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Abstract

Position taking is an important legislative area that has been investigated extensively by scholars. Since one of the main roles of the opposition is to present an alternative to the government, the question is, how does the opposition take its positions? In order to address this question, we analyze the use of one-minute speeches (OMSs) by opposition members in the Israeli parliament (the Knesset) during 2000-2011. There were four Knesset terms during these years, so we have the opportunity to study the opposition’s behavior over a period of time. We decided to analyze OMSs because they are considered an easy tool to use, one that offers short-term benefits, such as allowing a legislator to take a position on a topic of special interest to him or her, and long-term benefits, such as demonstrating ongoing participation in legislative procedures. The study uses mixed research methods, beginning with a statistical analysis and continuing with a content analysis of the speeches and the interviews conducted with members and leaders of the opposition. The statistical analysis shows that opposition members use OMSs more extensively than coalition members. Among the opposition members, we also found different behavior patterns based on nationality, seniority and ideology. In addition, the qualitative analysis of both the OMSs and the interviews shows that opposition members are active in two ways. First, they react to government-initiated proposals. Second, they raise topics for the Knesset’s agenda, a move that the coalition does generally not appreciate.
Literature review

Opposition is considered a keystone of democracy (e.g. Dahl 1966; Schapiro 1966; Lipset 1967; Lawson 1993; Helms 2008a). The study of the opposition asks questions about its composition, strength, definition, roles and effectiveness (e.g. Dahl 1966; Barker 1971; King 1976; Blondel 1997; Doring 2001; Norton 2008), but research about the opposition remains an inadequately explored area of political science (Mujica and Sanchez-Cuenca 2006). Furthermore, the research that does exist concentrates on the outcomes of the legislative process rather than on the behavior of the opposition as a political actor.

In this study, we concentrate on the opposition in Israel and focus on the behavior of the individual opposition members using a parliamentary tool about which there is scant knowledge: one-minute speeches. We begin by describing the main issues on the opposition's agenda. Then we introduce the research about position taking in parliament and the use of light parliamentary tools such as parliamentary questions and one-minute speeches. Both of these tools lead us to the research question: How does the opposition take its positions using one-minute speeches?

The definition of the opposition

In order to understand the meaning of the opposition in democracies we should start with the scholars’ debate about the appropriate definition of it. They agree that the term opposition has several meanings and is used in different contexts (e.g. Barker 1971; Dahl 1971; Norton 2008). They also note
that any democracy actually hosts a plethora of oppositions (e.g. King 1976; Blondel 1997; Kaiser 2008), and that it is a complex phenomenon and a nebulous concept (e.g. Barker 1971; Norton 2008). Hence, the attempt to define what constitutes the opposition is a highly contested matter (Parry 1997; Morgenstern, Negri and Perez-Linan 2008).

Barker (1971) identified the fundamental requirement for the flourishing of the opposition as some separation between the person or persons symbolizing sovereignty, and those exercising government. Based on Barker’s six meanings of the term opposition, Norton (2008) suggests subsuming them into two categories: whether a body opposes the existence of the state, or constitutional opposition as Sartori (1966) describes it. Kaiser (2008) provides a different way of defining the opposition by saying that it can be identified by two elements: their policy preferences and the institutional constraints under which they act. Finally, Brack and Weinblum’s (2011) critical review of the literature leads them to offer a new perspective on political opposition. Political opposition is a “disagreement with the government or its politics, the political elite, or the political regime as a whole, expressed in public sphere, by an organized actor through different modes of action” (p. 74).

Based on these suggested definitions we could say that in parliamentary politics, the opposition is defined as the parties not included in the executive cabinet. However, Morgenstern, Negri and Perez-Linan (2008) maintain that the definition of the opposition is murky in multiparty presidential regimes. They suggest defining the opposition in presidential systems as “the group of legislators who do not belong to the president’s party or to any party
which has membership in the president’s cabinet” (p. 163). In this paper, we define the opposition in accordance with Kaiser's (2008) two elements: their policy preferences and their institutional constraints.

**The opposition's role and strength**

Opposition parties seek one or more of the following: to become the ruling party, to become a partner in a coalition government, to influence policy, to protect and further the interests of their key constituencies, and to represent and give prominence to broader values and ideologies. Looking at these goals, we should wonder whether the opposition parties ever attain them.

Numerous studies have investigated the role of the opposition in a variety of countries; Japan (Inoguchi 2008), Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands (Andeweg, De winter and Muller 2008; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008), South Africa (Schrire 2008), Turkey (Hazama 1996), Spain (Mujica and Sanchez- Cuenca 2006), the European Union (Helms 2008b; Proksch and Slapin 2011), Africa’s regimes (Wondwosen 2009), New Zealand (Salmond 2004; Kaiser 2008), France (Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008), Germany (Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008), the United Kingdom (Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008; Kaiser 2008), Canada (Kaiser 2008) and Australia (Kaiser 2008). However, Israel is one country in which there has been little interest in the opposition. Hence, one of our research goals is to expand the knowledge about the behavior of the opposition in Israel. Second, the research about the role and strength of the opposition concentrates on understanding the procedures that allow the opposition to act
and achieve its goals (Hazama 1996; Blondel 1997; Doring 2001; Mujica and Sanchez-Cuenca 2006; Inoguchi 2008; Andreweg, De winter and Muller 2008; Helms 2008b; Kaiser 2008; Schrire 2008). As Riker (1982) notes, institutional rules do not determine that a particular political outcome will occur. Instead, institutions can only change the likelihood that an event will happen. In this study, we look at the institutional rules about the opposition’s ability to act in Israel and examine how individual opposition members create a political outcome.

Third, of all the parliamentary tools available to the opposition, the one studied most frequently is legislation (e.g. Sinclair 1986; Mayhew 1991; Olson 1994; Laver and Shepsle 1996; Stratmann 2000; Tsebelis 2002; Cox and McCubbins 2005). Mujica and Sanchez-Cuenca (2006) take an innovative approach by analyzing the content of the bills of opposition members. Furthermore, they categorize the content of these bills into five areas: basic rights, institutions (the internal rules of governmental bodies such as the constitutional court and the court of finance), legal issues (the penal code, civil and military codes, and procedural rules), electoral and party rules, and territorial issues. In this study, we expand these categories because position making involves many more subjects. Then we gather the subjects into three representative components based on Pitkin (1967) and Eulau and Karps (1977).

Special attention has been paid to budgetary legislation. Falco-Gimeno and Jurado (2011) show that when the opposition’s support is required to pass the budget, it will push for deficits if it is sufficiently concentrated and it is contesting a fragile government. Akirav, Cox and McCubbins (2010) found
that the opposition parties’ roll rates on exceptional bills (Budget) in the Knesset are higher than their roll rates on ordinary bills. Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup (2008) claim that legislative bills are one way among others to signal one’s priorities to the public in the competition for voters. This study agrees with this point, so we do not examine legislation, but the opposition’s OMSs.

Fourth, only a few scholars have examined the use of parliamentary questions or questioning time as a means of overseeing the government (e.g. Salmond 2004; Akirav 2011; Proksch and Slapin 2011; Saalfeld 2011). Even fewer have investigated OMSs as a tool for opposition members to take a position (Morris 2001; Hall 2002; Rocca 2007). As we can see, parliamentary questions and OMSs are considered less relevant and effective tools for opposition members in overseeing the government and taking a position on public policy issues. However, we maintain that these specific light tools can be very effective in challenging the government from unexpected directions.

Fifth, the conclusions of scholars about the strength of the opposition vary. Parliamentary opposition depends on indirect opportunities to affect parliamentary decisions in two areas: committees and plenary debates (Kaiser 2008). The role of the parliament in policy-making is marginal in South Africa (Schrire 2008). Brauninger and Deubus (2009) argue that despite the clear distinction between the government and the opposition in parliamentary democracies, there is indeed room to accommodate agenda setting by the opposition. Furthermore, activities take place across the government-opposition divide. Nevertheless, opposition and bipartisan agenda setting is rare. It is neither absent nor spurious, but related to the allocation of power
and the intensity of ideological conflict both within and between the coalition government and parliament. For example, the parliamentary opposition in Japan is constrained, but it still finds some room to maneuver and may influence legislative politics (Inoguchi 2008).

Morgenstern, Negri and Perez-Linan (2008) examine the size and shape of the opposition in Latin American governments based on six indicators: the size of the president’s party, the size of the government’s coalition, the size of the opposition, partisan cohesion, the effective number of parties and the durability of coalitions. From their analysis of 18 countries in Latin America, four distinctive patterns of opposition emerge: resistance – in which the opposition is small but remains united, divided government - in which a united opposition controls at least one of the legislative chambers, feeble opposition – in which the opposition is a small and divided contingent with little capacity to veto, and disarray –in which the opposition, albeit large, may be weak because it is very divided, and the president may be able to offer selective incentives to particular parties or individuals to create an ad-hoc coalition (Morgenstern, Negri and Perez-Linan 2008, 166-167). They found great diversity in the size and cohesion of the opposition in Latin America. This study uses their patterns to examine the opposition in the Israeli parliament.

Mujica and Sanchez-Cuenca (2006) examine three factors to explain deviations from the consensus in Spain. Two of the factors are institutional: the existence of a majority or minority government and the identity of the main mover behind a proposal. The third factor is more political: the content or subject matter of the bill under consideration.
Opposition and individual opposition parties are significant actors in exposing the government to public challenges and oversight, but are least effective in affecting the outcomes of public policy (Norton 2008). For example, Hazama (1996) found that in Turkey, a constitutional review provides opportunities for the parliamentary opposition to compensate for its legislative weakness. Similarly, Andeweg, De winter and Muller (2008) conclude that while there is an opposition in Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands, it is not very active or competitive.

In light of these studies, one may question why the existence of an opposition is considered a keystone of democracy when studies show that in most countries, it is weak and does not play its role effectively. Scholars offer several explanations for this conundrum. First, splits in the opposition may be one of the explanations for its weakness. “We have to distinguish between small opposition parties that may exploit favorable constellations of executive-legislative relations, and large opposition parties, the “official” opposition, which can only criticize the government and hope for the next general election” (Kaiser 2008, 36). When the opposition is concentrated in a single party, in the short-term it may be rewarded by the electorate, but in the long run, it will need to deal with the debt it incurs for this reward (Falco-Gimeno and Jurado 2011). Second, ideology and fragmentation may hobble the opposition, particularly if it contains more than one party. Furthermore, even if the opposition consists of a single party, there may be ideological and political variances that weaken and divide the opposition (e.g. Flemming and Damggard 2008; Falco-Gimeno and Jurado 2011). Third, the opposition may suffer from their role in the legislative process, both on the floor and within
committee debates. What are the procedures that enable them to be significant actors and when do they not make a difference? (Flemming and Damggard 2008; Schrire 2008). Fourth, the existence of a minority government may hamper the role of the opposition. Flemming and Damggard (2008) found that while parliamentary opposition is influential under a minority government, during the last two decades government and opposition parties have become more ‘integrated’ in policy-making.

Do the opposition members in the Israeli parliament behave in accordance with these ideas? By analyzing their use of light parliamentary tools such as parliamentary questions and OMSs, we hope to answer this question.

### Position taking in parliament

The OMS is rooted in three important legislative areas: position taking, legislative organization and legislative participation. How do opposition members of Knesset (MKs) use OMS as a tool for taking positions? To answer this question, we investigated the positions taken by opposition MKs with regard to their criticism of the government and its coalition. The unconstrained nature of OMS facilitates position taking. In addition, the motivations for using OMS shed light on why legislators designed the institution the way they did (legislative organization) and on legislative participation.

Existing studies on OMS have looked at how legislators in the U.S. House of Representatives use them (e.g. Maltzman and Sigelman 1996;
Rocca 2007), why they use them (e.g. Maltzman and Sigelman 1996; Morris 2001) and their content (e.g. Polletta 1998; Morris 2001; Hall 2002). This study examines the use of OMS in a venue never before considered, the Israeli parliament (the Knesset). Using Israel as the research site allows us to test existing theories with fresh data.

**One-Minute Speeches in the Israeli Parliament**

Since 2000, the year OMS were established in the Israeli parliament, five elections have taken place and five prime ministers have been in office. Israeli politics is based on unstable coalition governments that encourage MKs to be individualistic and distance themselves from their party affiliation (e.g. Hazan 1999; Akirav 2010). It is difficult for Israeli governments to maintain a majority (Akirav, Cox and McCubbins 2010). Hence, it is interesting to explore and understand the use of a new parliamentary tool, the OMS, which has few limitations and offers MKs the opportunity to speak out against government policy.

**Procedures governing OMSs**

Most parliaments, such as those in the UK, Scotland, Finland, Japan and New Zealand, do not use OMSs. Only five elected bodies have adopted it: the US House of Representatives, the European Parliament and the parliaments of Australia, Canada and Israel. A comparison of the procedures governing OMSs in these five legislatures yields several insights. First, OMSs

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1 This analysis is based on Part D, Chapter two, Article 33a of the Rules of Procedure of the Knesset and on Mulvihill, Mary. 1999. *One-Minute Speeches: Current House Practices*. CRS Report for Congress.
provide one of the few opportunities for non-legislative debate, where debate is almost always confined to the pending legislative business. Second, the recognition of the right to give a one-minute speech is the prerogative of the Speaker. Third, in the US House one-minute speeches are not provided for in the rules of the House, while in the Israeli parliament, the Australian parliament and the European Parliament they are. Fourth, there are set periods when OMSs can be given. Finally, each Member can give only one speech each legislative day. In sum, we can see that the opportunities OMSs give the Members in all five legislatures are similar. The speeches are not about legislation. The speech is initiated by a Member at a given time and lasts for a specified period. In the light of these restrictions, the main question is, how do opposition MKs use OMSs?

As mentioned above, Riker (1982) notes that institutional rules do not determine that a particular political outcome will occur. Instead, institutions can only change the likelihood that an event will happen. What are the institutional rules governing the opposition’s ability to act in the Israeli parliament?

*Procedures governing OMSs in Israel*

The first thirty minutes on Monday and Tuesday in which there are no votes of no confidence begin with one-minute speeches (Rules of Procedure, Part E, Article 158a). Every MK (including ministers and deputy ministers who are MKs) may speak. In order to do so, he/she needs to be on the floor and push the vote button to register. Therefore, MKs have a weekly opportunity to address the voters and tell them about their thoughts, wishes and activities.
without factional quotas or the Speaker’s approval. Hence, OMSs are a comprehensive indicator of the opposition MKs’ initiative, because its use is entirely in the hands of the legislator.

MKs operate in two formal arenas of parliament: on the floor and in committees. Needless to say, these two areas are related to one another. There are three major factors involved in floor time. First, all of the parliamentary members are supposed to be present during the debates. Second, all of the debates are open to the public. Finally, the proceedings of the floor are broadcast directly on television. Thus, visibility on the floor is an essential part of parliamentary life and is connected to the productivity of members of parliament (Sheafer and Wolfsfeld 2004). Hence, we concentrate on the floor arena.

Several institutional arrangements allow opposition members in the Israeli parliament to fulfill all of the roles of the opposition such as taking positions and criticizing the government, as well as introducing motions of no confidence, debates about the budget law, parliamentary questions, motions for the agenda and working in committees. In some cases, there are major restrictions on their ability to act. In other cases, the opposition's members have the ability to fulfill their role. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that until 2000 the opposition leader in the Israeli parliament did not have any formal status. Prime ministers used to update the opposition's leaders frequently about central issues. In 2000, the Knesset amended the law regarding the position of the opposition's leader. Since then, the prime minister must update the opposition's leader at least once a month (Chapter F, article 13). The opposition's leader may speak on the floor after the prime
minister’s speech (Chapter F, article 14), participates in official ceremonies (Chapter F, article 15) and receives a salary and all of the benefits similar to those of the ministers (Chapter F, article 16).

Method

In order to answer the question of how the opposition takes positions, we analyzed the use of OMSs by opposition members in the Israeli parliament during the years 2000-2011. Four Knesset terms (the 15th, 16th, 17th and 18th) are included between these years. Given that in every Knesset term we have several coalitions whose composition varies, this range of years allows us to examine the behavior of the opposition over a period of time.

We decided to analyze OMSs because they are considered an easy tool to use, one that offers short-term benefits, such as allowing a legislator to take a position on a topic of special interest to him or her, and long-term benefits, such as demonstrating ongoing participation in legislative procedures. The study uses mixed research methods, beginning with a statistical analysis of the OMSs and continuing with a content analysis of the speeches and of the interviews conducted with members and leaders of the opposition.

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2 We emailed all current opposition MKs asking them if we could interview them about their activities as opposition members. To date, we have conducted just three interviews by phone.
Results and discussion

Frequent use of OMSs by the opposition

In Table 1 we can see the opposition’s use of OMSs compared to that of the coalition. Since the first day of OMSs in the Knesset (January 2000), in every term the opposition delivered on average 65% of the OMSs, while the coalition delivered 35% of them. Thus, the data clearly demonstrate the extensive use of OMSs by the opposition MKs. Furthermore, this tendency accords with the literature both on light parliamentary tools such as parliamentary questions (Wiberg 1994; Akirav 2011; Saalfeld 2011) and one-minute speeches (e.g. Maltzman and Sigelman 1996; Morris 2001; Rocca 2007).

Table 1: The use of one-minute speeches by the opposition versus the coalition
The literature about the strength of the opposition talks about its composition. We were interested in investigating whether specific aspects of the opposition in Israel are more significant than others in determining the opposition’s use of OMSs. Hence, we ran crosstab procedures looking at Phi and Cramer’s V in order to determine the strength of the use of OMSs. The factors we examined were: nationality, gender, seniority, candidate selection methods and being a committee’s chair. Three factors did indeed prove significant: nationality, seniority and ideology.

**Nationality**

We wondered whether nationality was one of the major factors in understanding the opposition’s extensive use of OMSs. It is important to understand that in Israel most of the Arab MKs are part of the opposition. In addition, their number in the Knesset suffers from under-representation compared to their share in the general population. Furthermore, since the establishment of Israel in 1948 and up until now, no Arab party has taken part in the coalition. Therefore, Arab MKs can be considered a permanent part of the opposition in Israel.

Table 2: The connection between coalition/opposition and nationality with regard to the use of one-minute speeches.

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<tr>
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<th>15th Knesset</th>
<th>16th Knesset</th>
<th>17th Knesset</th>
<th>18th Knesset</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phi</td>
<td>0.408</td>
<td>0.327</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>0.301</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sig</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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From Table 2 we can see that opposition members who are Arabs use OMSs more frequently than Jewish members of the coalition. These findings are similar to those in previous studies both regarding nationality (e.g. Morris 2001; Rocca 2007) and Arab MKs (Akirav 2010; Schueftan 2011).

**Ideology**

With regard to ideology, Israeli political parties can be grouped into four groups; right wing parties, left wing parties, centrist parties and other parties including two ultra-orthodox religious parties, *Yahadut HaTorah* and *Shas* (Arian 2005). We wondered whether belonging to a specific political ideology would encourage MKs to use more OMSs.

Table 3: The connection between coalition/opposition and ideology with regard to the use of one-minute speeches.

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<th>15(^{th}) Knesset</th>
<th>16(^{th}) Knesset</th>
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<tr>
<td>Cramer’s V</td>
<td>0.431</td>
<td>0.505</td>
<td>0.722</td>
<td>0.485</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sig</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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From Table 3 we can see that opposition members who are left wing MKs use OMSs more extensively than right wing or centrist MKs. All of the coalitions between 2001 and 2011 were composed of centrist and right wing parties; hence, the results are not surprising. Furthermore, as noted earlier, Arab MKs are a permanent part of the opposition, and most of them belong to left wing parties. Previous studies regarding the use of OMSs noted that representatives from ideological extremes tend to use OMSs more extensively
than those who come from more centrist positions (e.g. Maltzman and Sigelman 1996; Morris 2001).

**Seniority**

Seniority is another variable that scholars have studied extensively, especially regarding legislative effectiveness, legislative entrepreneurship and sponsorship of legislation (Frantzich 1979; Moore and Thomas 1990; Schiller 1995; Mayhew, 2000; Anderson, Box-Steffensmeier and Sinclair-Chapman 2003; Garand and Burke 2006). Seniority in the current research has two categories: first term MKs and those who are in their second term or greater. Based on the literature, we wondered whether seniority was one of the explanatory factors for extensive use of OMSs.

Table 4: The connection between coalition/opposition and seniority with regard to the use of one-minute speeches.

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<th>15th Knesset</th>
<th>16th Knesset</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phi</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>0.212</td>
<td>0.466</td>
<td>0.253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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From Table 4, we can see that opposition members who are senior use OMSs more extensively than coalition members who are junior MKs. These findings accord with the literature; senior representatives are more active than their junior peers (e.g. Frantzich 1979; Moore and Thomas 1990; Morris 2001; Akirav 2010).
Based on previous studies, our findings are not surprising. Representatives who are at a disadvantage, such as members of the opposition, tend to use light procedural tools more extensively than other representatives. In addition, we see that within the opposition, factors such as seniority, nationality and ideology strengthen the use of OMSs. In addition to the frequency of the use of OMSs, the more interesting question is about their content.

The content of the speeches

We randomly sampled 100 OMSs from each year and analyzed their content. Hence, our database contains 1,200 OMSs that were coded by two separate assistants. Their coding was found reliable. Based on the preliminary content analysis, we arrived at three main categories: the subject of the speeches, the tone of the speeches (positive, negative or neutral toward the government), and who the speeches refer to (the coalition in general, the government in general, a specific party in the coalition, a specific minister, a general case or a specific case).

The subject of the speeches

Most studies about political speeches or political agenda setting map the content of speeches by subject such as the economy, the military, social welfare, education, and health care. In this study, we rely on a combined model of Pitkin (1967) and Eulau and Karps (1977). They define three components of representation: policy where the target is the great public
issues that agitate the political process, *service* which involves the efforts of representatives to secure particular benefits for individuals or groups in their constituency, and *allocation* which refers to the representative's efforts to obtain benefits for his or her constituency. Do opposition members invest more time in speeches about policy, hence criticizing the government, or speeches about their voters?

To date, we have analyzed 350 speeches out of the 1,200 in the data set. We have made several findings. First, opposition members use OMSs to criticize the government's policy on a variety of subjects (Arab members more about Israeli policy about the Palestinians, Jewish left wing opposition members more about social issues). Second, opposition members do not neglect their voters and do refer to specific issues that concern them (both service and allocation components). Third, opposition members regard OMSs as almost the only parliamentary tool that allows them to speak up and be seen and heard.

*The tone of the speeches*

We categorized the tone of the speeches as positive, negative or neutral toward the government (e.g. Lombard Snyder-Duch and Bracken 2002; Sheafer 2007) by searching for words that praised the government or criticized it. Most of the speeches were critical in tone regardless of the nationality, gender, ideology or seniority of the opposition members. This finding is not surprising. What is surprising is that there is a battle between opposition members who use more severe words against the government’s policy. Few speeches praised the government, but even those that did
included some criticism, as if using the carrot and stick system. To date, we have not found any speeches that were neutral in tone. As mentioned above, this finding is not surprising, as we expect opposition members to criticize the government’s policy.

*Who the speeches refer to*

We also categorized the object of the speeches into six topics: the coalition in general, the government in general, a specific party from the coalition, a specific minister, a general case or a specific case. We found that the majority of the speeches referred to the government. The rest of the speeches were spread out among the other five topics with no specific pattern.

Based on the preliminary interviews we conducted with opposition members, it appears that OMSs give them the opportunity to set their agenda with minimum constraints and maximum exposure to their voters. Although the OMS is short, it can be very precise, sharp and hurtful to the government.

The quantitative part of the research showed us that opposition members in the Israeli parliament use OMSs more frequently than coalition members. Furthermore, within the opposition we can see that Arab members, senior members and members of left wing ideological parties use OMSs more frequently than other MKs. Looking at the qualitative part of the research, we can see that opposition members consider OMSs a significant tool for taking a position, and criticizing the government and the coalition parties.
Conclusions

Opposition is an inseparable part of modern democracy. As such, we must investigate its strength, composition, role and effectiveness. The current research addresses this challenge by examining the opposition in a country that has been neglected in previous research (Israel) using a parliamentary tool that has also received scant attention in legislative studies (OMSs). Using mixed research methods helps us draw a comprehensive picture of how opposition members in the Israeli parliament use OMSs.

The neglect of OMSs in the research must change. Even though the OMS exists in only five legislatures worldwide, it can be an important light parliamentary tool that opposition members and other legislators can use to take a position on issues that matter to them. Furthermore, this use of mixed research methods allowed us to see the same phenomenon from different points of view of and increase our understanding about how the opposition takes a position on various issues. Future research should compare the countries that use OMSs, looking for similarity and differences.
References


