“Armed Forces and Society in Turkey: An Empirical Approach”

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Introduction

One scholar asserts that “democratization in Turkey cannot be studied without reference to its civil-military relations.” (Satana 2008:362) It is a quite valid observation given the fact that Turkish political system has been characterized by heavy influence of military on civilian politics (Tachau and Heper 1983; Sakallıoğlu 1997), a direct violation of the norms of civilian supremacy and of the democratic control of armed forces, which are regarded as sin qua non of democratic consolidation. Thus, when the European Union (EU) recognized Turkey as an official candidate country for EU membership during the Helsinki Summit in 1999, Turkey was forced to initiate major legal and institutional changes to curb the political powers of the military. This study intends to shed light on democratization process in Turkey during the post-Helsinki period by empirically analyzing a relatively under-investigated aspect of civil-military relations: public opinion and attitude towards the military and civil-military issues. Such an analysis would help us answer the question of to what extent a democratic political culture is present in Turkish
context and consequently contribute to our comprehension of the challenges and difficulties in front of Turkey’s democratic consolidation.

In civil-military relations literature, we see the dominance of dichotomous approaches, which assume a power relationship between two sides: the civil vs. the military. As a result, the studies on civil-military relations focus on the military and political elites and their interactions. The civil-military dichotomy, however, lumps together the political elites and society in the civilian side vis-à-vis the military and therefore ignores the autonomous causal role played by the social realm in civil-military relations (Schiff 1995; Sarigil 2011). As Schiff also observes “The current civil-military relations literature does not consider the citizenry, but relies instead on political institutions [government, parliament] as the main “civil” component of analysis. Although the relationship of civil institutions to the military is indeed important, it only partially reflects the story of civil-military relations.” (2009:44; see also 1995). As opposed to the dichotomous approach, Schiff proposes “concordance theory”, which treats citizenry as the third, important partner, distinct from both the military and the political elites. This approach simply expects that if there is concordance or harmony among the three spheres (i.e. the military, the political elites and the citizenry) on the social composition of the officer corps, political decision-making process, recruitment method and military style, then, domestic military intervention would be less likely to take place.

In line with concordance theory, this study also focuses on the role of social and cultural factors in civil-military relations. This subject deserves greater consideration because public opinion and attitude vis-à-vis the military has direct consequences for the democratic control of armed forces¹ and therefore for democratic consolidation. As Huntington notes, “the standing of

¹The democratic control of armed forces (dcaf) is defined as “the political control of the military by the legitimate, democratically elected authorities.” (Cottey, Edmunds and Forster 2002:6) For Cottey, Edmunds and Forster, this
the officer corps and its leaders with public opinion and the attitudes of broad section or
categoric groups in society toward the military are key elements in determining military
influence.” (1994:89). Therefore, Huntington argues that any change in the degree of “the
prestige and popularity of the officer corps and its leaders” in the society should have some
direct impact on the political influence of militaries and therefore on the possibility of conflict
between the military and civilian spheres (Huntington 1994:89). In a similar fashion, other
observers suggest that the popularity of a military might create favorable environment for
interventionist militaries to involve in the civilian politics (see Demirel 2004:128; Jenkins 2007).
It is argued that the high level of societal trust is likely to promote military’s ability to legitimize
its interventions (Duman and Tsarouhas 2006:411). Narli also draws attention to the role of
militarist culture in promoting the popularity and the prestige of the military and argues that the
militarist culture, which exalts “heroism, a sense of sub-ordination to the higher interests of the
country, and a readiness to sacrifice oneself when necessary”, is likely to facilitate deference to
the military (2011: 216; see also Michaud-Emin 2007: 33).

This work investigates factors and dynamics behind public opinion and attitude towards
military in Turkish context. The Turkish case emerges as a very good laboratory to conduct such
a research for several reasons. First of all, presenting itself as the guardian of Kemalist principals
(i.e. secularism and nationalism) and the state and national interests, Turkish military has
frequently involved in civilian politics through direct (e.g. 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997
interventions) or indirect means and mechanisms (e.g. statements, briefings, private meetings).
Since the early 2000s, however, Turkish civil-military relations have undergone major legal and
institutional reforms, which led to substantial decline in military’s influence over civilian

control has the following three components: 1) The military is not involved in domestic politics, 2) The defense
policy is controlled by democratic, civilian authorities, 3) The state’s foreign policy, including the deployment and
use of force, is under the control of the democratic civilian authorities (2002:6-7).
politics. As a result, it is argued that Turkish civil-military relations have already entered into a new era (Satana 2008; Aydinli 2009; Heper 2011; Sarigil forthcoming). In parallel to these major, unprecedented changes and developments in the last decade, we see growing scholarly attention to Turkish civil-military relations (e.g. Cizre 2004; Guney and Karatekelioglu 2005; Heper 2005; Duman and Tsarouhas 2006; Aydinli, Özcan and Akyaz 2006; Michaud-Emin 2007; Jenkins 2007; Aydinli 2009; Gursoy 2011; Heper 2011; Sarigil 2011; Satana 2011). However, these studies focus on the causes and results of the civilianization process and the interactions between the political and military elites in post-Helsinki period. Since they neglect public opinion and attitude, we do not know much about how does society approach civil-military issues in this new era.

Secondly, if we look at the military’s discourse, we see that the military strongly identifies itself with the nation (see also Birand 1991; Demirel 2004:140; Aydinli 2009:593). For instance, Ret. Gen. Aytac Yalman, commander of the land forces (2002-2004), once stated that “Turkish nation is a military-nation… Turkish Armed Forces represent the soul of the great Turkish nation.” During the August 2008 inauguration ceremony, the incoming Chief of General Staff İlker Başbuğ, noted “The fundamental source of power for a military is the gun. For the Turkish military, however, it is nation’s trust and love for the military (emphasis added).” (quoted in Sarigil 2011: 274). Moreover, it is written at the gates of the barracks that for Turkish military, “Strong army means strong Turkey”. Thus, in military’s discourse, we see that the military and nation are inseparable. It is, however, unfortunate that we have quite limited

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empirical knowledge of nation’s attitude towards the military and civil-military issues such as military’s interventions into civilian politics, its role in society and conscription.3

One reason for this limitation has been the lack of comprehensive data. The existing public opinion data sets (e.g. World Values Survey) usually include the variable of confidence in armed forces.4 However, since there has not been a comprehensive public opinion survey on civil-military relations, we have quite little empirical knowledge of the role of the factors and variables beyond “trust”. Thus, using newly collected original and comprehensive data on public opinion and attitude towards the military and civil-military issues,5 this study intends to provide some answers to the following questions: How do people view the military? Who does support military’s involvement in civilian politics? What are the determinants of public attitude vis-à-vis the military? More specifically, how do socio-economic, political and demographic factors shape people’s approach towards military and civil-military issues? What are the implications for the democratic development in Turkey and also for the broader theoretical debate on civil-military relations?

Findings: Empirical findings suggest that societal attitude towards the military and military’s involvement in civilian politics shows strong partisan nature: Individuals, who support the ruling, conservative AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, Justice and Development Party), are more critical of the military; while those who support opposition parties (e.g. the CHP and MHP) are more likely to have a favorable attitude. Another notable finding is that ethnic differences do

3 For two exceptions, see Tessler and Altinoglu 2004; Sarigil 2009.
5 In conjunction with Konda Research & Consultancy, we conducted a face-to-face public opinion survey in early October 2011 with a nation-wide, representative sample of 2775 individuals. The survey was part of the broader research project, entitled “Armed Forces and Society in Turkey: An Empirical Approach”. The research was funded by TUBITAK (The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey) and supervised by Zeki Sarigil and Yaprak Gursoy.
Compared to ethnic Turks, anti-military attitude is much stronger among the Kurds. Moreover, Turkish nationalism, which is stronger among ethnic Turks, is associated with strong pro-military attitude. Furthermore, the high level of socio-economic status is likely to reduce pro-military orientations. The article also discusses the major implications of these findings for democratic consolidation in Turkey and also for the theoretical debate on civil-military relations, in particular for the concordance theory.

The article proceeds as follows: The following part provides a discussion of possible factors and variables which might shape public attitude towards civil-military relations and draws some hypotheses. The research design section presents data, measurement and statistical analyses and empirical findings. The final part discusses the ramifications of the empirical findings for democratization process in Turkey and also for the theories of civil-military relations.

Theoretical Discussion

Previous research on public attitude towards civil-military relations in other political settings draw attention to the role of several demographic, social, political and economic factors and variables (e.g. see Gronke and Feaver 2000; Feaver and Kohn 2001; King and Karabell 2003). This study explores whether such factors also affect people’s approach towards civil-military issues in Turkish context.

Ethnicity: One might expect that ethnicity is likely to create difference in people’s approach towards military in Turkish case. It is a fact that the Turkish military has had tense relations with the Kurds. The military has been fighting against the ethnonationalist PKK (the Kurdistan Workers' Party, Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan) since the mid-1980s. The armed fighting, which got severer in the 1990s, resulted in thousands of deaths from both sides and a massive economic cost. Unfortunately, this fighting also involved massive violation of human rights, such
as torture, forced village evacuations and extra-judicial killings, particularly in the 1990s. Moreover, between 1987 and 2002, the state of emergency (OHAL) remained in force in several Kurdish provinces, which enhanced military’s pressure on Kurdish masses in the region. Furthermore, the military, which strongly advocates the principle of unitary nation-state based on Turkish nationalism, is also known as highly critical of granting further cultural or political rights to the Kurds. Given this background, we might expect that:

\[
H_1: \text{Compared to ethnic Turks, anti-military attitudes should be stronger among the Kurds.}
\]

Religion: With respect to the role of religion, when we look at the past trajectory of the relations between the military and religion, we see a rather ambivalent attitude towards religion. For instance, after the 1980 intervention, the strongly secular military embraced the ideology of “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” (Kaplan 2002). The military, which presented itself as the guardian of the secular republic, tried to promote religion in society through various means such as increasing usage of Islamic discourse, the introduction of required religious courses in education system, and opening new religious-track Imam and Preacher Schools (Imam Hatip). In addition, considering Islam as an ally against communism, the military regime used Islam as an instrument to contain the rise of leftist ideology in country in that period (Demirel 2004:136).

In the 1990s, however, the military treated political Islam as one of the major threats against the secular Republic and national security and therefore took tough action against raising political Islam. For example, in 1997, the military forced the coalition government, led by pro-Islamic Welfare Party (Refah Partisi), out of power. During the same period, known as February 28 process, the military also targeted several pro-Islamic formations and actors (e.g. pro-Islamic associations, business organizations, writers, columnists and religious brotherhoods) (see also Heper and Guney 2000; Jenkins 2007: 345). The military had also tense relations with the ruling,
conservative AKP in its first term (2002-2007). For instance, in 2007, through a message from its website, the secular military involved in presidential elections and attempted to prevent the presidency of Abdullah Gul. It was believed that Gul, whose wife wears headscarf, had roots in political Islam.

Despite such a record of ups and downs in the relations between the military and Islamic circles, the Turkish military is also associated with Islam. For instance, Kaplan (2002)’s ethnographic study of school textbooks displays a symbiotic relationship between the military and Islam. The textbooks treat Islam as the most suitable religion to the “Turk’s spirit of warfare”. As Kaplan states “both the military ethos and the Muslim faith become timeless attributes of the Turkish people.” (2002: 120). The textbooks present the military as “the defender of the Muslim faith” (see also Tachau and Heper 1983: 18). It is argued that since Turks accepted Islam, they have sacrificed themselves for the Islam by giving millions of martyrs to this religion (Kaplan 2002: 122). We see that religion is also used to exalt the military and militarism in society. The military is defined as a “Prophet’s hearth” (Peygamber ocaği) (Narlı 2000: 118). Consequently, conscription becomes a ‘holy’ service. If a soldier dies, he becomes a martyr (i.e. dying on behalf of Islam) and martyrdom is exalted with a strong religious discourse. For example, it is believed that those who died in defense of the community of the faithful are guaranteed immediate access to Cennet (i.e. eternal paradise in Muslim faith).

Given the ambivalence in military’s relations with Islam and Islamic circles, we should explore whether religion-related factors matter in public opinion towards military and civil-military issues. Thus, another hypothesis is:

\[ H_{2a}: \text{Religiosity increases pro-military attitudes.} \]
\[ H_{2b}: \text{Religiosity decreases pro-military attitudes.} \]

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6 Militarism refers to a set of ideas and structures that exalt or praise practices and norms associated with militaries (Chenoy, quoted in Altinay 2004: 2).
Ideology: Ideological factors may also shape the societal popularity of militaries. Huntington (1994:94) proposes that there is an inherent contrast and conflict between the military ethic and ideologies such as liberalism, and Marxism; inherent similarity and compatibility between military ethic and conservatism. Using the words of Huntington, military ethic emphasizes “the permanence, irrationality, weakness, and evil in human nature. It stresses the supremacy of society over the individual and the importance of order, hierarchy, discipline, and division of function”. Liberalism, on the other hand, emphasizes the reason and moral dignity of the individual. Therefore, Huntington (1994:144-147) observes that liberalism has been hostile to military institutions, function and values in US, while conservative approach has been more sympathetic, and constructive. Supporting this observation, Gronke and Feaver (2001) find that conservatives in US are more likely to have a positive image of the military. Then, whether an individual locates herself on the left or the right side of the political spectrum should have some impact (negative or positive) on her view of the military.

In Turkish case, ideology should also matter in public opinion towards military. During the Cold War, the main target of military interventions has been the leftist groups and movements. For instance, during the 1971-73 military regime, thousands of leftist activists have been detained. We see a similar bias towards the right during the 1980-83 military rule. Although both rightists and leftists experienced the wrath of the military in that period, the military promoted right-oriented Turkish-Islamic Synthesis in country. Thus, we might expect that:

\[ H_3: \text{Anti-military attitudes should be stronger among the left-oriented individuals.} \]

Nationalism: In general, nationalist thought favors a powerful nation and state. The existence of army is considered as essential to the existence of the nation (Huntington 1994:33). In Turkish context, we see even stronger association between nationalist thought and the military.
As a case in point, Jenkins notes that “most Turks still see the military and military virtues as being inseparable from the concept of Turkishness. They take genuine pride in their reputation as fearsome soldiers and boys are taught that every Turk is born as a soldier.” (2001: 84; see also Aydınlı, Özcan and Akyaz 2006:80). As indicated above, the military also presents itself as non-partisan, above-politics protector of the state and national interests. We also see a strong emphasis on nationalism and national ideals in military’s discourse. All these factors should promote pro-military stance among nationalist citizens. Thus, another hypothesis to be tested is that:

\[ H_4: \text{Pro-military attitudes should be stronger among the nationalist individuals.} \]

**Military service:** We should also take into account of the impact of personal experience and familiarity with the military. Treating military as a school or educator, one approach asserts that the military inculcate young men with nationalist and militarist ideals and values (e.g. heroism, nationalism, self-sacrifice for the nation, pride in war heroes, warfare) during their compulsory military service.\(^7\) Thus, military-as-school approach considers military service an instrument of socialization, which would yield pro-military feelings and attitudes.

Military’s pedagogical and socializing function is also emphasized in Turkish context. For instance, Cizre observes:

> The defining organizational characteristics of the TAF [Turkish Armed Forces] are based on the fact that it is a conscript army. This feature is of immense importance in integrating military values firmly into the society. Compulsory military service is an instrument that makes clear to young men who are enlisted at the age of twenty that they do not just have rights but also responsibilities and obligations to the state (2008: 326).

Comparably, Jenkins notes:

> The inculcation of the identification between nation and army was strengthened by the introduction of compulsory military service in 1927. In addition to providing military training, military service also assumed an educational and ‘civilizing’ role as it attempted to imbue the young conscripts with the values of the new republic.

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\(^7\) See for instance Weber 1976.
Another observer also states:

The Turkish military is a very important socializing mechanism, as it is in Israel, and the rite of passage into manhood for both Turkish and Israelis is the mandatory military service… Much of this cultural brainwashing and these socializing mechanisms might explain why Turkish society tenaciously grasps the view that the Turkish military is its most trusted and popular institution (Michaud-Emin 2007: 33-34)

If military service has a socializing impact on conscripts as military-as-school approach assumes, then, performing military service would cultivate pro-military attitudes. Thus one might anticipate that:

$H_5$: Individuals who performed military service should be more likely to have pro-military attitude.

This study is also interested in the possible impact of people’s support for democracy and civilian institutions. Is there a zero-sum relationship between support for democracy and civilian institutions and support for and appeal to the military? For some analyses, the answer to this question is affirmative. Michaud-Emin claims that the military’s popularity and influence over civilian politics is reinforced by the popular societal distrust in the political system. Using the words of Michaud-Emin “The very fact that politicians do not speak in a single voice and that the political system has been plagued, intermittently, by chaos and inefficiency since its inception are leading justifications for public support of the military (2007: 34). Aydinli (2009) also assumes such a relationship. Drawing attention to broad societal support for the military and a widely-held view of the military as “the ultimate protector of the nation-- even, if necessary, against its own political representatives”, Aydinli observes that Turkish society has maintained a direct, special bond with its military, keeping its politics and politicians in a secondary position. However, Aydinli also argues that the nature of this relationship has been changing:

Starting in the 1990s, particularly with the advance of the European Union accession process, but also in the more recent years of relative political stability and strong political leadership, society’s confidence in its politicians has strengthened, and signs of a growing dissonance in societal expectations from the military have grown. (2009: 586-587)
The statements above presume a zero-sum relationship between public support for civil institutions and democratic processes and support for the military. If it is really the case, we should expect that:

\[ H_6: \text{As trust in and support for democracy and democratic processes increase, the confidence in and appeal to the military would decline.} \]
\[ H_7: \text{Those who have less trust in the parliament would be more likely to trust the military.} \]

While testing the above hypotheses, we also control for the possible impact of several other factors such as religious sect (mezhep), martyr relative, party preferences, life satisfaction, household income, education, gender and age. The following part presents the data and statistical findings.

**Research Design and Method**

This study tests the above hypotheses by using original data derived from public opinion survey conducted in the fall of 2011. The survey research aimed at to identify and analyze societal attitude towards the military and civil-military issues. While conducting survey research, we cooperated with Konda, a professional public opinion research company based in Istanbul. After several meetings and workshops with Konda researchers in Spring 2011, we drafted the survey in early May 2011. In order to identify possible problems and difficulties with the survey questions, in the second half of May we conducted a pilot test in Istanbul, Ankara and Diyarbakir (12 participants from each province). As researchers, we participated in all face-to-face interviews conducted by Konda members and took notes. After we completed our reports on the pilot test, we had another workshop meeting with Konda in Istanbul and substantially revised the draft survey. We also received feedback on the draft survey from experts on civil-military relations.
The final version of survey was conducted in early October 2011, with a nation-wide, representative sample of 2775 respondents. The sample was constructed by using multi-stage, stratified, cluster sampling technique. Initially, 12 regions (geographic clusters) were formed by using the data derived from Address-Based Population Registration System (ABPRS) of Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT) and the results of March 2009 local elections. Based on the size of the population of individuals aged above 18, each region is formed into three strata: village (<4000), city (4000-800000) and metropolis (> 800000). Next, districts (clusters) were identified in each stratum (51301 districts in total)\(^8\) and among those clusters, 154 different districts were randomly selected by computer. In each district, on average 18 individuals within randomly selected households were interviewed face-to-face by Konda researchers.

For the measurement of the variables, responses to survey questions were used (see Appendix A for questions, coding and recoding). This study is mainly concerned with understanding and explaining “pro-military attitude” in Turkish context. It simply refers to respect for and societal trust to the military and appeal for its involvement in political matters. “Confidence in armed forces”, support for “conscription” and “military rule” are used as the indicators of pro-military attitude. Among the independent variables, an additive index was constructed for religiosity. Factor analysis has been used to select items to be included in religiosity index. The items with the highest factor loadings are selected and then combined to form an additive index.

Regression analysis has been conducted to test the hypotheses. Since the dependent variables are categorical and ordered, ordered logistical regression (ologit) with robust standard errors has been employed (see Long 1997; Menard 2002). The following part provides statistical analysis and findings.

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\(^8\) In this sampling method, villages were regarded as district (mahalle).
Statistical Analyses and Findings

Beginning with confidence or trust in military, descriptive analyses indicate that 66.2 % of respondents fully and 18.2 % partly trust the military; while 14.6 % express distrust. Which factors and variables do affect this variance and in what way? Table 1 provides logit analyses of confidence in the military.

Table 1: Ordinal-logit regression analysis of ‘confidence in the Turkish military’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors</th>
<th>Dependent variable: Confidence in the military</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1: AKP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-.1103112 (.024049)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious sect (Alevi)</td>
<td>-.0872392 (.2322687)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic origin (Kurdish)</td>
<td>-.6642821 (.1419097)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism (Turkish)</td>
<td>.4131106 (.0670491)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military service</td>
<td>-.2368123 (.1622053)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martyr relative</td>
<td>-.2015647 (.1443255)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology (left-right)</td>
<td>.0343387 (.0265117)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>-.4812005 (.113649)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHP</td>
<td>.5483281 (.1463211)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHP</td>
<td>.7329238 (.1848868)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust parliament</td>
<td>.8548882 (.0692373)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for democracy</td>
<td>.6665143 (.1153756)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic satisfaction</td>
<td>-.0299926 (.0587175)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household income</td>
<td>-.0000636 (.0000354)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.1888185 (.0414895)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.1731835 (.15536)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural-urban</td>
<td>-.0478174 (.0606545)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.0039786 (.0036571)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \tau_1 )</td>
<td>.9430249 (.5372542)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \tau_2 )</td>
<td>2.199926 (.5415328)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2611</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9 Trust to the military is relatively higher then trust to the parliament (24.3 % distrust; 20.6 % partial trust; 53.6 % full trust)
As expected, higher level of Turkish nationalism is associated with higher likelihood of trust in the military. However, the findings also confirm the hypothesis that Kurds are less likely to trust the military. These findings suggest that in its fight against PKK separatism, the military seems to have failed to earn the respect of citizens with Kurdish origin. The analyses below will also show that anti-military attitude is stronger among Kurds, which constitute a major challenge to the notion of military-nation.

Another interesting result is that we see a partisan attitude towards the military. As shown by Table 1, supporters of the ruling AKP are less likely to trust the military, while the protagonists of opposition parties (i.e. CHP and MHP) are more likely to have confidence in the military. One reason for this outcome might be the coup allegations against the AKP government in its first term (2002-2007). Since 2007, several retired and active duty military officers, including high ranking generals, were arrest due to the accusations of terrorism and coup plots against the first AKP government. Known as Ergenekon trials, these court cases seem to have eroded trust to the military among the voters of the ruling party.

Furthermore, military socialization hypothesis is not really supported by the findings. Military service is negatively associated with confidence in armed forces but it is not statistically significant. In other words, performing military service does not make any difference in terms of public confidence in the military. This finding supports the views skeptical of military-as-school approach. Krebs (2004), for example, argues that the logic of military socialization argument is

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**Notes:**
* p <.05 , ** p<.01 , *** p <.001

Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
unconvincing and its efficacy is exaggerated. Krebs suggests that the socialization model
problematically assumes soldiers as passive receivers who lack the ability for reflection

Another factor which shapes public trust to the military is religiosity: as religiosity
increases, the likelihood of confidence in the military declines. In other words, religious
individuals have less trust in the military. This suggest that “pious military” discourse does not
really resonate among religious circles in society.

It is also striking that ‘trust in parliament’ and ‘support for democracy’ do not really
reduce confidence in the military. Rather, those factors are positively associated with trust to the
military. In their empirical analysis of Turkish political culture, Tessler and Altinoglu reach a
similar conclusion: “…while it may appear anomalous that support for democracy is associated
with confidence in such institutions of order as the military and the police, which themselves are
not democratic, this, too, reflects a particularity of the Turkish case.” (2004: 35) For Tessler and
Altinoglu, it is probably because Turkish society considers the military, which played a critical
role in the establishment of the Turkish Republic, as the guardian of the Republic and
democracy. Sakallioğlu similarly notes “…together with the civilian bureaucrats, the Turkish
army historically built the republic and subsequently modernized it along a western path. This
mission turned it into the political symbol of nationhood and the instrument of preserving the

Finally, increases in education level decrease the likelihood of having trust in the military.
This implies that highly educated individuals are more likely to have a critical attitude towards
the military. Other variables (religious sect, martyr relative, ideology, economic satisfaction,
income, gender, age, and residence) either do not matter or do not have consistent impact on
confidence in the military.
Table 2: Ordinal-logit regression analysis of ‘support for military rule’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors</th>
<th>Dependent variable: Support for ‘military rule’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1: AKP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-.021604 .0221137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious sect (Alevi)</td>
<td>-.0342706 .193081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic origin (Kurdish)</td>
<td>-.8333775 .1558087***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism (Turkish)</td>
<td>.3469899 .06446***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military service</td>
<td>-.5131398 .1497532***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martyr relative</td>
<td>.1059434 .1240736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology (left-right)</td>
<td>.0021951 .0238852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>-.403315 .0955804***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust the parliament</td>
<td>-.1558526 .0567173**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for democracy</td>
<td>.2001939 .0947519*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic satisfaction</td>
<td>-.1077993 .0537103*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household income</td>
<td>-.0000291 .0000415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.3260139 .0377526**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.1964363 .1412046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural-urban</td>
<td>.1917641 .0540689***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.0091621 .0033316**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \tau_1 )</td>
<td>-1.607037 .4755932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \tau_2 )</td>
<td>-.9413535 .4740128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.0477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log pse. likelihood</td>
<td>-2316.1799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald chi2(16)</td>
<td>205.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob &gt; chi2</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
* p < .05 , ** p < .01 , *** p < .001

Concerning support for military rule, 13.5 % of participants in the survey partly and 28 % fully agree that if necessary, the military should be able to initiate a coup and rule the country. Only 55.8 % disagree with this statement. Given this distribution, what factors shape support for
military rule? In Table 2, we model public support for “military rule”. As shown, ethnicity does matter: Kurds are less likely to support military rule. This finding should be interpreted as another indicator of the strength of anti-military attitude among Kurds. However, Turkish nationalists are more likely to welcome military’s involvement in politics. Put differently, nationalist individuals are more sympathetic to the political role of the military.

Partisan attitude is also visible in Table 2. As one might expect, AKP voters are less likely to support military rule. However, it is quite striking that the likelihood of support for military rule increases among the voters of opposition parties (CHP and MHP).

The findings in Table 2 also disprove military socialization hypothesis. Contact or experience with the military seems to produce negative attitude towards military’s involvement in political matters. As Krebs also argues military socialization hypothesis is theoretically indeterminate because familiarity with the military might also breed consciousness of difference or even contempt (2004: 102). Krebs states:

…even if the military were an effective inculcator of values, the massages absorbed within one social context are not necessarily portable. In modern societies, individuals have multiple identities, and there is nothing given about which will seem most appropriate… Because identity is highly contextual, one should not be surprised to see soldiers thinking in national terms while in uniform, but then adopting regional, class, gendered, religious, or ethnic perspectives at other times (2004: 108).

The findings above provide strong evidence for this argument.

Table 1 indicated that there is not really a zero-sum relationship between trust to civilian institutions and processes and trust to the military. However, Table 2 displays that these factors reduce the likelihood of support for military rule. In other words, societal popularity of civilian institutions and democracy does not necessarily lead to a decline in military’s popularity but it does generate a reaction to military’s involvement in political matters.

Furthermore, economic satisfaction, education and age are also negatively associated with support for military rule. It seems that those who are satisfied with their current economic
situation are concerned with the possibility of instability which might result from military’s intervention into politics. Relatively limited support for military rule among senior individuals is probably due to their negative personal experiences with the past military regimes. Similar to the findings in Table 1, highly educated individuals are more likely to have an anti-military attitude and so more critical towards military’s encroachment into political sphere. Regarding the impact of location, compared those living in rural areas, individuals living in urban areas are more likely to welcome military rule, which is quite puzzling.

Table 3: Ordered-logit regression analysis of attitude towards ‘conscription’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors</th>
<th>Model 1: AKP</th>
<th>Model 2: CHP</th>
<th>Model 3: MHP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>.0190797</td>
<td>.0168683</td>
<td>.0104785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious sect (Alevi)</td>
<td>.5088252</td>
<td>.5130356</td>
<td>.513473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic origin (Kurdish)</td>
<td>.7492828</td>
<td>.7722097</td>
<td>.7532032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism (Turkish)</td>
<td>-.3825869</td>
<td>-.389431</td>
<td>-.3760602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military service</td>
<td>-.2900749</td>
<td>-.299267</td>
<td>-.3035214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martyr relative</td>
<td>.0404665</td>
<td>.0387621</td>
<td>.0325063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology (left-right)</td>
<td>-.0877112</td>
<td>-.0830461</td>
<td>-.0882886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>-.1648682</td>
<td>.1216262</td>
<td>.1648682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHP</td>
<td>.1156363</td>
<td>.1216262</td>
<td>.384445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHP</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.2743467</td>
<td>.2042656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust parliament</td>
<td>-.0725053</td>
<td>-.0896157</td>
<td>-.1011025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for democracy</td>
<td>-.4638402</td>
<td>-.4717416</td>
<td>-.4702262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic satisfaction</td>
<td>-.0028743</td>
<td>-.0116686</td>
<td>-.0245198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household income</td>
<td>-2.12e-06</td>
<td>-2.75e-06</td>
<td>-2.96e-07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.1381478</td>
<td>.1429697</td>
<td>.1457422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.1507612</td>
<td>.1623981</td>
<td>.1661979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural-urban</td>
<td>-.072281</td>
<td>-.0712819</td>
<td>-.0798732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.0026505</td>
<td>.0022991</td>
<td>.0024144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τ1</td>
<td>-.7542143</td>
<td>-.7204064</td>
<td>-.837829</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3 presents an analysis of the factors and dynamics behind public support for “the removal of conscription”. Such an analysis would also contribute our comprehension of pro-military attitude in Turkish society. A widespread observation in the literature is that militarist values are strong in Turkish culture. Narli (2011), for instance, point out that militarist beliefs and convictions constitute an important pillar of Turkish culture. It is widely believed that “every Turk is born soldier”, “Turkish nation is a military nation” and “being a martyr is the highest level of exaltation” (2011: 216; see also Demirel 2004: 140; Aydınlı, Özcan and Akyaz 2006: 80).

Defining Turkish society as a “martial society”, Varoglu and Bicaksiz (2005) also draw attention to the importance of military service in Turkey. In Turkish culture, the military service is perceived as a national duty and as a proof of masculinity. Using their words, “most Turks refer to military service as vatani görev, that is “duty for the motherland,” rather than as mandatory service, compulsory service, conscription, or any other term that implies involuntariness.” (2005:584-585). Halil Inalcik, a prominent Ottoman historian, also argues that militarism and warfare are defining features of Turkish nation:

The Turkish nation has preserved its military-nation character from the beginning of history till today… If the Turk is… marching on the forefronts of world history, that is because of his unshakable national characteristics, military character, his grand military virtues and his ability to engage in total war for his rights and freedom. The Turks has inherited this character from his history that goes back thousands of years (quoted in Altinay 2004: 30).
The idea of military-nation is also promoted through education system. Altinay (2004), for instance, treats the notion of military-nation as a myth, constructed and reconstructed by state education. Kaplan (2002 and 2006), similarly, observes that the state school system fosters identification with the military institutions and values (see also Jenkins 2007: 340). For instance, in school textbooks, it is stated:

We Turks give importance to military service. We are even known by the world nations as a nation of soldiers (asker millet). Military service is a holy duty to the country, ensuring protection of fatherland and nation. Every Turkish youth lovingly does this duty. The Glorious Turkish Army results from heroic soldiers. When we grow up we will become soldiers and take the duty of protection our country (quoted in Kaplan 2002:116).

The findings of our survey research also indicate that the notion of military-nation is widely shared in Turkish society. For instance 74 % of the respondents fully agree that Turkish nation is a military-nation (13 % partially agree). Similarly, 74 % object the removal of conscription.

That being said, the logit analyses in Table 3 indicate that compared to Turks, Kurds are more likely to support the removal of conscription, implying that the idea of military-nation is not that popular among Kurds. Cizre argues that:

Anti-military sentiment in Turkey has always been limited to a very small group consisting of a handful of a western-influenced group of intellectuals and human rights advocate. The factor primarily responsible for the popular perception of the military as the single most important guarantee against religious rule and political chaos is the fact that Turkey’s male population has been extensively socialized into an unconditional support for the military values through compulsory military service. (2003:216-217).

Contrary to these statements, the findings in Table 3 show that anti-military attitude is relatively stronger among Kurds. In other words, indoctrination into a set of militarist values seems to have failed among Kurds.

Another striking finding is that party preferences do not make any difference in terms of public attitude towards conscription. Thus, partisan attitude, which showed itself strongly regarding the political role of the military, disappears in case of conscription. In other words,
although society approaches military’s involvement in politics in highly partisan way (i.e. the supporters of opposition parties tend to welcome military’s role in politics), partisan manner becomes irrelevant with respect to compulsory military service.

Table 3 also indicates that leftists, highly educated individuals and Alevis are also more likely to support the removal of conscription. Anti-militarism finds more adherents among leftists and highly educated individuals. Thus, this result is not really surprising. However, further research would shed light on the reasons for support for the removal of conscription among Alevis. Given the fact that Alevis constitute a religious minority in Turkey, one might speculate that Alevis’ personal experiences during military service is likely to generate negative attitude towards conscription. As we would expect, Turkish nationalists are against the removal of conscription. Furthermore, as support for democracy increases, the likelihood of support for the removal of conscription declines.

**Implications**

What would be the broader implications of the above findings for the theoretical debate on civil-military relations and also for democratization process in Turkey? The empirical findings have major implications particularly for the concordance theory. By drawing attention to the autonomous role played by the social realm in civil-military relations, concordance theory helps us get beyond the civil-military dichotomy, which has been dominant in the literature. That been said, this approach assumes or treats military, political and social spheres as homogenous or monolithic entities. Empirical findings presented above, however, suggest that this assumption should be modified. Turkish case indicates that major divisions or differences might emerge among the citizens in their approaches towards the military and civil-military issues. Interestingly, we see similar divisions among the Turkish political elites and within the
military. If so, then, concordance theory should take into account of possible discordance within those realms (i.e. social, political and military). Therefore, concordance theory should provide some answers to the following questions: Under what conditions does concordance among the realms with internal discordance become more likely? How does concordance operate among internally discordant entities and to what extent does it contribute to civilian control of armed forces?

Regarding the ramifications for democratization process, in the last decade Turkish civil-military relations have undergone major transformation, which was triggered by the European Union (EU) requirements. In order to start accession negotiations with the EU, Turkish governments have achieved major institutional and legal reforms, which have led to substantial decrease in the political powers of the military. As a result, it is claimed that Turkish civil-military relations have already entered into a post-guardianship era (Sarigil forthcoming). Empirical findings indicate that despite demilitarization or civilianization process in legal and institutional sphere in the last decade, pro-military attitudes are still strong among certain circles at public level. It is quite striking that substantial numbers of people still attribute a political role for the military. For instance, 46.8 % of respondents ‘agree’ that even in issues outside security, the government should first consult with the military and then take policy decisions and actions. Thus, despite impressive transformation at legal and institutional realm in the post-Helsinki period, non-democratic elements still persist within society. In their empirical research on Turkish political culture, Tessler and Altinoglu similarly conclude that: “…attitudes conducive to democracy and democratization are held by a relatively limited number of Turkish men and women, and that, accordingly, an appropriate political culture probably does not yet exist to the extent necessary for democratic consolidation.” (2004: 43). This should be regarded as a major

11 For the recent divisions within Turkish military, see Aydinli 2009.
limitation because as Karabelias also notes “… a civilianization process can be successful only if a strong supportive constituency of democracy is formed at a societal level and liberal political values replace the patriarchic-oligarchic ones in the minds of the officer corps (emphasis added)” (2008: 468).

The findings have also some ramifications for the arguments treating Turkey as a model for the Islamic world. It is believed that as a Muslim country, Turkey was able to combine Islam with secularism, democracy and modernity, negating the argument that Islam and democracy are incompatible. Therefore, Turkey is presented as a model for Islamic countries in the Middle East and North Africa. For instance Anthony Blinkmen, President Clinton’s assistant, once stated that “Turkey sits at the crossroads- or, if you prefer, atop the fault lines- of the world. Because of its place… its history… its size… and strength, and most important, because of what it is- a nation of mainly Islamic faith that is secular, democratic and modernizing- Turkey must be a leader and can be a role model for a large swath of the world.”12 Such arguments became even more popular during the Arab Spring. Turkey is now treated as a model to be followed by the Arab countries, which have ousted their authoritarian regimes through mass protests and uprisings.13

The Turkey-as-a-model argument, however, tends to ignore the democratic deficits of the Turkish case. In their highly cited work, Linz and Stepan analyzes democratic consolidation on three dimensions: behavioral, attitudinal, and constitutional. Using their words:

*Behaviorally*, a democratic regime in a territory is consolidated when no significant national, social, economic, political, or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a nondemocratic regime or by seceding from the state. *Attitudinally*, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion, even in the midst of major economic problems and deep dissatisfaction with incumbents, holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life, and when support for antisystem alternatives is quite small or more-or-less isolated from prodemocratic forces. *Constitutionally*, a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental and nongovernmental forces

12 Quoted in Altunisik 2005: 45.
13 For a discussion on this point, see “Peter Kenyon, “The Turkish Model: Can it be Replicated?”*, NPR, 6 January 2012. Available at: http://www.npr.org/2012/01/06/144751851/the-turkish-model-can-it-be-replicated (accessed 4 June 2012). See also Salem 2011; Bali 2011; Liel 2012.
alike become subject to, and habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the bounds of the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process. (1996: 16)

Similarly, Przeworski states that “democracy becomes the only game in town when no one can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions, when all losers want to do this again with the same institutions under which they have just lost.” (1991:26).

In Turkish case, the idea of democracy does receive vast public support: 95% of respondents in our sample agree that under any circumstance and condition, the country should be ruled with democracy. However, what people understand from democracy appears to be problematic. People seem to have a highly pragmatic and partisan attitude towards democracy in the sense that as long as democracy serves their particular interests, they remain committed to democracy. If not, then, they are likely to turn their faces to non-democratic procedures and institutions. As the above quotes also suggest the consolidation of democracy requires not only democratic institutions and procedures (e.g. elections, political parties, constitution) but also an appropriate political culture (i.e. the prevalence of democratic attitudes and values among masses).14 If so, then, there are still major hurdles in front of democratic consolidation in Turkey. At least on attitudinal dimension, we see some deficiencies (i.e. highly partisan and pragmatic attitude towards democracy). This might also complicate EU-Turkey relations. Since EU recognized Turkey as a candidate country in 1999, we see comprehensive legal and institutional reforms in many areas (i.e. civil-military relations, minority rights, judiciary etc). However, political culture seems to be lagging behind the democratization and Europeanization process at institutional level.

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14 For instance see Almond and Verba 1989; Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998; Diamond 1999; Inglehart 2000.
## Appendix A: Variables, indices, measurement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Relevant survey questions (translated version)</th>
<th>Variable Coding</th>
<th>Variable re-coding, transformation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Confidence in the military</strong></td>
<td>Q26: I trust the military</td>
<td>1: Disagree 2: Partly agree 3: Agree 4: No answer</td>
<td>‘No answer’ is excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support for military rule</strong></td>
<td>Q31: If necessary, the military should be able to initiate a coup and rule the country.</td>
<td>1: Disagree 2: Partly agree 3: Agree 4: No answer</td>
<td>‘No answer’ is excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support for the removal of conscription</strong></td>
<td>Q36: Conscription should be abolished; military service should be voluntary.</td>
<td>1: Disagree 2: Partly agree 3: Agree 4: No answer</td>
<td>‘No answer’ is excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td>Q1: The gender of the respondent</td>
<td>1: Female 2: Male</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>Q2: How old are you?</td>
<td>17-86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td>Q3: What is the highest level of education that you have attained?</td>
<td>1: Illiterate 2: Literate without degree 3: Primary school 4: Middle school 5: High school 6: University 7: Master/PhD 8: No answer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military service</strong></td>
<td>Q5: Have you performed military service?</td>
<td>1: Yes 2: No 3: Female respondent 4: No answer</td>
<td>1: Yes 0: No 0: Female respondent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Q6: Which year?</td>
<td>1945-2011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Q7: Where (which province; which region)?</td>
<td></td>
<td>0: Other regions 1: East and southeast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Martyr relative</strong></td>
<td>Q10: Is there anyone in your family or among your relatives who lost his life during his military service or duty?</td>
<td>1: No 2: Yes 3: No answer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party preferences</td>
<td>Q12: Which party (or leader) did you vote for during the 12 June general elections?</td>
<td>1: AKP (AK Party) 2: CHP 3: MHP 4: BDP 5: Other 6: Did not vote 7: No answer</td>
<td>Dummy variable for each party choice [0,1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>Q14: In terms of political position, people tend to identify themselves with the left, center or right. How would you identify yourself?</td>
<td>1: Left 2: Left of center 3: Center 4: Right of center 5: Right 6: None of them 7: No answer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>Q15: Would you define yourself as a nationalist person? If so, how much?</td>
<td>1: Very 2: Little 3: None 4: No answer</td>
<td>1: None 2: Little 3: Very</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>Q17: Women who work as public official such as judge, prosecutor, teacher, police officer etc should be allowed to wear headscarf while on duty. Q18: Female students at primary and secondary schools should be allowed to cover their heads during class. Q19: The legal system and laws should be based on religious rules.</td>
<td>1: Disagree 2: Partly agree 3: Agree 4: No answer</td>
<td>By using principal component analysis, an additive religiosity index was constructed out of these survey items.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in the parliament</td>
<td>Q25: I trust the parliament</td>
<td>1: Disagree 2: Partly agree 3: Agree 4: No answer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for democracy</td>
<td>Q28: Under any circumstance and condition, the country should be ruled by democracy.</td>
<td>1: Disagree 2: Partly agree 3: Agree 4: No answer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for conscientious objection</td>
<td>Q44: The idea of conscientious objection suggests that an individual should have a right to refuse to perform military service if his beliefs, conscience do not allow him to join the military. Do you think the right to conscientious objection should be recognized?</td>
<td>1: No 2: Yes 3: No answer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic satisfaction</td>
<td>Q47: Compared to couple of years ago, how would you assess your current, personal economic situation?</td>
<td>1: Better 2: Same 3: Worse 4: Do not know 5: No answer</td>
<td>1: Worse 2: Same 3: Better</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Ethnic origin** | Q48: We are all Turkish citizens but we can have different ethnic origin. In terms of ethnic origin, how do you identify yourself? | 1: Turkish  
2: Kurdish  
3: Zaza  
4: Arab  
5: Laz  
6: Circassion  
7: Georgian  
8: Armenian  
9: Greek  
10: Other  
11: No answer | Dummy variable for Kurdish [0,1] |
|------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| **Religious sect** | Q50: How do you identify yourself in terms of religion and religious sect? | 1: Sunni Muslim  
2: Alevi Muslim  
3: Other Muslim  
4: Other  
5: Non-believer  
6: No answer | Dummy variable for Alevi [0,1] |
| **Household income** | Q53: Monthly, total household income? | | |
| **Place of residence** | The location, where the interview was conducted | 0: Countryside  
1: City  
2: Metropolis | |
References


Gronke, Paul and Peter D. Feaver. 2001. “Uncertain Confidence: Civilian and Military Attitudes about Civil-Military Relations.” In Peter D. Feaver and Richard Kohn (eds.), *Soldiers and


