The Canadian Arctic Council Chairmanship 2013-15: Lots of Leadership, but any Followers?
Heather Exner-Pirot
University of Saskatchewan

Introduction
In May 2013, Canada reassumed the Chairmanship of the Arctic Council, a two-year position that rotates amongst the eight Arctic states. This began the second cycle of chairmanships, which Canada had initiated 17 years earlier with the Ottawa Declaration which established the Council.

Canada was undisputedly a leader in establishing the Council and in expanding its mandate to include both environmental protection and sustainable development. However since its inception, the Council has focused overwhelmingly on the environmental protection portfolio, both through its communications and in its working group outputs. The 2013-15 Chairmanship has become an opportunity for Canada to refocus the Arctic Council on sustainable development and human issues, through its agenda theme of “development for the people of the North”. Canada’s chairmanship also marks the first time the Council has been chaired by an indigenous resident of the Arctic – Leona Aglukkaq, an Inuk from Gjoa Haven, Nunavut.

Canada faces a number of challenges in achieving a shift in the Arctic Council’s focus. The first is that the Arctic is strongly associated, in national governments, the media, and in the voting public’s mind, with climate change and environmental/wildlife issues. Arctic science is also heavily invested in this area and at the forefront of national and international debates about the Arctic. While Canada may try to rebalance priorities, there will likely be structural resistance to doing so. Second, Canada’s “human” development focus has adopted an explicitly economic development slant, a move seen with some suspicion of those who view resource exploitation negatively, particularly in the Arctic and particularly within indigenous homelands. These have been exacerbated by Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s poor reputation among environmental and Aboriginal groups. Third, it has not yet been established that the Arctic Council is in a particularly good position, as a regional-level international governance institution, to facilitate, manage or fund human development programming in Arctic regions.

1 The Chair of the Arctic Council does the bulk of the Council’s agenda-setting during their two-year tenure.
2 Norway’s Chairmanship was 2.5 years long, 2006-09, due to a desire on behalf of the Norwegians to move the Arctic Council Ministerial Meetings from autumn to spring “quite simply [because] springtime is a more pleasant time for the Ministers to visit the Arctic due to more sunlight and better weather conditions.” Email correspondence from Karsten Klepsvik to Heads of Delegation, March 6, 2007.
3 See Bloom (1999), 715.
This chapter will describe the process whereby Canada settled on its Chairmanship theme; explain the historical, political and socio-economic reasons for its development; and analyse the opportunities for its success given the current regional political climate.

**The Canadian Chairmanship**

*The Arctic Council Context, 2007-2013*

The years leading up to the Canadian chairmanship saw considerable change in the work of the Arctic Council and its importance in international relations and in the foreign policies of the Arctic states. The Arctic Council from 1996-2006 had value more for the fact of its very existence, than as a political force in its own right. Aside from a few, albeit comprehensive, scientific reports – the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) and Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR) of 2004 foremost among them, the Council’s outputs were seen as marginal, and its primary role was to shape rather than make decisions affecting Arctic policy.  

A number of things changed to make the Arctic Council more relevant in 2006. First, Norway assumed the chairmanship and in conjunction with Denmark and Sweden, who followed it in the chairmanship cycle, established a common agenda and a temporary secretariat in Tromsø, Norway. In this way, the Arctic Council become at once more institutionally effective and able to articulate a coherent agenda with medium term goals. Secondly, the Arctic became more politically and strategically important as it moved centre stage in international affairs. Melting ice was a large factor, with the 2004 ACIA playing a central role in articulating the effects of a warming Arctic to a global audience; as was the intensifying of investment and effort by the littoral states to submit claims to an extended continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean under the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Then, of course, was Russian explorer Artur Chilingarov’s feat of planting a titanium Russian flag at the seabed of the North Pole in August 2007 and the concomitant assertion of Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper that “Canada has a choice when it comes to defending our sovereignty in the Arctic; either we use it or we lose it,”...and make no mistake this government intends to use it.” Finally, the United States Geological Survey estimated that 13% of untapped oil and 30% of natural gas reserves were held in the Arctic in July 2008.  

---


speculation about resources and strategic advantage propelled the Arctic to front pages and the Arctic Council gained in stature and importance.

Not surprising then, 2007 marked the year that China applied for Observer status in the Arctic Council, followed in quick succession by South Korea, Japan, Singapore and India on the one hand, and Italy and the European Commission on the other. This external interest in the Arctic Council, and the sense that participation in the Council could provide an opportunity for engagement and influence, further bolstered the Council’s reputation, although the inordinate amount of time the consensus-based Arctic Council spent on addressing the applications also pointed conspicuously to its institutional flaws.

With greater interest and authority vested in the Arctic Council, some tangible outcomes were realized, foremost among them the signing of the 2011 Agreement on Search and Rescue (SAR) Cooperation in the Arctic.7 The SAR Agreement was the first legally binding instrument developed under the auspices of the Arctic Council, and while the Agreement itself was not particularly robust, it heralded a new era of institutionalization for the Council. This was followed in 2013 with an Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and Response in the Arctic, and the transition from a temporary to a Permanent Secretariat for the Arctic Council in Tromsø. The US Secretary of State (Clinton in 2011; Kerry in 2013) began attending the ‘Ministerials’ for the first time and better funding for working group and task forces started to be allocated. All in all, the Arctic Council found itself on an upward trajectory in the years leading to the Canadian Chairmanship.

Setting the Agenda

Given the cyclical nature of the Arctic Council, the timing of Canada’s chairmanship has been known for years, and speculation on what and how the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD) should focus its agenda began to be examined as early as 20098 – a scrutiny unique within the region that can be attributed to the preponderance of Arctic social scientists in Canada on the one hand; and the level of national and international interest in the Arctic leading up to 2013. Northern Canadian politics are more complicated than those in most if not all of the other Arctic states, due to a number of factors including the struggles between often competing jurisdictions; the potency of Aboriginal issues in the public domain; and the resonance that the North and the Arctic has on the Canadian psyche and identity. Arctic policy is not a simple issue of federal foreign policy or climate change policy for Canada, but a matter of importance to a spectrum of stakeholders.9

---

7 See Exner-Pirot (2012) for a fuller examination of the SAR Agreement.
8 See for example Griffiths, 2009; Exner-Pirot, 2011; and Axworthy, Koivurova and Hasanat (eds.), 2012.
9 Doug Nord, for instance, documents the relative luxury that Sweden had, during its Chairmanship, of assuming and administrative and leadership role in the Council as an “honest broker”, unencumbered as it
Franklyn Griffiths, writing for the Canadian International Council in 2009, articulated a strategy that would have seen Canada push for an enlargement of the Arctic Council, the development of an Arctic Fund to support Permanent Participants participation in Council activities, and the appointment of a Secretary of State for the Arctic in DFATD to lead the development and implementation of the 2013-15 chairmanship agenda. Exner-Pirot (2011) outlined an agenda that included international legal cooperation on fisheries and the development of a regional seas agreement. And the Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation held a workshop in January 2012, resulting in an edited volume, to discuss “in which direction Canada...wants to take the Arctic Council.” Local development did not feature prominently in any of these.

**Northern Consultations**

Prime Minister Stephen Harper named Leona Aglukkaq as Canada’s Chair of the Arctic Council in Cambridge Bay, Nunavut, on August 23, 2012. As an Inuk, the then Minister for Health, and MP for Nunavut, was an obvious choice for the position, and became the first Chair of the Arctic Council to also be an indigenous resident. But it was not totally uncontroversial: Aglukkaq was the first Chair of the Arctic Council who did not come from a Foreign Affairs Ministry or State Department, and it has been the custom to appoint the sitting Foreign Minister. A few commentators questioned not her abilities, but her Cabinet mandate and the competency of her office to address the larger foreign policy framework that the Arctic Council entails, such as relations with Russian.

Aglukkaq’s team began organizing northern consultations immediately, with visits to Iqaluit on October 27, Whitehorse on November 2 and Yellowknife on November 3, 2012. There she met with MLAs, aboriginal organizations, private businesses, and other stakeholders to develop priorities for the Chairmanship. Soon after the consultations, the chairmanship priorities were publicly announced by Canadian Ambassador Kenneth Macartney on November 29, 2012 at a SIPRI workshop in Stockholm, Sweden on “The were with strong interests or views on key regional issues, in “Creating a Framework for Consensus Building and Governance: An Appraisal of the Swedish Arctic Council Chairmanship and the Kiruna Ministerial Meeting”, Arctic Yearbook 2012, accessed from [http://www.arcticyearbook.com/images/Articles_2013/NORD_AY13_FINAL.pdf].

10 Griffiths (2009), iv.
11 Ibid, 30.
13 Axworthy et al (2012), iii.
Arctic Council in Transition: Nordic to North American Leadership”.\textsuperscript{15} There, Macartney announced the overarching theme of “Development for the People of the North” with three subthemes of:

- Responsible Arctic resource development;
- Responsible and safe Arctic shipping; and
- Sustainable circumpolar communities.

Aglukkaq went on to tour four of the Nordic member states of the Arctic Council in January 2013 to discuss and build support for the themes, including Iceland, Denmark, and Finland, before giving a speech on the chairmanship agenda at the influential “Arctic Frontiers” conference in Tromsø, Norway. There, she also participated in a roundtable with Arctic indigenous groups and Permanent Participants, and met with the Foreign Ministers of both Norway and Sweden, the latter being the Arctic Chair at the time, Carl Bildt.\textsuperscript{16}

The level and amount of consultations conducted by Aqlukkaq leading up to the chairmanship was unprecedented for the Arctic Council, but very consistent with contemporary northern political culture in Canada which places a premium on consultation. In many cases involving Aboriginal rights and land claims, it is actually required by law, through the “duty to consult” as articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada. Although there was no formal requirement to consult northerners on the chairmanship, there would have been significant political costs to not conducting them. Process is almost as important as outcome there, and the decision to focus on human development without first garnering local feedback would have appeared odd.

**The Canadian Chairmanship Theme: Development for Arctic Peoples**

Aglukkaq referenced her Arctic roots when explaining the decision to focus on Arctic peoples, saying that she would bring a different perspective to the table.

“As a northerner, I want to say – first and foremost – that people in the North want development...We want it!...For 16 years, the Arctic Council has been very focused on research – science research...we talk about his is an area that’s developing – Canada’s North is developing, the Arctic region of every country’s developing. But it’s the private sector that’s actually going to develop those regions – not scientists.”\textsuperscript{17}


\textsuperscript{17} Boswell (2013).
That focus on development – especially taken in the context of resource development – is a point of contention for Arctic stakeholders and observers, and represents some of the fundamental tensions in the region over what policies to prioritize.

When the Arctic Council was established it adopted a twin mandate. As per the Ottawa Declaration of September 19, 1996 it was a high level forum meant to:

- provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination, and interaction among the Arctic states, with the involvement of Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic [emphasis added].

The Arctic Council arose out of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) of 1991, which referenced “sustainable economic development” but had a primary concern with environmental issues. The Arctic Council thus represented a shift towards development issues. However, as Evan Bloom argued, there was “considerable disagreement” over what that would mean in practice and “it was not possible for the Arctic states to agree to a comprehensive sustainable development program, or even a list of priorities.”

These differences were evident throughout Arctic Council negotiations, and they were primarily between Canadian and Nordic perspectives. As Staples (1998) noted at the time in an issue of the WWF Arctic Bulletin:

> Throughout the conference, the Canadian Arctic experience with sustainability emerged as issues of community development and community empowerment - an experience that has been dramatically mirrored in the land claim agreements of the last two decades. In contrast, the Scandinavian and European experiences were defined generally as the vertical integration and coordination of actions and responsibilities across national, regional and local governments, and horizontally the integration and cooperation of sustainable development initiatives across social and economic sectors.

As alluded to by Staples, the Canadian focus was undoubtedly related to the prominence of indigenous and northern issues in federal polices, especially during that time as the new territory of Nunavut was being established. As Scrivener (1996) described it:

> More generally, Arctic issues were less prominent in the domestic politics of the other Arctic states, compared with the Canadian case. In some ways, the whole Arctic Council idea could be seen as an external projection of the

---

18 Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council (1996).
19 Bloom (1999), 713.
20 Ibid, 715.
internal political processes related to indigenous peoples of the Canadian north.  

In addition, the American’s minimalist understanding of the nature of the Arctic Council in the 1990s delayed development of Terms of Reference and concomitant action for a Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG), not to mention the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat (IPS). Ultimately, a Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG) was established to support Senior Arctic Officials (SAO) work on related issues and propose priority areas in the future. But although the SDWG has convened a number of workshops and produced several high quality reports and studies (such as the Arctic Human Development Report and the Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic), it has had little institutional and financial support and has focused more on time-limited projects than on programming. In other words, the challenges for sustainable development that were evident at the founding of the Council have never been adequately resolved.

Development vs Protection

Part of the problem in building momentum for sustainable development is the inherent tension between the two primary mandates of the Arctic Council: sustainable development and environmental protection. It is further complicated by the desire to consider the input of indigenous peoples and seek to reflect local cultures around the Arctic region. These three goals are often competing, as environmentalists and northerners clash over issues such as the seal and polar bear hunts; as industry groups clash with indigenous groups who have no history or expectation of benefiting from resource development; and as industry clashes with environmentalists over how much is enough regulation and what exactly constitutes ‘sustainable’.

In particular many European and Asian stakeholders, as well as environmentalists, view the Arctic as a place to be established – and preserved - as a ‘common heritage of mankind’. The European Parliament’s 2008 resolution seeking an Antarctic-like treaty for the Arctic is the best example of this, while more recently WWF has been campaigning for the establishment of the Last Ice Area. Such concepts are anathema not only to indigenous and local inhabitants, who might rightly see a threat to their self-determination, but to the governments of countries such as Canada and Russia. As Yevgeny Lukyanov, the deputy secretary of Russia’s Security Council, articulated in reference to the Canadian focus on development, "for the majority of Russians, the Arctic and everything connected to it, is not

---

24 Among these priority areas devised are: (1) Arctic human health; (2) Arctic socio-economic issues; (3) adaptation to climate change; (4) energy and Arctic communities; (5) management of natural resources; and (6) Arctic cultures and languages.
25 See for example the April 2009 Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic for an indigenous perspective on rights and involvement in Arctic international and legal developments.
an abstract concept or a romantic exotica, but a practical and a vitally important reality."26 Thus the Arctic, as well as the sub-Arctic, are not places to be set aside to nature, but form an integral part of their respective national economies. While Russia’s Arctic economy is well-developed and accounts for 20% of its GDP27, the Canadian North remains relatively undeveloped and unpopulated. As Aglukkaq has pointed out, and as the Greenlandic government has reinforced over the past few years, development of the many untapped resources of the Arctic is probably the best chance for local governments to reduce dependence on central governments and develop the means to fund self-determination.28 Indeed, it may be the only chance. But it poses a real challenge when it comes time to build a regional consensus around action.

The Chairmanship Sub-Themes

As part of its overall agenda, Canada articulated three sub-themes for its Chairmanship. The following section addresses these in sequence.

1. Responsible Arctic Resource Development

This sub-theme articulates the fundamental Canadian position that resource development can and must go ahead, but that reasonable measures need to be taken to ensure such development is responsible. The Chairmanship brochure29 cites the 2013 Agreement on Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response (OPPR) as an example for this type of activity, while also promising the establishment of a “Circumpolar Business Forum”, later rechristened the Arctic Economic Council. The latter initiative, co-led by Iceland, Russia and Finland, is meant to support businesses, large and small, in efforts to create prosperity, and will likely be launched in early 2014. Overall, the sub-theme is so broad, it would be easy to categorize any number of initiatives under its umbrella. But it is difficult to see what the Arctic Council can do specifically to support it.

The value from the Canadian government perspective is most likely to identify resource development as something that is legitimate and necessary for the Arctic Council states and Permanent Participants to assess and encourage – reflective of the ruling Conservative party’s values, but a shift from the Arctic Council’s reflexive inclination, as an organization if not as individual states, to be skeptical of it, with the consequences of irresponsible industrial development prompting the creation of the AEPS in the first place.

27 Aleksei’ Il’in, “Arktike opredeliat granitsy [Delimiting the Arctic],” Rossii’skaia gazeta 196 (September 18, 2008). As quoted in The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (February 2012), New Strategic Dynamics in the Arctic Region, Washington DC, 51.
2. Safe Arctic Shipping

The second sub-theme is related to the expectation that the International Maritime Organization will finalize a mandatory ‘Polar Code’, or *Code of Safety for Ships Operating in Polar Waters*, in 2014, or at any rate before the end of the Canadian Chairmanship. Although the Arctic Council itself has no legal jurisdiction over maritime travel, as members of the IMO and as subjects in its implementation, the Arctic states are key parties to its negotiation and agreement. As such, in the 2013 Kiruna Declaration, Arctic Council Ministers publicly decided “to strengthen our collaboration in that work toward its expeditious completion”.

While Canada has clear environmental, economic and traditional security interests related to Arctic shipping, its interests may be less urgent than Russia, with the more viable and increasingly busy Northern Sea Route; the USA, with the Bering Strait bottleneck; Finland, with its ice-strengthened ship-building industry; or Iceland and its ambitions to serve as a transshipment port for Asian goods. But Arctic shipping is a very important Arctic geopolitical issue; and legally binding agreements are becoming *de rigueur* in the Council with the SAR Agreement concluded in 2011 and the OPPR Agreement concluded in 2013. It was in both Canada’s and the Arctic Council’s interests to highlight the imminent Polar Code in this Chairmanship cycle.

3. Sustainable Circumpolar Communities

The last of the three sub-themes focuses on sustainable communities, “in which self-reliant individuals live in healthy, vital communities, manage their own affairs and shape their own destinies.” This was the most ambitious issue area of the Chairmanship, with specific initiatives listed for: short-lived climate pollutants and black carbon; incorporating traditional knowledge into the work of the Council; promoting mental wellness; and supporting the conservation of migratory birds. These issues are much more bread and butter types of issues for the Arctic Council and its six working groups and reflect continuity from previous agendas, adding balance to the Canadian chairmanship while positioning them under the overriding theme.

Overall, it is difficult to contest the value or relevance of the sub-themes, which articulate the specific goals and initiatives Canada seeks to spearhead in its two year cycle – with the exception of the Arctic Economic Council. While premature to assess its potential, it is a conspicuous break from previous Arctic Council initiatives and the typical gatherings of policymakers, indigenous leaders and scientists, and so will be under additional scrutiny and will be very much a Canadian initiative until and unless its broader value can be demonstrated.

Prospects for Success of the Canadian Chairmanship

---

30 Kiruna Declaration, 2013, 4.
The question that remains is whether Aglukkaq, and Canada, will be successful in shifting the Arctic Council’s focus from primarily environmental protection to include sustainable development, or whether its agenda will fizzle after 2015.

There are a number of barriers. The most important one is that, while the Arctic Council as a regional governance body is very well suited to address oceanic and transboundary environmental issues, it is not in the best position to address sustainable development initiatives. As I explain elsewhere (2013),

Development occurs best at a grassroots, community level, where education and capacity-building take place, institutions are strengthened, jobs are created and physical and mental health issues are addressed. Funding for development programmes usually occurs at the sub-regional (provincial, state, region or territorial) or national level. The Arctic Council is subsequently ill-equipped to either implement or fund development programmes in the Arctic.31

Sustainable development is certainly a regional good that should be highlighted, and the Arctic Council has played a significant role in influencing values and norms in the Circumpolar North, for example over respect for and inclusion of indigenous voices in regional decision-making since the 1990s. However it is probably impracticable for it to lead to actual programming. Mental wellness is a good example of a highly significant policy issue that affects all of the Arctic states, especially indigenous populations, to varying degrees. The Canadian chairmanship has appropriately decided to prioritize it and has allocated $1 million for a project, led by the SDWG, on the ‘Evidence-Base for Promoting Mental Wellness and Resilience to Address Suicide in Circumpolar Communities’. There is no doubt this kind of research is valuable. But it highlights the fact that the Arctic Council itself has no capacity to enact actual mental wellness projects, any more than it can enact climate change policies, but rather makes its contribution by assessing them. Many development kinds of projects are context-specific and require adoption and implementation by the most local levels of governance, from health care delivery to education to business development.

That is what makes policy initiatives such as shipping regulations, Search and Rescue protocols, and reducing black carbon emissions so much more attractive and efficacious for Arctic regional policymakers. For Canada to successfully shift the Council’s focus to better include sustainable development, it will need to demonstrate that it is a more valuable use of its time than focusing on environmental issues, and not merely a political gesture or partisan strategy.

The second challenge is whether Canada has retained enough moral leadership to shift the Arctic Council’s policy preferences at all. Environmental protection in the Arctic is popular.

31 Exner-Pirot (2013), 131.
It also has a good track record and is almost universally accepted. Canada’s position on development however, is not. As one commentator stated when Canada assumed the Chairmanship in May 2013:

To call the Canadian vision unfashionable (except in the north) would … be an understatement. Whereas the emerging mainstream view treats the Arctic as a space undergoing inexorable globalisation, the Canadian programme treats the Arctic as a bounded region. Whereas the mainstream view holds that a globalising region should be managed in a similarly global way, the Canadian vision is that the Arctic’s inhabitants have particular interests, distinct from non-Northerners’, that take priority.32

In that respect, Canada’s position was not criticized solely for being pro-resource development. It was being criticized for privileging the local versus the global – a position that is completely sensible from a Canadian perspective but increasingly unacceptable from the Arctic Council’s many European and Asian stakeholders’ perspective, not to mention the concerned global environmentalist who views the Arctic as a global commons for which we have a shared responsibility to protect.

Further complicating Canada’s efforts is the fact the Harper government has whittled away almost all of the moral leadership Canada might have claimed through its stewardship of regional governance and establishment of the Arctic Council in the 1990s. Recent claims to the North Pole33 and bellicose rhetoric since the mid-2000s have not improved its ability to use soft power to influence regional politics, with the dismissal by Hillary Clinton of Canada’s hosting of the Arctic 5 in Chelsea, Quebec in 201034 a consequence of this trend.

In addition to the sovereignty rhetoric, Canada has often been on the opposite sides of its European neighbours on Arctic environmental issues, from the prominent dispute over the EU’s ban on seal products, the management of polar bears, and last but not least Canada’s (non-) policy on mitigating carbon emissions to curb climate change.

The United States, via John Kerry in particular, has been focusing on climate change when discussing regional politics35, which is quite different from Canada’s agenda items. The inability of Canada and the United States to develop a joint agenda for 2013-17, for which

the Canadian government had openly contemplated in its 2009 Arctic foreign policy, makes it seem unlikely that the United States will continue to push Canada’s theme on development for Arctic peoples when it assumes the Chairmanship. While successful in focusing much needed attention on sustainable development issues, a shift in the Arctic Council’s modus operandi during Canada’s tenure at the helm does not appear forthcoming.

Conclusions

Despite (at the time of writing) eighteen years of focusing on environmental protection – 23 if the years of the AEPS are included – it should have been no surprise that Canada would choose to shift focus to sustainable development for its Chairmanship agenda, and as an adjunct to that, to select an Inuk Minister, Leona Aglukkaq, as Chair. Canada’s history, both domestically and within the circumpolar region, has seen a strong emphasis on local inclusion and empowerment, as well as resource development. This has been the case for decades. Finally, environmental protection is not a priority of the Harper government and it has not been made a priority for its Arctic Council Chairmanship.

While it is hard to dispute the merits of focusing on development for the people of the North within the political framework of the Arctic Council, in practice it has many challenges: a successful and popular history working on environmental protection; a better alignment for regional-level governance structures to deal with oceanic and transboundary environmental issues versus those of local capacity-building and development; and a lack of leadership, under a Harper government, that would be necessary to influence change in the Arctic Council.

None of this will condemn Canada’s Chairmanship to failure. It is just less probable that the kinds of long-term changes Canada would want to see are likely to take place. This supposition will be challenged or confirmed when the United States announces its Chairmanship agenda. As for development for the people of the North, while Arctic Council efforts may come up wanting, there is ample room for improvement within Canada’s efforts to address those issues domestically.

36 DFAIT (2009), Statement of Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, 23.
References

Aleksei' I'I'n, “Arktike opredeliat granitsy [Delimiting the Arctic],” Rossii’skaia gazeta 196 (September 18, 2008), as quoted in The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (February 2012), New Strategic Dynamics in the Arctic Region, Washington DC.


Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’s Northern Strategy Abroad, 2010.


European Parliament Resolution on Arctic Governance, October 9, 2008,


