The Effectiveness of Reform Coalitions Activities in EU Candidate Countries: the Factor of EU Accession Conditionality

Samorodova Anastasia,
National Research University Higher School of Economics
E-mail: stasya.samorodova@gmail.com

Introduction

The European Union was originally developed by the “Inner Six” – the most economically developed European countries, and at the beginning the emerged European Economic Community primarily aimed at economic integration. This collaboration was enhanced with political aspects in 1993 when the Maastrict Treaty became effective.

The first phase of accession of new members was completed in 1973. Initially candidate countries had to comply with the following criteria: stable market economy, economic growth and stable exchange rates. Since 1993, the rules of entrance to the EU have been repeatedly changed and turned into a value-conscious, geographic and political framework. Therefore, the EU stopped being only the economic alliance but transformed into a global supranational institution capable of becoming a key global competitive partner to the USA. After the collapse of the Communist bloc and with the accession of new member-countries of the Central and Eastern Europe with emerging democracies the Union literally became a “foster family with many adopted children”. The newcomers faced a tougher conditionality (formal and informal framework of requirements and conditions for accession to international organization that candidate member must abide by) in order to ensure the stability of the EU. It means that every candidate in order to become a member-country of the European Union had to reform its political (stability of government, rule of law, human and minority rights) and economic systems.

Another issue is that candidate countries are predominantly “weak” and unable to provide strong political institutions in accordance with the EU requirements. That is why this international organization has been implementing “reform coalitions” for its state-recipients, which contribute to the improvement of political systems in the candidate countries.

The debt crisis in 2008 initially struck the leading economy – the US, and spread like wildfire to other regions, particularly to the European Union. The financial crisis hit hard the “veterans” of the EU: Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy (then – PIGS). Moreover, the crisis exposed signs of a grave institutional sclerosis in these countries – a situation when privileged groups redistribute income/budget in its favor. The crisis also hit the new members of the EU (the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Croatia, Cyprus, Malta, Poland, etc.) but did not stop their economic growth.

When the EU came into being and new accession criteria were adopted the Union was implementing strong control over the new members, but for the “veterans” the control was weakening and allowed them to use external debt to pursue relatively irresponsible social and economic policies. Thus, the conditionality for new candidate countries looked obviously tougher than for the “veterans”, which eventually affected their institutional systems. This is how supranational institutions played positive role for the emerging economies’ development through creating restrictive framework built on serious calculations of conditionality for the accession to the EU. The single monetary area also strongly influenced the EU political system as a whole: since the currency is the same for all members, but governments and national policies are peculiar, so the destabilization of one national economy affects the whole currency union. The fact that the EU accession requirements are economically motivated eventually strengthens the country that is affiliated with the Union. This leads us to question is how does the EU accession conditionality influence the “reform coalition” activity in the candidate countries for the EU accession?

The first hypothesis is that conditionality “works” when it provokes and supports the formation of a strong “coalition of reform” in a candidate country.

The second hypothesis is that the long-run state’s stability and survival in crises depends on «reform coalition» following of the EU political and economic requirements.

Reforms as a factor of survival and development of political order.

The “Third wave of democratization” has revealed an extremely important problem of correlation between political and economic reforms that will contribute state's stability in crises. There is no common understanding of how reform process should be organized during the regime transformation. However, the general consensus said that the political reforms are expected to begin prior to economic due to the belief that economy restructuring should be implemented by a new “reform coalition” that adopts the new Constitution. Thus, first should come the reforms of the political system (administrative, constitutional, electoral) and then followed by the overall structural reforms.

Administrative reform. Researchers, who study legislative decision-making process, outline two main factors affecting the reform implementation procedure: (1) an effective administrative organization and a well-defined national norms; (2) compliance of institutional and
legal traditions in the recipient countries to the European law (Treib, 2006). In accordance with these factors scholars identified basic stages of administrative reforms that will enhance the quality of governance: (1) de-politicization of bureaucracy (Goertz, 2005); (2) lustration implementation and nomenclature elimination (Sedelmeier, 2006); (3) initiation of meritocracy principle and incentives system (Verheijen, Rabrenovic, 2007).

**Constitutional reform.** New government and “reform coalition” firstly should accomplish the main objective of democratic transformation – to adopt a new Constitution. Elaboration and adoption of new primary law through a widely inclusive process should demonstrate public consensus and civic agreement. A. Stepan and J. Linz distinguish the following methods of constitution creation (Stepan, Linz, 2011): 1. Retention of the “old” Constitution with a strict distribution of property rights and improved decision-making procedures; 2. Retention of the “old” Constitution with new party system norms; 3. Creation of the new Constitution by a transitional government; 4. Creation of the new Constitution based on the best benchmarks in terms of the successful constitutional frameworks; 5. Creation a fundamentally new Constitution.

Thus, the state’s stability and government’s electoral support depend on citizens’ inclusiveness into the process of creation and adoption of the Constitution. Also these conditions may influence the level of democracy. In this regard, J. Carey points that “efficiency” or “duration” of the constitution which is expressed in its “tenure” depend on limitations of civil servants’ powers (Carey, 2011).

**Electoral reform** is one of the primary steps to create a new political system. Party system in the initial stage of creating (or recreating) is subjected to high levels of volatility and fragmentation (Mainwaring, 1998). In these conditions the “holders” of the government have strong incentives to ensure their own status as viable political actors. Therefore, reforms can start from their pressure to change the “rules of the game” (Katz, 2008) and discriminate small opposition factions (or parties).

**Structural reforms.** During the transition the “coalition of reform” needs to develop a reform strategy for the further state’s successful functioning. There are two extreme opinions about the methods of structural reforms implementation – the “shock therapy” or a gradual reformation. Both of them have empirical evidences.

As J. Hellman pointed out those countries that had realized gradual economic reforms during democratic transition had lost to those countries that implemented “shock therapy” (Hellman, 1998). Due to the “shock therapy” in a short run the social and moral costs increase, but in a long-run perspective situation stabilizes (by correct and coherent methods of “reform
coalition”). Therefore, there is an opinion that a country that implemented rapid structural reforms will be able to ensure economic growth, reduction of unemployment and the state's ability to take social responsibilities (Rolan, 2000).

Scholars distinguish the following key components of structural reforms needed to transform from planned to the market economy (in the case of post-communist transformation): 1. privatization and private property rights protection; 2. Corporate restructuring; 3. Tax reform as a protection from rent-seeking behavior of pressure groups (Kornai, 1998).

These reforms in the CEE candidate countries during the transition period (i.e. in the early 1990-s) were associated with the principle of conditionality. The EU requires the adoption of new laws regulating the economy due to economic interdependence in the EU.

*Theoretical approaches to the concept of political conditionality.*

The European Union started to use the conditionality principle towards newcomers after the end of Cold War. Human rights and democratization were the requirements of the EU during the Greece, Spain and Portugal accession to this international organization (Sikking, 1993).

The Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) underwent radical changes over the past twenty years (the fall of communist regimes, transition to democracy and market economy, etc.). Ten countries in the region joined the European Union on May 1, 2004, Romania and Bulgaria followed in 2007, and Croatia became a member-country in 2013.

Why has the European Union been one of the global and regional driving forces since 1989? Many scholars, including G. Grabbe, J. Hughes, V. Jacobi, J. Kelly, G. Pridham, M. Vachudova, etc. argue that the EU made great efforts to transform the institutional, political and economic systems in the CEE countries. Thus, we can say that these countries underwent transformations in accordance with the EU standards. Moreover, the influence of conditionality and the EU “transformation power” have been especially explicit in the CEE countries (Grabbe, 2006).

Most surveys outline the influence of the European Union transformation power in the following areas:

- Minority rights;
- The process of external assistance;
- Models of conditionality.
Protection of minority rights is one of the most acute problems in the CEE countries, therefore the majority of “conditionality literature” is devoted to reforms in the newcomers’ legislation to improve the wellbeing of various minorities (Sasse, 2005). Empirical studies show that in some cases the European Union’s promotion of the inter-ethnic cooperation ensured a general consensus, but in reality provoked the polarization of views on how to reform the minority-focused legislation (Schimmelfenning & Scholz, 2007).

Further analysis of the aid conditionality impact in the candidate countries will show the importance of taking into account the change in implementation process. For instance, M. Botta and G. Schwellus argue that the effectiveness of conditionality is based on the following conditions: (1) it can directly influence the political decisions of the recipient states’ governments related to government external assistance, regardless of their institutional basis; (2) gradual decrease of state assistance indirectly supports the creation of independent control institutions (Botta & Schwellus, 2012).

Many experts claim that the conditionality of international aid programs does not work. However, few researchers explore the phenomenon of the correlation of the level of external assistance to a recipient state and its level of statehood. G. Montinola argues that the effectiveness of aid conditionality depends on the level of democracy in the recipient countries, because the cost of assistance to governments hinges on the real need of the recipient states in this assistance (Montinola, 2007).

Scholars put forward the following models to explain mechanisms of aid provision and the need for conditionality:

- **External incentives model** based on the rational method of negotiations, when actors defend their interests and aim to maximize their power and wellbeing. This model assumes that the EU exhibits conditions under which a candidate country can receive the “award” of the membership in or association with the EU (Schimmelfenning & Sedelmeier, 2004).

- **Social learning model** considers the logic of advisability. A recipient state chooses the most legitimate path of development for a better adaptation in the context of accepting country. Therefore, a candidate country will join the organization if it is ready to transform its culture and values according to the EU rules (March & Olsen, 1989).
- In accordance with the **lesson-drawing model** candidate countries transfer the successful experience of building powerful and stable political and economic system without awards and advice (Rose, 1991).

To sum up, there are no studies revealing the basic criteria of conditionality effectiveness. Therefore, in this thesis author will construct the model that will be able to detect not only the effectiveness of international aid and development programs in recipient countries, but also the effectiveness of conditionality of EU membership as a whole.

**Theoretical aspects of the “reform coalition” research.**

A state with unstable institutional system faces the risk of internal instability, and it may also spread to neighboring countries. So, global governance often reform the troubled state by providing good will and consultations about implementation of rehabilitation measures. However, global governance actors use radical, but standardized tools in the process of state-building without focusing on the recipient country context. Therefore, international organizations follow the “pattern” of elimination of the apparent threat, promotion of human rights and rule of law, democratic values, reforming the judicial system and law enforcement agencies. These are primary goals set by the international community in the process of nation-building and institutional reforms.

That is why the main actors in transformation of the political and institutional system are “reform coalitions” - formal and informal political mechanism that external actors use coupled with local government and business in recipient country, which allow them to solve certain problems through institutional, political and economic reforms (Peiffer, 2012).

Leftwich and S. Hogg propose the hypothesis that coalitions are the main targets in processes of recipient states’ development. Scholars build their theory on the need to involve politicians and economic agents in the transformation process, moreover, they argue that most policy outcomes are achieved through the negotiation process of elite groups and agents (Leftwich & Hogg, 2010). Therefore, sustainable development of a country depends on the extent to which leaders and elite group are capable of forming a successful reform coalition.

Some experts claim that coalitions are often formed in response to shock situations or crises. Whereas donors stimulate coalitions, for example, after a change of government or as a result of a conflict. There are numerous pieces of evidence that the most favorable period for coalition formation is when there are demands of state-recipient actors and the awareness of the need for change (Grebbe, 2011).
However, the coalition is the political agreement between the parties that are interested in their own independent agenda often prone to corrupt behavior. Each party joined the coalition because of the stimulus which it perceives as a political program measured as an unfair negotiating agreements. To prevent this situation the coalition may become a formal institution with a transparent and accountable functioning which can force participants to comply the law (Peiffer, 2012).

* * *

The principle of accession conditionality have been used for new “waves of expansion” after Maastricht and Copenhagen criteria adoption. Otherwise, EEC (European Economic Community) did not implement any formal and rigid conditions to Spain, Greece and Portugal in 1981 and 1986. But, these countries have experienced a variety of political and economic problems before and after entry to the EEC. In other words, “veterans” did not go through such a thorough accession conditionality policy in comparison with the countries of “new Europe”.

Economic crisis in 2008 revealed that the most vulnerable countries in the Eurozone - Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Ireland. Although, the crisis hit “newcomers”, but their economic growth did not stop or were quickly recovered.

Many factors influence on state’s stability (on its political and economic orders) and efficiency of institutions’ functioning in crises. Therefore, the center of this research is the strategy of political reforms that include constitutional, administrative and electoral transformations. Administrative reform involves legislative reform, adoption of several laws regulating public officials behavior in accordance with European standards, implementation of a large-scale lustration and elimination of nomenclature. The performance of any reforms should be legitimized by constitutional norms.

Electoral reform is one of the most difficult due to the presence of dilemma between representation of all population groups in the Parliament and the quality and government performance. So, this reform is connected with parameters of “reform coalition” (its vision of country future and motivation).

The direction and implementation of structural is equally important when “reform coalition” chooses between the “shock therapy” and gradual reformation.

In regard of models of conditionality - the “external incentives” and “social learning” - the EU accession method has particular influence on reform process and choice of transformation trajectories reform.
**Operationalization and Method**

We have compiled a database that describes the political and economic reforms in candidate countries of the last EU “wave of expansion” in 2004-2013 (Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia) and EU “wave of expansion”. To answer the stated research question we performed a «fuzzy-set» qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) developed by L. Cronquist (Cronquist, 2009).

Qualitative Comparative Analysis is a formalized qualitative method based on classical comparative analysis and Boolean algebra. The purpose of method is to define factors or combinations of necessary and sufficient conditions (INUS principle) that lead to expected outcome. It considers complex models of interaction between conditions, and contains procedures of identification the most parsimonious and intermediate solutions. Data is presented as fuzzy-set values in “truth table”, i.e. each possible configuration associated with its outcome value.

“Truth table” analyses combinations by combinatorial logic procedures in order to find the most parsimonious and intermediate combination of necessary and sufficient conditions of expected outcome. Next, we should justify how identified factors (or conditions) are matching with expected outcome, whether which part of factors (or all of them) leads to expected outcome, i.e., how expected result can be justified by the identified “solution”. Threshold values of variables used in QCA vary within the interval from 0 to 1.

Dependent variable or expected outcome is the political and economic order’s survival (SURVIVAL) after the 2008-2009 financial crisis measured as level of GDP p.c. in 2010. Result varies vary within the interval from 0 to 1.

Independent variables are presented below, operationalization, variables names and coding are provided:

1. Reform coalition – political parties (PARTIES): result varies within the interval from 0 (the former ruling party realizes new reforms) to 1 (fundamentally new government).
2. Reform coalition - business actors (BUSINESS): “0” - business actors do not participate in system’s reformation, “1” - do participate and support the reforms.
3. Population support (POPUL): “1” – population completely support reforms in accordance with European standards; “0” - population does not support the reform and opposes them.
4. Constitutional reform (CONSTIT): “1” - a new constitution implemented in accordance with European standards based of democratic principles, “0,5” - the creation of a constitution based on the framework of any successful state’s constitution, “0” –
implemented “old” democratic constitution or altered the constitution of “communist” period.

5. Administrative Reform (ADMIN): “1” - realized a comprehensive administrative reform: lustration implemented, eliminated the nomenclature, adopted new laws on appointment and limitation power of officials in accordance with European standards; “0.5” – adopted new laws in accordance with European standards, lustration has not been implemented, the nomenclature de facto persists; “0” – adopted a new constitution, but administrative reform has not been realized.

6. Electoral reform (ELECTORAL): “1” - radical reform (creation of a new system), vote threshold for parties is quite low, small parties are able to influence on decision-making process; “0” - the reform has not been implemented, the presence of small parties discrimination including the low level of representation in Parliament.

7. Privatization (PRIVAT): “1” – the “shock therapy” privatization, “0.5” - gradual privatization but 10-30% of the economy is still run by the state; “0” - the reform has not been realized.

8. Corporate restructuring (RESTRUCT): “1” - rapid corporate restructuring, “0.5” - gradual corporate restructuring; “0” - the restructuring had not been realized.

9. Tax Reform (TAX): “1” – rapid transition to new tax system; “0” – gradual transition.

country & parties & business & popul & constit & admin & electoral & privat & restruct & tax & survival \\
bulgaria & 0.4 & 0.7 & 0.3 & 1 & 0.4 & 0.7 & 0.3 & 0.6 & 0.7 & 0.3 \\
croatia & 0.3 & 0.2 & 0.2 & 1 & 0 & 0.4 & 0.2 & 0.7 & 0.4 & 0.1 \\
czech & 0.7 & 0.6 & 0.8 & 1 & 0.7 & 0.7 & 0.7 & 0.4 & 0.6 & 0.7 \\
estonia & 0.9 & 0.7 & 0.9 & 1 & 0.8 & 0.9 & 0.8 & 0.8 & 0.7 & 0.7 \\
hungary & 0.6 & 0.8 & 0.6 & 0 & 0.7 & 0.7 & 0.8 & 0.9 & 0.6 & 0.8 \\
lithuania & 0.7 & 0.7 & 0.6 & 0 & 0.9 & 0.2 & 0.3 & 0.2 & 0.8 & 0.7 \\
poland & 0.8 & 0.3 & 0.8 & 1 & 0.7 & 0.6 & 0.7 & 0.7 & 0.8 & 0.4 \\
romania & 0.9 & 0.8 & 0.8 & 0 & 0.8 & 0.7 & 0.8 & 0.7 & 0.8 & 0.8 \\
slovakia & 0.3 & 0.7 & 0.3 & 0.7 & 0.2 & 0.6 & 0.4 & 0.1 & 0.9 & 0.2 \\
slovenia & 0.8 & 0.4 & 0.8 & 1 & 0.8 & 0.4 & 0.3 & 0.2 & 0.6 & 0.9 \\
spain & 0.4 & 0.7 & 0.8 & 0.6 & 0.9 & 0 & 0.1 & 0.7 & 0.9 & 0.3 \\
greece & 0.7 & 0.6 & 0.6 & 1 & 0.3 & 0.4 & 0.6 & 0.6 & 0.7 & 0.2 \\
greece & 0.8 & 0.3 & 0.4 & 1 & 0 & 0.6 & 0.3 & 0.3 & 0.2 & 0
Table 1. Cross-country data.

The standard analysis in «fsQCA» program reveals the parsimonious solution that corresponds to parameters of “administrative reform” and “political parties”.

Figure 1. Parsimonious solution.

Moreover, the standard analysis in «fsQCA» detects an intermediate solution. In accordance with the values of “raw coverage” and “consistency” the most optimal solution for positive value of “survival” is combination “tax reform + administrative reform + population support of reforms + business-actors + performance of political parties”. Other parameters are less important or do not explain the expected result.

Figure 2. Intermediate solution.
Combination of intermediate solution factors distribute countries in the following graph:

Figure 3. Graph of intermediate solution outcome to expected result

High values of “consistency” on y-axis (equal to 0.891) and “coverage” on the x-axis (equal to 0.877) indicate that argument X (“tax reform + administrative reform + population support of reforms + business-actors + performance of political parties”) for 90% is the “infallible” solution for achieving the expected positive outcome (survival) and for 88% this solution covers the entire sample of 14 countries.

Combination of parsimonious solution factors distribute countries in the following graph:
High values of “consistency” on y-axis (equal to 0.962) and “coverage” on the x-axis (equal to 0.769) indicate that argument X (“performance of political parties + administrative reform”) for 96% is the “infallible” solution for achieving the expected positive outcome (survival) and for 77% this solution covers the entire sample of 14 countries.

“Specify” analysis identified positive and negative (pre-condition is the symbol “~”) conditions for the occurrence of expected result. We draw attention to value of “consistency” and choose a combination of conditions with the highest value of consistency: parties * business * popul * ~ constitut * ~ priv * ~ restruct * tax. Surprisingly economic conditions, such as privatization and restructuring of enterprises, are less significant in achieving the expected result.

**Main results**

To compare the intermediate solution of factors (“coalition reform + administrative reform + tax reform”) we selected Poland (the highest value of the “Administrative reform” criterion) and Portugal (the lowest value of the “Administrative reform” criterion) in accordance with the “Most Different Systems Design”, Bulgaria on the principle of MDSO (“Most Different – Similar Outcome”) in comparison with Portugal (Berg-Schlosser, de Meur, 2009).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Bulgaria</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reform coalition</td>
<td>Public support Societal atomization; high level of public support the EU accession</td>
<td>Socialists have come to power. Search of “Bulgarian special development path” =&gt; failure. Reforms in accordance with EU conditionality have started in 1999.</td>
<td>The bipolar party system =&gt; inconsistent policy of development.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Variables

- **Reform coalition**
  - Public support
  - Societal atomization; high level of public support the EU accession

- **Administrative reform**
  - “Shock therapy”. By 2000 the problem of politization
administrative apparatus had been functioning in accordance with EU standards. of administrative apparatus is still dominated. neoliberal or socialist.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tax reform</th>
<th>Completed in 2003.</th>
<th>The standardization of tax system was completed in 2004.</th>
<th>The creation of welfare-state – increase of tax rates.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Table 2. Comparative analysis of “coalition reform”, administrative and tax reforms in Poland, Bulgaria, Portugal

Thus, reform coalition is the crucial condition for successful reform of the institutional and political systems after a nondemocratic regime’s failure. Polish political and economic elites were consolidated around the idea of entry to the EU and association with the “Grand Europe”. The idea of returning to the Europe was formulated during the reign of communist regime that contributed to supporting the “Solidarity” (opposition party) as well as to realizing the “shock therapy” policy by new government. Rapid political (particularly, administrative reform) and institutional reforms were fully supported by polish population and the EU notwithstanding the cleavages within “Solidarity”.

In 1991-1992, political situation in Bulgaria was characterized by a total lack of understanding of the direction of development and reform strategy. The Socialists (former communists) came to power and announced the implementation of “Bulgarian special path”. Therefore, until 1999 reforms had been inconsequent and unfocused on any concrete target.

In 1986 Portugal entered to the EEC as a weak but economically perspective state. Main requirement for the EU accession was to improve the marine and fishing infrastructure, which provides the EU’s potential trade zone with Africa and other countries. Therefore, there were no need to implement political reforms. Due to constant government change many political transformations were either not completed or limited.

It should be emphasized that public confidence and its support of reforms is important factor. Non-democratic regimes destruct public confidence to government, therefore, society in Poland, Bulgaria and Portugal were primarily characterized as social atomization. Thus, the main goal of “reform coalition” was not just the implementation of reforms, but also to fight for electorate support.
So, the EU accession conditionality sets goals that require a mature and responsible elite that is capable to harmonize its own interests with public interests. Precise and consistent strategy of political and institutional reformation makes it possible to ensure the long-run stability of a state and survival of the new political and economic orders in crisis.

**Discussion**

In this research we presented a complex comparative analysis of political and institutional reforming in candidate countries on the accession to the EU in two “waves of expansion”: 1981-1986 and 2004-2013.

Qualitative comparative analysis showed that approaches to EU accession conditionality has evolved. “Old” member states entered primarily the economic union where there were no fundamental political and economic differences. The Cold War consolidated politically the West in general and the Western Europe in particular. European Economic Union was created not just for searching solutions of economic controversies, but also to aggregate forces to prevent economic crises that are “breeding ground” for spreading of left-wing and ultra right-wing movements. Therefore, “early” conditionality set only the economic development orientations (“conditionality from below”) based on fiscal regulation methods. However, “new” countries that outlived the one-party Communist regime were substantially different from the EU member countries, so, in these cases economic reforms are not enough. The EU has developed more extensive accession requirements that include implementing new political institutions in accordance with European standards.

The analysis detected the most “successful” country on combination of such factors as tax reform, administrative reforms, reform coalition (intermediate solution) that lead to country survival in crisis – Poland. This example shows the importance of “coalition reform’s”’ chosen reformation strategy (especially on an example of Bulgaria). Population supported westernized party “Solidarnost’” that had formed in authoritarian regime. Therefore, new government could realize “shock therapy” and political reforms based European norms. Despite the social atomization and fragmentation of the political elite, transformation strategy had not changed that indicates a high “reform coalition” potential. Moreover, administrative and tax reforms have been implemented and completed earlier than in any other official candidates for the EU accession. Poland also demonstrates successful survival during the 2008 financial crisis.
The EU accession conditionality influences on political and economic systems in the candidate countries, moreover, this mechanism motivates elite to put new standards and circumstances into practice. In this way, it is easier to conduct reforms when external conditions contribute to formation of a strong “coalitions of reform” which is able to break with the past and to build a fundamentally new political and economic system that may overcome crises and instability. Therefore, hypotheses mentioned above confirmed.

The EU accession conditionality is an indirect method of supranational organization’s control for the development in candidate countries. It is primarily aimed to prevent an emergence of new authoritarian regimes that will be able to threaten the functioning of not only the EU but also the entire international community. Despite the heterogeneity of “new” candidate countries the EU requirements were oriented on gaining the political and economic potential of “reform coalitions”. Economy begins to grow rapidly, government regulation based on the rule of law ensures the protection of human and minority rights. Total accountability of administrative apparatus, legislative and executive powers contributes to democratic stability.

References


