POLICY CHANGE IN FRANCE AND ITALY.
THE POLITICISATION OF SECURITY AS A DRIVING FORCE

Séverine Germain, Ph.D
Post-doctoral fellow, International Centre for Comparative Criminology,
University of Montreal, Canada
severine.germain@gmail.com

Introduction

My paper aims at explaining why French and Italian municipalities are getting more and more involved in the governance of safety, together with the centralised State. My point is that social protests are the driving force of change: I claim that, in both countries, municipalities try to answer the residents’ protest about crime and disorders, which occur in the mid nineties, by implementing new “urban security” policies.

In France, as in Italy, the politicisation of safety, defined as the transformation of social facts into public issues and their recognition by public authorities, was based on the conjunction of several structural dynamics, embedded with a particular political and institutional context. In urban city centres, the increasing flux of different categories of population, occasionally combined with a rise in some types of crime that caused some residents to perceive a rise of «disorder» (as defined by Skogan, 1990).

Over the nineties, Italy has become the theatre of numerous social protests in the largest cities located in the North and the Centre of the country. The «citizens’ committees» asked the public authorities to deal with what they consider to be a decline in their quality of life because of the emergence of safety and environmental issues (Della Porta, 2004a). In France there didn’t seem to be so many social protests because they seemed to be given fewer publicity in the media but it doesn’t mean that residents’ collective action didn’t exist. My claim is that the residents’ protests in both countries were caused by the conjunction of similar dynamics, but were expressed in different ways according to different «political opportunity structures» (Tarrow, 1994).

In both countries, dealing with disorder is not the priority of the State police, who tended to neglect this issue because other missions are more attractive to the police, because of its organisation (Monjardet, 1996). Therefore, local governments felt prompted to reassume their responsibilities in the field of policing, especially by reorienting the municipal police’s missions, to deal with the residents’ claims. They were all the more inclined to reassume their

---

1 The scientific literature on citizens’ committees is quite abundant. The national research carried out by Donatella Della Porta (2004) is probably the most important reference.
2 This element is probably due to the method used to identify social protests, i.e. press review. The media coverage of residents’ protests seems less extensive in France than in Italy. The first reason is that there is much more pluralism in the local media in Italy. The second reason is that this method is based on the hypothesis of contentious politics whereas the two French case studies show that residents’ action can be channelled by local authorities and therefore be more cooperative.
responsibilities as they have had their powers increased by political and administrative decentralisation processes over the last decades.

In spite of similar dynamics of social protest in the two countries, there remained a strong difference, due to their different political and institutional contexts of the nineties. In Italy, the traditional pattern of aggregation of interests, chiefly based on a vote-catching system, had been declining since several decades, until the explosion of the three main political parties at the beginning of the nineties. The citizens’ committees phenomenon took place in this particular situation. In France, there was not such a generalised political crisis and the residents protests that occurred could occasionally cast doubt on the local system of aggregation of interests, but not as systematically as in Italy.

My paper is based on my PhD dissertation dealing with local security policies in France and Italy (Germain, 2008). I investigated four case studies (Bologna and Modena in Italy, Lyon and Grenoble in France) thanks to the combination of three methods: local press review from 1997 to 2006, documentary analysis (local governments’ plans and projects, residents associations’ archives) and semi-structured interviews with the main protagonists (local officials, elected officials, citizens), in each city.

My work is theoretically based on public policy analysis and political sociology, since I import some concepts from the social movements literature to the field of agenda-setting research in order to understand the politicisation process of security. In this paper, I use the concept of «political opportunity structure» (Tarrow, 1994) for comparative examination of the different dimensions of the political superstructure that influence the course of protest in both countries. The concept has been increasingly discussed, especially because it didn’t take into consideration how international pressures could influence domestic opportunity structures, i.e. what Sidney Tarrow himself has named the «scale shift» (Della Porta and Tarrow, 2004: 151) from the national to the transnational level. However, in the field of security, I claim that the concept of political opportunity structure fits in well with the analysis of interactions between the local and national levels, which is indispensable for my purpose, whereas the transnational level remains much less relevant.

The concept of political opportunity structure can be divided into several dimensions in order to be applied to empirical evidence (Fillieule, 1993). In particular, I focus on the macro processes which lie behind social protests to show to what extent the politicisation of security is based on similar dynamics in France and Italy. Then, I show how the politico-administrative system influences collective action, shedding further light on national and local particularities and the way they interact. I especially use the concept of multi-organisational field (Curtis and Zurcher, 1973) to analyse in a dynamic way the two Italian case studies. Their outcomes with regard to mobilisation strongly differ, in spite of very close structural characteristics: the different constellation of alliances and oppositions between local interest groups influences to a large extent the defining process of the security issue and therefore the exit of mobilisations.

Residents’ protests in Grenoble, Lyon, Bologna and Modena. Empirical premises

In Grenoble and Lyon, two medium cities in the Southern East of France, residents’ protests differ from one neighbourhood to another, especially between the city centre and suburbs. In the 2nd arrondissement of Lyon, residents’ claims chiefly deal with prostitution, whereas in the historical centre, they tend to focus more on night disorder, especially noise nuisances coming from bars and pubs in the Vieux-Lyon, or social signs of disorder such as
begging. For instance, the Neighbourhood Committee Lyon-Terreaux, - a residents association born in November 2000 - protested against marginalised people gathering with their dogs in Place des Terreaux (a central square in Lyon, in front of the town hall). Generally speaking, the association denounced the decline of their standards of living, i.e. the rise of crime (thefts) as much as social and physical signs of disorder (littering, shards, drug dealing, noise nuisances), and even refused the opening of a free health centre for hard-pressed people (Germain, 2008).

In Grenoble (160,000 inhabitants), residents’ protest seemed less extended in the city centre. Some residents’ associations complained about a wine event, the «Fête du Beaujolais» («Beaujolais’ Day»), which increasingly tended to get out of hand over the years. The neighbourhood union complained about littering, vomiting, urinating in the streets. In 2005, there was even a clash between young people and the police who had been called by some residents, so unusual an event that reported by the national media. On the other hand, some residents were very active in La Villeneuve, a deprived neighbourhood with a large amount of social housing. An action group called «La délinquance, ça suffit!» («Crime is enough!») started in 1996 to protest against crime and disorder in the neighbourhood. Residents mainly complained about some youth gathering in semiprivate spaces, such as staircases or central walkways, they blamed for littering, urinating, smoking, drug consuming, etc. (Germain, 2008).

A study about the city of Bologna (a 400,000 inhabitant city in the Centre of Italy) shows that between 1991 and 1998, more than 10,000 inhabitants would have asked the mayor to deal with issues such as prostitution, drug dealing and graffiti (Barbagli, 1999). In the requests and petitions the researcher analysed, the most frequent word used was «degrado», which can be translated by «deterioration» or «decline». The watchword encompassed both physical and social signs of disorder. Another study, the national research about citizens’ committee carried out by D. Della Porta, shows that in Bologna, events of protest were chiefly focused on the decline of the neighbourhood (33 in 2000), then followed by drug issues (17) and prostitution (17) (Lewanski and Mosca, 2003 : 70).

In Modena, a medium city (180,000 inhabitants) distant from 40 km from Bologna, residents’ protests were also focused on drug dealing and prostitution, two issues they related to illegal immigration (Poletti, 2002). For instance, in August 1997, some residents assaulted immigrants they accused of drug dealing in the neighbourhood Crocetta (Chiodi, 1998). These clashes were largely reported by the local and national media.

MACRO DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL PROTESTS IN FRANCE AND ITALY

All these mobilisations commonly resulted from macro dynamics that had taken place in France and Italy over the last decades. Macro dynamics are defined here as political, economic and social processes which affect the whole society but independently from people’s will. I chiefly examine here what makes residents perceive heightened disorder in their living place in four different localities.

The rise of crime

In both countries, crime has dramatically increased since the fifties. In France, the total amount of thefts rose from 187,500 in 1950 to 2,4 millions in 1995, namely a rate of 14‰ thefts in 1950, as against 67‰ in 1995. Between 1963 and 1995, the total of burglaries was multiplied
by 8 and that of robberies with violence by 23. Since the mid-eighties, thefts have remained quite stable whereas violent crime has increased (Roché, 2004). Between 1985 and 2001, the rate of interpersonal violence rose from 2‰ to 5‰ (Lagrange, 2003: 15). In Italy, crime has irregularly increased since 1945, alternating periods of rise and fall. Between 1986 and 1991, the huge increase of property crimes ends with a peak of 3000 thefts for 100,000 inhabitants, as against 1700 in 1986. The fall of crime from 1991 to 1994 was followed by a new phase of growth until 1999. However, the 1991 peak has not been reached again (Colombo, 2002).

The evolutions of the crime statistics that are observed at the national level may hide local level tendencies. It is difficult to present data for French cities since only aggregated data at the level of national police circumscription was available and therefore little useful for our purpose. On the other hand, Italian data were available. In Bologna, for example, whose crime statistics globally evolve in the same direction as the Italian ones, one of the most worrying items lies in pickpockets, which exponentially increased from 1306 recorded crimes in 1984 to 10 144 in 2003 (the rise is by far faster than the rise of the total of thefts)\(^3\). It is worthwhile to mention that drug production, trafficking and dealing have hugely increased in Bologna since the eighties. The number of recorded crimes rose from 268 in 1984 to 379 in 1991, and then decreases until 1995 (266), before rising again very quickly to peak again in 1999 (953). As far as pimping is concerned, the number of recorded crimes increased by 450% between 1991 and 1994, from 3 to 126, before decreasing in 1995 and then regularly rising until 1999. These evolutions mean an increase in police activities but it’s difficult to see if it is due to a rise of citizens’ request or an increase in criminal acts. Whatever the reality of drug crimes and prostitution, they were increasingly seen as problematic by some residents, as was the decline of their neighbourhood, especially in the historical centre.

The police statistics help defining the criminal context in Modena, even if, once again, police statistics show in police activity rather than crime evolution. As far as pimping is concerned, after a stable period between 1984 and 1994 (with a number of recorded crime in the region of 4-5 the number of recorded crimes suddenly rose from 4 in 1994 to 20 in 1996, before falling to 6 in 1997. We lack data between 1998 and 2000 but in 2001 and 2002, the number of recorded crime seemed to stabilise around 17. On the other hand, drug production and dealing rose in an irregular way between 1984 and 1991 (from 245 recorded crimes to the pick of 381), before falling until 2000. However, the number of drug addicts cured IN the social and health municipal services rose from 839 in 1991 to 1317 in 2000, which means that drug dealing didn’t disappear even if the number of recorded crime decreased.

To what extent the rise of crime can lead people to collective action? The state of the art suggests that «the relationship between one’s personal and contextual perceptions of and experiences with crime, on the one hand, and participation in collective crime prevention activities, on the other hand, is complex, multi-faceted and highly individualized.» (Schneider, 2007: 37). Indeed, some empirical enquiries find a strong correlation between the personal and contextual salience of crime and participation in collective crime prevention activities (for instance Skogan, 1990), whereas other research appear to reject it (for instance Dowds and Mayhew, 1994). S. Schneider concludes that serious crime would tend to deter involvement while victimisation from certain types of minor offences would result in greater willingness to participate. This point brings me to examine the perception of disorder in the collective action.

process.

The perceived heightened disorder

In the four cities, all the issues that lead some residents to protest can be qualified as «disorder» (Skogan, 1990), i.e. situations which challenge the shared rules of using public spaces. Wesley Skogan makes a distinction between signs of physical disorder (broken streetlights, abandoned buildings, etc.) and signs of social disorder (drug addicts, prostitutes, beggars, graffiti, vandalism, etc.). Signs of social disorder suggest that usual norms of behaviour in public spaces are broken, whereas physical signs of disorder are felt by residents as institutions breach of trust (public facilities maintenance and lack of control). It is extremely difficult to assess the evolution of disorder, since there are no national statistical data whether in France or in Italy, and neither at the national level nor at the local one. However, it seems that in the four cities, residents complain much more about disorder and soft crime than serious crime. So, it is worthwhile understanding how the perception of heightened disorder can result in collective action. On the one hand, a study carried out in Chicago showed that three types of variables influence the perception of disorder (Sampson and Raudenbush, 2004): individual personal characteristics, the level of observed disorder in a neighbourhood and the racial and economic composition of the neighbourhood. If observed disorder predicts perceived disorder, the racial and economic context matters more: as the concentration of poverty and minority groups increases, residents of all races tend to perceive heightened disorder, even after controlling other variables. On the other hand, «research indicates that participation in collective crime prevention programs may have less to do with crime concern and more to do with the influence of a number of other personal and environmental variables.» (Schneider, 2007: 37). The state of the art reveals a relative consistency of several predictors, which nevertheless varies according to different crime prevention activities. These are socio-economic status, ethnic homogeneity of the neighbourhood (social cohesion), feelings of attachment and belonging to the neighbourhood in which one lives, affiliations within community organisations.

1/ Ethnic minorities in Italy and France

According to Sampson and Raudenbush’s theory, the heightened perception of disorder by residents would partly lie in the social representations of foreign people shared by the native population. Seeing disorders appears to be imbued with social meanings, especially cultural stereotypes. However, cultural stereotypes must be distinguished from racial prejudices (in the sense of personal hostility) as, according to the two researchers, the association made by respondents between Afro-Americans, poverty and disorder is historically grounded in America and therefore not irrational. In France, the immigration phenomenon is very old since the country has had a long colonial history, especially in Northern Africa. So, cultural stereotypes could be as deeply rooted in the French history as in America. On the other hand, Italy has not experienced immigration until the eighties. Italian residents’ perceptions could be based of the sudden rise of the total amount of immigrants and their presence in public spaces, especially when drug dealing or prostituting. In the Italian case, the association made between foreign

4 We do not claim that immigrants are by essence lawbreakers but that some part of visible illegal activities such as drug dealing or prostitution use foreign people.
people, poverty and disorder would be based rather on cultural stereotypes than on those rooted in history.

Large Italian cities in the North and the Centre have been experiencing since the end of the eighties a totally new phenomenon: a massive rise of immigration, whereas Italy had always been an emigration country. In 1980, the Italian ministry of Interior granted 198,483 residence permits, as against 548,193 in 1990 and 1,503,000 in 2002 (Colombo and Sciortino, 2004). Let’s mention that Italy has one of the lowest birth rates in the European Union and owes its demographic growth to immigrants. In 2004, the fecundity index by native women was 1.26, as against 2.61 for foreign women living in the country\(^5\). Besides, some economic sectors are totally dependent on foreign working forces, such as support personnel, farm workers, unskilled industrial workers.

There was 120,000 fewer inhabitants in Bologna between 1971 and 2001 (one quarter of the whole population). Bologna has one of the lowest birth rates (8.14% as against 9.67% in Italy) and the highest young-to-old ratio\(^6\) of the 13 biggest cities in Italy: 266.24 in 2003, as against 135.87 in Italy. The share of immigrants rose there from 1.4% in 1992 to 6.8 in 2004. In a medium city such as Modena (180,000 inhabitants), which lost 6,000 inhabitants between 1980 and 1995, the share of foreign people went up from 1.9% in 1992 to 9.7% in 2005.

Citizens committees’ protests would have made up the main way of worrying about the growing immigrants flux (Della Porta, 2000). Besides, some events of protest have explicitly blamed immigrants for the rise of crime and disorder in their neighbourhood. Several academic works report some clashes between residents and immigrants in Genoa (1993), Turin (1996), Modena (1997), most often because of drug issues (see Belluati, 1998; Chiodi, 1998; Allasino et al., 2000; Petrillo, 2000). It is worthwhile to add that between 1988 and 2002, the proportion of immigrants in the total amount of people suspected of drug production, trafficking and sale (i.e. highly visible activities in public spaces) strongly rose, especially in large Northern cities, such as Turin, Milan, Bologna or Florence, where this share rose above 60%. In Turin, for instance, foreign people accounted for 25% of the total amount of people suspected of drug trafficking and dealing in 1988, as against 75% in 2002 (Barbagli, 2003).

In France, the phenomenon of immigration is much older. A French demographer estimated that in 1999, around 14 millions people had at least one immigrant parent or grandparent, that is to say 23% of the whole population (Tribalat, 2004). It is difficult to assess the number of born immigrants in France since, on the one hand, immigrants’ children who were born in France could automatically have the French citizenship and, on the other hand, ethnic statistics are strictly forbidden. So, as sociologist Laurent Mucchielli put it, the connexion between crime and immigration has two different dimensions in the French context.

«In France as in most western countries, the immigrant is strongly associated with delinquency in collective representations and in media and political discourses concerning ‘insecurity’. This association can be decomposed into two distinct concerns: the delinquency of foreigners and the delinquency of French youth born of immigrants.» (Mucchielli, 2003: 27).

A research made by a student in Lyon shows that residents and shopkeepers in the city centre tended to consider the youth born of immigrants coming from deprived suburbs surrounding the city as those who committed crime (Renard, 2001; Bétin and Martinais, 2004). Youths born of

---


\(^6\) The share of people above 65 is divided by the share of children under 15 and then multiplied by 100.
African immigrants were called «the caps», referring to the way they often get dressed.

« The caps, we call them like that here, the caps because we can’t say Arabians. Once, I told the prefect «the Arabians», he told me you mustn’t say that because it’s racism. But it’s not racism when I say Arabian, it’s a race, that’s all. So we came to an agreement with the others, we say «hey look, here are the caps. [...] We’re becoming racist, we shopkeepers, by dint of that. But it’s not for the same reasons as before. There’s a rise of racism with all that.» (Secretary of the Neighbourhood Committee Lyon-Terreaux, shopkeeper, 50 years old, quoted by Renard, 2001: 80, my translation).

If that research had difficulty to prove that shopkeepers and residents have had an influence on the security policy process in Lyon, another academic research dealing with the genesis of the CCTV system in Lyon’s city centre (Beetschen, 2004) had success in proving it. So, there seemed to be an implicit ethnic dimension in the claims made by shopkeepers and residents about safety since they targeted the youth born of immigrants as the offenders.

Indeed, some discourses admitting that there was an overrepresentation of youth born of African immigrants among juvenile delinquents started emerging in France at the end of the nineties (Mucchielli, 2003). For instance, Christian Delorme, the «curé des Minguettes» - i.e. the priest who attended the first events of urban violence in 1981 in Lyons’s suburbs, and played an active role in the collective actions lead by youth born of immigrants in the eighties - noticed, during the parliamentary inquiry about juvenile delinquency, that:

«In France, we don’t manage to say certain things, sometimes for nice reasons. It is the same for the over-delinquency of youth born of immigrants, which has been denied for a long time, in order not to stigmatise. We have waited that the reality of neighbourhoods, police stations, courts, prisons set the evidence of this over-representation to admit it publicly. However, politicians don’t know how to speak of it.» (Carle and Shosteck, 2002, my translation).

According to L. Mucchielli, it is an exaggeration to think that youth born or African immigrants («Blacks» and «Beurs», i.e. Black and Arabic people) embody stereotypes of young offenders, while social housing neighbourhoods where they are concentrated appear as dangerous places (Rey, 1996; Boucher, 2001).

2/ Middle classes’ protest

There can be said that there is a consensus among researchers about the fact that those who get mobilised belong to the middle classes and are very well integrated to their community. First, most studies have found that middle-class homeowners with higher socio-economic status were more willing to engage in preventing activities (Dowds and Mayhew, 1994; Hope and Lab, 2001; Skogan, 2004). In France, S. Roché (2000) also found that owner-occupiers and intermediate professions were more inclined to alert the municipality about disorders. In Italy, a study carried out in Turin in 1998 suggests that, facing insecurity, the propensity to choose certain forms of collective action - such as signing petitions - rises along with the education level. Second, if race and ethnicity appear to be poor predictors of citizen participation in crime

---

7 I use the phrase «middle classes» in a generic term to name people who are different from the traditional working class and the bourgeoisie.

8 The share of people who signed a petition or a request regularly rises as the education level does, from 7% (elementary school) to 20% (master’s degree). On the other hand, the propensity to participate in a meeting or a
prevention measures, the ethnic homogeneity of the neighbourhood on the other hand has emerged as a relevant factor in the anglo-american literature (Skogan, 1990; Sampson et al., 1997). Third, the research has also revealed the relevance of a sense of local belonging and attachment among residents as a determinant of collective participation (Taylor, 1996; Girling et al., 2000), which resulted in particular in a high level of participation in volunteer groups and activities (Hope and Lab, 2001). All these factors appear relevant in our four case studies.

In Italy, citizens committees’ leaders mainly belonged to the middle class and were provided with high levels of education and incomes, whereas the members were more socially diversified (Della Porta and Mosca, 2002). As far as some studies have shown in Turin, Genoa and Bologna, citizens committees tended to emerge more frequently in city centres than in suburban neighbourhoods (see Petrillo, 2000; Della Porta and Mosca, 2002). The overrepresentation of citizens committees in historical city centres could be put down to the gentrification dynamics that have occurred since the last decades, like in Bologna (Anderlini, 1998; Baldini et al., 2000) or Milan (IReR Lombardia, 2006). Because of the rise of tertiary activities and the increased level of education, Bologna experienced the arrival of new social groups who replaced the older ones: the total amount of workers fell whereas that of employees and self-employed rose. The only case study where citizens’ committees were not born in the city centre is Modena, a medium city however known as one of the wealthiest in Italy (cf. table 1).

Table 1: Unemployment rate, average income and professional groups’ employment rate in Modena

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Modena</th>
<th>Italy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate (2004)</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average income</td>
<td>22,198 €</td>
<td>14,939 €</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional groups’ employment rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Managers and directors</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Intellectual, scientific professions and of elevated specialisation</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Intermediate professions (technical)</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Employees</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Professions relative to sales and services</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Artisan workers and manual qualified workers</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Conductors of systems, operating of fixed machinery and furniture</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Unskilled manual workers</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


9 I won’t discuss the notion of gentrification, as do for instance Fijalkow and Prétéceille (2006). I use it as a generic term to describe the evolution of the social composition of some neighbourhoods.
- Military and police forces 0.6% 0.1%

Total 100.0% 100.0%

Adapted from City of Modena, Indagine trimestrale sull’occupazione e la disoccupazione a Modena, media 1999 and Baldini & Silvestri (2003).

In Modena, committee members were principally shop owners and long-standing residents (Poletti, 2002). Besides, most of the committees’ leaders interviewed in Modena had already have experiences within leftist political parties or syndicates, community organisations, the local media or other professional activities which had brought them to keep contact with the local government. Citizens’ committees were also based on friendly relationships established during former collective action: committees actually remobilised previous participation experiences and networks (Della Porta, 2004b: 23-24). Therefore, in Italy, collective action in the field of security largely arose from well-integrated citizens reacting against the new phenomenon of immigration.

In France, the case of La Villeneuve in Grenoble, illustrates the extent to which collective action was due to the old long-standing middle class residents of the neighbourhood. Those who have regularly asked for the municipal government to deal with disorder over the last twenty years were called «the little White» by municipal officials10, since they represented the last wealthy residents in an impoverished neighbourhood. Indeed, in the seventies, La Villeneuve embodied a social leftist project of living together («vivre ensemble») (Joly, 1995). The local population participated in designing the neighbourhood, which was expected to mix different social classes by mixing in the same block council flats and private ones. Therefore, at the beginning, the neighbourhood had a quite large share of middle and upper classes as regarded the average of the city (cf. Table 2).

Table 2: Family heads’ professional groups in La Villeneuve (Arlequin and Village Olympique) and Grenoble in the seventies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Professional group (%)</th>
<th>Arlequin (1973)</th>
<th>Village Olympique</th>
<th>Grenoble (1968)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>liberal professions and upper management</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>middle management</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>employees and shopkeepers</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>manual workers and relative workers to services</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inactive / students / pensioners</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Joly (1995: 111, table 2).

But the socio-economic composition of the neighbourhood progressively changed over the years. The share of inactive/students/pensioners largely rose in the neighbourhood (Filou et al., 2003: 22). Indeed, whereas, the average unemployment rate was 16% in Grenoble in 1999, it was about 24% in La Villeneuve, reaching 34% in Arlequin and 27.8% in Village Olympique. The unemployment rate even went up to 40.7% among the 15-24 year old group (29.2% in

10 Interview with a municipal official in Grenoble, 2006 (Germain, 2008).
1990), as against 27.1% in the whole city\textsuperscript{11}. Moreover, the crime prevention and security municipal office underlined that a growing concentration of deprived people could be noticed in this area, even in private residential estates (Crime prevention Department, City of Grenoble, 2004). Indeed, more and more private residential owners tended to rent their apartments. Nevertheless, if the rate of workers was twice higher than in Grenoble and the share of managerial professions and intermediate professions was slightly lower than in the entire city, there remained a lot of disparities according to residential estates. It means that there remained some pouches of both ethnic and socio-economic homogeneity within the impoverished neighbourhood, i.e. the long-standing middle class residents. The most mobilised association, the Arlequin neighbourhood union, had been ruled by former association and/or leftist activists (some of whom had been elected at the city hall in 1995 and 2001), retired from then on but who had exercised intermediate professions (Germain, 2008).

In Italy as in France, well integrated residents belonging to middle classes took action to denounce soft crime and disorder in their neighbourhood. The next question to deal with is why they addressed their protest not only to the State representatives (such as the national police and the prefect) but also to the local government. To shed further light on this point, it is necessary to analyse the political opportunity structures which embed collective action in the four cities.

\textbf{Urban policing, decentralisation and political crisis:
THE POLITICO-ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM IN QUESTION}

Social protests in France and Italy can’t be understood without an analysis of the political and institutional context in which they’re embedded. First, in both countries, the national police organisation, highly centralised, tend to depreciate urban policing. Second, residents addressed the mayor with protest since he gained powers and legitimacy thanks to the decentralisation reforms that took place in the eighties in France and in the nineties in Italy. However, there remains a strong difference between the two political contexts. Whereas Italy was the theatre of a generalised political crisis in the nineties, France was not, which made residents’ protests less often contentious there.

\textit{Urban policing: a shared power}

I support that residents asked local governments for dealing with disorder first because the police organisation tend to depreciate urban policing in both countries. Since mayors have police power in both countries, they were prompted by the residents’ claims to reassume this power.

More than ten years ago, French sociologist D. Monjardet diagnosed a crisis of what he called «urban policing», i.e. the social function of maintaining public peace and order (Monjardet, 1996). He proposed to understand policing as the combination of three types of police, each of them with its particular historical roots: law and order, investigation (crime policing), urban policing. First, the maintenance of law and order has always been a State

\textsuperscript{11} Insee, 1990 and 1999.
priority. From a historical point of view, the police were born to defend the State’s interests (Bayley, 1985: 95) and have always been under the supervision of the national political authority. Second, crime policing is focused on law enforcement: the police have to enforce legal rules and this kind of mission is ruled by the profession itself, since the police culture makes dealing with serious crime attractive. Third, urban policing is almost a social function and can act effectively only if integrated and visible within the community. But as W. Skogan noted for the US, «Police attention to many of these problems diminished over time, and this shift, encouraged by new technology and the emergence of new priorities, resulted in three major changes in how big-city police did their work. All of these changes affected their capacity to deal effectively with disorder.» (Skogan, 1990: 85-86). Similar dynamics affected the French police.

The relationship between police and population was cut off by the establishment of State control\(^\text{12}\), which resulted in centralisation. On the one hand, centralisation resulted in the definition of priorities by the central State, which meant that at the local level, the police was only accountable to the State substitutes, i.e. the prefects. On the other hand, the centralisation of police recruitment contributed to cut the police officers from their territorial roots and therefore from the local population. Besides, the technological change, especially the general use of car for patrolling, increasingly reduced the physical presence of police officers on the beat and therefore their abilities to fulfil their urban policing function. Lastly, the police tended to narrow their focus on serious crime as the volume of recorded crime went up to high levels (see above).

As a consequence, the police’s capacity and will to effectively deal with disorder have declined in France over the last decades. The same diagnosis could be applied to the Italian police, whose organisation is also based on centralisation and car patrolling, and who have also experienced a huge rise of crime since the fifties. The police proximity reform, which took place at the end of the nineties in France and at the beginning of the years two thousand in Italy, can be considered as central government’s attempts to deal with urban policing crisis in both countries. What is specific to France and Italy, as centralised policing systems, is that municipal police forces do exist alongside the national police. It is not only the national police which are responsible for urban policing, but also the municipal police forces, since in both countries the mayors have some powers in the field of security.

French mayors have had police power\(^\text{13}\) since the 1884 Municipalities Act\(^\text{14}\), but they can only practice under the supervision of the prefect, the State representative at the local level. Italian mayors also have power in the field of rural and urban policing, traffic, noisy activities (Ragonesi, 2002 : 95). As representatives of the State, French as well as Italian mayors can also officially carry out criminal investigation (but in practice the French mayor almost doesn’t). In both countries, mayors have at their disposal municipal police forces to enforce municipal rules but they have no control over national police forces (National police and gendarmerie in France; State police and Carabinieri in Italy).

French municipal police forces are ruled by the 1999 Municipal police Act. First, they were given power in the field of traffic law enforcement\(^\text{15}\). Then, they were authorised to check the identity of by-law or traffic lawbreakers. Lastly, the Municipal police Act made the signature of a « co-ordination convention » between the mayor and the prefect compulsory in several cases:

\(^{12}\) The establishment of State control was achieved in 1941 with the Darlan Act, under the Vichy Government.

\(^{13}\) The mayor must enforce «public order, safety, security and salubrity».

\(^{14}\) The mayor’s police power was defined by the article 97 of the 1884 Municipalities Act, and then repeated in the article L2212 of the French local government code of practice (Code général des Collectivités territoriales).

\(^{15}\) The decree n.2000-277 of March, 24th 2000 lists all the types of ticketing.
when municipal police forces have more than five agents; when they work by night (from 11 pm to 6 am); when they have to be equipped with guns. In 2002, it was estimated that 41% of the municipal police forces were equipped with weapons: 6% with 4th category weapons, 21% with 6th category weapons and 13% with both (Malochet, 2005: 61).

In Italy, municipal police forces have all kinds of police functions. The municipal police were given power on criminal investigation and public safety by the Municipal police status outlaw voted on 1986 and later, they got traffic law enforcement out of a 1992 decree. Therefore, in the legal framework, the Italian municipal police can carry out criminal investigations under the supervision of the public prosecutor. As auxiliary public safety agents, municipal police officers can be authorised by the prefect, on the mayor’s request, to carry a weapon without any licence. The list of weapons municipal police agents can carry is defined by a decree issued by the ministry of interior (1987): for instance, guns are allowed but not tonfas. In practice, only very small municipal police are not equipped with guns.

Residents’ claim mostly lied in complaining about disorder, which could be dealt with by municipal governments and/or the State, according to the definition of the issue. For instance, drug issues can be dealt with by the local government, from the point of view of disaster risk reduction, and/or by the national police from the point of view of law enforcement. Since, on the one hand, residents protest against issues that can often be dealt with both by the local governments and the State and, on the other hand, urban policing is far from being a priority of the national police, it is not surprising that residents addressed their protests to the mayors. Moreover, it is all the less surprising since decentralisation reforms had globally increased local governments’ power and legitimacy.

**Decentralisation reforms and the Italian political crisis**

France and Italy have both experienced decentralisation reforms over the last decades. In France, the Decentralisation act (1982-1983) enforced general municipal power even if not in the field of security. Moreover, in 1982, mayors became responsible for the social crime prevention policy and started entering local partnerships with the State, as known as CCPD (*Conseils communaux de prévention de la délinquance*, Local council for crime prevention). Since then, mayors have always participated in local crime prevention partnerships.

In Italy, institutional reforms took place throughout the nineties. Municipalities were chiefly concerned by two laws. First, thanks to the Localities’ autonomy Act (1990), the mayor and the junta became responsible for the municipal administration, into the shoes of the elected municipal council. Then, in 1993, the Mode of election of local elected officials Act set out direct universal suffrage for the election of mayors. Moreover, the municipal council lost power again since, from then on at the time, they could no longer nominate the mayor’s assessors (the mayor did). The 1990 and 1993 reforms were clearly aimed at freeing the mayor from political

---

16 Municipal police agents can be authorised by the prefect to be equipped with guns by justifiable request of the mayor. Municipal police agents can be equipped with 4th category weapons (guns) and 6th category weapons (teargas bombs, tonfas and self-defense batons). The list of weapons that can be used by municipal police agents was increased by flash-ball guns in 2004.

17 Survey carried out by the municipal police unit of the National Centre for Local civil service, data by January 1st 2002, quoted by Malochet.

parties (see next section) by providing him power over the municipal bureaucracy and political legitimacy.

In both countries, by increasing local governments’ power and mayors’ legitimacy, political and administrative decentralisation reforms increased the residents’ propensity to address their protest to the municipal government. But what distinguishes Italy from France is that decentralisation reforms took place in the former country to cope with the generalised political crisis which sapped the Italians’ trust in their political parties. I claim that the main difference observed between residents’ protests in France and Italy - i.e. the larger promotion of protests through the local media in Italy - is chiefly due to the particular Italian political context, characterized by the end of what was named « the First republic ».

Unlike France, in the nineties Italy had to cope with a generalised political crisis, with the exposure of the corruption of some political parties by the Operation « Clean Hands ». The particular Italian political opportunity structures allow to explain the extent of the citizens’ protest, which was widely more extensive than in France.

In Italy, since WW2, political parties have ruled both the State and the civil society, insomuch the political system was qualified as a « partitocracy ». The integration process of the politically and economically fragmented Italian society was based on the political parties’ ability to intermediate local and regional interests. The Christian Democracy (DC), the dominant political party which had monopolised the State apparatus since 1945, used public resources to build up a dependent clientele (this phenomenon is known as « lottizzazione »), especially in the deprived South of the country (Caciagli, 1982). During the seventies, the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) - the DC additional political force since 1963 - started as well considering the State as a major source of resources to distribute. The main opposition party, the Italian Communist Party (PCI) is pushed aside from national government on a permanent basis but deeply rooted at the local level thanks to a large institutional infrastructure (syndicates, farmer co-operatives, women associations, etc.).

The fragmentation of the Italian society, which allows for the practices of patronage and vote-catching, is balanced by the unifying belonging to one of the two political subcultures: the white one (catholic) or the red one (Communist). Indeed, the DC and PCI deep political grassroots, combined with the reciprocal relations established with a large number of associations and lobbies, resulting in the existence of these two political subcultures (see for instance Caciagli, 1988). However, the social and economic modernisation started in Italy in the fifties progressively changed the relations that had brought together political parties, associations and identification to a subculture. Political parties turned out to be unable to adapt to the claims made by those new social groups that emigrated from the South towards Northern industrial centres, and who were more educated and secularised. This new situation caused the disaffection of large parts of the population with the Government and the institutions (Woods, 1992)\(^{19}\), especially since the growing financial deficit of the country increasingly prevented the dominant political parties from distributing State resources to their traditional clientele. The Operation «Clean hands»\(^{20}\), which revealed the corruption of the political class and resulted in the explosion of the DC in 1993 and the PSI in 1994, definitely sapped the Italians’ trust in their

---

\(^{19}\) Which results in particular in the emergence of political Leagues.

\(^{20}\) The Operation Clean Hands started in February 1992, when the Milanese judge Antonio Di Pietro (a political leader nowadays) had a PSI member (Mario Chiesa, health official) arrested while he was cashing a backhander. The PSI was the first political party affected by the operation, then followed by the DC.
ruling class.

In that particular context of political crisis, it is not surprising that some organised groups claimed to participate into the policy process in the shoes of the political parties and their associative infrastructure. A research dealing with social protests in Bologna from 1985 to 2000 confirmed that the rise of locally articulated requests - and often made by citizens’ committees – is congruent with a decline of syndicates mobilisations (Della Porta and Mosca, 2002). Moreover, committees’ activists have often already been members of political parties, associations or syndicates and have therefore learned some skills for collective action (Della Porta, 2004b). Lastly, as political parties seemed unable to propose an alternative mediation of interests, the requests made by citizens’ committees tended to remain fragmented and not aggregated by the traditional political channels.

On the other hand, in France, residents’ requests seemed more channelled by the old inhabitants associations, deeply rooted in the local political system. In Lyon, the CIL (Comités d’Intérêts locaux, Local interests Committee) were born at the end of the 19th century and originate in local residents’ mobilisations coping with quality of life issues (Amzert, 2001). In 1960, all these Cil got united in the Ucil (Union des comités d’intérêts locaux, Union of Local interests committees). In 2006, 34 Cil were still active in Lyon. In Grenoble, the most diffused residents associations are the UQ (Unions de quartier, neighbourhood unions), the first of whom was born in 1921. They got united in 1961 in the Cluq (Comité de liaison des unions de quartier, Linkage committee of neighbourhood unions) and in 2006, 22 were still active (Germain, 2008). If the traditional aggregation structures can be occasionally criticised, the pattern of aggregation of interests still globally works. Indeed, the press review revealed that residents’ claims regarding crime and disorder were mostly transmitted to the local governments by old resident associations in Lyon as in Grenoble. i.e. alongside the traditional institutionalised interest groups.

The multi-organisational fields: local variations in the policy formulation process

To examine the outcome of the mobilisation process, it is indispensable to shed further light on the multi-organisational field in each case study. This concept can be defined as the total potential amount of organisations the collective action can establish relations with (Fillieule, 1993). The comparison between Bologna and Modena illustrates well how influential the multi-organisation field is on the defining process of the issue and, therefore, on the way local authorities recognise the problem.

In Bologna, the watchword of «degrado» could point out several phenomena that occurred in the historical centre (Sebastiani, 2001): young people with dogs («punkabestia»), drunk people, homeless people squatting public spaces; students and city users going out by night to have a drink. On the other hand, in Modena, the social protest clearly focused on prostitution and drug issue too -as said before- but blaming the «illegal immigrant who commit crime». Why such a different formulation in two cities suffering the same macro-dynamics and distant from only 40 kilometres? I support that in Modena collective reached what the local authorities perceived as a consensus among the local society whereas in Bologna, citizens’ committees failed. To put it in other terms, citizens’ committees had success in expanding conflict in Modena but not in Bologna, although it is a key factor of success (Cobb and Elder, 1983).

In Bologna, citizens’ committees didn’t have success in imposing a common definition of the «degrado» because, on the one hand, they appeared to be politically divided and, on the other hand, they didn’t get other organisations support.
The first citizens’ committees appeared in Bologna in the nineties, but started multiplying under the Centre-Right local government of Giorgio Guazzaloca. In 2005, they were about 20 active committees, 18 of whom gathered to set up a coordination named the «Streets Federation» (Germain, 2008). When the Left regained the town council in 2004 with Sergio Cofferati elected mayor, the citizens’ committees movement split up into two parts: four committees freed themselves from the Streets federation action. For instance, the four committees refused to participate in the meeting protest which took place on November 13, 2005 in front of the Municipal theatre where the Mayor had come to open the theatre season. These four committees, who had kept close to the Left, argued that they preferred to wait for the leftist security policy to be implemented before complaining. Besides, these four committees wrote by themselves an «integrated plan» to deal with the historical centre «degrado», with about fifteen leftist associations as co-signers. In 2006, the four committees officially rallied to the local government policy and gathered under the heading of «Bologna vivibile» («Livable Bologna»). To put it in other terms, in 2005 the Streets federation started coping with a competitive movement close to the local government, whereas the Federation did not have success in recruiting other political support.

Moreover, another organisation started disagreeing with the Streets federation’s claim. The topic of protest changed in the years two thousand, as citizens committees started off-loading the blame of the decline of the historical centre onto bar retailers and consumers, and onto the municipality who had let take-away shops and pubs concentrate in the area (Germain, 2008). One should mention the total amount of students increased by 100% between the seventies and the nineties, from 47 000 to some 100 000 (Baldini et al., 2000: 96-103). Since the university departments are all to be found in the historical city centre, take-away shops and pubs have therefore tended to concentrate there too. By blaming bar retailers, the Streets federation faced the shopkeeper federation (Confesercenti)’s growing opposition. For instance, the Streets federation asked for opening time slot restraints, a proposal which clearly did not get the shopkeepers support.

In Modena, citizens’ committees had success in mobilising different organisations, especially older institutionalised professional groups.

First, the social protest immediately gained the political parties support. At the beginning of 1997, the local government held a public meeting to deal with security issues. It was decided to organise a demonstration in February 1997 and a lot of leftist political parties and professional syndicates did participate. In Modena, the traditional aggregation structures joined the citizens’ committees action from the beginning of the social movement. It has to be mentioned that among the professional syndicates that support the mobilisation, there is a police syndicate: SAP (Sindicato Autonomo di Polizia, Autonomous Police Syndicate). At that time, SAP was the dominant syndicate within the local police.

Second, the climate of tension due to drug dealing in Crocetta led citizens’ committees to promote a petition in June 1997. They called for law enforcement in the field of illegal immigration, as they thought that the increase in drug dealing and prostitution was only due to the influx of illegal immigrants in the country. Indeed, in Italy, illegal immigrants who had been caught for committing crime were free to move until their repatriation, which mean that they

21 In 1999, the Left lose Bologna for the first time since WWII, notably because of the security issue (Campus and Pasquino, 2000).
could easily avoid the sanction. The citizens’ committees petition supported the Minister of Interior’s bill of law enforcement, which planned to have detention centres built for illegal immigrants waiting for their repatriation after being caught for committing crime. The committees managed to get A 18 476- signature petition, i.e. more than 10% of the local population. This petition had great impact since it was passed on to the Parliament by the Region Emilia-Romagna to support the Minister of interior’s bill \(^{22}\). Besides, in 1999 the four major leftist shop owners and artisans syndicates - representing more than 30,000 people in the province of Modena - mounted a vigorous press campaign entitled « I delinquenti, li vogliamo così » (« We want offenders like that »), especially to have a CPT (Centro di Temporanea Permanenza, Immigration detention centre) built in Modena (cf. the illustration below). Even if some leftist personalities and the Green party (belonging to the local government) strongly criticised the illustration for being very shocking, the campaign was a success and 8000 people signed the petition over two days. The success of those two petitions confirmed that the social protest did spread successfully in Modena.

**Illustration published in three local newspapers (La Gazetta di Modena, Il Resto del Carlino, ed. Modena and Ultime Notizie on September 17-18, 1999.**

Lastly, it is necessary to underline to key role played by the local police syndicates in the social protest outcome. In February 1999, the committees publicly presented what the local media named «the Decalogue», i.e. a 10 measure plan to fight crime. This programme was jointly mapped out by the committees’ coordination, trade unions, economic interests groups (shopkeepers, artisans, small and medium-sized businesses) and two local police syndicates (SAP and Siulp, Sindicato Unitario Lavoratori Polizia, Unit Syndicate of Local Police officers). One of the committees leaders considered that the local police syndicates contribution was decisive since they brought the expert knowledge to design a realistic technical plan, containing feasible measures, two of whom had remained at the heart of the public debate for the following years: the building of the CPT and the implementation of the «proximity municipal police».

The comparison between the two Italian case studies clearly shows the impact of the multi-organisational field on the mobilisation outcome. On the one hand, in Bologna, citizens’ committees didn’t manage to spread the movement towards institutionalised political, economic and social groups, while on the other hand citizens committees in Modena gained further support from organisations and interests groups from the beginning, which allowed them to reach a consensus. The problem definition is a key point to understand the social protest outcomes in the field of security. As said before, local governments and the State both have power in the field of security. To put it differently, the security issue is at stake in the institutional relations between centre and periphery. According to the problem definition promoted by the social protest, the State local representatives (police prefect and prefect) clashed with the local government, each of them shifting the responsibility onto the other. In Bologna, the multiple definition of «degrado» resulted in a confusion of responsibilities between the State and the local government, that they both used to refuse dealing with the issue. For instance, in 1998, the prefect cleared the police

\(^{22}\) The bill was passed and in 1998, the Turco-Napolitano Act created the CPT (Centro di Temporanea Permanenza, Immigration detention centre) to fight against illegal immigrants committing crime.
responsibility asserting that the local demand was responsible for the rise of drug dealing and prostitution in Bologna.

«People are dissatisfied? They are right to protest. Not to have dealers below one’s windows is a fair request. But we, the national police, do what the law allows us to do. We can’t prevent the youths from injecting themselves, we can’t prevent the free movement of anyone. It doesn’t mean however that we are powerless. And then, we don’t need to be hypocritical, don’t make me hold priest forth: if there’s some traffic, prostitution, the two major pains in Bologna with illegal immigration, it’s because there’s a demand for paying sex and drugs from the Bolognese. [...] All in all, a share of our society is a party of the decline.» (Enzo Mosino, Prefect of Bologna, La Repubblica, ed. Bologna, July 17, 1998, my translation).

Moreover, until the loss of Bologna, the Left systematically shifted the responsibility for security onto the State police, whereas dealing with disorder and soft crime is far for being a priority of the police organisation (cf. above). Under the Right-wing government, the municipal position changed as the local government decided to use the municipal police to fight against soft crime and disorder (especially through the creation of a special unit in charge of policing the historical centre).

On the opposite, in Modena, the focus of the protest on the illegal immigrant who commits crime came to be the State police’s priority, and this resulted in several police «blitz» against drug dealers and prostitutes, a rise of the total amount of expulsions and an increased cooperation between the municipal and the national police forces to fight against crime. Lastly, the public authorities, co-ordinating their effort, (mayor, police prefect and prefect) had success in having a CPT built in Modena.
Concluding remarks

The aim of the paper was to show to what extent social protests were a major factor of the renewed involvement of municipalities in the field of policing in France as in Italy. Three main concluding remarks can be made.

First, in the four case studies, social protests resulted from the mobilisation of a small group of middle classes activists who protested against heightened perceived disorder in their neighbourhood. These rule creators are not so different from the «moral entrepreneurs» that Howard Becker identified a few decades ago (Becker, 1991), i.e. people in the upper classes who encouraged moral crusades to set up new norms upon the society. Studying the politicisation of security issues at the local level brings us to reflect on the way local social order is built nowadays. What is specific to security issues is that, whereas they chiefly deal with disorder and soft crime, they are labelled «security» by the public authorities because they meet with a historical institutional conflict between centre and periphery. «Security» issues are used by local governments to gain breathing spaces at the hands of the State in both countries by implementing new policies.

Second, this paper suggests that immigration flux largely gives way to social preoccupation in both countries. The immigration factor allows to explain the temporal gap between the politicisation of security in France and in Italy. In France, security issues entered the public agenda from the mid-seventies (see the report Peyrefitte, 1977) and became electoral issues in 1983 in several French cities, such as Roubaix (Northern France), Marseille (Southern France) or Paris (Rey, 2002), whereas Italy did not undergo the same phenomenon until the mid-nineties, a decade after a massive increase of immigration flux in the country. So, it seems that the politicisation of security issues was partly linked to immigration processes in both countries, as the pressure of immigration in some neighbourhoods made some residents perceive heightened disorder and get mobilised, even without explicitly coupling the two issues in their discourses.

Third, the comparison between four cities located in two countries allowed to question the relevance of the «contentious politics» model: In France, social protests were channelled by traditional aggregation structures and got less public exposure than in Italy. The press review appeared less relevant to tackle the politicisation process of security in the two French cities. Moreover, the comparative analysis showed the key role of public authorities in the problem-definition process, which means that, to analyse the protest outcomes, one needs to examine not only the social movement’s discourses but also those produces by the public authorities. The French literature on political sociology applied to public policy analysis especially insists on the political and administrative dynamics that influence the specification of alternatives (Lascoumes and Le Galès, 2007). From this point of view, by focusing of the formation of public policies while relying on the concept of politicisation process, political sociology can successfully combine with the literature on social movements (which tend to give priority to highly publicised protests) to get further into the analysis of policy change.
Bibliography


