

The Political-Ideological Path of Frelimo in Mozambique, from 1962 to 2012

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Abstract

This paper investigates the path taken by the Liberation Front of Mozambique (Frelimo) for the definition of its identity and ideology. From the foundation of the liberation front in 1962 to the present, there are three clearly time sections, in which the changes in Frelimo, both in what concerns to its ideology and to the historical events it watched, must be divided. The first one goes from the foundation in 1962 to the independence in 1975 and the officialization of the organization as a Marxist-Leninist party in 1977. The second one goes from that time until the Constitution of 1990, in which the multipartism and the opening of the economy were enacted. The third period comprises the last two decades. Frelimo was founded by the merging of three movements with diverse ethnic bases, and soon faced an internal crisis between the socialist line and the tribalist one. When the party defined itself officially as marxist-leninist, it expelled the other faction. As a party whose top leaders come from the south and that acted primarily in the north during the liberation struggle, Frelimo is historically weaker in the center of the country, where Renamo guerrilla was stronger. After democratization, Frelimo have been strengthening its hegemony, but the party abandoned Marxism and its leaders themselves became businessmen. This paper incorporates Przeworskian “Social Democracy as a historical phenomena” approach, Mandel's critique of Eurocommunism, and cartel-party theory to analyze Frelimo's ideology nowadays.

Paper presented in the XXIInd World Congress of Political Science, from July 8 to 12, 2012, in Madrid, in the panel Political Parties in Emerging, Transitional and Developing Countries.

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The history of Mozambique as a country is intertwined with the history of the Liberation Front of Mozambique (Frelimo), partially because of its central role, partially because their leaders, since the beginning, worked to make sure that the official version of Mozambican History put the party as the responsible for the independence.

The existence of Frelimo starts before the country's independence but after the beginning of the struggle for liberation from Portuguese colonization. Some smaller groups had fought against Salazarist Portugal before, but the opposition to the exploitation got strengthened when three different groups merged to compose a common front. In the 1950's, civic protests were brutally repressed by Portuguese forces, and many nationalist groups were formed in exile after that. Three of them would origin Frelimo, as it will be explained.

Frelimo deserves a special study as a party by any of the recurrent motivations for party politics studies in political science. It is a party which existence is longer – in some cases only if the liberation front is considered the same as the political party, what is not unanimous – than that of some parties like Brazilian Workers Party, French Socialist Party or Uruguayan Broad Front. Besides that, although cultivating some cult of personality – what is not uncommon in European and South American longtime established parties either – Frelimo is institutionalized and has deep roots in society, a heavy party machine, and a label that is located above the personal reputation of its leaders.¹ This is especially important in Africa, where it is uncommon that a political party share such traits.

From the foundation of the liberation front in 1962 to the present, there are three clearly time sections, in which the changes in Frelimo, both in what concerns to its ideology and to the historical events it watched, must be divided. The first one goes from the foundation of the front in 1962 to the independence of the country in 1975 and the officialization of the organization as a Marxist-Leninist party in 1977. The second one goes from that time until the Constitution of 1990, in which the multipartism and the opening of the economy were enacted. The third period comprises the last two decades.

This paper analyzes the ideological path of Frelimo, from the nationalist liberalization of the first days to the post-communist times, with special emphasis in the particular traits of Mozambican Marxism-Leninism and, last but

* Paper presented in the XXIInd World Congress of Political Science, from July 8 to 12, 2012, in Madrid, in the panel *Political Parties in Emerging, Transitional and Developing Countries*.

¹ As Carbone (2005) says, both Frelimo and its rival party Renamo share the lack of internal democracy, the fact of being much stronger in some regions than in others and among some ethnic groups than among others; though, while Renamo is a heavily personalistic and lacks a strong internal organization, Frelimo is both disciplined and institutionalized.

not least, in how to label the party's nowadays ideology. For facing this last challenge, I will briefly incorporate Przeworskian "Social Democracy as a historical phenomena" approach, Mandel's Trotskyist critique of Eurocommunism, and Katz and Mair's cartel-party theory.

The struggle between two lines

Out of Mozambique, Frelimo was formed as a coalition of three revolutionary nationalist organizations in exile that seek the liberation of the country. The front was born in September 1962 in Dar es Salam, capital of Republic of Tanganyika (nowadays, Tanzania), that was liberated from the United Kingdom just seven months before. The three organizations which merged to form Frelimo – the National Democratic Union of Mozambique (UDENAMO, *União Nacional Democrática de Moçambique* in Portuguese language), the Mozambique African National Union (MANU), which bore an English name, and the National African Union of Independent Mozambique (UNAMI, *União Africana de Moçambique Independente*, in Portuguese) – were also very young, and all of them had moved to the new neighbour independent Tanganyika as it was ruled by pan-Africanist Julius Nyerere, who afterwards would help Frelimo (Bragança, 1980; Nwafor, 1983).

UDENAMO was formed in 1960 by exiles from forced labor and colonial oppression in British colony Southern Rhodesia (nowadays, Zimbabwe) supported by ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union). MANU was formed in Tanganyika in the following year, with the support of TANU (Tanganyika African Social Union), by Mozambican emigrants and refugees in Tanganyika, Zanzibar and Kenya. Also in 1961, UNAMI was formed in Malawi, with the protection of the Malawi Congress Party. The three movements were reluctant to work together, as Nyerere defended, but they changed their idea when Eduardo Mondlane went to Dar es Salam and convinced MANU, UDENAMO and UNAMI's leaders² (Bragança, 1980; Nwafor, 1983; Cabaço, 2007).

Eduardo Mondlane, a Ph.D. Anthropology Professor in the University of Syracuse, United States, and consultant in the United Nations, who had been outcasted from a South African university by the *apartheid* regime and kept in touch with many other African exile anti-colonialists in the *Casa dos Estudantes do Império* (Empire House of Students) in Lisbon, was chosen to be the president of the front (Cabaço, 2007; Macagno, 2009). Mondlane was assassinated in 1970, and the Central Committee of Frelimo chose Samora Machel as the new leader. Machel would be both a theoretician and a leader of the front, a main responsible for the conversion to Marxism-Leninism, and would enter History as "the father of the Nation" (Macagno, 2009).

The three movements that composed the front had roots in different ethnic groups and the only thing that clearly linked them was the fight against colonization (Garcia, 2003). There was no clear ideology besides the anti-colonial feeling and, perhaps, nationalism, although some leaders could be more concerned on their tribes than on a nation that hardly existed at that point.

² According to Garcia (2003), although at the first sight it seemed that the idea were that the front was intended to be a coordinator of the different parties, Tanganyika's government wanted since the beginning the formation of a single party, what Nyerere considered more effective in the liberation of Mozambique, necessary for his supposed interest in promoting a territorial annexation of the Mozambican North.

A serious division was born inside Frelimo since the beginning of the organization's armed struggle: there was the "anti-colonial nationalist" line, and the group that advocated for the socialism (Macagno, 2009). Frelimo's vice president, reverend Uria Simango, supported armed struggle but opposed the organization's option between capitalism or socialism and to present the colonization in terms of class (Bragança, 1980).

Frelimo's internal crisis would have had its climax between 1966 and 1969 but the struggle between the two lines virtually goes from 1962 until 1970 (Bragança and Depelchin, 1986). Bragança (1980) understands the struggle between the two lines, between the revolutionaries and those who wanted just a formal independence, as a representation of the class struggle. The opposers to Marxism-Leninism inside Frelimo have been labeled as reactionaries, infiltrated traitors and "new exploiters".

Among other internal struggles, the leader of UNAMI, Baltazar da Costa, opposed that its members receive military training, as Mondlane wanted, but just an intellectual one, to "be useful to Mozambique in the future". In December 1963, Baltazar da Costa left Frelimo (Garcia, 2003), but he would not be the only one. In September 1964, Frelimo engaged itself in the armed struggle against Portuguese forces, and most of the founders of the front left not to take part of it. In 1967, Samora Machel, then director of the Department of Defense, summoned the Central Committee of Frelimo, which created provincial committees in order to centralize the decisions in that level and to subordinate all the organization's civil activities to armed struggle (Bragança, 1980).

The two lines that divided Frelimo in the 1960's were the Marxist-Leninist and the African-nationalist. The latter, to what belonged men like Lázaro N'kavandame, Uria Simango, and Mateus Gwengere, wanted to establish a new native ruling class, based in the tribes and regions, and frequently saw the white people as the enemy. The Marxist, on the other hand, defended by men like Mondlane, Joaquim Chissano and Marcelino dos Santos, considered the simple establishment of a new ruling class as the maintenance of the system of exploitation that existed in colonial times, but with new exploiters. They advocated for a social revolution, a complete transformation of the society, and for the building of a "new man" and the formation of a people's power government. In the same path, they refused the racialist idea of "blackness" and the tribalism, considering that people from different ethnic, religious and regional origins can be part of the united socialist country (Nwafor, 1983; Garcia, 2003).

Colonel Sérgio Vieira, one of the leaders of Frelimo and one of the most important developers of the concept of "the new man" in Mozambique, spoke clear: "For whether black, white or yellow, the enemy is the enemy and he is not defined by his skin pigmentation. The enemy in our area of the world is 'colonialist-capitalist exploitation'" (Nwafor, 1983: 29). Samora Machel himself had said that they wanted to "kill the tribe to make the nation be born" (Macagno, 2003).³ Machel described the developing of Mozambican Marxism and nation through praxis:

³ According to Garcia (2003), a pro-Chinese faction inside Frelimo – as labeled by Portuguese Army – led by Marcelino dos Santos and Uria Simango accused Mondlane himself of tribal favoritism in the designation of the leadership positions in Frelimo.

It was in the course of political-military training that we forged national unity, and developed a common outlook, a patriotic consciousness and a class consciousness. We came (to the camp at Nachingwea in Tanzania) as Makondes, Makuas . . . Rongas or Senas, and we left as Mozambicans. We came in as black, white, coloured and Indian persons, and we went out as Mozambicans. We came with a limited vision, because the only zone we knew was our zone. It was there that we took on the full dimension of our country and the values of the revolution. (Nwafor, 2003: 39).

That is why Sérgio Vieira considered the Portuguese language as having a geostrategic role, as it distinguishes Mozambique from the neighbor countries and demarcates their frontiers. Therefore, the linguistic unity was politically central in the strategy of Frelimo to form a Mozambican nation, and Portuguese language was taught in all nationalized ex-private schools. The “national languages”, that is, the ethnic local languages, were viewed with suspicious as a tribute to the tribe, the enemy of national unity. Years later, Frelimo’s V Congress final document would advise not to use those languages because they undermine the nation-building efforts (Matusse, 1999).

According to Macagno (2003), Sérgio Vieira opposed fiercely to the integration of the traditional chiefs to local government machine. It was due to its relation, in colonial times, to “indirect governments”. This political structure was designed to use the local chiefs as mediators between local people and the metropolis, what Portuguese tried to apply in Mozambique and that worked successfully in British colonies and was supported by many anthropologists, such as Malinowski.

Contrary to what the local chairmen intended, Mondlane’s theses were confirmed in the II Congress of Frelimo in July 1968 and he was reelected as the president of the front. Mondlane would be murdered with a bomb by PIDE (International and State Defense Police; *Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado* in Portuguese) in February 1969 a day after having suggested to turn the front into a vanguard Marxist-Leninist party (Bragança, 1980).

After the crime, the debate about the “racial question” radicalized. Mondlane’s followers considered the racialization as “reactionary” and “primary”, while Uria Simango’s group did not trust in the white minority that joined Frelimo in the anti-colonial struggle (Macagno, 2009). The murder of Mondlane by Portuguese political police PIDE was attributed by Frelimo’s Marxist leaders as a product of the struggle between the two lines, and therefore they promoted an expurgation of the members associated to tribalism. In a process of “revolution in stages”, Frelimo moved from the “national democratic phase” that began in 1962 to the “popular democratic” one from 1969 on (Garcia, 2003).

As the vice president, for hierarchical reasons Uria Simango should have substituted Mondlane, but because of the struggle inside Frelimo, soon Samora Machel and Marcelino dos Santos were also appointed to compose with him a triumvirate Presidency Council (Chichava, 2010). On November 1969, Simango was suspended by Frelimo’s Executive Committee because of a pamphlet he had published criticizing the organization. On May 1970, Samora Machel assumed Presidency alone, with Marcelino dos Santos as the new vice president, and banished Simango (Garcia, 2003; Chichava, 2010).

Uria Simango complained about an attempt on his life, besides exclusion and murders against Frelimo’s members from the North of river Save by

Mondlane and other Southern leaders. According to him, he and other members from Sofala province – Silvério Nungo, Mariano Matsinhe and Samuel Dhlakama – were intended to be executed for being accused of responsibility for Mondlane's murder (Chichava, 2010). Indeed, afterwards Simango would be shot to death. He was not only accused to have taken part in the complot that killed Mondlane but also to have supported Lázaro N'Kavandame's secessionist conspiracy (Macagno, 2009; Chichava, 2010). According to Nwafor (1983), N'Kavandame and Gwengere were also implicated in the conspiracy against Mondlane.

A Maconde trader, Lázaro N'Kavandame was since the beginning of armed struggle a member of the Central Committee and the chairman of his northern province, Cabo Delgado. In 1968, N'Kavandame conspired to declare independence of Cabo Delgado alone. Full of a tribalist spirit, his group showed some resistance to Mondlane's leadership, because he was married to a white American woman and because of his different ethnic group. He was born in Gaza province, south of Mozambique, where the majority ethnic group is that of Changanes, and Frelimo was accused of being a Changane-dominated party. Accused of opportunism and treason, N'Kavandame would be expelled from Frelimo, arrested and, afterwards, shot to death (Bragança, 1980; Nwafor, 1983; Garcia, 2003; Macagno, 2009; Chichava, 2010).

Although the liberation front mostly operated in the north, Frelimo's top leadership came from the south, what made Michel Cahen⁴ define the movement as "essentially a coalition of cadres from the extreme south and a guerrilla mass in the extreme north". Therefore, the national unity and anti-tribalist speech convinced more people in the South than in other regions of Mozambique. That is not surprising that the guerrilla movement Renamo (Mozambican National Resistance), the most important contender of Frelimo, that was born *circa* 1976, has been able to achieve a significant support in the center of the country despite the "largely coercive recruitment of Renamo members" (Carbone, 2005).

Led by Afonso Dhlakama⁵, Renamo accused Frelimo, that was supported mostly in the North and the South, of damaging the ethnic groups of the center, as most of its own supporters came from the ethnic group Ndaou, who lives primarily in the center of the country (Macagno, 2003). Renamo was born as a counter-revolutionary movement supported by the white ruling elite from Rhodesia. When the country conquers its liberation as the free Republic of Zimbabwe in 1980, Renamo got the support of the *apartheid* regime in South Africa (Macagno, 2009). Renamo bettered its bad international reputation of armed bandits – that is way Frelimo used to refer to them until the opening to multipartism – by the adoption of ethnicist identity arguments (Macagno, 2003). As Carbone (2005: 425) states:

In large areas of central Mozambique, Renamo's guerrillas were able to operate most successfully and establish links with local communities. [...] In particular, Dhlakama's movement became an outspoken defender of traditional rules and leadership, of religious beliefs and of (especially non-southern) rural communities.

⁴ Cahen, Michel (1998). "Dhlakama é maningue nice!' An atypical former guerrilla in the Mozambican electoral campaign". *Transformation*, 35: 1-48. *Apud* Carbone (2005).

⁵ Not to be mistaken with Samuel Dhlakama, former member of Frelimo.

Renamo's strategy was efficient because of Frelimo's "homogenizer Jacobinism". Trying to attenuate it but keeping its own speech based on the "national unity", Frelimo stopped to attack tribalism and focused on attacking regionalism, although the two categories are obviously intimately related (Macagno, 2003).

Mozambican Marxism

Frelimo officially adopted Marxism-Leninism as both the organization's and the country's official ideology and denominated itself as no longer a front, but as a vanguard party, from then on called Party Frelimo. As Carbone (2005: 424) systematically analyzes, this transformation from a liberation movement into a Marxist-Leninist party had long-lasting implications: "The Leninist notion of a vanguard single party, with restricted membership and party primacy over the state, implied a decision to do away with (and repress) opposition political organizations."

Besides that, "centrally planned and collectivist socio-economic and agricultural policies" adopted by Frelimo also had social consequences, like the unpopularity in many rural areas, like those where Renamo would prosper. As Carbone (2005: 425) notices, it was particularly evident in the provinces of the central and centre-north regions: Sofala⁶, Manica, Zambezia, Tete and Nampula. As the author (Carbone, 2005: 424-5) explains, those policies included a "systematic privilege accorded to the urban and industrial sectors" by direct or indirect state subsidies combined with a "forced modernization" for rural communities and "forced resettlements envisaged by collective villagisation programmes", besides the attacks on traditional institutions already mentioned in this paper. There was also nationalization of land and urban property, which had previously been owned by land speculators, and of all rented property in order to undermine the incipient national bourgeoisie, which the party considered emerging local exploiters (Nwafor, 1983).

Sonia Kruks⁷, quoted by Macagno (2009), advocates that, although the postulates of the adoption of the Marxism-Leninism were explicitly explained and systematically formulated only in Frelimo's III Congress in 1977, there existed already a "tacit socialism" in Frelimo especially since 1968. The way she explains the process of conversion of Frelimo from a nationalist front to a Marxist-Leninist party refuses the "anticommunist" arguments which state that Frelimo's "marxist option" was due to its dependence to the Soviet Union or to China (Macagno, 2009).⁸ Indeed both Samora Machel and Aquino de Bragança – important theorist from Frelimo and particular counselor of Machel who died in the same flight accident that victimized the Mozambican president – had already stated that Frelimo was moving toward a Marxist-Leninist socialism and that the life conditions in the country and the enemies the organization faced turned no alternative but that.

⁶ Chichava (2010) highlights that Sofala is historically considered as politically hostile to Frelimo. Until 2004, Sofala was always the constituency where Renamo had its best national electoral result: 77% in 1994, 71% in 1999 and 65% in 2004. In 2009, when Frelimo won the election in all the country, Sofala was the constituency where Frelimo got its smaller share of votes: 51%. Among the five towns where Renamo won 2003 mayor election, the only one that was kept in control by the party in 2008 local election was Beira, the capital of Sofala.

⁷ KRUKS, Sonia (1987). "From Nationalism to Marxism: The Ideological History of FRELIMO, 1962-1977" In: Irving Leonard Markovitz (ed.) *Studies in Power and Class in Africa*. New York, Oxford University Press.

⁸ On the other hand, Garcia (2003) sustains that Mondlane starts to accept an ideological tendency toward Marxism only in 1969 – what would be explicitly accepted in the III congress in 1977 – and that previously Frelimo was just a liberalization force, not a communist one, as the support provided by the Ford Foundation to the front was an evidence.

Indeed, in Frelimo's first Congress in September 1964 it defined already the enemy in terms of class, as it is evident in the formally documented task of "putting an end to the exploitation of man by man", using the expression taken from Marx's "Capital". As Samora Machel claimed, the enemy was the "fascist-colonial system" and not the Portuguese people, who was also victim of fascist oppression. The first Marxist school had also been opened in January 1974, three years before the III Congress (Bragança, 1980; Nwafor, 1983).

According to Bragança (1980), Frelimo was a peasant movement until the liberalization of the south of the country. Then, it turned possible to solve the dilemma of implementing socialism in a society with a small working class and 90% of the labour force was composed by the peasantry: building a workers-peasants alliance, that would compose the base of the revolution, whose coordination would be up to the working class. As Nwafor (1983: 36) states:

[...] the consciousness and ability to lead this struggle exist – in objective class terms – only in the class-consciousness of the proletariat, however embryonic, it alone – as both [Amílcar] Cabral and Machel have testified – is capable of being the leading class of social transformation in the struggle for socialism. The political consciousness of the peasantry is incapable, by itself, of reaching a fundamental social critique of the capitalist system.

Far from the idealization of Frelimo made by that some authors, Bragança and Depelchin (1986) complain that at some ideas concerning the nature of the state and its relation to civil society have been practiced and accepted as unquestionable postulates, such as the status of the state apparatus as "the privileged tool for transforming Mozambican society" and the understanding of the State as an "administrative entity separable from the rest of Mozambican society" and not as "a result of struggles rooted in class conflicts in the civil society", as the maintenance of the revolutionary line would require.

After the murder of Mondlane, the new leader Samora Machel defended a heterodox Marxism, adapted to Mozambican peculiarities and formed through praxis, that is, in which theory is developed through experience and practice (Nwafor, 1983; Macagno, 2009). Machel used to say that the armed struggle in the liberated zones was his school of Marxism, and once poked fun that, when he read Marx, it seemed that he was reading the author for the second time⁹ (Macagno, 2009). As Nwafor (1983: 42) says about the socialist line inside Frelimo: "They saw in the liberated zone a laboratory for the development of the new society; for this zone constituted not only the physical liberation of territory, but the liberation from old habits of thought – liberation from a system."

The option for Marxism, combining "a critical assimilation of the modern classics on war" and the Marxist experiences of the "brother countries" Angola and Mozambique, according to Aquino de Bragança, should be understood as an encompassing understanding of the "African condition": expelling the Europeans was not enough, as Africa was already included in the international capitalist system, but it was necessary to transform the exploitation system imposed by the colonizers, what did not happen in the rest of the continent (Macamo, 2012). Samora Machel stated to the Central Committee in the Frelimo's III Congress: "The orientation of Frelimo will be constituted by a

⁹ Machel said that to Swiss sociologist Jean Ziegler in the beginning of the 80's, as quoted by CHRISTIE, Iain (1996). *Samora: uma biografia*. Maputo, Nadjira. *Apud* Macagno (2009).

synthesis between the revolutionary experiences of the Mozambican people with the universal principles of the Marxism-Leninism”(Bragança, 1980).

Frelimo defended a Marxism that it understood as “scientific”, rejecting both the “blackness” and the many versions of socialism experienced in Africa after liberalization, such as “African Marxism”, “communitarian Marxism” and “Islamic Marxism”. The prolongation of the armed struggle allowed to a radicalization of the Marxism not only in Portuguese colonies but also among other African nationalist movements, such as those of South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and West Sahara (Macamo, 2012).

Vaz (2012) sustains that the Party Frelimo that was born in Frelimo’s third Congress in 1977 and adopted Marxism-Leninism as ideology is a new organization that should not be seen as a continuation of the liberation front created in 1962, which was composed of many different people united by the goal of independence from Portugal. According to him, until 1977 the party itself proclaimed that it was born in 1977, but afterwards their leaders got interested in relating their organization to the struggle for independence, which is positively evaluated. Vaz (2012) sustains that most Historians, as Frelimo supporters, are partial in their analysis. The Marxist-Leninists imposed the changes in 1977, and those who disagreed could not oppose: they fled, had been murdered, or had been arrested, like Uria Simango and N’Kavandame.

Macagno (2009) adverts that Michel Cahen, in his pioneer study¹⁰, considered that Frelimo’s socialism was not real but an ideological fiction, even before the opening to market economy. Contrary to the radical disruptive speeches from Samora Machel, there was a structural continuity of the colonial times, especially in the relation of dependence of Mozambique on South Africa.

In the beginning of the 1980’s president Samora Machel’s Stalinism implemented a “political and organizational attack” to defeat definitely the “internal enemy”. In 1983, the death penalty started to apply to “those who attempt against the people’s and the State’s security”; it was held in Maputo a demonstration supporting the whipping law, while the Revolutionary Popular Court publicly sentenced six person to be shot; the so-called “Production Operation” started, in order to expel from the cities thousands of people judged unproductive and send them to the north (Macagno, 2009).

How to label Frelimo today?

Samora Machel died in 1986, in a flight accident that supposedly had been intentionally caused by the *apartheid* regime, who also supported the Renamo struggle against Frelimo. Months before, Mozambican government negotiated with the IMF and the World Bank and borrowed 45 million dollars in the beginning of 1985. In Frelimo’s V Congress in July 1989, Frelimo abandoned Marxism as its official ideology. In the 1990’s, the country faces deep changes, such as the end of civil war, the enactment of a new constitution and the implementation of multiparty democracy, besides socioeconomic reforms supported by the IMF and the World Bank (Macagno, 2009).

The end of civil war and the beginning of multiparty democracy were enacted in the General Peace Agreement signed by president Joaquim

¹⁰ CAHEN, Michel. (1985), “État et pouvoir populaire dans le Mozambique indépendant”. *Politique Africaine*, 19: 36-60.

Chissano – the successor of Machel in the leadership of Frelimo – and Renamos’s chief Afonso Dhlakama in 1992 in Rome. As Carbone (2005: 426) highlights, it was an “elitist agreement between the top leaderships of Frelimo and Renamo”, as it excluded all the unarmed political oppositions and also ignored that the majority of Mozambicans, consulted by the government, expressed that they did not want the end of the single party regime.

As Manning (2008) notices, the success of the transformation of a guerrilla rebel movement like Renamo into a political party was due in large part to the intervention of international donors and the United Nations during the political transition, financing the organization new peaceful and institutional activities. However, as Afonso Dhlakama concentrates in a personalistic and authoritarian way the power inside the party, it had not developed itself organizationally. Carbone (2005) argues that this political and administrative underdevelopment of Renamo, that until that moment was nothing more than an influent military organization, contrasted with Frelimo’s the superior structure and experience of 20 years ruling, giving the latter enormous advantage since the first elections.

As Frelimo ever since would need votes, it started to target groups with whom it had no sympathy previously, “such as traditional leaders and religious communities, and even business people”, announcing its intention to “congregate Mozambicans of all social classes and strata”. Chissano, who was the president since the death of Machel in 1986, won presidential elections with the majority of votes in 1994 e 1999, respectively with 53% and 52% of the preferences. The “informal and personalised negotiations” that he boosted with Renamo’s leader during the transition were paralyzed in his second term as president: “Chissano moved away from the model of inter-leadership consensus, rejecting the idea that the government needed Dhlakama’s consensus on issues for which the latter insisted on being part of decision-making.” (Carbone, 2005: 437).

In 2002, Chissano was substituted by Armando Guebuza as Frelimo’s general secretary in an institutional process that was decided by an assembly of party leaders – and not only by Chissano – and formally approved by Congress (Carbone, 2005).¹¹ Guebuza revitalized the bases of Frelimo and its party apparatus in all the country (Brito, 2008. Chichava, 2010). His declared intention was to eliminate all the political opposition, seeking for an ultra-hegemony (Chichava, 2010). In 2004, Frelimo had Guebuza as its candidate and the gap in favor of the party increased: he obtained 63% of the votes for national Presidency. A similar increase happened in the legislative seats (Carbone, 2005). After 2004 electoral success, Frelimo became even less receptive to Renamo’s claims (Brito, 2008).

Frelimo’s hegemony is increasing over time. There is a weakening of Renamo, that did not developed as party, keeping its centralized and personalized nature of internal authority and lacking local politics, while Frelimo “used its incumbency to make incursions into Renamo’s electorate, delivering economic development and patronage that Renamo could not” (Manning, 2008: 43).

¹¹ “[...] a nomination was produced by the Comissão, and has then formally endorsed by the Comité Central and later approved by Congress. Guebuza was thus selected in a largely consensual and disciplined, but explicitly top-down and undemocratic, manner.” (Carbone, 2005: 428).

Besides that, one of the reasons is the problem of fraud and inequality of conditions for the contenders, that happened in the elections 1999, 2004 and 2009 as international observers advert (Carbone, 2005; Brito, 2008 and 2009; Hanlon, 2009). Hanlon (2009: 5) describes that officials delayed the issuance of documents of opposition parties and in some places they refused to accredit their party delegates in the polling stations. According to him, a thousand officials in the polling stations (among a total of 90'000) considered that their duty was first of all to the party and not to free elections, and filled the ballots with votes for Frelimo or with illegally invalidated votes for the opposition, or let colleagues to do that.

As Hanlon (2009) says, in a state of a prevailing party as Mozambique, a superposition between party and state cannot be avoided. Indeed, Carbone (2005: 421-4) affirms that Mozambican political system is "still characterized by an ambiguous relationship between ruling party and state apparatus, a heavy centralization of power, increasingly rampant corruption, and the feeble independence of the legislative, media and judicial systems".

Carbone (2005: 428-430) says that "a formal separation of state and party structures was introduced in 1990-1, and this has reduced the direct relevance of party branches and the power and privileges of local party leaders", but as the majority of the officials are Frelimo members – a heritage of "two decades of monopolistic rule" –, what happens is that state and party structures turned to be parallel instead of overlapping, and therefore the separation between state and party is "largely an artificial one".

In a country where a highly hierarchical party broadly controls the decisions and where there is an opening of its economy to private markets, the result could not be very different from Brito's (2008: 7) diagnosis: "The majority of rising bourgeoisie becomes from Frelimo and the state's leadership in various levels and it largely depends on these political links to have access a resources and obtain contracts."

All these transformations of Party Frelimo, that cannot be labeled as a Leninist one anymore, put the challenge to find a new classification for Mozambican ruler party. As it has been previously announced, some approaches will be now briefly referred in this effort, if not to find an answer, at least to clean up the road.

Mandel (1978) states that when communist parties in Europe integrate themselves into the bourgeois state and make use of electoral victories in bourgeois parliamentary democracy, there is a material pressure over their apparatus that gradually leads them to a social democratization process. Indeed, this phenomena is quite similar to the one that was experienced by social democratic parties when they chose to use elections as demonstration means, according to Przeworski's (1985) classical systematization; from then on, there was a pressure to the institutional way: they decided also to use it to implement policies, and then to try to win elections, and finally they made coalitions with bourgeois parties as the working class was not the majority of voters.

This "social democratization theory" does not apply to Frelimo, as both Social Democratic and Eurocommunist parties were minority and unable to win an election alone. That is the reason why they moderated their policies: to capture median voter and to build a government coalition. Although Frelimo

started to seek a multiclass constituency, its adherence to market economy has nothing to do with an electoral necessity to moderate economic policies, as the party not only is hegemonic as its gap over the contenders is even increasing. Clearly, it is partially related to the country's economic dependency on foreign aid after the end of cold war, what led it to accept international intrusion in order to borrow money from the IMF and the World Bank. Though, Frelimo's leaders also benefitted with the ideological conversion of the party and the regime.

Just as Mandel's (1978) critique on Stalinism as a "socialism in just one country", in which there was an increasing symbiosis between the party apparatus and the soviet bureaucracy, that was converted in a privileged social strata, the same can be seen in Mozambique. Obviously, soviet pressure for the conversion of the focus of Leninist parties from all over from the world struggle for internationalism into the defense of the Soviet regime as a bastion cannot be applied to any other country, and no one would see Mozambique as an exception. Though, Mandel states that the communist parties from many countries in the world followed Soviet Union's example and considered that national borders delimited a necessary area to implement socialism, as it were not an international project, leading to Eurocommunism. Mozambique, again, is a different case, as it needed soviet financial support and did not have such autonomy, but still the symbiosis between the state and a privileged social strata that occupied the top positions in the party is something that happened in Mozambique.

Katz and Mair's cartel-party theory takes in account nowadays stronger tendency towards an ever closer symbiosis between parties and the state. Frelimo did not reduce its proximity to the even after abandoning Marxist-Leninist ideology and allowing multipartism. Its identification as cartel party, however, would also be problematic. In the cartel-party model, many parties share the power and the benefits of the access to the state. In Mozambique, Frelimo not only does not share the power, but it is also increasing its dominant position and cooperating ever less with Renamo and other parties.

The symbiosis between the party and the state that is present in Mozambique is typical of post-communist countries, as Kopecký (2012) shows in his study on East European polities. According to him, "the high scores of parties on indicators of corruption and, to a lesser extent, on practices of patronage suggest that parties in the region do not shy away from rent-seeking within the state in a quest to exploit state resources to their own advantage" (Kopecký, 2012: 270).

Perhaps, Frelimo could be viewed as a catch-all party, as it opened itself to a very heterogeneous constituency. Future studies on contemporary Frelimo could advance in the challenge of labeling it by comparisons of post-communist Mozambique with other dominant-party polities, like PRI in Mexico, where, although under formal democratic rules, ruling party keeps its power by frauds and patronage, in a heavy partisan occupation of state apparatus, while the original leftist ideology is blurred.

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