

“Bereft of Friends”? – Analyzing Foreign Policy Similarity with China in the UN General Assembly

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Abstract

With China’s emergence as global economic and political power, it is a common assumption that the Chinese government is rapidly expanding its influence in international politics. However, systematic studies of China’s impact on the policy behavior of other states are still rare. Based on the analysis of UN General Assembly votes, the paper describes patterns of foreign policy similarity with China. The findings endorse the claim China receives increasing levels of backing in international politics from states in Southern and Western Africa, the Caribbean and South America as well as in Central and Western Asia. Logistic estimations are employed to explore the plausibility of different explanations for foreign policy similarity: economic, diplomatic and military linkages, domestic institutional similarities and processes of parallel problem solving. The analysis finds high similarity levels to correlate with shared regime characteristics and comparable patterns of socio-political globalization as well as that foreign aid and arms trade help to buy support.

(11,413 words)

1 Introduction

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is emerging at the center of world politics. Regardless whether the years 2004 and 2005 are cited as “turning point in Chinese diplomacy” (Lam 2006: 160), or whether the first evidence of the state’s leadership’s “growing assertiveness” in global politics is dated back to 2006 (Medeiros 2009: 187–188). Beijing is reaping the rewards of three decades of economic rise and foreign policy adjustments in the 1990s that both laid the foundation for an “increased international activism” (Goldstein 2005: 119) and the country’s “emergence as an active player in the international arena” (Medeiros and Fravel 2003: 22). Be it the world climate talks, the reform of the global economic and financial system or international security challenges, the country’s leadership seizes its chances to contribute to the build-up of a multipolar international system and to protect and pursue its national interests in global politics.

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In advancing its objectives, the Chinese leadership does not fend by itself. A central feature of the country's rise in international affairs is its ability to gain the support of other states and increasingly coordinate policies with them. In the last years Beijing coordinated policy positions and joined diplomatic leverage by drawing on intergovernmental clubs with (re-)emerging powers in the context of BRICS and BASIC, and with Russia and its Central Asian neighbors through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)—although with varying degrees of success. Within the BRICS-group, for instance, China finds rhetorical support for its commitment to multilateral diplomacy and the foreign policy principles of non-aggression and non-interference in domestic affairs. In 2011, Brazil, Russia, India and China abstained from the vote on the 'No-Fly Zone'-resolution in the United Nation Security Council (UNSC), claiming that the Libyan crisis should be ended by diplomatic means.² Although this consensus crumbled in early 2012 when voting on Syria, the BRICS members still managed to uphold that any solutions to the crises in Syria and also Iran should be based on political dialogue.³

However, support for Chinese foreign policy objectives does not only stem from the (re-)emerging powers. Besides Russia, more than a quarter of the UN member states reflected China's position on Syria by not attending the respective plenary meeting, abstaining from the vote or by also voting against the Arab-backed resolution on Syria. In Latin America, for instance, the member states of the Alianza Bolivariana (ALBA) apart from Antigua and Barbuda demonstrated their disagreement with the UN resolution in one or another way. In Southern Africa, half of the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) members did the same.

For China, receiving a helping hand in pursuing core interests has not been restricted to global high politics. When China boycotted the Nobel Peace Prize Ceremony in 2010, another 16 states joined in. Absentees involved not only some of the usual suspects like Russia, Pakistan, Cuba and Sudan, but also Argentina and Colombia, who expressed sympathy with Beijing's position by sending only representatives and not their ambassadors to the City Hall in Oslo.⁴ In addition, since the ten ASEAN members made a start in 2004, an increasing number of states, especially in the Global South, have been granting China full market economic status within the World Trade Organization—a core interest of the Chinese leadership not only for status reasons but also because it cushions penalties of WTO dispute settlements (Medeiros 2009: 64, 85).

² South Africa, although first voting in favor of the UNSC resolution, joined the BRIC-members' position later on. See "Security Council Approves 'No-Fly Zone' over Libya", online: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm> (12-9-2011); and "BRICS as a Block", online: <http://blog.nus.edu.sg/southasiansoundings/2011/04/23/brics-as-a-block/> (12-9-2011). For the formal agreement on the principles, see "Sanya Declaration of the BRICS Leaders Meeting", online: <http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7351064.html> (12-9-2011).

³ See the "Fourth BRICS Summit's Delhi Declaration", online: <http://www.bricsindia.in/delhi-declaration.html> (29-3-2012); and "BRICS summit: Emerging economies condemn military threats against Iran, Syria", online: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/brics-summit-emerging-economies-condemn-military-threats-against-iran-syria/2012/03/29/gIQA48JuiS_story.html (29-3-2012). For the UN voting records, consult UNGA's resolution on "The situation in the Syrian Arab Republic", online: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/ga11207.doc.htm> (6-4-2012); and the UNSC's negotiations on "The Situation in the Middle East", online: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N12/223/56/PDF/N1222356.pdf?OpenElement> (6-4-2012).

⁴ See "Embassies represented at the Nobel Prize Ceremony on December 10", online: http://nobelpeaceprize.org/en_GB/embassies-2010/ (13-9-2011); and "Empty Chair Emphasizes Nobel Schism", online: <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704457604576011132100260582.html> (13-9-2011).

The time in which China was “bereft of friends”, “a beacon to no one—and, indeed, an ally to no one” is thus certainly over (Segal 1999: 33; see also Sutter 2003). Albeit this claim faces only limited objection in academic and political debate and has attracted substantial attention within the “China rise”-literature, surprisingly little systematic research exists on why other states choose to align with China. Furthermore, the few studies that do exist not only come to contradicting results. The works also narrowly focus on the question whether China’s economic power is translated into direct political influence or not and treat alternative causes, if at all, as secondary.

This paper intends to overcome some of these shortcomings by asking what factors most often explain similarities between a state’s foreign policy choices and Chinese diplomatic interests. It is argued that bilateral foreign policy similarity can be driven by economic, diplomatic and military linkages; institutional, socioeconomic and cultural affinities; as well as processes of parallel problem solving. To test for the plausibility of the different explanations, I employ logistic regression estimations on a large panel of countries for the period from 1978 to 2010. To measure the dependent variable, I draw on an updated and expanded version of Eric Voeten and Adis Merdzanovic’s (2009) UNGA voting data and calculate a novel chance-corrected similarity measure which has been recently proposed by Frank Häge (2011).

The paper proceeds as follows: First, I review the literature on China’s economic and political rise, focusing on studies which assess the country’s regional and global influence and relevant diplomatic strategies. Second, I discuss different explanations for foreign policy similarity, mainly drawing on literature on vote buying in the UN and on policy convergence, and formulate corresponding hypothesis. The third section presents the research design and provides a more detailed description of the dependent variable, foreign policy similarity with China, and its development in the sample period. Fourth, the quantitative results will be presented and discussed. The last section concludes and points to further areas of research.

2 China’s Political Sway

Studies within the “China-rise”-literature address Beijing’s ability to win other countries’ support for its own political objectives in global and regional affairs mainly as the consequence of trade and financial power. David Lampton (2008) identifies five economic dimensions of China’s growing international heft, the “power of the *buyer*, the *seller*, the *investor*, the *development assistance provider*, and the *innovator*” (ibid.: 88, italics in the original). According to Zhiqun Zhu (2010: 2), the country’s economic resilience and its stockpile of foreign exchange reserves make “it possible for China to expand trade and investment and enhance its political influence in every corner of the world.” Due to its trade relations with weak and fragile states, China is particularly in a beneficial position to use economic leverage in such countries (Hart and Jones 2010: 74). In Africa, both trade and largely untied foreign aid (except for the One-China policy) translate into political power as they “help to cultivate the goodwill of African leaders who provide Beijing with diplomatic support and valuable contracts as a matter of reciprocity” (Tull 2006: 476, 468). In other regions the payoff of economic strategies, however, is less obvious. As observed by Rhys Jenkins (2010: 830), except for smaller countries in Central America and the Caribbean, “there are limited opportunities in

Latin America for China to increase its influence through grants and concessionary loans”.⁵

Taking a closer look, even in Asia evidence for China’s economic leverage is less conclusive than often assumed. After conducting several case studies of Chinese attempts to exert power in Southeast Asia, Evelyn Goh (2011: 24) finds that “the most notable elements of China’s growing power—its economic strength and integration into the world economy—are manifested in structural, and often unintentional, ways” and stresses that “China does not thus far have a significant record of managing to get its smaller Southeast Asian neighbors to do what they would not otherwise have done”.⁶ Also Evan Medeiros et al. (2008: 239) conclude that “China does not appear to have had much success in translating economic interactions into political influence” in six Asian-Pacific countries. Finally, the only large-n cross-national study that I am aware of, equally calls into question a straightforward link between China’s growing economic might and political influence. Drawing on states’ dependence on Chinese in- and outbound foreign investments and exports to the PRC in 2007 as main explanatory variables, Kastner (2010: 6, 19–21) finds no systematic and significant relation between these economic ties and a state’s propensity to meet Beijing’s interests with regard to the referendum on Taiwan’s UN participation in 2008, Beijing’s Tibet policy, and the recognition of China’s status as a market economy.

Outside the economic realm, China’s rise in international affairs and its ability to win over political support has been related to the Communist leadership’s embracement of soft power strategies and its appeal as a development model, particularly to authoritarian countries in less developed world regions (Lampton 2008). For instance, in Southeast Asia, with the exception of Singapore and Vietnam, the region’s countries disapproved Tokyo’s bid for a permanent seat in the UNSC and thus gave in to Beijing’s diplomatic campaigns (Yoshimatsu 2008: 15). Soft power is further believed to have helped China’s leadership to gain influence both in Asian and African and to a lesser degree in also in Latin American countries (Ellis 2011b: 91; Kurlantzick 2007, 2009; Sutter 2003: 76, 82–83).⁷ However, one has to bear in mind soft power from a Chinese perspective could include “anything outside the military and security realm, including not only popular culture and public diplomacy but also more coercive economic and diplomatic levers like aid and investment and participation in multilateral organizations” (Kurlantzick 2007: 6; see also Glaser and Dooley 2009: 9).

For others, China’s emergence as influential power in international politics is facilitated by a general shift from a “responsive” to “proactive diplomacy”, state and public diplomacy and attempts to reshape regional orders (Zhang 2010: 41; Zhu 2010: 6–7). One important aspect of this has been the establishment of comprehensive and strategic partnerships with individual countries, which serves as diplomatic instrument to expand international influence and “generate bargaining leverage in its bilateral interactions” (Medeiros 2009: 86; see also Cheng and Zhang 2002). This logic is also translated to the multilateral context where it takes the form of “forum diplomacy”

⁵ In a similar vein, Daniel Drezner (2009: 43–44) and Shaun Breslin (2011: 195–196) argue that Beijing’s financial leverage is limited to capital-starved countries and has little prospect of success when dealing with great powers.

⁶ Goh (2011: 6–7) assesses Beijing’s power as a multiplier (promotion of economic regionalism), the power to persuade (countering the ‘China threat’ discourse) and the power to prevail (Taiwan status, South China Sea disputes) vis-à-vis ten Southeast Asian states.

⁷ Other authors, in contrast, argue that generally and despite the importance the Chinese leadership attaches to soft power and public diplomacy, the soft power strategy has so far had only limited success (Gill and Huang 2006: 26; Li 2009: 16).

through which Beijing has been able to engage large groups of countries and facilitate Chinese influence in the respective regions (Medeiros 2009: 77–78, 159–160; Su 2009: 35ff; Zhang 2010: 40).

3 Theory and Hypotheses

The above-cited works provide a great deal of knowledge on the Chinese use of diplomacy and economic statecraft to achieve its foreign policy objectives. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence supporting these assumptions is mainly anecdotal and, with regard to the more systematic studies, the results are ambiguous. Thus, the question on what factors most often explain China's ability to gain support for its objectives and values in international politics remains. Against this background, it is argued that a better understanding of China's rise in international affairs and of the underlying patterns of international support is gained by taking a step back and considering the Chinese government's ability to coerce other states into accommodating with its interests as just one of several explaining factors. As the reviewed literature fails to provide systematic evidence for the prevalence of coercive and direct types of power over other states, this study, thus, includes assumptions on indirect forms of influence contributing to the diffusion of political interests and principles. Reasoning from this broader perspective, similar foreign policy interests develop on the basis of shared institutional and socioeconomic characteristics in domestic and international affairs as well as through strong bilateral relations (or linkages).

Shared institutional and socioeconomic attributes

Influence through bilateral linkages is regarded an important driving force for foreign policy similarity. However, the likelihood of influence transmission in bilateral relations depends by large on country-specific conditions: Studies on policy convergence, for instance, cite shared institutional characteristics, similarity in socioeconomic structures and cultural likeness as factors which further facilitate cross-national policy transfers (Knill 2005: 770).⁸ In addition, countries facing parallel problem pressure are expected to choose similar solutions (Holzinger and Knill 2005: 792). For instance, countries integrated in comparable ways in global political and economic processes and exposed to similar problems are more likely to formulate parallel policy responses, especially in a context of shared institutional, socioeconomic and cultural attributes.

That said, foreign policy similarity may exist independently from bilateral linkages and Chinese diplomatic strategies. Politically like-minded countries should vote the same as China due to domestic interests. Empirical studies on voting behavior in the UNGA demonstrate that democratic governments are more inclined to vote in line with the US and other G7 countries because of shared principles (Dreher et al. 2008: 148–149; Voeten 2000a: 190).⁹ Taking the reverse of this argument, it is assumed that

⁸ Besides these country-related facilitating factors the type of policy and its dimension are assumed to impact the likelihood of cross-country policy transfers. For example, policies involving high domestic distributional conflicts or paradigms that entail ideational changes should be harder to transfer (Knill 2005: 770–771).

⁹ Wang (1999: 205) argues that “developing countries with higher levels of democracy would vote more frequently with the U.S. in the UN General Assembly than less democratic countries” because they “share such principles as free speech, private property, elected representation, and other political interests“. See Kim and Russett (1996: 648) for further evidence that more democratic countries support resolutions on human and political rights whereas less democratic countries are more inclined to favor self-determination. These findings are corroborated by research on government ideology in OECD countries and voting alignment with the US (Potrafke 2009).

countries that are characterized by non-democratic principles and values such as restrictions in the freedom of expression, limited possibilities to participate in the political process, a low competitiveness of representation and weak rule of law, tend to vote the same as China—independently of dense economic, military or diplomatic ties.¹⁰ Many politically “like-minded” countries, for instance, voted together with China against the UNGA resolution on the human rights situation in Myanmar in 2010.¹¹ Sharing the concern that “information transmitted via the Internet could threaten the ‘stability’ of states”, China figures among several other authoritarian countries in the list of states which have co-sponsored Russian resolutions on cyber-security in UNGA (Gjelten 2010). The above-made arguments lead to a first set of hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1a: *“Like-minded” countries tend to align more often with Chinese interests independently of the existence of bilateral linkages due to shared institutional characteristics.*

Hypothesis 1b: *Parallel problem pressure induces similar foreign policy choices independently of the existence of bilateral linkages, especial if countries share institutional and socioeconomic characteristics.*

Economic, Military, and Diplomatic Linkages

For the transmission of influence, nevertheless, bilateral linkage, understood as the density of Chinese ties with other states, is a precondition (Way and Levitsky 2007: 53, 54). It is anticipated that influence transmitted through bilateral ties is not limited to the direct imposition of policies but also operates on more indirect terms through the facilitation of anticipatory obedience as well as lesson-drawing, transnational policy coordination and political cooperation (Bennett 1991: 227–229; Holzinger and Knill 2005: 779–781, 782–785).

With regard to economic linkages, I argue in line with the reviewed literature that tools of economic statecraft like control of imports, provision of trade facilitations and direct investments as well as granting of aid enable China to influence the foreign policy behavior of economically weaker partners and to coerce them into support for core diplomatic interests (Baldwin 1985: 42; Deibel 2007: 209, 243–268; Mastanduno 2008: 172, 178). High levels of foreign policy alignment should thus be expected in less-developed countries where China has during the last decade extended its presence as an important buyer of natural resource, major source of foreign investments and donor of untied aid. In the forefront of the 2005 World Summit, for instance, the Chinese government demonstrated how its economic power helped to convince African

¹⁰ Also in case of Chinese attempts to exercise political influence over the foreign policy behavior of another state, overlapping political norms and values in the latter country should ease these attempts because they should be not so likely perceived a threat to the domestic political consensus. Or, looked at it from a different angle, “[g]overnments from countries that respect freedom of speech domestically may be more inclined to reject Chinese pressure either because they wish to signal support to these values or because they would face harsh criticism from their publics if they would cave to Chinese pressure.” See Erik Voeten, “Freedom and (Not) Attending the Nobel Peace Prize Ceremony”, online: http://themonkeycage.org/blog/2010/12/09/press_freedom_and_not_attendin/ (6-9-2011).

¹¹ See the UNGA resolution “Situation of human rights in Myanmar“, online: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/527/00/PDF/N1052700.pdf?OpenElement> (9-4-2012); and the corresponding voting records, online: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2010/ga11043.doc.htm> (9-4-2012).

states not to support India's bid for a permanent seat in the Security Council (Hart and Jones 2010: 73).

Quantitative studies on the influence of US aid disbursements and UNGA voting corroborate the assumed mechanism: changing the size of development assistance and providing untied aid (general budget support, grants) indeed buys votes in UNGA (Dreher et al. 2008: 155–156; Wang 1999: 207).¹² In addition, trade dependence increases the responsiveness to external demands, including the unspoken ones, due to fears of losing market access and other economic benefits, and causes economically weaker states to accommodate with the foreign policy interest of the more powerful one (Dreher et al. 2008: 155; Keohane and Nye 1977).¹³

Similar mechanisms should function through military trade. Controlling arms transfers enables the more powerful state in a dyad to impose foreign policy choices on (a weaker) recipient state according to the former's core interests (Sullivan et al. 2011: 279).¹⁴ Thus, the link between arms trade and foreign policy alignment should be observed for "small, poor countries (mainly in Africa) who cannot afford more advanced systems, and countries such as Burma and Sudan whose access to the global arms market is restricted", as well as for Pakistan (Medeiros 2009: 91–92). The latter being China's only quasi-military ally. In addition, in cases when China's arms trade is associated with further military activities like high-official visits and exchange programs voting similarity becomes even more likely due to the increased level of bilateral exchange (Ellis 2011a: 5–6).

Finally, strong political ties possibly further increase foreign policy similarity. The availability of manifold diplomatic links or networks not only allows for the transmission of material goods but also enables the exchange of non-material such as knowledge and information which may facilitate bilateral policy coordination (Hafner-Burton et al. 2009: 562, 571; Holzinger and Knill 2005: 781–782). Besides, in the context of an asymmetrical distribution of political power, the mechanisms operating through political ties are not restricted to transnational communication but can include political conditionality and coercion as well.¹⁵

The above-made assumptions lead to the following expectations regarding economic, military and diplomatic linkages as causes of states' high levels of foreign policy similarity with Chinese positions in international politics:

¹² For a comparative study analyzing the effects of US and Soviet aid, see Kul Rai (1980); on Soviet aid and trade, see Philip Roeder (1985) and Kunihiko Imai (1992). Contradicting results, however, are reported by Charles Kegley and Steven Kook (1991) in their study of US aid and UN voting during Ronald Reagan's term in office. To the best of my knowledge, no similar analysis exists for the Chinese case. Studies dealing directly with China in the UN concentrate on the identification of patterns of voting affinity with China in the UNGA (Chai 1979) or with China's general UN policy (Kim 1979).

¹³ Assessing the impact of Chinese influence on Malaysian politics, Brian Andrews et al. (2007: 17) conclude that the "Malaysian government tries to avoid antagonizing China and considers Chinese interests when formulating policy" and that "[t]here is also limited evidence to suggest that the Malaysian government has taken certain actions out of fear of potential Chinese retaliatory actions."

¹⁴ Sullivan et al. (2011), however, fail to prove this link in their statistical analysis and argue that defense alliances are the best predictors of US military aid allocations (ibid.: 290). Derouen and Heo (2004: 467) also only find limited support of the strategic use of military assistance by the US to induce accommodation to US foreign policy interests.

¹⁵ Whenever transnational communication is the main transmission channel in a country's political relations with China, possible mechanism at work include lesson-drawing, transnational problem solving, emulation of policies and international policy promotion (Holzinger and Knill 2005: 783–786).

Hypothesis 2a: *States with strong economic linkages with China and/ or a high degree of trade and aid dependence tend to exhibit higher levels of foreign policy similarity.*

Hypothesis 2b: *States with strong military linkages with China through arms trade and regular military contacts tend to align more frequently with Chinese foreign policy interests.*

Hypothesis 2c: *Strong political linkages with China induce high levels of bilateral foreign policy similarity.*

4 Data and Methods

The data set used to test the plausibility of the assumptions includes annual observations on all UN member states except China for the period from 1991 to 2010.¹⁶ The sample period accounts, on the one hand, for the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and changing alignment patterns in the post-Cold War international system (Kim and Russett 1996: 641; Voeten 2000a: 213). On the other, China's foreign policy relations entered a period of normalization and adjustment in the 1990s and Beijing began to promote its diplomatic interests by entering the first special partnerships with individual countries as well as stepping up bilateral and multilateral cooperation in general (Goldstein 2005: 119, 130–135).

Dependent Variable: Foreign Policy Similarity

The study's dependent variable measures foreign policy similarity with China on the basis of UNGA vote records.¹⁷ It is based on a similarity score ranging from -1 (least similar interests) to 1 (most similar interests) using the three main categories of UN voting data (approval, disapproval and abstentions). The three binary dependent variables take a value of 1 for all countries belonging to the group of nations in the 75th and 90th percentile as well as in the 25th percentile of all observations ranked by their similarity score, respectively.¹⁸ The two first variables are taken as measures for (very) high levels of *foreign policy similarity* whereas the latter one represents *foreign policy dissimilarity*.

For the calculation of the similarity score, I draw on chance-corrected agreement indices (Häge 2011). The procedure addresses the question of affinity in the same way as Curtis Signorino and Jeffrey Ritter's (1999) widely used *S* score by measuring distances between state positions and then converting the dissimilarity into a similarity score. Häge, however, follows a different approach with regard to the standardization of dissimilarity values. For the "case where foreign policy ties are cheap", for instance, voting in the UNGA, he takes into account that some differences are harder to achieve than others and, thus, corrects dissimilarity proportions upwards (Häge 2011: 294–295, 302). A major consequence of the correction is that agreement indices are on average lower than the *S* score, do not concentrate at high levels of similarity and, thus, provide a more realistic and conservative depiction of foreign policy similarity with China.

¹⁶ The population of the dataset was generated using the EUGene software and has a total of 3,724 observations (Version 3.204) (Bennett and Stam 2000).

¹⁷ The voting data for the years until 2008 is taken from Voeten and Merdzanovic (2009). The years 2009 and 2010 have been coded on the basis of the vote records provided by the United Nations Bibliographic Information System. See UBISNET, online: <http://unbisnet.un.org/> (7-1-2012). I also added a variable coding each resolution's corresponding UNGA main committee to be able to differentiate between policy-dimensions.

¹⁸ Table A-1 in the Annex provides a country list for the 75th percentile in 1991, 2000 and 2010.

Using UNGA votes for calculating the similarity of states' foreign policy positions with China bears the advantage that data is available for all states of the international system and a for long time period. Although the votes in the General Assembly are often criticized as purely symbolic, the data comes with two further advantages. For one, it is less distorted precisely because of the more symbolic nature of UNGA votes. On the other hand, UNGA votes expose a higher variance than other foreign policy decisions like, for instance, the choice of alliances partners and, thus, contain more information on a nations' foreign policy portfolio (Gartzke 2006; Voeten 2000b: 185–186). However, one has to bear in mind that the resolutions' topics concentrate on international security, humanitarian and other political issues.¹⁹ Resolutions in the Economic and Financial Committee account only for a small fraction of votes and, thus, the data has little meaning to depict foreign policy similarity in this policy field.

Figure 1 illustrates the development of the similarity score from the 45th/46th throughout the 64th/65th UNGA session in selected policy issues. It indicates that foreign policy similarity with China basically follows the voting on social and humanitarian issues and on resolutions on disarmament and international security.

[Figure 1 here]

With regard to the regional distribution of the similarity score in the recent past, the data reveals that high degrees of affinity are to be found mainly in South-Eastern Asia and Southern Asia but also in Central Asia countries as well as in Northern Southern, and Western African states.²⁰ The findings further endorse the claim that a China receives growing levels of support for its foreign policy positions: Particularly in the Caribbean, South America, Central and Western Asia the proportion of shared votes have risen considerably in the last two decades. In contrast, very low (and decreasing) levels of voting similarity are observed in the United States and Canada as well as European and Oceanian states.

Independent Variables

With regard to explanatory factors, the study contains two variables to measure shared institutional and socioeconomic characteristics in domestic and international affairs and a number of indicators for different dimensions of diplomatic, economic and military linkages with China.²¹ Due to limitations in data availability, however, I was not able to include China's outgoing foreign direct investments and other proxies for military linkage than bilateral arms trade.

Regime Similarity. Countries that resemble Chinese political norms and values are more likely to pursue similar interest in international affairs and have less incentive to regard Chinese influence attempts as a normative threat. I constructed an ordinal variable on the basis of Freedom House's average ratings of civil liberties and political rights and compared each country's score with the Chinese one (Teorell et al. 2011).

¹⁹ In the last decade, almost one third of the resolutions were related to disarmament and the international security (First Committee), one fourth to social and humanitarian issues (Third Committee) and a fifth to other political objective (Fourth Committee).

²⁰ Table A-2 in the Annex summarizes the regional distribution of of the similarity score.

²¹ Table A-3 in the Appendix reports descriptive statistics.

The resulting variable ranges from zero (totally opposed political beliefs) to six (very close matches of shared political norms and values).

Global Involvement. To compare a country's involvement in international politics and society with China's enmeshment, I draw on the KOF Index of Globalization (Dreher 2006).²² The resulting ordinal variable combines the political and social dimension and ranges from one (low equivalence) to seven (high equivalence). Economic globalization is excluded, because UNGA votes hardly touch topics of international trade and finance.

Diplomatic Exchange. Turning to the bilateral political relations, I first control whether a country maintains diplomatic relations with Beijing at the level of chargé d'affaires, ministers or ambassadors or not.²³ As this constitutes a very weak indicator of dense diplomatic ties, the effects are expected to be very low.

Shared IGO membership. This variable measures dense political ties through joint membership in international governmental organizations and draws on data collected by Pevehouse et al. (2004) and Wallace and Singer (1970).²⁴ The ordinal four-point scale takes a value of one for weak diplomatic ties (0-15 joint memberships) and four if ties are strong (46-64 joint memberships).

Strategic Partners. Strategic partners are defined as countries which maintain a cooperative, comprehensive or strategic partnership with China. In particular since the beginning of the 2000s, Beijing has been intensifying its bilateral relations with countries in Middle East, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia (Goldstein 2005: 130–135; Zhu 2010: 9). The binary variable has been coded on the basis of information of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs' webpage, newspaper articles and secondary literature (Medeiros 2009: 79–81, 83–85).

Trade Dependence. With regard to economic linkages, I measure trade dependence on China by the volume of trade with China as the portion of a country's total external trade. To test for Beijing's power as a buyer and seller, similar measures are calculated for a state's export and import dependence. The raw trade data has been obtained from the UN International Merchandise Trade Statistics.²⁵

Aid Projects. To examine whether Chinese aid functions as a transmission channel of influence or not, I include a binary variable taking the value of 1 if a country received any number of Chinese aid projects in a given year. As foreign aid is expected to be used to induce foreign policy behavior on recipient states *ex ante* as well as to reward or punish partner countries *ex post*, I added a two-year moving average of the number of Chinese aid projects reported by AidDATA.²⁶

Arms trade. Arms trade includes transfers of major conventional weapons from China to a country as reported in the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. Following the coding

²² This paper draws on the 2011 version of KOF Index of Globalization, online: <http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/> (24-2-2012).

²³ Reşat Bayer, Diplomatic Exchange Data set (v2006.1), online: <http://correlatesofwar.org> (26-9-2011).

²⁴ International Governmental Organization Data (v2.3), online: <http://correlatesofwar.org> (26-9-2011).

²⁵ United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database, online: <http://comtrade.un.org/db/> (26-9-2011).

²⁶ AidData collected project-level aid data reported by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce for the period from 1990 to 2005 (excluding 2002), online: <http://www.aiddata.org/research/china> (7-9-2011).

and reasoning regarding aid projects, I included a binary variable taking the value of 1 if a country received any amount of major conventional weapons from China as well as the two-year moving average of SIPRI's trend-indicator value (TIV) in US\$.²⁷

National Capabilities. Various studies suggest that more resourceful states experience less difficulties to resist influence attempts by third parties than weaker states (Buono de Mesquita and Smith 2007; Dreher et al. 2008; Sullivan et al. 2011). To differentiate between the effects of different dimensions of national capabilities, I use a disaggregated index containing three categories for measuring a state's industrial resource consumption, demographic and military power capabilities, respectively (Singer 1988; Singer et al. 1972).²⁸

Research Strategy

To test the hypotheses, the study employs logistic regression estimation with robust standard errors. The basic assumption is that the effects of the explanatory variables on the outcome become stronger when moving up to the group of countries with (very) high levels of foreign policy similarity and to be non-significant and/or negative otherwise. Furthermore, I separately estimate dynamic logistic models to test whether the explanatory variables affect the onset of foreign policy similarity, its duration or both.

The model's independent variables are all measured with a temporal lag of one year as it is assumed that the existence of interstate linkages and similarity in state attributes has to precede the outcome of interest.²⁹ Further, I expect voting coincidence in the UNGA having high duration dependence. Under normal circumstances, states do not change their foreign policy priorities overnight. To minimize the problem of temporal dependence, I include a variable counting the years since the last time a country had a positive outcome on the dependent variable. In addition, the regressions employ different approaches to temporal splines (Beck et al. 1998; Carter and Signorino 2010).

5 Results

To what extent do shared institutional and socioeconomic characteristics in domestic and international affairs and the presence of strong diplomatic, economic and military linkages help to explain variations in foreign policy similarity? Table 1 to 3 present the results of the empirical analysis on this question.

The statistical evidence strongly supports the assumption that much of the variance in foreign policy similarity is related to shared political attributes and similar level of socio-political globalization (Hypothesis 1a, 1b). The two respective variables' coefficients are positive and highly significant throughout all except the sixth models. Indeed, Model 6 provides further support for the first two hypotheses: Choosing foreign policy dissimilarity as dependent variable, the coefficients of *Regime similarity* and

²⁷ The TIV estimates the value of the transferred military resources rather than the real volume in US\$. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfers Database, Trade register and Importer/Exporter TIV tables, online: <http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers> (5-9-2011).

²⁸ National capabilities are measured by the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC, v4.0) score which combines data on military personnel and expenditure, total and urban population as well as iron and steel production and energy consumption. Online: <http://correlatesofwar.org> (6-1-2012).

²⁹ As mentioned above, this assumption will be relaxed by testing the two-year moving averages of aid and arms trade to account for the fact that both can be made an instrument for *ex ante* inducement and *ex post* reward or punishment.

Global involvement change numerical signs to the negative (Model 6 in Table 1). Expressed in odds ratios, a one unit increase in *Regime similarity* and *Global involvement* reduces the chance of foreign policy dissimilarity (*p25*) with China by around 21 and 18 percent, respectively, whereas it increases the probability of foreign policy similarity (*p75*) by 56 and 26 percent.³⁰

[Table 1 here]

The control variables operate largely in line with the findings of previous studies. According the expectations, foreign policy similarity exhibits high temporal dependence. Each elapsed year a country did not reach a high level of foreign policy similarity reduces the likelihood of future foreign policy similarity significantly. Natural cubic splines having a knot at the first year of *Years* support this claim. Further, resourceful countries share on average less often Chinese foreign policy positions. This effect, however, is restricted to industrial resources (*Capabilities (resources)*). A numerous population, indeed, increases the likelihood of foreign policy similarity.³¹

Turning to the impact of political linkages, the statistical evidence gives only limited support for hypothesis 1c. The inclusion of measurements for strong diplomatic ties and the co-presence in IGO does not add much explanatory power to Model 1. The diplomatic recognition of the PRC, after all entailing the acceptance of the one-China principle, seems to be only partially correlated with foreign policy similarity (Model 2 and 3). The effect of *Diplomatic exchange* fails to have an impact when re-estimating the model for the years after 1999. Rather surprisingly, neither do specialized relations between a country and China in general increase the chance of foreign policy similarity (Model 5).

In fact, the data indicates that maintaining a strategic partnership with China increases the chance of disagreement on resolution (Model 6 and Table A-4). Nevertheless, strategic partnerships have an increasing effect explaining very high levels of foreign policy similarity (*p90*). Identifying influential observations within these models sheds light on this, at a first glance, contradicting result. With regard to foreign policy dissimilarity the results are driven by observations of democratic European countries like the France, Greece, Italy, Poland, Romania, Spain, and the United Kingdom as well as Brazil. On the other hand, Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Russia, Sri Lanka, and Venezuela account for the influential observations regarding high levels of foreign policy similarity (*p90*). The successful implementation of a partnerships' objectives such as "coordination in international affairs", "adopting common foreign policy positions", "cooperation on nontraditional security issues" and "promoting China's concepts of 'democracy and equality in international relations'" seems to be limited to countries with medium to high levels of regime similarity in the Global South (Medeiros 2009: 86).

The only observed diplomatic linkage that is fully in line with the assumptions is that of *Shared IGO membership* (Model 4). A one unit increase of the variable nearly doubles the likelihood of a country's foreign policy similarity with China.

Table 2 reports the results for economic and military linkages. With regard to trade relations, Model 7 and Model 8 indicate that China's influence stems less from its

³⁰ The coefficients and odds ratios of all models are summarized in Table A-4 of the Annex.

³¹ The military dimension of national capabilities is not included due to its high correlation with *Capabilities (resources)*. Tested in separate model, it further did not show up to be significant at conventional statistical levels.

position as a major export destination in bilateral relations. Only in the case of countries showing very high levels of foreign policy similarity (*p90*), *Export dependence* becomes statistically significant and, expressed in odds ratios, makes it fourteen times more likely that countries shows a high level of foreign policy similarity (Table A-4). In general, economic influence generally seems to function better through a country's trade dependence on China and the PRC's position as a seller in particular. Typical country-cases for the latter observation include Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sudan, United Arab Emirates and Vietnam.

[Table 2 here]

A positive effect of foreign aid disbursements on foreign policy similarity, as reported in the cited studies on US aid and voting in the UNGA, seems also valid in the Chinese case. Receiving any number of aid projects from China makes bilateral foreign policy similarity more feasible. Although the coefficient for the binary aid variable does not reach significance at conventional statistical levels, its sign points the right direction (Model 9). It is demonstrated rather by the two-year moving average of the number of Chinese aid projects, which strongly correlates with the recipients' foreign policy similarity (Model 10). This effect may be driven by the fact that many aid projects take considerable time between the first agreement and their realization. Moreover, it may indicate that more aid buys more support.

The contrary is true for arms trade. The fact that a country has received major conventional weapons from China is more important than the actual size of these deals to encourage governments to accommodate with Chinese foreign policy choices (Model 11 and 12). Taken together, the results on China's economic and military linkages provide general support for the plausibility of hypotheses 2b and 2c.

Finally, the results from estimating a combined model containing indicators for political, economic and military linkages are presented in Table 3. Model 13 confirms the main assumptions. The coefficients of the explanatory variables point into the same direction as in the separate estimations and, by large, reach the 10 percent confidence level or better. Only aid disbursements and arms transfers exhibit lower confidence levels of 12.9 and 10.1 percent, respectively.³²

With regard to the question whether the different explanatory factors are more likely to transmit influence in the form of *ex-ante* inducements or *ex-post* rewards, Table 3 further presents the separate estimations of dynamic logistic models.

[Table 3 here]

The results of Model 14 and 15 suggest that the explanatory variables can be divided into three groups with different effects on foreign policy similarity: First, initial evidence is provided that political ties through shared membership in a large number of intergovernmental organizations as well as high trade dependence on China are less a prerequisite of foreign policy similarity but rather the consequence and help to maintain it. Second, shared regime characteristics and comparable patterns of socio-political

³² As non-random pattern of missing observations in time-series cross-sections may distort the results, I re-estimated Model 13 after imputing the missing data. The re-estimation yields qualitatively similar results. The multiple imputation was executed with the program Amelia II (version 1.6.1) written by James Honaker, Gary King and Matthew Blackwell, see "Amelia II: A Programm for Missing Data", online: <http://gking.harvard.edu/amelia/> (12-4-2012); and Honaker and King (2010).

involvement in the international system seem to be important facilitating factors of foreign policy similarity independently from the focus on onset or duration. The respective coefficients throughout the models in Table 3 are all positive and statistically significant. Third, some evidence is provided that only the implementation of aid projects and the supply of major conventional weapons by China induce foreign policy similarity (Model 14).³³

Discussion of Results

The results have two major implications for the study of China's rise in global affairs and sources of the country's political clout. First, the statistical analysis provides evidence for the importance of shared regime characteristics and comparable patterns of global socio-political involvement in explaining the incidence as well as the onset and duration of foreign policy similarity. This emphasizes the need to disentangle the impact of bilateral linkages as transmitter of different types of influence from the effects of domestic regime characteristic as well as processes of parallel problem solving. The two latter factors function independently from indirect influence and the possible imposition of policies of a dyad's more powerful actors by exploiting asymmetrically distributed economic or political resources. As outlined in the theoretical section, they are regarded as facilitating factors for policy imposition as well as cooperation and policy coordination through transnational communication. Future analyses on China's ability to translate economic power into political influence should, thus, consider including interactions with such country-related factors.

Second, this study provides first statistical evidence for the concurrence of economic linkage and foreign policy similarity. On one hand, aid projects and arms supply enable China to buy influence from recipient countries. This stands in contrast to findings "that at least the US tend to use aid more often as a reward for a country's prior voting alignment than as an *ex ante* inducement" (Derouen and Heo 2004: 468) and points to the diverse use of tools of economic statecraft in different political cultures. As prior studies have found that at least in Latin America the opportunities to employ economic statecraft is limited with the exception of smaller countries in Central America and the Caribbean (Jenkins 2010: 830), future research should investigate whether the effects of aid disbursements are contingent with the recipient country's size and development stage.

On the other hand, influence through dense trade ties does not seem to function generally by reverting to power as a buyer. The results indicate that a good political understanding is conducive to high levels of economic exchange with China. Thus, contrary to common wisdom, the assumption that economic interdependence provides a source of direct political influence in asymmetrical relations, which goes back to Albert Hirschman's (1980 [1945]) work on state power and international trade patterns, may be only one side of the medal (Wagner 1988: 472). Extending the liberal peace argument, it can be expected that trade interdependence leads to converging foreign policy interests in the long run, because it eases interstate cooperation (Dreher et al. 2008: 155; Oneal et

³³ The binary variable of arms trade as used in Model 11 is not statistically significant in Models 14 and 15, indicating that the effectiveness of using arms transfers as an inducement depends on the volume of the traded military goods. This assumption is supported by re-estimating Model 14 taking the yearly size of Chinese arms exports to a partner country (results not reported).

al. 2003: 374).³⁴ This argument may be translated to the political dimension as the results on shared membership in intergovernmental relations suggest.

5 Conclusion

The primary aim of this paper was to assess the plausibility of different theoretical explanations for similarities between a state's foreign policy choices and Chinese diplomatic interests. It was argued that a better understanding of China's rise in international affairs and of the underlying patterns of international support is gained by taking a step back and considering the Chinese government's ability to coerce other states into accommodating with its interests as just one of several explaining factors. Thus, beside China's economic relations with other countries I included diplomatic and military linkages as well as shared institutional and socio-political characteristics in domestic and international affairs in the investigation.

This paper's findings endorse the claim, that the exertion of direct influence over other state's diplomatic choices is only one possible explanation of general foreign policy similarity with China. Important prerequisites of foreign policy alignment are rooted in shared regime characteristics and comparable levels of socio-economic globalization. Dense trade linkage and the co-presence in intergovernmental networks rather result from shared interests and explain the duration of high levels of foreign policy affinity.

Despite statistical evidence in support of the main theoretical explanations, the results should be neither over-interpreted nor could the analysis be regarded as a definite test for specific causal channels. The establishment of a causal link between foreign policy similarity and the study's explaining factors is not implied. The main contribution of this study can be seen in broadening the perspective on possible explanations of foreign policy similarity with China and providing first plausibility tests. More quantitative and qualitative work is needed to better understand the nature of China's political clout in international relations. It has also to be highlighted that the present study is concerned with general patterns of support for China's political interests and principles in international politics and less with incidences of China exertion of direct power over other states.

With regard to future comparative small-n studies on China's (in-)direct influence over the foreign policy behavior of other states and its ability to spread political values and principles, the data provided in this paper could serve as starting point and help to identify cases for in-depth study.

Besides conducting a more detailed analysis of the mechanisms at hand, interesting directions of future research are various. Regarding China's bilateral political relations, on the one hand, the scope of analysis could be broadened by considering data on China's leadership travel as done by Kastner and Saunders (2012) or introducing alternative and updated measurements for diplomatic linkages. Future analyses should also test the robustness of this paper's results by drawing on different measurements of the dependent variable like key votes and resolution that have been proposed or sponsored by China.

On the other hand, for instance, Beijing stepped up efforts to engage states in multilateral institutional settings, not only in Asia but also in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. Until now, this resulted in the establishment of the Shanghai Five/

³⁴ In a classical realist's world, this is especially likely since "economic relations between states strengthened 'like-minded' groups at the expense of others, and influenced the trajectory of how the national interest was defined" (Kirshner 2012: 69).

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 1996/2001, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000 and the China-Arab-Cooperation Forum (CACF) in 2004. China has further increased its presence in regional organizations in recent years.³⁵ This “forum diplomacy” allows Beijing to engage large groups of countries and facilitates Chinese influence in the respective regions (Medeiros 2009: 77–78, 159–160; Zhang 2010: 40). Thus far, little systematic research exists on the PRC’s ability to exert influence over political outcomes in global affairs by reverting to suchlike forums and benefitting from its position in intergovernmental networks (Hafner-Burton et al. 2009).

Finally, future systematic studies on China’s rise and the country’s perceived growing influence in international relations should abandon the rigid concentration on economic statecraft and rather focus on China’s ability to mobilize supporters among “like-minded” countries to achieve its goals international politics and to establish intergovernmental foreign policy networks to ease policy coordination and cooperation with major countries in the Global South. The findings of this paper suggest that China during its economic and political rise indeed became a “friend” or at least a “beacon”, at least to many leaders of developing countries in the Global South.

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³⁵ In Latin America, for instance, Beijing’s membership in the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and its observer status in the Organization of American States (OAS), as well as China’s participation in the bi-regional East Asia-Latin America Forum (EALAF).

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Tables & Figures

FIGURE 1: Foreign Policy Similarity with China, 1991-2010




TABLE 1: Foreign Policy Similarity: Shared Attributes and Political Linkages

	Model 1 (p75)		Model 2 (p75)		Model 3 (p75) 2000s		Model 4 (p75)		Model 5 (p75)		Model 6 (p25)	
<i>Diplomatic exchange</i> _{t-1}			0.597**	(0.252)	0.384	(0.382)						
<i>Shared IGO membership</i> _{t-1}							0.653****	(0.103)				
<i>Strategic partners</i> _{t-1}									0.483	(0.347)	0.995****	(0.304)
<i>Regime similarity</i> _{t-1}	0.445****	(0.0490)	0.445****	(0.0525)	0.424****	(0.0840)	0.491****	(0.0412)	0.444****	(0.0490)	-0.231****	(0.0413)
<i>Global involvement</i> _{t-1}	0.237****	(0.0485)	0.228****	(0.0522)	0.402****	(0.0820)	0.208****	(0.0436)	0.233****	(0.0481)	-0.201****	(0.0512)
<i>Capabilities (population)</i> _{t-1}	27.08**	(11.39)	29.93**	(12.24)	17.28**	(6.465)	24.38**	(9.813)	27.11***	(10.42)	-67.89**	(28.00)
<i>Capabilities (resources)</i> _{t-1}	-35.50**	(17.14)	-40.98**	(19.33)	-23.85**	(10.69)	-55.24****	(19.39)	-41.46**	(18.43)	37.58****	(10.57)
<i>Years</i>	-1.678****	(0.188)	-1.594****	(0.190)	-1.678****	(0.300)	-1.538****	(0.181)	-1.672****	(0.187)	-1.623****	(0.175)
<i>Spline1</i>	-0.226****	(0.0609)	-0.221****	(0.0636)	-0.275***	(0.0977)	-0.209***	(0.0637)	-0.224****	(0.0607)	-0.262****	(0.0586)
<i>Spline3</i>	0.0720**	(0.0285)	0.0753**	(0.0309)	0.108**	(0.0458)	0.0712**	(0.0308)	0.0708**	(0.0284)	0.0880***	(0.0285)
<i>Spline7</i>	0.000198	(0.00469)	-0.00305	(0.00579)	-0.0107	(0.00771)	-0.00274	(0.00568)	0.000492	(0.00470)	0.000325	(0.00539)
<i>cons</i>	-2.032****	(0.316)	-2.548****	(0.433)	-2.659****	(0.686)	-3.832****	(0.436)	-2.022****	(0.315)	1.778****	(0.222)
<i>N</i>	3150		2719		1413		2801		3150		3150	
<i>McKelvey & Zavoina's R²</i>	0.585		0.607		0.622		0.624		0.593		0.544	
<i>Wald chi²</i>	460.26		458.86		315.76		781.47		458.03		557.07	
<i>pseudo R²</i>	0.433		0.444		0.496		0.454		0.433		0.357	

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01, **** p<.001.

TABLE 2: Foreign Policy Similarity: Economic and Military Linkages

	Model 7 (p75)		Model 8 (p75)		Model 9 (p75)		Model 10 (p75)		Model 11 (p75)		Model 12 (p75)	
<i>Export dependence</i> _{t-1}	1.338	(1.020)										
<i>Import dependence</i> _{t-1}			5.908***	(2.085)								
<i>Aid projects (binary)</i> _{t-1}					0.252	(0.198)						
<i>Aid projects (average)</i> _{t-1}							0.391***	(0.136)				
<i>Arms trade (binary)</i> _{t-1}									0.980****	(0.238)		
<i>Arms trade (average)</i> _{t-1}											0.0138**	(0.00629)
<i>Regime similarity</i> _{t-1}	0.500****	(0.0622)	0.464****	(0.0561)	0.460****	(0.0525)	0.460****	(0.0525)	0.438****	(0.0492)	0.437****	(0.0494)
<i>Global involvement</i> _{t-1}	0.175***	(0.0663)	0.176***	(0.0573)	0.254****	(0.0523)	0.260****	(0.0522)	0.235****	(0.0474)	0.234****	(0.0469)
<i>Capabilities (population)</i> _{t-1}	22.53***	(8.247)	22.46***	(7.606)	33.17**	(15.32)	33.20**	(15.45)	24.22***	(7.860)	23.70***	(7.778)
<i>Capabilities (resources)</i> _{t-1}	-35.81*	(19.95)	-36.67*	(19.36)	-39.87**	(19.07)	-37.98**	(17.54)	-33.57**	(17.00)	-33.03**	(16.11)
<i>Years</i>	-1.516****	(0.235)	-1.355****	(0.215)	-1.734****	(0.194)	-1.731****	(0.195)	-1.610****	(0.186)	-1.647****	(0.187)
<i>Spline1</i>	-0.173**	(0.0836)	-0.141*	(0.0748)	-0.251****	(0.0639)	-0.251****	(0.0646)	-0.209****	(0.0607)	-0.223****	(0.0613)
<i>Spline3</i>	0.0529	(0.0392)	0.0397	(0.0351)	0.0858***	(0.0308)	0.0853***	(0.0312)	0.0646**	(0.0284)	0.0710**	(0.0287)
<i>Spline7</i>	0.0000462	(0.00605)	0.00168	(0.00553)	-0.00297	(0.00574)	-0.00276	(0.00581)	0.00108	(0.00469)	0.000142	(0.00473)
<i>cons</i>	-1.694****	(0.397)	-1.888****	(0.350)	-2.258****	(0.368)	-2.339****	(0.361)	-2.108****	(0.311)	-2.057****	(0.312)
<i>N</i>	2054		2254		2801		2801		3150		3150	
McKelvey & Zavoina's <i>R</i> ²	0.638		0.616		0.604		0.605		0.588		0.593	
Wald chi ²	384.40		392.32		456.98		466.79		486.08		465.86	
pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.497		0.473		0.443		0.445		0.439		0.438	

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01, **** p<.001.

TABLE 3: Foreign Policy Similarity: Onset and Duration

	Model 13 (<i>p</i> 75)		Model 14 (<i>p</i> 75) (in t1=0)		Model 15 (<i>p</i> 75) (in t1=1)	
<i>Diplomatic exchange</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	-0.157	(0.340)	0.433	(0.540)	-0.676	(0.458)
<i>Shared IGO membership</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	0.610****	(0.177)	0.215	(0.254)	0.901****	(0.250)
<i>Trade dependence</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	3.848*	(2.040)	-2.970	(3.509)	9.937*	(5.124)
<i>Aid projects (average)</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	0.245	(0.161)	0.824***	(0.268)	-0.193	(0.227)
<i>Arms trade (average)</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	0.00822	(0.00501)	0.0203***	(0.00621)	0.00404	(0.00698)
<i>Regime similarity</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	0.550****	(0.0794)	0.644****	(0.0984)	0.571****	(0.118)
<i>Global involvement</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	0.187***	(0.0723)	0.192**	(0.0861)	0.236**	(0.103)
<i>Capabilities (population)</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	20.40***	(6.297)	62.94**	(25.82)	12.04**	(5.210)
<i>Capabilities (resources)</i> _{<i>t</i>-1}	-47.03**	(19.92)	-71.35	(60.78)	-50.61****	(11.62)
<i>Years</i>	-1.433****	(0.237)				
<i>Spline1</i>	-0.198**	(0.0880)				
<i>Spline3</i>	0.0760*	(0.0425)				
<i>Spline7</i>	-0.00817	(0.00737)				
<i>cons</i>	-3.738****	(0.829)	-6.174****	(1.088)	-4.353****	(1.134)
<i>N</i>	1739		1293		446	
McKelvey & Zavoina's <i>R</i> ²	0.683		0.532		0.296	
Wald chi ²	435.51		116.53		51.05	
pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.529		0.234		0.158	

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. * *p*<.1, ** *p*<.05, *** *p*<.01, **** *p*<.001.

Annex

Table A-1: Countries by Level of Foreign Policy Similarity with China

Foreign Policy Similarity		1991	2000	2010
High (>p75)	Very high (>p90)	Cuba Zimbabwe Libya, Viet Nam Iran Brunei, Sri Lanka Malaysia Tunisia Laos Myanmar Indonesia Iraq Uganda Syria Namibia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia	Myanmar Egypt Oman Libya Algeria Sudan Laos Qatar Cuba, Bahrain, Viet Nam, Iran Jordan Tunisia Pakistan Saudi Arabia Syria Indonesia, Togo	Egypt Malaysia Oman, Indonesia Sudan Bangladesh, Brunei Qatar Libya Cuba Syria Kuwait Zimbabwe Viet Nam Myanmar Algeria Saudi Arabia Tunisia Venezuela Yemen, Mauritania
		Mauritania, Bangladesh Jordan, Algeria Guinea, Kuwait, Mexico Guatemala Morocco, Djibouti, Philippines, Tanzania UAE, Qatar Somalia North Korea Mali Yemen Comoros Lebanon Afghanistan Sudan Belize	Brunei Mauritania Lebanon Kuwait Morocco, North Korea Bangladesh UAE Malaysia Djibouti Sri Lanka, Ghana, Tanzania Philippines Nigeria, Gabon Zambia Maldives Senegal, Belarus Kenya Uganda Russia Burkina Faso, Nepal, Cambodia India Swaziland, Thailand, Saint Lucia	Iran Belarus Sri Lanka Laos Pakistan UAE, Bahrain, Singapore, Lebanon Nicaragua Senegal Guinea Comoros Cambodia Trinidad and Tobago Swaziland North Korea Thailand St. Vincent & the Gr. Ethiopia Barbados Ecuador Bolivia Grenada Jordan Niger Lesotho

Notes: The countries are displayed in descending order of their foreign policy similarity score. Comma-separated countries have identical similarity measures.

TABLE A-2: Foreign Policy Similarity with China by sub-regions

Region	Sub-region	1991-1995	1996-2000	2001-2005	2006-2010
<i>Africa</i>	Eastern Africa	0.160	0.196	0.319	0.315
	Middle Africa	0.034	0.141	0.034	0.171
	Northern Africa	0.448	0.582	0.777	0.693
	Southern Africa	0.181	0.194	0.303	0.409
	Western Africa	0.282	0.328	0.333	0.408
<i>Americas</i>	Caribbean	0.015	0.096	0.185	0.410
	Central America	-0.008	0.024	-0.015	0.189
	Northern America	-0.441	-0.377	-0.466	-0.518
	South America	0.051	0.055	0.151	0.323
<i>Asia</i>	Central Asia	-0.184	-0.002	0.152	0.501
	Eastern Asia	0.099	0.127	0.171	0.206
	South-Eastern Asia	0.436	0.556	0.582	0.587
	Southern Asia	0.406	0.511	0.539	0.550
	Western Asia	0.210	0.260	0.410	0.390
<i>Europe</i>	Eastern Europe	-0.147	-0.017	-0.002	0.030
	Northern Europe	-0.237	-0.152	-0.163	-0.146
	Southern Europe	-0.218	-0.128	-0.175	-0.119
	Western Europe	-0.233	-0.151	-0.179	-0.149
<i>Oceania</i>	Australia and New Zealand	-0.173	-0.096	-0.174	-0.205
	Melanesia	-0.071	0.103	-0.105	0.047
	Micronesia	-0.246	-0.408	-0.547	-0.504
	Polynesia	-0.149	-0.239	-0.151	-0.089
<i>Total</i>		0.070	0.132	0.161	0.228

Notes: The table displays the mean of foreign policy similarity scores by geographical UN sub-regions.

TABLE A-3: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Observations	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Country code	3724	2	990	462.0599	261.0795
Year	3724	1991	2010	2000.653	5.732933
Foreign policy similarity (p25)	3709	0	1	.2534376	.4350379
Foreign policy similarity (p75)	3709	0	1	.2550553	.4359511
Foreign policy similarity (p90)	3709	0	1	.1051496	.3067875
Regime similarity	3684	0	6	3.021444	1.91719
Global involvement	3425	1	7	4.077956	1.474292
Diplomatic exchange	2827	0	1	.8160594	.3875043
Shared IGO membership	2924	1	4	2.642271	.7968067
Strategic partners	3690	0	1	.0569106	.2317031
Trade dependence	2345	9.14e-06	.5460855	.0370901	.0465429
Export dependence	2371	1.53e-07	.8474987	.0268003	.0705369
Import dependence	2585	.0000118	.3109243	.0408971	.0405812
Aid projects (binary)	2926	0	1	.1254272	.3312593
Aid projects (average)	2926	0	5	.1628503	.3944711
Arms trade (binary)	3690	0	1	.0598916	.2373181
Arms trade (average)	3690	0	818	3.76084	28.14393
National Capabilities	3306	2.43e-07	.1527098	.0045578	.0135799
Capabilities (population)	3303	7.22e-07	.1313823	.0041665	.0114986
Capabilities (resources)	3240	0	.1793605	.0047657	.0165479
Capabilities (military)	3059	0	.2659235	.0053245	.0193815
Years (p25)	3709	0	20	5.368833	5.743563
Years (p75)	3709	0	20	5.675115	5.858165
Years (p90)	3709	0	20	7.909679	6.102609

TABLE A-4: Summary of Effects of Explanatory Variable

Model	Variable	Foreign Policy Similarity					
		(p25)		(p75)		(p90)	
		Coeff.	OR	Coeff.	OR	Coeff.	OR
1	Regime similarity _{t-1}	-0.239****	0.787	0.444****	1.560	0.642****	1.900
	Global involvement _{t-1}	-0.196****	0.822	0.2370****	1.267	0.212***	1.236
2	Diplomatic exchange _{t-1}	-0.057	0.944	0.597**	1.816	1.823****	6.192
3	Diplomatic exchange _{t-1}	0.097	1.102	0.384	1.468	1.816**	6.150
4	Shared IGO membership _{t-1}	0.021	1.021	0.653****	1.922	0.745****	2.107
5, 6	Strategic partners _{t-1}	0.995***	2.706	0.483	1.621	1.414***	4.114
7	Export dependence _{t-1}	-3.501**	0.030	1.338	3.813	2.666**	14.387
8	Import dependence _{t-1}	-2.652	0.070	5.908*	368.035	12.851****	381541.2
9	Aid projects (binary) _{t-1}	-0.399*	0.671	0.252	1.286	-0.078	0.926
10	Aid projects (average) _{t-1}	-0.442*	0.643	0.391***	1.479	0.020	1.021
11	Arms trade (binary) _{t-1}	-1.259**	0.284	0.980****	2.664	0.968****	2.632
12	Arms trade (average) _{t-1}	-0.009	0.991	0.014**	1.014	0.006****	1.007

Notes: OR = Odds ratios. For details, see Table 1 to 3. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001.