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Relationships Between Mayors and Economic Elites at the Local Level in Southern European Countries

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Abstract
This paper aims to explore the relationships between political and economic elites at local level in Southern Europe countries. We focus on France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, countries that share the same type of government and present common patterns in the interactions between political and business leaders. These countries belong to the “strong mayor” form of local government, where, according to Mouritzen and Svara’s typology of horizontal power relations, mayors control the city council and are in full charge of all executive functions. Also, taking into account Hesse and Sharpe’s typology for local-central government relations, these countries belong to the Franco type, where the local government structures the territorial interest intermediation and mayors represent communities' interests before higher government levels. We use a survey of political leaders in European local governments as the empirical material to nurture our study.
0. Introduction

Our starting point is the fact that businesspeople are privileged in their relations with political authorities. According to Charles E. Lindblom (1991), private business has a privileged position in the public policy process. It performs functions that affect the whole of society, functions which might be thought of as public functions. Thanks to this privileged position, businesspeople have priority over other interest groups or citizens. Consequently, businesspeople are involved in routine discussions with public authorities and are continuously required to provide information and advice, such that behavioural habits of interaction are established (1991: 105).

In the present paper we explore some mayors' personal features in Southern European countries to determine whether they have an impact on the relationships between political and economic elites at local level. We have access to empirical material connected with these relations, the dataset from the POLLEADER (Political Leaders in European Local Governments) international research project. Although this project was not conceived to analyse these topics, some of the 300 variables of the questionnaire inquire about the perceived influence of private actors over local authorities and the frequency of contact between them. The POLLEADER survey of European mayors (see results in Bäck et al, 2006) aimed to contribute to a better understanding of the evolving role of local leaders in different European democracies and to facilitate comparisons. It was conducted in 2004 and 2005 and includes responses from approximately 2,700 city leaders of municipalities with populations of over 10,000 in 17 European countries. The project analyses the recruitment, working conditions, value and role orientations, and the actions of local mayors as well as the institutional set-ups forming the action space of local governance in European countries.

We will explore these data to study some aspects of the relationships between economic and political elites at the local level, according to mayors' own perceptions when answering questions related to these relationships. Although the survey is larger in scope, we will focus exclusively on data from questions regarding: a) frequency of contact with representatives of business interests, and b) the perceived influence of these interests. The particular questions the survey asked about those issues were:

v137: On the basis of your experience as a mayor/councillor in this City, and
independently of the formal procedures, please indicate how influential each of
the following actors is over the Local Authority activities: Local businessmen.

4 High influence – 0 No influence

v76: How frequently do you have contact with the following individuals or
groups? -Private business representatives.

(4) Daily – (3) 2-4 times a week – (2) Once a week – (1) 1-3 times
a month – (0) Never/Seldom

The responses will help us to answer two research questions that we present in this
paper:

a) Do leaders’ particular characteristics influence the patterns of relationships
between local authorities and local businesspeople in Southern European local
democracies?

b) Does the type of local government matter in relationships between mayors and
local businesspeople?

Although business/local authority relationships are multifaceted, in the present
analysis we analyze them only through responses regarding the “influence perceived by
mayors” and the “frequency of contacts.”

The present paper is divided into three parts. In the first part, we present some
theoretical approaches for studying mayors' particular characteristics and the interaction
with local private actors. In the second part, we compile the existing typologies for local
government systems. In the final part, we comment on the analysis and findings
concerning the relationships between mayors and local business elites in Southern
European countries.

1. Mayors and Local Private Actors.

As the present research is confined to the local level, our theoretical framework
focuses on urban politics approaches within the academic literature.

According to Nicholls (2005: 783), mayors of important cities are now embedded
in complex networks with many territorial authorities, although they are still “the pre-
In urban politics the main question is no longer “Who actually governs?” (Dahl, 1961: 1), but “How is governance achieved?” (Stone, 1986; Nicholls, 2005).

Urban governance takes into account the manifold actors involved in urban space. Peter John (2001: 40) summarises the concept of “urban governance” as follows:

*Governance is about the move toward a more informal form of politics. As a shift away from relatively restricted and formalized patterns of public decision-making, governance derives from the diverse sets of relationships across the many organizations occupying the local space.*

As Le Galès pointed out, private-sector actors play a more important role, as the type and organisation of private actors is among the most significant factors in explaining the urban governance regime and its political orientation in European cities (Bagnasco and Le Galès, 2000: 179). Further, some private-sector actors and organised business interests are likely to contribute to urban governance and to orientate their strategies in order to contribute to the production of certain collective goods, especially in European medium-sized/regional cities, which comprise the majority of the European urban structure (2000: 180). In this vein, Molins et al (2010) find in their studies that business associations (and interest groups as a whole) usually adapt to state structures rather than the other way around.

The findings of Bagnasco and Le Gales are particularly relevant to our research, insofar as private interests seem not to be as organised as has historically been the case with corporatism, but it is possible to find indications of private actors' mobilisation in different kinds of cities (2000: 180). Others scholars, like Harding et al (2000: 975), highlight the weakness in the literature on the private-sector role in urban governance. The literature is not focused on the “influence that business interests have over local governing arrangements and practices;” for this reason there is also a lack of methodological guidelines for research on business influence on local politics.

In general, scholars who cover our research topic tend to agree on the importance of economic interests in local decision-making processes. For instance, according to

*There can be no doubt that these businessmen are playing an increasingly important part in setting agendas for urban development. So much so that they appear to be eclipsing the role of elected councillors, who seem powerless but to endorse these agendas, albeit in the face saving language of 'partnership'.*

In their research on local business actors in the United Kingdom, North et al (2001:831) acknowledge that the debate on the degree of influence and leadership exerted by business groups is still open, while it seems quite clear that business representatives are closely involved in the formal apparatus of local policy-making (Deas and Ward, 1999; Imrie and Raco, 1999).

Regarding organisation, according to Le Galès (2000: 185), private-sector actors in cities are either weakly, or not at all, organised. Leaders of city councils tend to avoid established institutions when seeking to build links with local business communities; rather they try to “build more personal networks of people,” because these new “relationships tend to be built upon concrete achievements.” This is a relevant idea for our present research, suggesting as it does that personal features are important in shaping these networks.

There are some other theories that must be taken into account. On the one hand, urban regime theory studies the way in which “urban local authorities need to build bridges with other interests” (Harding et al, 2000: 983). Harding (1994: 359-360) summarised the main elements of urban regime theory, arguing that liberal democracies have two interdependent systems of authorities: one based on popular control (organs of representative government) and another based on the ownership of private productive assets (especially the business community). Urban regime theory aims to combine classic community power studies (Hunter, Mills) with the insights of urban political economy. It assumes that cooperation with non-governmental actors is essential for the effectiveness of local governments (Stoker and Mossberger, 1994: 197). In addition, as De Socio summarises, urban regime theory can be used to explore “the political nature of regime coalitions and coalitions building,” since one of its principles is based on the assumption that “business elites occupy privileged positions within regime coalitions because of the scope of resources and expertise they command and cities require for
economic development and/or fiscal solvency” (2007: 340).

At the same time, the growth-machine thesis is also relevant (Molotch, 1976; Logan and Molotch, 1987), as it claims that entrepreneurs’ activity is a key factor in shaping the urban system. Logan and Molotch focus on how growth strategies are defined and used by local business groups and how business leaders attract support from other interests, such as local authorities. Local authorities are, for Logan and Molotch, natural allies, concerned with increasing growth.

Also worth noting is Keith Bassett’s work on the different forms of partnership between the public and private sectors related to economic development in Great Britain, which argues that these “partnerships have acted as vehicles for the entry of local business leaders into urban politics and policy-making.” (1996: 539)

In sum, all the approaches that tackle the relationships between political and business elites at the local level point out that the participation of economic groups in urban governance is clear and increasingly important. However, how to measure this implication and its exerted influence is still an open question.

One of the factors within the typology affecting pressure group effectiveness that Grant presents (1989: 117, 128) is the political party in office: “The party in office can make a considerable difference to the political influence exerted by a pressure group,” although “two governments with the same party label can be very different in their approach to pressure group activity”. Indeed, Wilson and Grant (2010: 204) argue that centre-Right parties are usually considered “pro-business.” Consequently, regarding the political aspect, we take into account the fact that relationships between parties and business groups may vary depending on the particular parties involved (Allern, 2010:57). For example, conservative parties are expected to established stable alliances with business groups, among others (Schmitter, 2001: 82). Thus, we can expect that mayors’ political ideologies influence their relations with local businesspeople.

In our study, we focus on the Southern European countries, characterised by the 'strong-mayor form' of local government (Mouritzen and Svara, 2002:212). Mouritzen and Svara found that “the most important factor shaping the mayor’s influence is form of government,” but they also acknowledge that a mayor’s influence can be enhanced by other factors, such as his or her strength as a public leader, involvement in policy goals
and/or daily details of policy implementation, and experience in charge, considering that mayors are both individuals and institutional leaders. In this vein, these scholars (2002: 211) consider that another factor that is related to the influence a mayor has is “the length of time the mayor has spent in office”. In their analysis, they found that mayors with five or more years’ tenure (the more experienced group), showed a greater amount of influence in the budgetary and economic development decisions (their areas of study) of strong-mayor, committee-leader, and collective cities.

According to Stone, the personal attributes and leadership qualities of mayors are crucial to understanding the issues they deal with (2005: 129): individuals with certain characteristics tend to be more frequently selected both to enter, and to remain in, public office (Steyvers and Reynaert, 2006: 43.)

In summary, for the purpose of this study we expect that some mayors' particular characteristics --such as political ideology and number of years in office--can be important for Southern European mayors when they interact with local business groups.

2. Local government typologies

Some studies have confirmed that the institutional organisation of urban governance matters to a large extent (Bäck et al, 2006). Local government systems are usually considered independent variables in comparative studies of local politics. Every model of urban governance presents different dynamics, key actors, instruments and outcomes. As the typology of local government systems is at the centre of some of our hypotheses, we will present an overview of the literature regarding this topic.

Typologies of local government systems are grouped around two issues: a) vertical power relations (relations between municipalities and upper-level governments) and b) horizontal power relations (relations between the council and/or other actors within the city hall) (Heinelt and Hlepas, 2006: 21)

From the vertical power relations’ perspective, there is a first subdivision between Southern European systems of local government and Northern European systems (Page and Goldsmith, 1987). The Southern municipalities are characterised by few functions and competencies, low levels of legal discretion and high access of local politicians to central (and regional) levels of government. Northern European systems are
characterised by a deep decentralisation of functions, high levels of discretion and low access of local politicians to the central state.

Hesse and Sharpe (1991) developed a different typology based on vertical power relations in which they observed three ideal types of systems:

- Franco Group: This group follows the Napoleonic tradition. Franco-type systems have a strong constitutional status. Their main duty is to represent their respective communities’ identities at higher levels of government. The Franco type encompasses France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Belgium.

- Anglo variant: this type has a weak constitutional status, but a high degree of autonomy from the centre. The position of the mayor is weak in comparison to councillors in their role of service provision. This type comprises the United Kingdom, and Ireland in Europe, but Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and, partly the United States are included in this group as well.

- Northern and Middle European variant: these countries have a high degree of autonomy, and theirs is the most decentralised model, due to the Prussian tradition. They enjoy a constitutional status and economic independence. This type includes Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, but also, with some peculiarities, Austria, parts of Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland and Japan.

Goldsmith’s typology based “on the objective or ethos which underlies” local governments (1992: 395) is relevant as well:

- Clientelistic/Patronage model: the primary duty is to ensure that communities’ interests are well promoted and protected, especially at higher levels of government. This model involves the traditional idea “that local political leaders were expected (and themselves expected) to deliver favours (jobs and/or other benefits) to their supporters in return for votes.” France, Italy, Spain, and Greece fit this model.

- Economic-development model: this refers to countries close to the “growth-machine” model (Logan and Molotch, 1987), such as Canada, the United States, and Australia. The primary duty of local government is to promote communities’ economics. This ethos is called “boosterism.” The presence of local political actors in local economic development is important.

- Welfare-state model: The local government produces and delivers welfare-state
services (education, transport, housing); this model is based on the principles of efficiency, equity and redistribution. Local politicians do not have an important weight, due to the importance given to professional officials in their stead. This model includes the Scandinavian countries, parts of Germany, the Netherlands, and Great Britain.

From the horizontal dimension of power relations, typologies of local governments focus on the council and the mayor and/or other political and administrative leaders within city hall. Mouritzen and Svara's typology of local government systems is based on the hypothesis that the structural features of local governments stem from the balance among three organizing principles (2002: 50): the layman rule (elected officers must be involved effectively in the making of decisions); political leadership (politicians must promote value choices and feed energy and passion into policy systems); and professionalism (answering to and addressing needs). The four ideal types are:

-the strong-mayor form: the elected mayor controls the majority of the council. The mayor is in full charge of all executive functions, and can hire political appointees to help with any function. This type emphasizes the political leadership principle.

-the committee-leader form: the “political leader” in the municipality is not necessarily the mayor: someone other than the mayor might control the council. Executive powers are shared. Although the political leader may have responsibility for some executive functions, others are in charge of collegiate bodies.

-the collective form: the local council is the decision centre, responsible for all executive functions. It is composed of locally elected politicians and a president (the mayor), who presides. The layman principle is emphasised in this type.

-the council-manager form: all executive functions are in the hands of a professional administrator (city manager), appointed by the city council. The council is a small body, headed by a mayor who formally has presiding and ceremonial functions only. This type emphasises professionalism.
Table 1. Mouritzen and Svara typology.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<th>Features</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong-Mayor</td>
<td>Control the majority of the council</td>
<td>France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Germany (except Hesse), Austria (six Länder), some English cities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All executive functions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political appointees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political leadership principle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee leader</td>
<td>Political leader may not be the mayor</td>
<td>Denmark, Sweden, some English cities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leader may not control the council</td>
<td>Austria (three Länder).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shared executive powers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Collegiated bodies for executive functions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective form</td>
<td>Collegiate body: decision centre</td>
<td>Belgium, Czech Rep., some English cities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>It has all the executive functions</td>
<td>Netherlands, Switzerland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Composed of elected politicians and the mayor (president)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Layman principle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council manager</td>
<td>Professional administrator appointed by the council</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All executive functions for the manager</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mayor only presides</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professionalism principle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mouritzen and Svara (2002).

Thus, on the one hand, Southern European countries belong to “the strong mayor form,” where, according to Mouritzen and Svara’s typology of local government systems focusing on horizontal power relations, mayors control the city council and are in full charge of all executive functions. And on the other hand, taking into account Hesse’s and Sharpe’s typology for local-central government relations, these countries belong to the Franco type, where the local government structures the territorial interest intermediation and mayors represent communities’ interests to higher government levels. Heinelt and Hlepas (2006) combine both typologies in order to attend to horizontal and vertical dimensions while focusing specifically on mayors. They develop the POLLEADER
typology\(^1\) of different types of leadership: political, executive, ceremonial, collegial and strong mayor forms (see Table 2). Particularly (Heinelt and Hlepas, 2006: 36):

> Because strong mayors in the Franco type of local government systems lead a municipal administration that is responsible for a relatively limited scope of 'state' functions, but are nevertheless clearly the political representatives (and agents) for the local community, they will be called 'political mayors'. France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain are included in this type.

**Table 2. The POLLEADER typology.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forms of local government systems according to (horizontal) power relations (Mountzen and Svara 2002)</th>
<th>Franco type</th>
<th>Anglo type</th>
<th>North-Middle European type</th>
<th>Central-East European type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong mayor form</td>
<td>'political mayor' France, Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal</td>
<td>'executive mayor' England</td>
<td>'executive mayor' Germany, Austria</td>
<td>'executive mayor' Poland, Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee leader form</td>
<td>'collegial leader' England</td>
<td>'collegial leader' Denmark, Sweden, (Austria)</td>
<td>'collegial leader' Netherlands, Switzerland, (Germany)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective form</td>
<td>'collegial leader' Belgium</td>
<td>'collegial leader' England</td>
<td>'collegial leader' Czech Rep.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council-manager form</td>
<td>'ceremonial mayor' Ireland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In sum, Southern European countries are based on a “clientelistic” system of relations between leaders and citizens; local government units in Southern Europe have limited competencies and limited legal autonomy, but strong leadership in the figure of the mayor (although the importance of the institutional contexts and resources should not be dismissed.) (See Peters, 2005; Lowndes, 2009). In our research we focus on France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, both because we have seen that the North/South cleavage is a main point in all the typologies and because of the specific features of this

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\(^1\) Within the POLLEADER research project.
group of local government systems. In addition, the clientelistic relationships among actors in Southern Europe countries and the characteristics of “political mayors” lead us to expect that relations between political and business elites in these countries are different (higher degree of influence and frequency of contacts) than in the others types.

3. Empirical analysis and findings

Informed by the scholarly literature on this topic, we present two research questions to study the interactions between mayors and local business groups.

▲ Research Question 1:

Are mayors’ particular characteristics relevant factors in the analysis of patterns of relationship between local authorities and local businesspeople in Southern European local democracies? In this descriptive analysis we focus on two variables related to the office of mayor: length of tenure and party affiliation. These relationships are studied with particular focus on:

a) the frequency of contact mayors have with local business representatives:

H1. The longer mayors hold office, the greater their frequency of contact with local business representatives is likely to be.

H2. The more conservative mayors are, the greater their frequency of contact with local business representatives is likely to be.

b) the recognition of influence over local authorities exerted by the local business groups:

H3. The longer mayors hold office, the greater the degree of influence exerted by local business elites.

H4. The more conservative mayors are, the greater the degree of influence exerted by the local business elites.

▲ Research Question 2:

Is the type of local government system significant, in the context of analysing relationships between mayors and local businesspeople? We also study these relationships with particular focus on:

a) the frequency of contact with local business representatives:
H5. Mayors within “political mayor” type systems will tend to have greater frequency of contact with local business representatives.

b) the recognition of influence over the local authorities exerted by the local business groups:

H6. Mayors within “political mayor” type systems will tend to perceive higher levels of influence exerted by local business representatives.

In relation to the research question about particular characteristics and analysing the frequency of contact, our data show interesting results in this first descriptive analysis. As we can see in Figure 1, observing the average number of years in office at various levels of frequency of contact with local business representatives, we see that, as we expected, the mayors serving longest (7.6 years average) meet local businesspeople more that once a week, although the differences are low and not statistically significant (chi square=4.754; sig=0.314).

Figure 1. Average years in office and frequency of contact with local business representatives from mayors' perspectives.

Source: Own elaboration.

As for the political party factor, we wanted to determine whether mayors affiliated with conservative parties in Southern Europe claimed to meet local business representatives more frequently.\(^2\) With respect to this factor as well, our data show

\(^2\) To make this analysis we exclude the cases where the mayors were elected from an independent list. Also, we follow here the party classification used in the POLLEADER project, and present three
differences that are not statistically significant (chi square=4.825; sig=0.306). Further, mayors belonging to Social Democratic parties actually show a slightly higher mean in the frequency of contacts with businesspeople (1.29 average) than mayors belonging to conservative (1.25 average) and national or regional parties (1.22 average).

Figure 2. Average frequency of contact with local business representatives from mayors' perspective (score 0 to 3).

Source: Own elaboration.

The next part of the analysis seeks to test whether party affiliation and the number of years in office have an impact on the perceived influence exerted on mayors by local business elites.

First, when comparing means, as we can see in Figure 3, we can observe that mayors serving longer terms in office (7.42 years average) show lower levels of perceived influence exerted by the businesspeople in their towns and cities, so it might seem that when mayors are re-elected they claim to perceive less influence, though here,

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categories: (1) social democratic parties: ecologist, (former) communists, and socialdemocrats, (2) conservative parties: conservative and christian-democrat parties, and (3) national and regional parties.
again, the differences are low and not statistically significant (chi square=1.789; sig=0.774).

**Figure 3. Average years in office and influence exerted by local businesspeople from mayors' perspective.**

![Bar chart showing average years in office and influence](image)

*Source: Own elaboration.*

Regarding mayors' political affiliations, we observe that again differences are very small as we can observe in Figure 4, although in this case they are just large enough to be considered statistically significant (sig= 15.796; sig=0.003). Mayors affiliated with conservative parties show a slightly higher level of self-perceived influence by local businesspeople (2.12 average) than mayors affiliated with social democratic parties (2.04). It is interesting to note that the highest level of influence registered (2.27) refers to mayors belonging to regional or national parties.

**Figure 4. Average influence perceived by mayors from different political parties (score 1 to 3).**
In addition, attending to the adjusted standardised residuals (Table 3), the statistically significant cells show that among the social democratic mayors, 42% claim to perceive “some influence” from local businesspeople, and 31% consider businesspeople highly influential. Among conservative mayors, we find a lower percentage (26%) that perceive “some influence” from these groups, but a higher one that considers them highly influential (43%). Regarding mayors belonging to national and regional parties, the data show that 54% of them claim to see business groups as highly influential; mayors affiliated with national and regional parties thus comprise the highest percentage for the “high influence” category.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Social democrat</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>National/Regional</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Little-No influence</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some influence</td>
<td>42*</td>
<td>26*</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High influence</td>
<td>31*</td>
<td>43**</td>
<td>54**</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Perceived influence for mayors' political party.

Note: ** [1.96]; * [2.56] Entries are percentages.

Source: Own elaboration.
Regarding the second research question, our data show that, contrary to what we expected, the mayors in the “political mayor” type do not claim higher frequency of contact than the other groups. These differences are statistically significant (chi square=24.691; sig=0.000). Comparing the means, the “political mayor” group is the second lowest (1.24), with the “executive mayor” group having the highest mean (1.34).

Figure 5. Average frequency of contacts with local business from mayors' perspective (score 0 to 3).

Source: Own elaboration.

Taking into account the adjusted standardised residuals, we observed that within the “political mayor” group, only 6% claim that they seldom or never have contact with local business representatives. Whereas within the “executive mayor” group, only 2% claim that they seldom or never meet local business representatives, with 36% claiming to have contact with local businesspeople more than once per week.

Table 4. Frequency of contact for local government type.
As for the influence exerted by local businesspeople, our data show that mayors of the “political mayor” type are not the group that claims to view local businesspeople highly influential. These results are also statistically significant (chi square=29.426; sig=0.000). The “political mayor” group is the second lowest (1.97); the highest perceived influence is claimed by the “ceremonial mayor” group (2.20).

Figure 6. Average influence of local business perceived by mayors (score 1 to 3).

Source: Own elaboration.

Attending to the adjusted standardised residuals, we can observe in Table 5 that within the “political mayor” group, 33% of mayors perceive businesspeople to be either not influential or not very influential, 36% claim that there is “some influence,” and 30% perceive that they have “high influence.” A higher percentage of the “collegial mayor” group (44%) claim to perceive “some influence” from the local businesspeople and a lower percentage (22%) perceive “high influence,” whereas 27% of the “executive
mayor” group claim that there is little influence or no influence over local authorities by business groups.

Table 5. Perceived influence for local government type.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Ceremonial</th>
<th>Collegial</th>
<th>Executive</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Little-No influence</td>
<td>33**</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>27*</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some influence</td>
<td>36*</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>44**</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High influence</td>
<td>30**</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>22*</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ** |1,96|; *|2,56|. Entries are percentages.

Source: Own elaboration.

Final remarks

In this paper, we have attempted to offer a descriptive analysis, a basis for further research focusing on mayors within the “political mayor” form. We’ve sought to determine whether mayors’ particular characteristics, such as seniority or political affiliation, are salient factors in assessing mayors’ interactions with local business representatives. Our dataset yielded interesting results, contrary, in large measure, to what we expected. For this reason, our further research will take into account these results among others, in order to prepare a regression model to identify the main factors that determine the way that mayors interact with local businesspeople.

4. References


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