INDIRECT GOVERNMENT OF PROTESTERS IN THE MARGINS OF THE STATE: THE CASE OF PERUVIAN INDIGENOUS MOVEMENTS

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Principal abbreviations
AIDESEP: Interethnic Association of Peruvian Rainforest Development
COICA: Coordinator of Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon Basin
EIA: Environmental Impact Assessment
OEPIAP: Organization of Students from Peruvian Amazonia's Indigenous Peoples
OGGS: Social Management General Office
ORPIO: Regional Organization of Indigenous Peoples of the East
PST: Workers’ Socialist Party
RAL: Loreto’s Environmental Network
UNAP: Peruvian University of Peruvian Amazonia
Introduction. Thinking Power Exercise in Situations of Social Conflicts, beyond the Oppositional Perspective

While extractive sector fuels Peruvian economic growing, protests against natural resources extraction in rural Peru have intensified. Following the Latin-American tendency of the "ethnicization of demands coming from rural populations", it is “now as indigenous that one demands the access to land, territory defense and environmental conservation, a right over natural resources" (Gros, 2001, p. 151). During the 2000 decade, several mobilizations have proven their capacity to oppose to the state’s extractive projects. 2006 Corrientes river mobilizations against Pluspetrol oil company led to Dorissa agreements, a “victory” for Corrientes population who was granted important health programs financed by the company and the regional government. 2009 mobilizations and Bagua clash prompted Peruvian government to abrogate the litigious decrees, after several months of protest. In these two emblematic cases, indigenous organizations (at the local level of Corrientes, the Federation of Native communities of Corrientes – FECONACO; at the regional level in the case of 2009, the Interethnic Association of Peruvian Rainforest’s Indigenous Peoples – AIDESEP) were at the core of the protest.

These two examples, often seen as “turning points”, are emblematic of the highly conflictive dimension of natural resources extraction. In these arenas, indigenous peoples and their own perspective of development are pictured opposing themselves to the Peruvian state, associated with oil and mining companies. These movements have proven a great capacity to stand in to the way of the Peruvian state with regard to its extractive policies, while the mining and energy sector represents a sizeable part of the country’s economy. In the meantime, indigenous organizations are inserted in transnational networks (Brysk, 2000) that favor protests’ media coverage and then challenge repressive modes of conflict regulation – as a Peruvian Energy and Mining Ministry official puts, “you hit an indigenous in a demonstration and they are already blocking an oil station’s access road in United States, England or Canada”.

Interviewed Peruvian state officials agree on the difficulty of repressing indigenous movements, more than other movements. Therefore, how can the interaction between the Peruvian state and indigenous movements be thought? As Foucault puts, “if power only had a function of repression, if it only worked on the mode of censure, exclusion, barrage, inhibition, […] if it only exercised in a negative way, it would be very fragile. If it is strong, it is because it produces positive effects” (Foucault, 1975, p. 755). The Peruvian state’s incapacity to repress indigenous movements does not mean that it cannot ensure a control over protest. Foucauldian understanding of government as a “conduct of conducts”, as a way of guiding the possibilities of others’ action (Foucault, 1982, p. 237), helps to foresee how power can be exercised over protest beyond repression and ruling. In its interaction with

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1 After several episodes of blockades, hostages takings and even a clash that led to the death of a policeman, Pluspetrol finally agreed, the 23rd of October of 2006, to pay nearly 15 millions of dollars for implementing health programs for the Corrientes basin’s population (Bebbington, Bielich et Scurrah, 2011).

2 The “rainforest decrees”, adopted to implement the Free Trade Treaty agreed with the United States, were accused to encourage oil concession on indigenous territories.

3 Interview with a member of the Energy and Mining Ministry’s General Social Management Office, 24th of January 2011, Lima.
contentious action, the state does not reduce to coercion, and the conduct of protestors’ conducts relies on mechanisms that transcend the frontier between public and private actors, between official proceedings and informal interactions.

In this paper, I will then propose an analysis of the “government of protesters” as an understanding of power exercise’s local anchoring through which indigenous protesters’ conducts can be conducted, taking into account the diversity of actors (oil companies, nongovernmental organizations – NGO, local authorities…) who interact with indigenous organizations. To do so, I will draw on empirical data collected through several field works between 2010 and 2012\(^4\). Archives revisal and interviews with public extractive sector actors, oil companies’ officials and national NGO help to understand how analyzing the exercise of power over protesters implies focusing on its local dimension. Then, ethnographical data on a specific Amazonian organization will serve as a basis to analyze how power actually works, beyond the “juridical conception of power” which is, at the end, a “representation of power” (Foucault, 1976, p. 186).

After analyzing the importance of confrontation as a constitutive narrative of indigenous movements, I proceed with an analysis of “participative apparatus” as devices that prompts the formation of spaces of “pacific” interaction, drawing on a specific situation of contact observed on the field. Taking into account the structures of domination and relations of power that characterize indigenous movement’s space, I then analyze these informal links as channels for an “indirect government” of protesters that goes beyond coercion. Finally, I suggest thinking the state as constituted in its margins by regulatory practices that transcend the common distinction between “public” and “private” actors in the management of conflicts.

**Indigenous Movements and the Idea of Confrontation in Peru**

**Oppositional Narratives in the Consolidation of Peruvian Indigenous Organizations**

The “irruption of the indigenous issue on the international stage” reached a critical moment in the 1990’s, with Rigoberta Menchú receiving in 1992 the Nobel Peace Prize and the 1994 zapatista insurrection. Alongside those events, a set of mobilizations took place against the celebrations of the discovery of America – “El V Centenario” (Le Bot, 2009). They helped generalizing the “indigenous” movements’ label. The protests were indeed part of a “500 Years of Indigenous, Black and Popular Resistance’s Campaign”. It was prepared at the end of the 1980’s in several Latin-American countries, throughout peasant and indigenous organizations meetings. Internal debates where then quite heated. They opposed supporters of a classist interpretation of Western imperialism – who wanted to call the campaign “Autodiscovery of Our America” – and those who adopted a more indianist perspective. With corporatists systems’ collapse (and the specific support they used

\(^4\) The 2010 field work was done in June, in an indigenous students organization based in Iquitos, an Amazonian city; the 2011 field work took place, from January to April, in Lima (one month) and Iquitos (two months) in the same organization (this field work was the more ethnographic one, as I was present every day in the organization, interviewing its members, observing collective events and participating in the organization’s activity). The third field work is currently taking place from April to July of 2012, in the city of Lima, in the city of Iquitos and the Pastaza Amazonian river with its local indigenous organization, and in the Andean region of Cajamarca where a gold mine project is generating dissent among rural populations, as part of a first field work of my PhD dissertation.
to bring to peasants syndicates), Marxism’s decline and indigenous’ schooling that prompted the emergence of an Indian elite, the indianist rhetoric thus tended to dominate (Van Cott, 2005 ; Gros, 1999). A “First Continental Summit of Indian Peoples” was held in Quito in 1990. Its declaration stated that “us, Indians of America, never gave up our constant struggle against the conditions of oppression, discrimination and exploitation that were imposed through our ancestral territories’ European invasion” (Declaración de Quito, 1990). The 500 Years Campaign then helped diffuse this discourse of a historical oppression and resistance, drawing on the image of the struggling Indian against colonial authorities, from whom indigenous organizations claimed a direct lineage. Thus, the oppositional framework between colonial/western authorities and past and present indigenous is constitutive of the movements that spread and institutionalized in the 1990’s.

Such narrative results was mutually elaborated by 1980’s consolidating indigenous organizations and committed intellectuals. Since the 1971 Barbados declaration, in which anthropologists mission was told to “make the most of actual system’s conjunctures to act in favor of indigenous communities” (Primera Declaración de Barbados: Por la Liberación del Indígena, 1971), social scientists have been strategic allies of indigenous protests. For instance, the Quito declaration stated that “we have to walk […] alongside intellectuals committed with our cause, to destroy the dominant and oppressor system and to construct a new society” (Declaración de Quito, 1990). Intellectuals have indeed been decisive agents of indigenous organization process (Bellier, 2012), contributing to the consolidation of an oppositional narrative. Their anthropological, sociological or historical expertise helped constitute the indigenous subject as historically and inherently opposed to Western society and national state authorities. In Peru, the indigenous formal organizational process was first incited by a revolutionary military government, under Juan Velasco Alvarado’s presidency (1968-1975). Leading a “revolution by decree”, this “political army” (Kruijt, 2003) claimed its nationalist and socialist values. The National System of Social Mobilization was created in 1971 to prompt auto-organization and to canalize popular support. In this task, several teams of sociologists and anthropologists were hired, specifically for the Amazonian populations. Social scientists then began to cover the Peruvian rainforest, explaining its inhabitants how to organize themselves to resist missionaries and other kinds of foreign pressure on their territory (Chase Smith, 2003). Velasco’s government provided them with a strategic tool that still exists: legal recognition of “native communities” with the 1974 “rainforest law”\(^5\), enabling indigenous groups to settle together and get a collective title deed on a given territory. A coup puts an end to Velasco’s government, but intellectuals went on promoting indigenous organizations to ensure native communities’ legal recognition. Gradually, Amazonian groups created local ethnic organizations, which grouped together at a provincial level. In 1980, the provincial level gave birth to a national level, with the creation of the Interethnic Association of Peruvian Rainforest Development (AIDESEP)\(^6\).

AIDESEP actively accompanied legal recognition of native communities: in 2007, its work culminated with a total of 1.200 legalized native communities (Chirif et García Hierro, 2007). It has been one of the key actors in the creation of the Coordinator of

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\(^5\) Law n°20653, June of 1974.
\(^6\) Nevertheless, only in 1985 AIDESEP formally inscribed in the Public Registers (27\(^{th}\) of May of 1985, Record n°6835, registration entry A-1).
Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon Basin (COICA), which groups nine national indigenous organizations together and is quite active at the international level. In 2003, the anthropologist Richard Chase Smith estimated that about 70% of Amazon basin’s indigenous population was affiliated to AIDESEP through local federations. With its 6 decentralized organizations and its 57 local federations (that represent, according to the organization, 1,350 native communities), AIDESEP is henceforth considered the major indigenous organization in Peru. It has consolidated a public discourse drawing on the reinvention of autochthonous tradition and has been a key organizing actor in moments of mobilization. During the summer of 2008 and from April to June of 2009, AIDESEP has indeed articulated local, regional and national levels of organization to mobilize against Alan Garcia’s “rainforest decrees”, which purpose was the implementation of some dispositions of the Free trade agreement passed with United States. During these protests, AIDESEP, its regional and local federations have embodied the image of indigenous warriors, blocking roads and rivers and wearing traditional symbols of authority (feathers, crowns, war paints and spears). The 5th of June, when the police and the army intervened in Bagua to unblock the roads, 10 protesters officially died in the intervention and, as a retaliation, a group of indigenous protesters killed 24 policemen (using their spears) that had been taken hostage previously (Hughes, 2010). The Bagua clash is a culminating point for indigenous organizations, as well as an emblematic narrative of confrontation and repression.

The Transmission of Confrontational Narrative to Younger Organizations

Another important area of AIDESEP’s intervention is the bilingual education and the promotion of indigenous peoples’ access to the university: besides its programs of training of bilingual teachers and health professionals, AIDESEP has concluded various agreements with public universities, negotiating measures of affirmative action for students coming from native communities. Some of the indigenous students who succeeded to be accepted in these public universities formed their own organizations. Drawing on the data collected throughout several field works I did in one of these associations7, I would like to explore how the local level of indigenous movements helps to the understanding of ethnic protest’s interaction with the state and private actors.

The Organization of Students from Peruvian Amazonia’s Indigenous Peoples (OEPIAP) is a young organization created in 2003 by a dozen of indigenous students who had just joined the public university, thanks to an agreement concluded between AIDESEP and the Peruvian University of Peruvian Amazonia (UNAP). The organization is based in Iquitos, the capital of the Peruvian main Amazonian region called Loreto, representing a third of the Peruvian territory. To reach their original native community, OEPIAP’s members sometimes need a whole week by boat, the rivers being the only transport available (save a couple of small roads). More than 90% of Loreto’s area has been granted for oil exploration and exploitation and although the majority of grants are not in activity yet, the presence of many oil companies (be they only in the exploration step) generates frequent conflicts with the native communities they superimpose to (see the map below).

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7 In 2010 and 2011, I did two ethnographic field works inside the organization, of one and two months, during which I interviewed 16 of OEPIAP’s members, gave a questionnaire to all of the presents, and realized many observation reports about informal conversations, meetings, demonstrations and other events I was able to attend.
In 2003, indigenous students were accommodated in AIDESEP’s regional organization, ORPIO (Regional Organization of Indigenous Peoples of the East), but they could hardly face the expenditures due to their urban students condition. Their family lacked material resources and lived in remote native communities, their mother tongue rarely was Spanish, and they suffered urban poverty, discrimination and scholar difficulties – as it is the case for the majority of indigenous students who benefit from public university agreements (Espinosa de Rivero, 2008). Creating this organization was then a collective solution to provide students with feeding and to allow them to receive public and private subsidies. They differed from ethnic federations insofar as they did not have (initially) a representative vocation and as they were a multiethnic group. But the majority of them were affiliated to an ethnic federation, often being part of AIDESEP network, and many were those who had had a previous experience of taking part in a protest in their respective provinces.

In the university, some members of the growing number of indigenous students began to bond with leftist activists from a Trotskyist political party, the Workers’ Socialist Party (PST). In May of 2006, they organized together OEPIAP’s first protest: a one-day occupation of the university’s board of education, the administrative staff being taken hostage and the wall covered with painted lames in favor of indigenous movements. With this successful mobilization (OEPIAP got the Regional Council to commit itself to pay for the indigenous students’ lunch in the refectory), the PST and OEPIAP’s members got closer. Wagner, then president of the OEPIAP, even became
– along with two other comrades – a PST officer, and claimed he was an “indigenous trotskyist”. One of the PST member remembers: “when we met, they didn’t do these meetings [they do today], they only met on issues like chores repartition, but meeting to talk about ‘political things’, it was something we demanded to the one who were in the PST, and we demanded them to do the same in their meetings”. This moment marks the beginning of a politicization process, defined as a rise in generality discourse and the recognition of the adopted stances’ conflictive dimension (Hamidi, 2006). Key actors like Wagner, re-elected as OEPIAP’s president several times, gave internal meetings a more political orientation and built alliances with other urban activist sectors as trade unions and environmentalist NGOs. While the group got bigger, OEPIAP organized more and more demonstrations. In these events, indigenous students appeared – as other indigenous organizations generally appear in moments of protest – adorned with traditional authority’s symbols. This way of demonstrating allowed indigenous students to perform a representative role – a performance which, according to Emmanuel Soutrenon, is a specific feature of the “demonstrating body” (Soutrenon, 1998). From 2008 OEPIAP has appeared, in local newspapers, as the “leaders of Amazonian peoples”, and have embodied, at the urban level, the image of indigenous warriors confronting the state and oil companies (see photographs below).

Embodying Confrontation in Local Newspapers Reviews of Demonstrations (Loreto newspaper La Región, 14th of August of 2008)

OEPIAP publicly appeared representative of Amazonian ethnic groups whereas AIDESEP’s regional organization, ORPIO, lacked visibility. Its president was also the COICA’s General Coordinator, and as a consequence regularly travelled to Geneva to intervene in the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. A case of corruption ended tarnishing totally its legitimacy. Then in April-June of 2009, during

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8 Informal conversations with Wagner in July of 2010, Interview with PST members Renato and Monica, respectively the 17th of March, in Iquitos, and the 6th of April of 2011, in Lima.
9 Interview with Monica, PST member, 11th of April of 2012, Lima.
10 In 2010, they were 45 and in 2011, 50.
the wave of mobilization that spread in all the Peruvian Amazon, it was Wagner, OEPIAP’s president, who led the Iquitos Struggle Committee (Comité de lucha). Therefore, the confrontational narrative was constitutive of OEPIAP’s public embodying of a representative role.

**From Confrontation to Pacification**

Protest moments make visible the conflictive dimension of indigenous organizations’ interactions with the variety of natural resources extraction’s actors (oil and mining companies, as well as public officials and policemen). This visibility should not eclipse the variety of situations in which indigenous organizations encounter with private and public actors – nor the fact that the repression prompts the implementation of pacific mechanisms of interaction. For this purpose, a series of institutions and devices have been created in the 2000 decade. For instance, the General office of social management of the Energy and Mining ministry was created in 2005, and the Interministerial Commission for Social Conflicts Prevention was implemented in 2006. Existing participative devices in the extractive sector were also consolidated throughout the decade. Such devices have been adopted after major conflicts: “if you look at the dates’ coincidence between the mechanisms implemented by the Energy and Mining Ministry, they have to do with some emblematic conflicts”, notes a former Environment vice-minister. Bagua events were given an impressive publicity in international media, prompting Peruvian authorities to reevaluate the possibilities of repressing indigenous movements:

> Natives are very well organized. They are 320 000 but they disturb more than if they were a million! If Bagua victims had been peasants, there wouldn’t have been international aftermath as it happened. […] You hit an indigenous in a demonstration and they are already blocking an oil station’s main road in United States, England or Canada. […] It has to do with media; everything has to do with media in general.

As with other environmental conflicts, Bagua triggered renewed efforts to implement conflict management mechanisms alternative to repression. The specificity of Bagua conflict, compared with other protests against natural resource extraction, was its ethnic dimension. It prompted an ethnicization process of the already existing “pacific” devices of conflict management. After 2009, the Interministerial Commission for Social Conflicts Prevention was reformed to ensure a better management of indigenous protest. As a member of this commission, who has studied sociology, puts, “when it has to do with native cultures, since Bagua, policemen always consult us. […] So we always advise that they do not intervene and stay in alert. […] the priority is: ‘dialogue’”. The pursuit of dialogue requires new devices, institutions and professionals that open a variety of encounter fields with protesters. Therefore, a binary perspective opposing resistance to police repression overshadows the complexity of interactions that can imply cooperation as well as confrontation. If repression and experience of confrontation are undeniable facts, my hypothesis is that the government of protesters goes much beyond the opposition between indigenous organizations and the Peruvian state and/or extractive companies. An

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11 Interview with Jose de Echave, 12th of April 2012, Lima.
12 Interview with a member of the Energy and Mining Ministry’s General Social Management Office, 24th of January 2011, Lima.
13 Interview with the Interior Minister representative for the Interministerial commission for social conflicts prevention, 4th of February of 2011, Lima.
element of this modality of governing protesters is the “participative apparatus”: it multiplies situations of contact in which protesters’ conduct can be conducted much more efficiently than in moments of repression.

**Situations of Contact**

**Participative Apparatus’ Consolidation in Peru**

In Peru, participative devices (“citizen participation” laws) have spread since the 1990’s in the extractive sector, and consultative norms have been implemented for indigenous people. As “indigenous movements” and environmental controversies growingly met on the field of the opposition to natural resources extraction, participative and consultative devices have tended to converge. Their common point is their official purpose: to give a voice to rural populations impacted by natural resource extraction, and growingly considered as ethnic minorities, so they can take part in the policies and administrative measures concerning development strategies. To understand how these devices can be considered tools for ensuring the government of protest, it is useful to refer to Foucault’s definition of apparatus:

> What I am trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid. […] The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be established between these elements. Secondly, what I am trying to identify in this apparatus is precisely the nature of the connection that can exist between these heterogeneous elements. […] Thirdly, I understand by the term “apparatus” a sort of […] formation which has as its major function at a given historical moment that of responding to an urgent need. The apparatus thus has a dominant strategic function. (Foucault, 1980, p. 194-195)

Apparatus is then understood as a variety of discursive and non-discursive elements that are linked by a relation of interdependence, and that have a profoundly strategic dimension. How can participation be understood as an apparatus in the case of Peruvian extractive sector? A first way of encompassing participation is to refer to laws and administrative measures that promote participative devices. They have developed since 1995 with the publication of the first decree that made compulsory, for oil and mining companies, to present the result of their environmental impact study – a device then called “citizen participation in the approving process of environmental studies presented to the Minister of Energy and Mining” (ministerial resolution N°335-96-EM/SG). Since then, at least six different laws and decrees have been passed concerning “citizen participation” in the extractive sector\(^\text{14}\). A look at their content indicates two tendencies. First, the multiplication of compulsory mechanisms and steps of the extractive activity in which they must be implemented indicates an increased obligation for the state to consult and invite involved populations to participate. Second, the terms used in these texts show a tendency to ethicize the categories of population involved by these mechanisms. From the

“society”, the “public” the “citizenship”, the “people” and the “participants” invoked in the mid-1990, the texts shift, at the end of the 2000’s, to the reference of “indigenous peoples”, “native communities” and their “representative organizations”. Participative devices are growingly thought for populations defined on an ethnic basis, to such a point that the “citizen participation” norms elaborated for the extractive sector are about to be replaced by the “law on the right of previous consultation for indigenous and native peoples” passed in September of 2011 – currently in a process of implementation.

As many scholars have stressed out, the “autochthonous”, “native”, “indigenous” figures have been increasingly linked, at the international level, to a variety of environmental and human rights policies and debates. They have shed a light on the decisive paper of investigators (anthropologists, sociologists, jurists), NGOs and international organizations (be it the International Labor Organization, the United Nations, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Bank and the Interamerican Bank for Development….) in this process (Brysk, 2000 ; Roussel et Verdeaux, 2006 ; Bellier, 2012). Valorization of “local knowledge”, “indigenous peoples’ participation” in development projects echoes the analysis of the diffusion of the World Bank’s discourse that Michael Goldman calls “Green Neoliberalism” (Goldman, 2005). His ethnography of the international institution shows how, confronted with external critiques, the World Bank reformed and specialized in producing a “green knowledge” that takes part in the production of “environmental sates” (particularly in Africa, Asia and Latin America). In these environmental states, hybrid state actors are generated to implement policies of development that stress the importance of “local feedback” and “participation” of ethnic minorities. The first participative devices related to environmental dimension of development projects were de facto implemented in Peru during the structural reforms decade prompted by the World Bank. Among the several structural adjustment loans was the Energy and Mining Technical Assistance Project, granted for energy and mining sector’s privatization. One of the conditions of the loan was the implementation of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and their elaboration through participative devices (World Bank, 1999). More recently, institutional reports of the Energy and Mining Ministry systematically refer to World Bank’s publication about “community relations” or “participation”.

Participative devices have been implemented in Peru for twenty years. Fed by discourses and practices that circulate at the international level, they have been profoundly linked to privatization processes carried out by Fujimori’s government – some Peruvian sociologists have stressed out how citizen participation had been a key tool in the public services privatization, prompting individuals, associations and NGO to take on basic services’ implementation (Remy Simatovic, 2005 ; Panfichi, 2007). If participation and privatization are intrinsically linked in Peruvian case, how do state officials in charge of their implementation and private actors articulate?

15 Since the beginning of the decade, the Directions of Environmental Issues in mining and energy sectors (respectively DGAAM and DGAAE) have produced not less than 50 guides related to EIA, community relations and indigenous peoples’ participation. The majority of them has been written by consultants trained in United States and working with World Bank agencies. See for example MINISTERIO DE ENERGIA Y MINAS, Guía de relaciones comunitarias, Lima, 2001, 104p., which refers to World Bank’s 1994 report “Managing Environmental Problems: Economic Analysis of Selected Issues”, to The World Bank Participation Sourcebook, 1996, and to David Shelton and Lars T. Soefestad’s 1995 World Bank Social Development Paper, “Participation and Indigenous Peoples”.

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Participation and the Privatization of the Peruvian State

Since the mid-1990's have flourished a multiplicity of pacified encounters spaces between local populations (and in particular indigenous peoples), extractive companies and state officials. After a first step of “previous consultation” through the intermediary of ethnic federations, local populations shall participate in “public audiences” and “participative workshops” in which EIA is presented and exposed to the public’s commentaries and critiques. If a disagreement leads to a conflict, “dialogue tables” (mesa de diálogo) might be implemented in which protesters' leaders, local elected representatives, companies’ spokesmen and state officials from the energy and mining sector meet and try to find an agreement. A series of public institutions are in charge of implementing these mechanisms, at the interministerial level (the Social Conflicts Prevention Interministerial Commission evoked above), the ministerial level (the Intercultural Vice-Ministry in charge of the implementation of the Previous Consultation bill), or in specific departments of the Energy and Mining Ministry (the Social Management General Office (OGGS), the Energy Environmental and Energy Issues General Direction and its mining counterpart). Each of these entities has produced a considerable amount of institutional documents like guidebooks, legislative texts compilations or reports on previous experiences regarding citizen participation, EIA elaboration, community relations or previous consultation. A growing number of officials are sent to these entities and, when they do not come from social sciences field (which is increasingly the case), are taught intensive seminars on conflicts resolution or native/peasant communities.

The diversity of institutional mechanisms and entities, the production of a specific knowledge on conflicts prevention and the professionalization of the officials responsible for the implementation of such devices seem to indicate an institutionalization of the pacification field. Nevertheless, interviewed officials recurrently argue that the Peruvian state does not have the means to implement pacific relations in practical terms, given it lack of authority. As an official of the OGGS puts, “the indigenous go to the ladder. They denounce the state, the president, the minister, the vice-minister, and here it goes until the end. The little ladder…”. The state is described as a ladder constituted by a vertical structure of rungs, whose unique ability is to receive complaints and to conform to the protesters' claims. The Peruvian state fails to inspire fear to the indigenous and is then unable to prompt the dialogue between the conflict protagonists. This lack of authority might be due to the fact that very often, state officials do not reach Andean and Amazonian marginal territories and that it is usual, after a presidential election, to remove former officials so the new ones are linked to the elected political party. The OGGS civil servant, after the 2011 elections, repeatedly complains about the turnover and the replacement of trained workers by unskilled officials, but members of the elected party, according to a clientele strategy. The official of the OGGS considers moving to the private sector, after more than five years working in the Energy and Mining Ministry:

16 For example the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (PUCP), the most prestigious private university in the country, has a Conflicts Analysis and Resolution Center that provides continuous formation for extractive companies workers. It proposes three certificates (“Training in arbitration”, “Analysis, management and resolution of environmental conflicts”, “Negotiation and efficient communication strategies in conflicts management”) and a seminar on “peasant communities” given by an anthropologist specialized on the Andes and mining, Alejandro Diez Hurtado.

17 Interview with a member of the Energy and Mining Ministry's OGGS, 24th of January 2011, Lima.
I’m looking for a new job. [...] Not in the public sector anymore. I picture myself better in the private sector.

What are you looking for?

An oil company, a mining company, could be. An oil company, so I can be in the rainforest. [...]”

And what could you do in an oil or mining company?

Being there, with the communities… See it from another angle, no? Not anymore from the state’s angle, but from the community, how they work, everything… It would be seeing more specific cases, how you can do to articulate to the communities… Now, with the consultation bill, they are going to need more people. So there’s going to be a lot of jobs. 18

Resolving conflicts and relating to native/peasants communities is more likely to be achieved in the private sector, providing they have “good social responsibility standards”: oil and mining companies, instead of the state, have a continuous presence given that they work on “specific cases”. “Corporate social responsibility” is not a mere communication device to improve companies’ public image: the problematic of “articulating to” communities is a key one for them. They cannot carry out their activity if local populations oppose a fierce refusal – hence the multiplication of “community relations” departments and specialists inside each companies. Instead of the state, private companies do not lack material resources to ensure a continuous presence in the potentially conflictive zones where they seek to operate. Anthropologists have sometimes emphasized how extractive companies could, in some remote areas, substitute to state authorities to carry out development projects and social services such as education or health (Meléndez Guerrero, 2009). The perception of private companies responsible for social development appears for instance in the professional trajectory of the “community relations” service’s director of an Argentinean oil company operating in Peruvian Northern Amazonia. After 12 years spent in the civil and public sector, working in development projects, she experienced a disillusion: the development field was occupied by a diversity of small NGO that depended on a decreasing cooperation aid, did not fulfill their objectives and, in the end, “did business”:

And then, when they presented me this [proposal of working in the company’s community relation service], I thought it was interesting to be able to develop what we had been doing [within the civil sector], but with the support of the private companies. Why not? Actually it was like crossing a river because at the beginning, my fellows wouldn’t even say hello to me. [...] But it was for working in development, not for doing something else. 19

Working in private sector is perceived as the only mean to reach poor areas, in particular indigenous people. The mission of the “Community relations” service is to implement participative devices, to prevent conflicts, but above all, for its director, to “work in development”: organizing public audiences is as important as building schools, implementing electrification or potable water systems, as the state does not fulfill its obligations. As they are able to create a sustainable relation with local

18 Interview with a member of the Energy and Mining Ministry’s OGGS, 12th of April of 2012, Lima.
19 Interview with the Pluspetrol Norte S.A. “community relations” service’s director, 26th of April of 2012, Lima.
populations, private actors seem to have a greater capacity to produce consent and govern protesters than the state. To this extent, oil companies’ substitution to public officials can be understood as an “indirect government” of populations that goes beyond the analysis of Peruvian state as a failed state: the privatization of the state, as a process of delegation of its fundamental functions to private intermediaries, appears as a redeployment much more than as a withdrawal (Hibou, 1998, 2004).

Participative apparatus can then be understood as designed for environmental policy sectors and prompted by the growing visibility of environmental conflicts. It is profoundly linked to privatization process, be it of the energy and mining sector, or the Peruvian state as a whole, and then growingly dependent on private actors’ intervention, much beyond legal obligations. Participative mechanisms are devices of prevention that enable pacification of relations very likely to be contentious. This pacification intervenes during, but above all, before a conflict is triggered. Such an analysis makes necessary to understand how participative apparatus can articulate, at the local scale, to indigenous protests’ actors.

**OEPIAP as an Intermediary Space**

I have stressed out the fact that the OEPIAP’s has became, at least for the media, a rural representative of Loreto’s indigenous peoples. As such, they are approached by a variety of actors who seek to contact Amazonian native communities.

“Brother Paul”, the president of a local NGO called Loreto’s Environmental Network (RAL), is one of them. He meets OEPIAP students for the first time in the regional AIDESEP federation, ORPIO, where the young indigenous are then living – and where Paul regularly goes to organize, and participate to, protests against oil companies. In 2008, ORPIO begins to reproach OEPIAP for occupying public space and overshadowing official indigenous organizations (i.e., AIDESEP and ORPIO). Paul then offers the students to host them on the RAL’s field. The Loreto Regional Council finances the construction work and in 2009, the OEPIAP moves in the RAL’s field\(^\text{20}\). From then on, the students live in a kind of urban indigenous community, with some traditional features of a native community – in particular, we find the typical pile dwellings with thatched roof, the *maloca*, where traditionally take place politics and ritual collective activities, while tropical plants and exotic animals proliferate. This place seems to embody this “middle ground” often found between indigenous organizations and ecologist activism (Conklin et Graham, 1995). Since OEPIAP’s members lived in the RAL, Paul was like a father to many of them. Ricardo, OEPIAP’s vice-President in 2011, nods: “I couldn’t have been able to study without him. I’ve learned at the economic, organizational, alternative level. He is here, always. So we decided to make the most of him. But in the good sense of the word. *Taking the most of his intellect…*\(^\text{21}\). Paul “is here” to help them to organize, to collect subsidies; he diffuses his ideas on environmental conservation, teaches English classes and gives the students some advices for their schoolwork – or even, sometimes, some economical help to pay university fees. In return, he asks the students to join him in native communities to introduce his ecologist point of view, propose development projects or translate the ILO Convention N.169. He has come to take the place of PST’s activists in the role of OEPIAP advisor, all the more so

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\(^{20}\) Interview with Paul, RAL’s President, 23\(^\text{rd}\) of March of 2011, Iquitos.

\(^{21}\) Interview with Ricardo, OEPIAP’s vice-President, 3\(^\text{rd}\) of March of 2011, Iquitos.
after 2009 when the trotskyist structure, weaker than ever, decides to call its leaders back to Lima.

Then, when Paul meets with oil companies on the “corporate social responsibility” discursive field, he is able to act as a broker between extractive sector and OEPIAP. In 2011, during field work, an oil company engineer called Fernando is introduced by Paul and Wagner to the whole OEPIAP group.

It is Saturday morning. We are all sitting in the maloca, where weekly meetings take place. This morning, at the end of the meeting, OEPIAP’s president, Marcio, informs us that an engineer called Fernando, from an oil company, is about to visit us. With the other students, we have been silently waiting for more than an hour, sitting on the little school tables that furnish the room, when Fernando arrives. Some students precede him, carrying quite voluminous cardboard boxes; a former OEPIAP president and now regional elected representative, Wagner, walks on his side. When they enter the maloca, they hug and tease each other in front of us. Wagner introduces Fernando as “an old-time friend”, explains that he is here to help the organization. Fernando nods and adds that the RAL’s president, “brother Paul”, informed him of the students’ needs, so he decided to offer them some kitchenware. Marcio makes a brief welcome speech, Fernando asks the students in the public to introduce themselves, one by one. After these introductions, two students start to open the boxes. They put on a couple of tables an impressive quantity of plates, cutlery, glasses, casseroles and even some electrical goods like a mixer. “Brother Paul” is here, joking with the students while OEPIAP’s vice-president takes picture of Marcio, Wagner and Fernando smiling next to the gifts. The engineer asks me to take a picture of everyone, Fernando in the middle of the group. Then we get back to our seats and during 10 minutes, students get up one by one to thank Fernando in the name of their indigenous people. Now Fernando takes the floor during close to half an hour, telling his long-standing friendship with the awajún people thanks to his job, praising indigenous peoples’ humility. He tells us about his being caught by indigenous protesters during the Bagua events with the 24 policemen who were killed – he would have been one of the few who could escape alive – to insist on the fact that there is no use to fight, dialogue is always possible; he exhorts his audience to stay open to external help like his or mine (pointing me out). Then Wagner takes the floor, exposing the various projects OEPIAP has for making ends meet. He hopes Fernando’s company will help them to carry these projects out, he says. Fernando answers that he will do his best to build a lasting alliance between his company and OEPIAP, and puts an end to the meeting, proposing to take some pictures with the whole group outside. Then he shakes some hands (mainly OEPIAP leaders, and mine) and leaves. The meeting has lasted two hours; students go back to the kitchen to try the brand new utensils for the lunch.

The day he enters for the first time the OEPIAP community, Fernando tells us he met Wagner when he was only a child living with his family in an area where the engineer used to work. The former OEPIAP president, as for him, recalls having met Fernando for the first time during the April of 2009’s wave of Amazonian mobilizations. OEPIAP was at the front of Iquitos’ protests, Wagner being the President of the city’s Struggle Committee. A day he had called to a demonstration in a radio program, Fernando had phoned and proposed for lunch. Since then, he has helped the young

22 An ethno-linguistic group to which Wagner and Marcio belong.
23 “Gobierno confirma que 38 policías fueron secuestrados por nativos en Amazonas”, El Comercio, 5th of June of 2009.
24 Extract of the fieldwork notebook, scene observed the 5th of March of 2011 in Iquitos, Loreto, Peru.
“indigenous leader”, father of two children, in many economic difficulties. Wagner talks about Fernando as a “friend”. In the OEPIAP meeting I attend, Fernando exhorts the indigenous students to dialogue on the basis of his experience of Bagua events. His attempt to approach these young indigenous always seems linked to the experience or the anticipation of violence: becoming “friend” with those who the media call the “Amazonian peoples’ leaders” seems a much more efficient, simple and pacific way to put an end to environmental conflicts.

What can be seen on the RAL’s field is then an intermediary space where an indigenous organization, public entities (here, the Loreto Regional Council), environmentalist NGO and private actors can encounter, despite the leftist influence on OEPIAP’s politicization process and the radical nature of the collective action they have been involved in. The interaction observed during the OEPIAP meeting shows well that “the crude picture of a fight between two clear-cut antagonistic actors, a social movement and its opponent, is utterly inadequate” (Rucht, 2004, p. 212). As Dieter Rucht puts, we always find, in social movements, a variety of actors (allies, media, official and informal mediators) but also a great range of interactions between them, from cooperation to frontal conflict. On the local terrain of OEPIAP, the small-scale observation makes visible some ambiguities and contradictions through the meeting of indigenous protesters, environmentalist activists and oil companies. This encounter is made possible by a “constellation of interests”, a weberian notion used by Michel Dobry to express the fact that even if conflicts’ actors come from very different social backgrounds with their own objectives, their interests can converge in a specific moment (Dobry, 2003). The meeting between OEPIAP, Fernando and Paul is like a “friendship ceremony” in which the characters interact with their own logics, related to the social universe they come from. Having been able to observe directly Fernando’s welcome meeting makes possible to understand how such meetings can have effects on protesters, maybe longer-lasting than repression would: exploring this micro-situation should help to understand how pacification apparatus work adapting to local social realities.

Channels for an Indirect Government of Protesters

Clientele Relationships Turning Legitimate

Fernando’s visit is not the first link established between oil companies and OEPIAP. Already in 2010, an indigenous student reported about a Canadian oil company having contacted him a year before:

As I am here in Iquitos, sometimes the [company's] manager comes here to talk with me. So I tell him […] “Oh no, I’m scared, because in my community, they are not in favor of companies. – Yes, but this is some bad information they give you… Now companies like us, we don’t have contamination. Others do, but we don’t”, they tell me. […] I’m the only one here in OEPIAP belonging to this place, to their grant. […] They wanted to send me to my community. I said them “okay”. “Very well Jhony”, now you can go”. […] And I fooled my people. There, I fooled my people.

Yes? You feel that you fooled your people?

25 Interview with Wagner, former OEPIAP’s president, former PST officer and elected in the Loreto Regional Council, 6th of March of 2011, Iquitos.

26 It is quite usual to meet indigenous people with names that try to sound American, but their parents sometimes get confused with the spelling.
Yes... Because they told me: “first, introduce yourself as coming from the Regional Council”. And I accepted. [...] I arrived and I said I was from the Regional Council, while I was actually from the oil company. [...] Then I convinced two Apus27, and I took them to Lima.28

Here we can see how the company tries to reach a reluctant community using the influence channel of Jhony, much easier to contact. His status of urban student is supposed to make his introduction as a member of the Regional Council more credible: indigenous and politicized students are seen to acquire a new authority in their original background (on the changing patterns of indigenous leadership with the access to formal education, see, in the Peruvian Amazonian case: Chaumeil, 1990 ; Vega Díaz, 2000). Jhony then helps to counteract the influence of those who “give bad information” (generally, in the discourse of the oil extraction actors, some radical NGO). First, some Jhony’s community members realize that he has been lying, and decide to punish him (he is beaten by the community authorities). But then they accept to negotiate with the company, who eventually gets to extend its activities to this part of its grant. It had remained, until now, impossible to explore because of fierce opposition of its inhabitants. These interpersonal relationships between an indigenous student and an oil company seem relatively frequent since 2009, according to the interviews and informal conversations in the OEPIAP. Nevertheless, they are always likely to be criticized for their lack of legitimacy: according to official discourses (especially the ones hold in the course of the many mobilizations OEPIAP participated to), an indigenous should not treat with oil companies. Fernando’s welcome meeting, as a collective performance, then helps to understand how the relationship between an oil extraction institution and OEPIAP can become legitimate.

Michel Dobry calls “collusive transactions” these “exchanges between actors located in different and autonomous sectors or fields, [...] the ones and the others involved in games or issues that are specific to the social sectors in which they are immerged” (Dobry, 2009, p. 111). According to him, collusive transactions, although potentially illegitimate, can have “effects of legitimation”. The alliance being sealed between the indigenous students and the oil company engineer fits well with this category. The “effect of legitimation” can be seen analyzing Fernando’s welcome meeting as a performance. This meeting appears as a “ceremony of friendship”. Wagner and Fernando insist on the fact that they are friends at a verbal level (Wagner introducing the engineer as his friend, Fernando telling his long-lasting history of friendship with the awajun people) but also at a gestural level (they hug, laugh, stand in a relax way…). The students’ expression of gratitude (in particular when they stand up one by one to thank Fernando on behalf of their people) also helps formulating the transaction in the terms of friendship. They thank him because Fernando was not compelled to offer them such quantity of goods: he did it by “good will”, a recurrent expression during the meeting. In his works on clientele relations in Corsica, Jean-Louis Briquet has come to study “the reasons that incite to present under the subjective aspect of a voluntary and morally justified link, a relation objectively determined by the unequal repartition of resources among individuals” (Briquet, 1999, p. 9). What he calls “paradoxical friendships” in clientele transactions is a “morality of disinterest” that makes the exchange durable and legitimate, in that it “institutes in the long term a set of obligations and moral debts that guarantees the permanence of

27 Quechua term used in some parts of the Amazonia to designate traditional authorities.
28 Interview with Jhony, 23rd of June of 2010, Iquitos.
mutual involvements between the patron and its clients” (Briquet, 1999, p. 10). If the inequality of resources is at the core of the meeting between Fernando and the indigenous students, something more is happening in the “friendship ceremony” than a mere material exchange: the ritualization of friendship makes possible the creation of a longer-lasting alliance.

In the short term\(^\text{29}\), Fernando is daily present in the OEPIAP’s space. Thanks to Wagner’s influence, he is attending awajun classes with Marcio, the organization’s president. The class takes place every day in the evening and after that, Fernando often stays a little bit more to talk with the students and, sometimes, offers the whole group some dinner. In his informal conversations, he goes on talking about “openness” and “trust”, recalling the indigenous students that too much confrontation leads to tragedies such as Bagua events. Such a discourse works like a standard that enables to (dis)qualify behaviors. While opening oneself to the other’s help is showing good sense, closing oneself, refusing other’s ideas is impeding the organization’s progress. Hence, the friendship ritualization here introduces a set of hierarchies and judgment standards in function of actors’ will to accept others’ influence.

**Internal Relationships of Influence**

How can these patterns of judging one’s action actually diffuse among the whole group and have an actual effect on their behavior? It is not enough that the relationship with Fernando is legitimated by its formulation in terms of friendship at the collective level. Only through internal channels of influence can discourses of “openness” and “trust” can circulate and have tangible effects.

Beyond OEPIAP’s discourses of fraternity between its different ethnic components, there is an implicit rivalry between two groups: one lead by Wagner, and the other one by Ruben, who was expelled from OEPIAP by his rival in 2010 but who lives and works in the RAL’s office. The spatial distribution of indigenous students inside OEPIAP, on the basis of the houses repartition\(^\text{30}\), expresses this partition and seems to reproduce the difference one can encounter between western and eastern part of Loreto (see scheme below). A questionnaire designed to collect factual data on every OEPIAP’s members helps specify how the rivalry between Wagner’s family and Ruben’s family structure the organization\(^\text{31}\).

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\(^{29}\) At least until the end of my fieldwork, that is one month after the “friendship ceremony”, Fernando visits the OEPIAP’s members several times a week.

\(^{30}\) OEPIAP has 15 houses, each one with three bedrooms in which lives one, sometimes two students – and, when it is the case, with her or his boy/girlfriend and his children (two students are parents, Wagner and his older brother).

\(^{31}\) The questionnaires was answered by 40 OEPIAP members, the others being out of the city during the second field work.
Inside the group, approximately one third of the indigenous students are family-related to Wagner, being one of his brothers (Wagner has three younger brothers and one elder who arrived after him in the organization) or one of his more or less remote cousin. Their mother tongue is awajun or achuar, two ethno-linguistic categories belonging to the jivaro group and who have been the first in creating ethnic federations\(^{32}\). They all come from native communities located in the western part of Loreto. A smaller group is constituted by Ruben’s family (he has three brothers belonging to OEPIAP), whose members say they belong to the huitoto group, located in the eastern part of Loreto. In this area, the rubber industry has been much stronger in the late 19\(^{th}\) century than in the western Loreto. As a consequence, its native population has been inserted in denser networks of production and settled in multiethnic villages where the native tongue was lost, due to a stronger acculturation than in the jivaro communities. The latter, known to be “warrior” tribes, experimented a very early process of auto-organization to confront missionary and oil extraction pressure – they were the first, in Peru, to create formal ethnic organizations (Santos-Granero et Barclay, 2007).

Therefore, Wagner’s group constituted since its members share a certain routine of political organization, speak awajun and achuar together, and often are the daughters and sons of the most influent group inside their native communities, groups that are family-related to ruling groups in others communities. Inside OEPIAP,

\(^{32}\) The first South American ethnic organization was the Ecuadorian Shuar federation, created in 1964; in Peru, it was the Aguaruna-Huambisa Council (CAH) which was created in 1977 and was a key actor in AIDESEP creation. Both Shuar and Aguaruna (awajun) belong to the Jivaro linguistic group.
Wagner has been exerting an influence over the other indigenous students thanks to his ability to impulse internal organization, to lead protests, to get elected... and, above all, to attract new resources for the organization. In 2010, Ruben created a NGO called Curuinsi, whose purpose was to attract subsidies for development projects in the indigenous students’ native communities. After having first tried to participate and lead this NGO, Wagner decided, as the president, to expel Ruben from the OEPIAP. But Ruben moved to his office, located in RAL’s buildings (see scheme above), and his three brothers still belonged to OEPIAP. Ruben could go on attracting new indigenous students (including from Wagner’s group, for example 2011 OEPIAP’s president, Marcio), therefore threatening Wagner’s monopole on the resources acquired by political representation and mediation.

It is this competition for the monopole over mediation’s resources which structures the rivalry between Wagner and Ruben, and it is justified a posteriori in ethnic terms (an alleged incompatibility between acculturated huitoto and politically organized awajun). Therefore, it is to protect this monopole that Wagner inserts the engineer Fernando into the group, as he represents a new source of income:

Since he is my friend, Fernando wants to learn my language, he wants to learn awajun. So what I am doing, now – he is going to pay for these classes. So I have looked for somebody from here, from OEPIAP: Marcio. I want to show him that one he’ll be into it, giving him all the... information so OEPIAP goes on finding funds that stay here [in OEPIAP]. Above all, I want to take [Marcio] out of [Curuinsi, Ruben’s NGO] and I’m going to tell gim “you know what, leave that and work, teach Fernando and he’s going to pay you. And he’s going to pay you well...”. And from Monday he will begin his classes. [...] Every day, from 7 to 9pm. Wagner’s “friendship” with the engineer legitimates the fact that he helps Fernando to create a sustainable alliance with OEPIAP (giving “information” on what seems to be social reality of awajun peoples, and on the organization, in exchange with a support to find funds). But Wagner actually does it because he tries to ensure his monopole of influence on OEPIAP, “taking Marcio out of Curuinsi”. Therefore, the reproduction of domination structure (that is, here, a material dependency on Fernando) works in a horizontal way, thanks to a “coalition of interests” (Dobry, 2003): only because Wagner has an interest to introduce Fernando can the “friendship” with the engineer extend to a bigger part of the group. Hence, thanks to his classes, Fernando is regularly present in the OEPIAP, informally speaks with them and goes on promoting “openness” and “trust” to outsider’s help. At the end, these discourses get legitimate thanks to “friendship” narrative, and circulate relying on “coalition of interests” and internal influence channels. The interactions with actors like Fernando, as the ones indigenous students have with other oil companies and NGO that meet on the field of “social responsibility” and “citizen participation”, explain how OEPIAP’s leaders and followers have come to change their way of being “indigenous representative”.

Creating Consent, Inducing Participation

A first way of observing the “openness” and “trust” discourses’ influence is to focus on the collective level, trying to understand how OEPIAP’s definition of indigenous leadership has evolved. Wagner recognizes this evolution, and seems to advocate

33 For an OEPIAP member to be expelled, a motion has to be presented and justified in the general assembly, and the student cannot be expelled without a consensus of the organization.
34 Interview with Wagner, 6th of March of 2011, Iquitos.
for a new kind of leadership. He now considers that oil companies have improved: “Important legal parameters have changed. [The Canadian oil company] has a very high social responsibility index. They talk about global warming, social and environmental responsibility. But [indigenous] leaders don’t know that, because they never take the time to talk! Us [OEPIAP], we talk.” Such a stance implicates changing of target:

If there is to be investment, it must have good social and environmental responsibility indexes. The problem is not investment, it has to be clear: the problem is not oil companies, foreigners. The problem is our laws! […] The laws say: “[indigenous] peoples’ participation”, “consult the peoples”. […] But they are never carried out (nunca se cumplen)! […] I have prospects for the Congress. […] I want to create a consolidated indigenous current.

The “indigenous current” Wagner wants to create will then rely on a more legalist position of changing and carrying out laws so “social and environmental responsibility” actually goes with oil extraction. Wagner now pictures himself in the Congress, when in 2010 he would criticize the elderly indigenous leaders’ participation in “dialogue tables”, saying he was against negotiation and the priority was to build the mobilization in the street. At a collective level, it implicates to change OEPIAP’s strategy, and this evolution is then described by “Brother Paul” in terms of a maturing process:

The group matured, understanding that his political role, instead of only being a protest role, was to have certain purposes, to win spaces. […] They won allies and they understood that it was much more useful, to have allies. And working with several of them, forming fronts, movements, participating. Therefore, gradually, for the void left by ORPIO, when ORPIO’s leadership was absent, the coordination with local unions and the indigenous movement was through OEPIAP. […] It was… and it is, today, the representative voice of indigenous people. In Iquitos.

You have just made a distinction between the political role and the protest role.

Yes, in the extent that protesting to win only five more places in the university’s refectory is quite easy. But having a political plan to […] win more spaces, to have a better organization, to look for allies, it is much more than the former role. Last year, for example, the political role has been much more important than the protest role.

From protest to politics, from opposition to alliances building: the maturation process of OEPIAP has taken the organization to propose a new way of making indigenous movement visible. And thanks to the void left by AIDESEP’s regional organization, ORPIO, OEPIAP is now a “representative voice of indigenous people in Iquitos”.

At a more individual level, effects of “openness” and “trust” discourses can also be observed, if one looks at the “carriers” of the indigenous students, understood as the interaction between the objective evolution of the positions they occupy, and the justification they give of theses tendencies (see Olivier Fillieule’s study of « activists’ carriers » in the processual analysis of individual engagement: Fillieule, 2001). In

35 Interview with Wagner, 6th of March of 2011, Iquitos.
36 Interview with Wagner, 6th of March of 2011, Iquitos.
37 Informal conversation with Wagner: field work diary of the 24th of June of 2010, on the boat between Iquitos and Yurimaguas.
38 Interview with “Brother Paul”, 23rd of March of 2011, Iquitos.
2012, the first OEPIAP student graduated his carrier, so it has not been possible to follow them after the university. Nevertheless, 13 have already worked in the meantime they were studying. The majority of them have been hired in the extractive sector (4) and/or in developments projects for NGO (6)\textsuperscript{39}. When asked about their professional projects, the other students nearly always refer to development projects they want to implement in their community, in the sector of local business creating, environment conservation or natural resources management. They generally mention the support of NGO, local administration but also oil companies to carry out these projects. Therefore, not only has the majority of indigenous students come to accept the principal of oil extraction, but it tends to participate to this sector as well. Even if indigenous students are not directly hired by oil companies, the extractive sector is so central in Loreto’s economy\textsuperscript{40} that working in an environmentalist/humanitarian NGO or a local administration implies to deal with oil companies. In any case, they are capitalizing their position of indigenous representative, highlighting the “horizontal” and “flexible” dimension of their projects, be it a project of political representation, economical development or indigenous culture preservation. The several sectors (indigenous organizations, local/regional authorities, oil companies, NGO) in which they begin to work tend to converge in the discursive field of “sustainable and community-based development” that participative apparatus contributes to diffuse. In case of conflict, these young professionals are strategic intermediaries between participative apparatus’ actors and native communities, hence making possible the “government of compromise” (Nay et Smith, 2002).

**Conclusion. Indirect Government of Protest and the Production of the Peruvian State**

Although the narrative of confrontation with the state is constitutive of indigenous organizations (be it in the image of “indigenous warriors” as in the memory of repression), pacific devices of conflicts regulation have spread. The perspective of “participative apparatus” then takes us to study how these devices actually work far beyond their institutional framing (Foucault, 1980). The growing rhetoric of participation and the ethnicization of environmental conflicts regulation in Peru can be seen in legal devices, as well as in international financing institutions as the World Bank and the Interamerican Bank of Development, or in guides of “community relations” produced by public institutions (the Energy and Mining ministry) and private institutions (NGO, oil and mining companies). Therefore, one needs to analyze the local interactions of this multiplicity of discourses and actors.

The search for pacific interactions leads oil companies to enter in spaces of encounters with protesters. The ethnography of a specific indigenous organization, OEPIAP, makes visible the logics of “affective” discourse in making “paradoxical friendship” legitimate (Briquet, 1999). Such a process requires the intervention of some intermediaries who have an interest in legitimating “collusive transactions” so they can preserve the influence they exert on their group. In the “situation of contact” analyzed in this paper, OEPIAP’s internal channels of influence can explain how the former OEPIAP’s president, Wagner, and the engineer Fernando enter in a “coalition of interests” that helps to perpetuate the alliance between the oil company and the

\textsuperscript{39} According to the questionnaires passed to 40 of the indigenous students.

\textsuperscript{40} Loreto’s public administration formally depends on oil companies’ royalties, but we have also seen that companies tended to assume the Peruvian State’s functions of development in remote areas.
group of indigenous students (Dobry, 2003). These alliances thus make possible an inflexion of OEPIAP’s practice of leadership, at collective and individual levels, that appear not only as consent on the principle of oil extraction, but as direct or indirect participation to this activity as well. Indigenous students are “governed”, in the extent that among a possibility of actions, they orientate their behavior and discourses in this direction of consent and participation, a choice that results from the interactions generated in OEPIAP as an “intermediary space”: “power exerts itself on ‘free subjects’ insofar they are ‘free’” (Foucault, 1982, p.237). This process seems to be quite representative of the general tendency of Peruvian indigenous organizations since Bagua events, but only would a deeper investigation could prove it. In any case, these micro-processes offer some elements of analysis for the understanding of Peruvian state in its relation to social conflicts.

In this space of encounters, the Peruvian state can be considered (nearly) absent if it is understood only through its public officials and its repressive apparatus: although local authorities punctually appear, through the figure of Wagner or of the Regional Council, private companies and NGO interact much more with indigenous students. Nevertheless, the Peruvian state can also be understood as an actor of these interactions in the extent that it fully encourages them, delegating the task of developing remote areas, educating minorities and relating to native communities. The state “indirectly governs” by redeploying itself in privatization processes (Hibou, 2004). As Foucaults puts in his 1978-1979 lectures in the College de France, the state is better analyzed through government techniques that are not limited to the state sphere and generate a process of “statification (étatisation) of society” (Foucault, 2008, p.109). Instead of a top-down understanding of the state as a unified entity, his analytics focus on the material dimension of the state through its practices. In this sense, tactics of government generate a “governmentalization of the state”:

it is the tactics of government which make possible the continual definition and redefinition of what is within the competence of the state and what is not, the public versus the private, and so on; thus the state can only be understood in its survival and its limits on the basis of the general tactics of governmentality. (Foucault, 1991, p. 103)

Peruvian Amazonia is considered a margin (geographically, ecologically, culturally) in which the actors who succeed to interact with, and exert power on protesters mainly belong to the private sphere (NGO, companies…). In the indirect government of protesters, these actors contribute to redefine Peruvian state, which actively takes part in this perpetual displacement of its intervention frontiers. Timothy Mitchell argues for an understanding of the state that takes seriously “the elusiveness of the state-society boundary” (Mitchell, 1991, p. 78). From this perspective, the Peruvian state is produced in its margins by this indirect government of protest. It reshapes it continuously, through the intermiggling of public and private actors in conflict regulation processes, the alleged “weakness” of Peruvian state in controlling its opponents and the consequent predominance of private actors show a particular and perpetual formation of the state: the “power to regulate and control is not simply a capacity stored within the state, from where it extends out into society. The apparent boundary of the state does not mark the limit of the processes of regulation. It is itself a product of those processes” (Mitchell, 1991, p. 85).
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