

## **Title: Political Recruitment Theory on Cabinet Appointments**

Theme panel: Political Elites: Comparative Perspectives

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### **Abstract**

Three areas of inquiry can be identified in the academic literature on political recruitment: one explains how and why individuals enter politics professionally or as party members; the second looks at how and why some politicians become members of parliament and make their careers there; the third examines how and why cabinet appointments are made.

Who are these people and what qualities or characteristics do they embody? These questions cut across fields of enquiry. Since the integration of cabinets, it seems, represents incipient development, I looked for its background in Mosca, Pareto and Michels and to identify some assumptions. I attempted to sort consistently, in a way that allowed me to build a theoretical model that, in the context of representative democracy, would explain the majority of appointments to public decision-making positions. The theoretical proposal considers that appointment decisions are conditioned by an institutional framework. Six criteria were examined:

-Co-opting opponents to neutralize them.

-Headhunting experts to prevent or resolve problems inherent in the complexity of modern states.

-Invitation to activists and intellectuals with recognized reputations for representing honor and prestige.

-Designation of team members to reward loyalty and provide a basis for trust.

-Appointment of representatives of allied groups to confirm or ratify an alliance.

-Appointment of economic and military representatives or other elites confirming the recognition of their interests.

### **The concept of political recruitment**

In contemporary democracies the elections determine the appointment of only a small part of the total of public decision makers, legislators (representatives and senators) and the heads of federal and local executive branches. Those who were elected appoint the rest of all, according to its criteria or conditions. First, the ministers or secretaries of departments and many senior managers of governmental offices depend on the prime minister or president, or in some cases the approval of parliament. This may include the members of the diplomatic corps, the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the armed forces, CEO of governmental companies and public autonomous agencies. Second, something similar happens in local governments. Thirdly, the members of the judicial branch do not even result from the designation or approval of those who were elected.

This huge and diverse set of those who do not owe their appointment to a mass of voters is a research problem, which should be explained by the theory of political recruitment in response to who, how and why they get power or maintain it. In this case I refer to power in two senses: one, to be empowered to take public decisions, another to meet the most important responsibilities, such as management and administration of public resources, the public policies design and implementation, the safeguarding of national security, the representation of the State and the administration of justice.

In general, recruitment refers to all activities and procedures to be carried out in the organizations to select new staff in the ownership of their jobs. Similarly, according to the definition of Bobbio (1981: 1393-1394), the political recruitment is carried out “in the political structures and, in particular, in legislative bodies and agencies of the party leaders”, and has the function “to ensure” their “roles” are “properly covered”. Moreover, Bobbio considers then, that the theory of recruitment has focused on the selection criteria, but “remain unclear psychological and sociological factors that promote the entry and career”.

Another definition that I think is important to be named is Putnam’s (1976: 46), who refers to the political recruitment as “the process that selects from among the millions of people socially and politically motivated that shape the political stratum, the thousands which reaching positions with national significant influence”. Note that for Putnam the relevance of the recruitment process is used for upward mobility, which leads some individuals (the advantaged and motivated men) from a level to a one higher (with national significant influence) in Bobbio contrast, for whom recruitment is not considered relevant to the hierarchy of influence or supremacy of one over the other, as if he provided officials (in the sense of making something work) all “political structures”. In this definition, functionality appears more important than power.

It is also important to note that Putnam mentions two qualities of potential recruits that are *socially advantaged* and *motivated*. Since I consider that socially advantaged imply the possession of any resources, material (wealth), symbolic (prestige), persuasive (grassroots social networks) or knowledge (education, experience or skills). And motivation has to be ambition, or at least have provided their own consent, of who are interested in promoting a collective benefit, group, or at least his own. So, first, not everyone is a candidate to be recruited or conscripted, only those who belong to one or more special populations or *pools*, on the other hand, in the process of recruitment incentives operate in a two-way relationship, or exchange between two parts: the recruits with their motivation and resources (motivation is not enough to be recruited, if you are not socially favored), and the recruiter or gatekeeper with their interest and capability to repay or reward (is not enough their interest in recruiting anyone, if is not offered a benefit or a detriment to exchange). In addition, Keller (1963, 172-174) notes that historically have been considered two main types of attributes desirable for candidates to enter to the top positions of the elite: one, on the presumed superiority inherent biological and social, and other, the merit in one or more tasks or skills. The two main types of content or attributes have been incorporated in various ways according to the values prevailing in each society.

An additional definition which can explain more possibilities is Czudnowski’s (1975, 155), for whom the political recruitment is “the process by which individuals or groups of individuals are induced into active political roles”. Note that in this case is not the notion of upward mobility, but to change roles, so one can think on the possibility of a professional political career in not every cases implies a rise in terms of power (or influence). Nor is it

considered that the potential recruits possess outstanding qualities or even motivation, so that the universe is not limited to a minority or *pool*. Moreover, this is not the topic of motivation or ambition on the part of recruits, but in the process he leads, like a rather passive, or subject to which they can influence, persuade or motivate.

### **Research into political recruitment**

According to previous definitions, recruitment is always a selection process to fill vacancies in any political structure, which allows upward mobility in the political careers or a change of role from a non-political to a politician. So the theory would have to explain who is selected for each vacancy, how they are selected, who will select or induce, and why, in at least three main areas of inquiry: political parties, parliaments and public service, especially in the cabinets. Another field of inquiry which might be considered is about leaders or actors playing an active role outside the political parties, parliamentary and governmental structures (think of union leaders, civil society activists and chiefs of organizations in general whose bases are in the pressure or influence on legislative processes and public policy, but their objective is not to conquer the power or rule).

In addition, I want to elaborate on the third: if we accept that any governmental office is a political structure, then any public official has an active political role, whether or not partisan. If we look at the definition of Bobbio, legislative branches and political parties are two subsets of “political structures”, implying that there may be more or there are in fact more “political structures”, such as those I mentioned at the beginning of the text, and one of the most important, is necessarily the cabinet. Something else, the pathways of the recruits occasionally or frequently move from one area to another, from parliament to government or vice versa, and the various other political activities or the reverse.

In the literature on recruitment that have reviewed, I find that the majority of published *papers* and books relating to the entry of political parties, promotion or advancement within these processes to determine the qualities of candidates and politicians who make careers in parliaments (Abramson and Claggett 2001, Conley and Smith 1983; Czudnowski 1972 and 1975, Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Goodman, Swanson and Cornwell 1970, Ishiyama 1998, 2001, Sanbonmatsu 2006, Kuroda 1988; Darious 2002, Norris 1997, Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Prewitt 1965 and 1970, Seligman 1967, and Seligman, King, Lim Kim and Smith 1974 and Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008). Other work relates to the generality of recruiting the political elite, and it can be considered old in terms of its date of publication (Keller 1963, Putnam 1976, Schwartz 1969, and Seligman 1971).

I know there is more literature available on the subject, but I believe that based on what I have reviewed is enough to say that is still an emerging or limited the scope of study regarding the integration of the cabinets. In this regard I have found three papers that come to the case for my goal, which is to explain the appointments in the cabinet, essentially answering the question why, without neglecting those of whom and how.

The most recent is the Amorim (2006), who made an analysis in terms of rational choice from a neo-institutionalism approach on the assumption that there is a strategy in the shape of the pattern formation of the cabinet. His argument is that if you need to build a parliamentary majority may require a more or less proportional partisan representation into the heads of ministries. Conversely, if one wants to govern with authority or exclusive privileges that do not require a parliamentary majority, then a cabinet can be integrated with a preponderance of advocates and experts. Additionally, in the decision making process for each appointment or conditions affecting three elements: personal preferences

(the ruler), the institutional incentives and economic conditions in the country. I believe that these elements give a little body or to the appointment of Bobbio in respect to the pending study by the sociological and psychological causes behind the recruitment, beyond the qualities or attributes of potential recruits.

Another is the *paper* by Mann and Smith (1981), an old text but it is interesting to refer to the structure of opportunities. They note that appointments are not only at the beginning of a new administration, but also along it. The most interesting is that in these cases is considered in a special way those who are already part of the government, those in office. When there is a resignation or a dismissal or death occurs, someone is promoted or is transferred from another ministry or government agency to fill the vacancies. For decisions at times and takes into account those who have had a good performance in office or during his political career or in this administration. For definitions of political recruitment, this would allow me to add that it is a process seeking alternatives to lateral or downward mobility, because to fill a vacancy is not always a promotion or a change of role.

From a different perspective, Nicholls (1991) considers the ambition as one of the causes for recruitment into the cabinets, especially for businessmen, as in many cases involving lower-income wage to obtain from their salary or utilities. It is interesting as it relates to the recruitment at the highest level of the structure, government policy will not always mean a promotion and it may be related to a change of role. Highlights some cases of businessmen or CEO retired, and draws attention to the possibility of holding a position in the cabinet opens the possibility of making important business or after the end of the administration. This also involved a significant interest and pressure from those who hold economic power to include people who represent their interests or act as interlocutor. This seems very important to note that the definitions I note political recruitment focuses on potential recruits and recruiters, but his theory would also have to include all the stakeholders involved in the process before, during and after, and in different ways for some and against others, as I may consider this work of Nicholls. He added that stakeholders have different ways to get involved or influence the process, to recommend, to vote, to veto, to press, sponsoring or opposing.

Also some gender studies have relevance by the theme, such that focus in the number and percentage of women in cabinets. I.e. Martin (1989 & 1991) inquires about characteristics and sociability variables of women as cabinet and sub cabinet heads in U.S. government. In addition to consider some differences in the patterns between man and women for reaching the highest positions, I think is becoming more important the gender quota, with formal or informal rules, as a fact for the integration of many cabinets.

### **The causes of the political recruitment**

According to the previous, I believe that political recruitment is largely a result of *imperfections* in the representation of modern democracy. If we agree with Bobbio (1996, 24-26) that the democratic regime is that characterized by “a set of procedural rules for making collective decisions in which it is expected and encouraged the widest possible participation” and these rules must state “what procedures are to make decisions” that establish who are the individuals authorized to make decisions binding on all members of the group”, the problem I encounter is that in many cases are not clear and visible the rules or criteria that lead to the appointment, even in cases that are defined by Congress or a camera as a result of an agreement or negotiation between different parliamentary groups.

If the election and not selection determines only a part of all who make decisions and execute public tasks in the public interest of greater responsibility and importance, then the political recruitment is directly related to what Bobbio called “broken promises of democracy” or “internal difficulties” to it:

- Groups, and no individuals, are the players in politics (pluralism).
- There are into parliaments more representation of interest group representatives than general interest.
- Persistence of oligarchies (competition between elites).
- Extending the right to participate in decisions, has not involved other areas than political competition.
- There is an “invisible power” in two dimensions: lack of transparency in decision-making and there are factual, legal or illegal powers that influence them.
- No appreciation for the *res publica*. There are many people apathetic about politics.

These “broken promises” adds that there are changes that the society has experienced, which has become more complex. This has involved:

- Technocracy: That is, the need for technical experts to participate in government to make decisions in matters that only they understand, while “democracy is based on the assumption that everybody can make decisions about everything.
- Bureaucracy: The size of the state has grown so much as its bureaucratic apparatus, which is arranged hierarchically in a manner diametrically opposed to “democratic power”.
- Low yield: This is the risk of ungovernability, in the sense that civil society has become an inexhaustible source of demands to the government, “with each response leaves unsatisfied a part of it”. The amount and speed of these demands are such that no political system, however efficient, is capable of adapting to them (pp. 28-44).

Necessarily (as hypothesis not proved here), a right or a wrong recruitment influences in the governability of a regimen taking to account its efficacy, stability and legitimacy.

### **From theory of elites to the theory of political recruitment**

According to Norris (1995, 13-14), studies of recruitment are drawn from other sub fields of political science, include theories of governmental representation, socialization, progressive ambition, electoral behavior, behavior of the parties and, especially, the political elites. For this and at what seems to me like a failure in studies to explain the appointments in cabinets, I decided to make a revision of the classical theory of the elites, to find elements that can relate with these “broken promises” and the transformation of society, I believe, let me talk about a flaw in the representation and to outline an idea about the criteria and procedural rationality behind the appointments, pointing to answers to why.

#### *Mosca: a blend of several criteria*

I believe that the theory of recruitment may be is prefigured in *Elementi di scienza politica* of Gaetano Mosca, and synthesized in quotes this proverb: “No one enters heaven without the approval of the saints”. The explanation is important to be exposed full *in extenso*:

The formation of a nucleus of people, as the case may include two or three dozen to a hundred individuals, who monopolized the state and occupied, sometimes by turns, the most important positions, it is a fact that occurs all autocracies, or rather in all the centers of

power in the political regime. Only vary the selection criteria for this group, which forms the first layer of the ruling class, whether the regime is autocratic or liberal, or that he will prevail in the democratic trend or aristocratic. But in all cases and under all regimes, a constant and has always had great importance is the acceptance of which are already part of the group. In normal times, when it comes to reaching one of the posts which have indeed a part of power in one state and therefore the fate of many individuals, are almost always required a consensus or at least the sympathy of those who have reached the positions indicated (1984: 312).

Mosca considers that *ruling class*<sup>1</sup> is divided into two strata. He added that officials of the upper intake and determine the race of the lower layer. The most interesting is that their choice may not be for the best, the most able, as time will surely could be tested in empirical research, but sometimes prefer to select those who have “common and secondary qualities, because they make less shade to the superior” (p. 317).

According with Mosca, the qualities to be part of the *ruling class*, in terms of requirements and conditions vary according to periods and countries. For example, in primitive societies “the military value comes to be the recruitment of class domination” and to the extent that a civilized society requires other, although in reality the composition of the ruling class has never been determined by a single criterion, but it has always consisted of a mixture. “For example, wealth in shaping the ruling class” enters as a right and then always in societies governed by the order is maintained as a matter of fact. Mosca also considers the legacy, while “birth is an important element for access to the ruling class” as “facts”, as it involves “wealth, social relations that are acquired easily, intellectual and cultural knowledge”, even “frown and habit for control and to occupy an important position”. And one element that is important in civilized societies is the “personal merit”, “namely a role for politics”. However, it should be stressed that the personal merit “does not automatically” determining admission to the ruling class, but requires a more or less formal recognition through examinations and qualifications as a requirement of society. So Mosca outlines a theory qualifies the idea that recruitment of the ruling class, at least in civilized societies, not as a homogeneous group of special people, but as a conglomerate composed of elements that owe their position to inherit the lineage or wealth and others who have won on their own because of knowledge and skills, which illustrates perfectly the reference cited above Keller on the assumption of a biological or social superiority and merit, as the two main qualities that promote entry or advancement within the elites of potential recruits.

After reading Mosca, I recapitulate the following in relation to my interest:

- A recruitment goal may be to highlight the qualities or merits of those who rule or govern. To do this the selection criterion is to choose who is inferior in abilities or qualities who rules or government. While this seems exclusive of autocratic societies or political systems poorly developed, in advanced democracies fit this criterion in the sense that the more developed a society is more differentiated in their systems and specialized in their functions, we would expect then that CEO of the heads of departments and public administration were conditioned upon a satisfactory profile of the position covered by the

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<sup>1</sup> I use *ruling class* as synonym of *political class*. By the goal of this paper I consider is not fundamental go to a discussion about it and only take the name as the title of the English edition of Mosca's *Elementi*.

*curriculum vitae* of the officer with enough merits, so had little chance that their subordinates or colleagues to “shadow” them.

- Another goal of the recruitment would be to fulfill the tasks of the public service, government and administration. For which the selection criterion may be to appoint or select those who can act on it.
- The degree of development of each society and the type of orientation of its economy determines or affects the merits or qualities required for recruitment.
- The appointment is obtained by inheritance or by merit.
- Recruiting is not determined by a single criterion, but it is a mixture of several.

Then, I find the selection criteria for Mosca acts on two components of democratic governability: one, the stability, as regards the fact of which are already part of the group who “monopolize the State functions” and not to “shadow” who rules or govern; other, the efficacy, expressed in the acceptance of those with knowledge and skills to fulfill the tasks of public service.

#### *Circulation as Recruitment in Pareto*

In the case of Vilfredo Pareto (1980), the concept of recruitment is similar to *circulation*. First, the ruling class is not homogeneous. It has its own government and a more restricted class, a boss or a committee that dominate effectively and practically, which is the *selected class of government* (§ 2254).<sup>2</sup> This determines the “facto conditions for entry” (§ 2046) and the demand for certain elements of society. For example, warriors, when there is or there will be a war. The circulation is then the entry and exit of each other, and consists of two dynamics: the speed at which this occurs and the response of supply and demand of income (§ 2042-2044).

For Pareto, recruitment aims to the empirical and normative stability (§ 2025). That should be its goal and for that is needed to select the *selected class of government* including the astute individuals and the willing to use violence against it. Stability, as the way of Machiavelli, is nothing other than hold on to power without using force, and considers it “very useful” than “to keep it worthwhile imaginary goals” (§ 2184).

It should be noted that stability on an elite depends that has no excessive gap between nominal and merit parts. I.e., the *selected class* has aristocracies added that “a significant number of its lack of characters to stay in them” (§ 2051). In other words, the elite are constituted by elements that belong to it because of its merits or to enjoy privileges, and that is threats to stability that prevail are those of the others. This is similar to what arises in reference to Mosca that there were powerful surround those not “make them shade”. Elite is not composed wholly or predominantly provided by the best, but for those which occupy higher positions in power or influence. So recruitment should serves to maintain enough members by merit within the elite.

Because of *circulation*, the *selected class of government* is in a state of continuous and slow change (§ 2056), largely by the effort of a subaltern meritorious class. This means that recruitment is explained by the pressure from others for growing up. Without it, there would be no need to open the entrance. Given this pressure, “the *selected class* to maintain

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<sup>2</sup> From here in advance every number concerned to Pareto corresponds to paragraphs of his *Trattato di sociologia generale*

their power, takes the class of individuals governed" (§ 2251). Some of them for the use of force, who are soldiers, police officers and other subjects for the exercise of violence, and others as political clienteles, acting on them in many ways, such as agreements with the main business men, and corrupt voters, journalists, politicians and others (§ 2257).

In addition, recruitment should be to provide the ruling class of the best elements of the entire population, thus depriving the best elements from the governors (§ 2190). And finally, there is another possible criterion for recruitment or desirable: it should provide "maximum utility by a community or for a community" (§ 2058).

The political recruitment, according to Pareto, should be a means to retain power, but this involves to share it and provide those who govern with the best members of the governed people, and ideally to obtain the highest returns to society.

According to these purposes, and because elite does not mean the best, but the *decision makers* or those involved in the power. This leads me to believe that recruitment does not necessarily include in its criteria for selecting the best, but the reliable from the recommended people, some which guarantee returns (as in dealings with clientele groups or move electoral orientation), those that remain commitments, which exchange resources or those are better to have inside than outside as adversaries.

#### *Recruitment as co-optation: Michels*

Reading to Robert Michels (1969: 204-206), the political recruitment appears purely as co-optation, which was called by him "conciliatory methods". In explaining the struggle between the leaders, especially among the elderly and those who aspire to political power, he argues that the governors give a restricted part of their own power to opposition leaders for becoming them "harmless", "unruly but influence", which can even help them to increase the "glow of his position". Even "if the government ranks are filled and there is no place for new activities", at least it is possible to give them appointments and orders. Michels noted that the revolutionary labor movement was hampered in democratic countries with "grant positions in the ministry" of "its leaders most conspicuous", and in this way "to conquer the domain of the revolutionary impulse".

The procedure described by Michels is machiavellian in the perverse sense of the term: high positions and honors are offered to the opposition leaders, "but actually they are relegated to positions of the second order non - give them significant influence and where they have no hope of becoming into majority some day". Instead give them "the heavy burden of responsibility for common discussions and demonstrations, so that its activity is similar to the old leaders". Stability is rewarded by co-optation

Something more about the idea of recruiting in Michels: it seems he is according with Mosca in the idea of old leaders always tend "to acquire the right to choose their own colleagues, and thus deprive the masses of the privilege of appointing leaders who prefer" but differs with Pareto's idea of circulation of elites, because for him the struggle between old and new leaders do not imply the defeat of one or the other, but what happens is an amalgam of these two elements to what it called a *reunion of elites* (pp. 206-207).

#### **Typology of recruitment**

Since the previous review and considering the facts of institutional frameworks and the necessity of respond demands in order to maintain the governability, a cabinet is not the space occupied by the most powerful, but they or some of them are present in many of its representatives or delegates, as well as those who can solve the difficulties arising from the

complexity of the modern state. I assume that ministries of a cabinet are not so much personal spoils as institutional spaces for negotiation, interest representation and privileged rooms for troubles solving. Although, at times the real power of those which occupy positions in parliament or ministries in the shadows, "are in most cases, positions of real power" (Uriarte, 2007).

According to this, I believe therefore that is possible to name six types of recruitment and explanations for a cabinet:

1. Co-optation.- neutralization of an adversary, because is better to includes him inside the government than remain him against.
2. Reward.- payment to the loyalty of members of the close staff, the people own or nearby. On one side is an incentive to maintain their trust, and on the other hand, if there is no reward, they could become into staff of any opponent or competitor.
3. Alliance.- exchange with those which have transferred resources or contributed to the victory as pursuant to an agreement . It's also a way to reconcile competing defeated. It may happens when several groups or cliques competing for one or more candidacies, then who wins is committed to certain appointments in exchange for support from others. Thus there is a zero-sum game of winners and losers absolute, allowing moderate the conflict and maintain unity.
4. Trade.- agreement with factual powers appointing a representative or delegate of them as a manner to confirm the recognition of their interests and maintain support from them.
5. Headhunting.- engagement of experts to prevent or resolve problems of the complexity of modern state.
6. Recognition.- invitation to an activist or an intellectual as a tribute to his honor and prestigious career and to bring in this way good reputation to the regimen.


Additionally, any recruitment is the combination of three factors: first, the competition between individual demanding in which everyone is considered because of its resources, the formal rules are clear and the process appears open; second, the influence or pressure of the stakeholders conglomerate and discretion or personal judge of the gatekeepers or who takes de decisions; informal rules prevail and the process is not open; third, the arbitral decision of gatekeepers.

An appointment is not only the result of the exercise of will, but also make the decision after considering all factors involved, which in a democracy may include the various pronouncements being made in the public and the media, as well as popularity polls weight. Recruitment in each one of them prevails over the other criteria, some may be purely arbitrary as an act of volition, or recommendation is enough, and there are those who are gaining in competitive examination.

### **Rationality of recruitment**

In the following scheme I have wanted to report that political recruitment (B) is caused by obstacles to democracy as Bobbio says. It's at the same time cause of an effect in terms of governance (C), as a respond in terms of stability, efficacy and legitimacy. This process involves the stakeholders' recommendations or pressures, the contest and competition between prospects, and the preferences or discretion of who has the power to take the decision, and specially the necessities and requirements for responding to the governability challenges.

## Political Recruitment Explanation for Cabinet Appointments



In the following table, I want to say that each type of recruitment recognizes ideally some value in the recruits, in which there is intent from a bounded rationality.

<b>Recruitment rationality. General model</b>			
<b>Kind of recruitment</b>	<b>Value recognized on the recruit</b>	<b>Recruitment function</b>	<b>Recruitment desire effect</b>
Co-optation	Threat	Neutralizes opposition	Reduces pressure, stabilizes
Reward	Loyalty	Pays for discipline and support	Assures incentives to the staff and its loyalty
Alliance	Joint, unity	Ensures an agreement with adversary groups	Moderates conflicts
Trade	Wealthy, prestige, influence	Recognizes interests of factual powers	Maintains support of factual powers
Headhunting	Knowledge specialized	Solves technical problems	Efficacy, efficiency and good performance
Recognition	Honorability, representativity, respect	Responds to claims of moral character	Gets prestige and good reputation

### Final consideration

This theoretical proposal assumes that each appointment is due to a few causes that can be identified and typified. It may be satisfactory in terms provides reasonable answers to why and how can one explain that this or that individual receives an appointment to a position in public service. The proposed theory could be rejected in appointments which can be due to causes other than those stated above. For example, a ruler to take its decisions by astrological criteria could appoint their ministers by their zodiac signs. This seems a remote, that could be possible in some autocratic regime, but some other arbitrary criteria may be present in any democracy. Also socialization variables influence. Might be the case for a ruling that favored his appointment of some kind of affiliation to whom they originated from the same village, city or province, or as it were of the same Rite Masons or the same religion. However, I believe that in a representative democracy can have a satisfactory explanatory power considerably.

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