where the most anti US attacks had occurred which included 61 incidents in 1990 alone (Wilson, 1991).

Chile was being increasingly used as a route to transport cocaine from Bolivia to the US and Asia. (Wilson, 1991).

Only five other countries had a free trade agreement with the US, Canada, Mexico, Jordan, Singapore and Israel (Hornbeck, 2003).

Hornbeck (2003) indicates that there would be only a small rise in US imports in Chile of 6-14% compared Chilean growth of exports to the US of between 18 and 52%. Total impact of US GDP would only be in the range of 0.001% to0.003%.

The US has traditionally played a dominant role in the OAS for many reasons including the fact that it contributes over 60% to the organizations annual budget.

See Figure 1, p. 429 (Torche, 2005).

See Figure 3, p. 430 (Torche, 2005).
References


