A Presidentialist Democracy Managed as a Parliamentarist One: The Case of Brazil

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Abstract
In this paper, we will review the literature of Brazilian Multiparty Presidentialism System, also known as coalitional presidentialism. In this system, the president needs the support of several parties acting sometimes as a premier. Not only a full guide for the last 25 years of research will be offered, but also some suggestions. First, we are going to look at the pessimist theories about the system and its conclusions regarding its performance. Than we move to five branches of studies showing the mistakes made by the previous theories and the reasons why the system works. These five explanations are: i) cabinet construction and the creation of government coalitions; ii) maintenance of the coalitions with resources provided by the Executive to Congressmen for pork barrel; iii) the power of institutions; iv) the strength of party leadership inside the Congress and v) researches about federalism and its consequences.

Key words – multiparty presidentialism – Brazil – review – failure – success.

Introduction
Since the late 1980s, many authors have published studies about Brazil and its political system. The 1988 Constitution created a presidential system with a highly fractionalized Congress. In this scenario, it is mandatory to the president to create a congress coalition in order to help him with his bills. Passed almost 25 years since the publication of the first article about the theme, we consider a good idea to create a guide for future researchers covering the topics on this literature. Because the relevance of the theme, its full bibliography has a huge size, making

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impossible an analysis of all papers regarding multiparty presidentialism. Therefore, we decided to select nearly all works of the main authors who worked or have been working in this subject. We also analyzed some important papers with a specific contribution from authors who do not work too much with this theme.

Some papers tried to show the general characteristics of the system. We can mention Mainwaring (1990) who did a comparison between the old institutionalism in Latin American politics with the fresh contributions about presidentialism and democratic stability, proposing a research agenda that must study specially the time where the Executive power got stronger, affecting political parties in Latin America.

Power (2010a) stated that there were some branches of research regarding Brazilian political system after the 1988 Constitution. One of them, looking at the electoral system had bad conclusions about the future of democracy in Brazil. Another one, based on the internal rules of Brazilian Legislative had an optimistic conclusion about the future of the system. The same author (2010b) asked why Brazilians are the most indifferent people regarding the system of government, if it is a democratic or a dictatorship one, for him, features like high levels of corruption can give the answers.

Our aim is to show a synthesis of this literature with a different approach from that observed in the previous cited articles\(^3\). First we are going to analyze the studies which belonged to a first wave of publication stating that the system had some features which forbidden its existence for much time. Because the conclusions of those studies were not observed, other papers started to be published in order to explain how a system with such characteristics was surviving with a reasonable degree of stability. In this way, the paper has the following sections: Section one will show studies which had bad conclusions about the future of the system. Section two will present the main features of coalition building in presidential regimes. Next, we will analyze the tools used to keep the coalition working. Followed by another one regarding the importance of institutional design and the role played by the party leadership in the Executive-Legislative relations in Brazil. Last but not least, we will check the influence of federalism on Brazilian coalitional presidentialism\(^4\).

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3 Our focus is not so far from Power (2010a), except that here more branches of research about the theme will be presented.

4 We consider multiparty presidentialism and coalitional presidentialism as synonyms.
1. Pessimistic conclusions about multiparty presidentialism

Since 1988, with the new Constitution, many words about the institutional design created by the document were said like the existence of a presidentialism system with plurality elections, Legislative branch elected under an open list proportional representation, federalism, facility to create new political parties, Executive independent from Legislative, fixed term to president and his political power. Chronologically, a first wave of studies focusing on the debate presidentialism versus parliamentarism on a supranational view argued that all those above mentioned factors would lead to the fail of Brazilian new democracy, the forecasts were the worst possible when researches defended the parliamentary regimes superiority over presidential ones. In this section, we will show the main studies that has this kind of conclusion.

Some years before the creation of the 1988 Constitution, Linz (1973) had sowed points against presidential systems. For him contrary to parliamentary systems, on the presidential ones winner takes all, or, the executive elections’ party winner gets all the benefits of the job and doesn’t have to share these benefits with any other party, moreover, the president’s personalist feature (elected by the citizens) would allow him to waive the help of partisan leadership. In the situation of a party in the executive, but without majority of seats in Congress, the system would have problems. Linz (1990) showed more arguments in favor of parliamentary regimes saying that presidential systems have a paradox, because it creates at the same time a person with huge political powers –the president- and institutions responsible to take out these powers from him (like auditing institutions). Another problem in Linz’s view is the internal conflict of the president. For the author, act as politician inside a party and be the executive chief of a nation are mutually exclusive options. In addition, the fixed term is an impediment for quick solutions under crisis times like corruption involving the president because it is more difficult to implement impeachment process for a president than to dissolve a parliamentary cabinet.

The first text, which had in its focus only the Brazilian case, came from Abranches. In his 1988 work, he compared historically Brazilian system with consolidated democracies around the world and concluded that the main difference between Brazil and other countries in the sample was associated to the kind of government system. At that time, there was not any other consolidated example of a system with proportional representation, any political parties and presidentialism. These facts made Brazil to be the only country, which organizes its Executive
power with coalitions. The groups have been formed with regional and political criteria. In this scenario, the president must choose if he prefers to be a hostage of many commitments that come with a big coalition or keep a fine-tuning with his own party in a small coalition. The main problem of this kind of system in the author’s view lies on the fact that it is fully supported on the government’s current performance.

Papers from late 1980s and early 1990s say that center-right wing parties have congressmen with regional voting trend; while left wing parties have deputies more compliant to their leadership and catch-all parties have an undisciplined delegation. These assertions were due to incentives to individualism behavior in the Brazilian electoral system like open-list proportional representation, incumbent with guaranteed rights to run for re-election, possibility of a larger number of candidates than contested seats and the possibility of a MC to change from one party to another without any punishment (197 changes between 1987 and 1990, and 262 cases between 1991 and 1995). All these incentives created weaknesses in the party system, growing the boards of catch-all parties with subsequent disciplinary legislative problems (MAINWARING, 1991, 1997; MAINWARING and PÉREZ-LIÑÁN, 1997).

Stepan and Skach (1993) in a historical analysis if many democracies, said that the correlation between democracy consolidation and type of regime are stronger in parliamentarism than in presidentialism. The most susceptible point of presidential systems lies on the fact that in these regimes, even without legislative support, the Executive cannot be removed, while in parliamentary regimes it can. In the case of a crisis between the powers, presidential regimes would have its democracy broken. Contrary to Abrâncio (1988), Stepan and Skach (1993) stated, without further depth of their hypothesis that presidential regimes do not create incentives for coalition formation.

One more time open list proportional representation is claimed to be the cause of the weakness of political parties and of the Legislative. Assuming that president and party leaders are weak, the legislative control and the subsequent stability of the system are functions of a lot of features

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5 The author mentions the fact that ministries distributed to partners of government does not have the same value each other, claiming that regional issues are important in granting departments; however, an indicator capable of measuring such an impact was not showed.
6 The possessor of a particular political position had direct access to the party list in the upcoming elections. Suspended by the Supreme Court in 2002.
7 Opportunity extinguished by the Supreme Court in 2007.
8 Which contradict certain studies, as we shall see.
like: Profile of voting deputies (those with greater dominance tend to give greater support to the Executive); of the political experience of the President in building his cabinet (as José Sarney did and Fernando Collor and Itamar Franco did not); of the electoral strength of certain politicians who can judge themselves self-sufficient not being party dependent; and others. Weighted these factors, from this perspective, conclusions about the system were not the best (AMES, 2002a, 2000b).

According to Negretto (2006), the biggest share of studied presidential regimes where composed by minority governments. Government crisis (not regime crisis) tends to occur in countries where a party, which is not the president’s party, controls the median legislator also having veto power. The Executive-Legislative battle is expected to rise when a president with simple majority in Congress gives this place to a coalition government reaching its peak when minority governments gets the office.

A less pessimistic finding lies on the presumption of more accountability and identifiability created by a proportional Legislative and a plural Executive. Presidents with no absolutist power also can be seen as beneficial for the system. However representatives have little incentive to follow party directives and seek a personal reputation with the electorate if, the control of list access from party leadership is small, the vote is nominal and not on the list and when there is a high proportion of candidates in relation to district magnitude. All these features can be found in Brazil, this seek for personal reputation weakens bargain between legislative parties and the Executive (SHUGART e CAREY, 1992; CAREY e SHUGART, 1995; SHUGART e MAINWARING, 1997).

Shugart and Maiwaring (1997) showed pros and cons of the system. On the bright side they highlighted the bigger power gave to constituency, Congress freedom in legislative issues and mandate stability instead of cabinet instability. The dark side comes with fixed terms, which tend to create minority governments that without the option of legislative dissolution are unable to deal with crisis; the other problem is the possibility of a hooker be elected only because of his good talk and/or look.

As we could see, many authors attested that electoral rules, multiparty system, federalism, the impossibility of minority government building, and even ideology would lead presidential
system to fail. However, with the course of time this was not observed in Brazil. Now we are going to see the reasons why the above theories were wrong.

2. Cabinet construction as coalition building

The previous theories did not consider that the president can get support from other parties with some resources he has. The first way presidents get this support from MCs is using the offer of jobs inside the federal bureaucracy. Since we can observe cohesiveness inside the group created, the support to the president will be effective (FIGUEIREDO e LIMONGI, 1999). The job offering exists on the whole bureaucracy, but we consider cabinet being the positions offered to some party in a department (or ministry) or in a special secretary. A new cabinet is formed whenever a new president is inaugurated or when there is a change in the party composition of it or when more than 5% of the ministers are changed (AMORIM NETO, 1994).

Researches about cabinet building in Europe (AMORIM NETO e STROM, 2006; AMORIM NETO e SAMUELS, 2010) showed that the share of independent ministers inside the cabinet is a positive function of: Electoral volatility; semi-presidential regimes; minority governments and from the legislative powers of the president being negatively related with Congress fragmentation. Figueiredo, Salles and Vieira (2010) said that for many countries in Latin America, including Brazil 67% of presidents without electoral majority built government coalitions using cabinet offers. Arretche and Rodden (2004) argued that because high transaction costs legislative coalitions would be impossible. Therefore, government coalitions would be preferred when the ministers would act as bridges between the Federal Executive and the House of Representatives decreasing theses transactional costs. To Reile, Pereira and Power (2011), cabinet is a manner of coalition building, while resources for pork barrel are considered coalitional fine-tuning during the term for the Executive gets his agenda approved. They also say that bigger the share of presidential party inside the House and his popularity smaller the number of departments gave to other parties.

About Brazil, analysis comparing the 1946-1964 period the post-1985 years concluded that different features are responsible for different kinds of cabinets. Party indiscipline and legislative fragmentation tend to create coalitional cabinets (those based on party criteria); high legislative power to the president create cooption cabinets (ministers with party ties but not

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9 Coalition governments consist in the supply of executive positions for allied parties to receive permanent parliamentary support. Legislative coalitions involve ad hoc negotiations with congressmen treated case by case.
acting as a party agent inside the cabinet). In both periods, bigger the job offering, bigger the legislative discipline, it also can be seen that the number of MCs and senators appointed as a minister is high, with the biggest part coming from the South and Southeast regions.\(^{10}\) (AMORIM NETO, 1994; AMORIM NETO e SANTOS, 2001; AMORIM NETO, COX e MCCUBBINS, 2003; FIGUEIREDO, 2007).

Since the cabinet has been built, it is desirable to analyze it under some circumstances. One regards to proportionality, i.e., there is a right ratio between departments offered to some party weighted by its share inside the coalition, it is called coalescence degree.\(^{11}\) The measure allows us to observe if a party with few seats is receiving more departments than it is supposed to, or if a party with much seats is receiving few departments. Empirically, it is showed that coalescence and Legislative submission have a positive relationship; it is also negatively correlated to the number of decrees\(^{12}\) issued by the president and; it is supposed that weak Executive-Legislative relations by-product of a low coalescence degree stimulate a higher number of decrees issued by the Executive (AMORIM NETO, 2000, 2002; AMORIM NETO e TAFNER, 2002; AMORIM NETO, COX e MCCUBBINS, 2003).

We can see, however, that this measure raises a problem when it has been taken all departments as equal, at most, weighting them by their budget. According to Amorim Neto (2000), there are no reasons to believe that departments are different and that some of them have more value to one kind of party while others are preferred by other kinds of parties. Against his point of view, we believe that they are in fact different regarding their normative power, discretion in budget spending, ability to contract outsourced employees, media exposure and time accumulated by some party as the chief of a department. Because of these variables, each party has a special attention to each Department, preferring one to the other. Figueiredo (2007) says that besides other characteristics, the cooption strategy must be taken into account. One first approach including some sources of differences in departments were done by Meneguello (1998) when she classified them as belonging to economics, politics or social fields. For her, between the

\(^{10}\) In other countries, such as Belgium, the main criterion for the distribution of ministries is geographic.

\(^{11}\) \(\text{Cabinet} = 1 - \frac{2}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} (|S_i - M_i|)\), where: \(M_i\) is equal the % of departments received by party \(i\) when the cabinet was appointed and \(S_i\) is equal the % of seats held by party \(i\) in the total number of seats in the House controlled by parties inside the coalition.

\(^{12}\) In Portuguese they are called medidas provisórias and must be countersigned by the Congress in some time or be re-launched by the Executive.
Presidency of José Sarney and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, only Fernando Collor de Mello had a nonpartisan cabinet.

Finally, besides coalescence, cabinet is a powerful weapon to restrict public spending. Amorim Neto and Borsani (2004) declared that cabinet stability creates an increase in public spending and a decrease in government savings to pay public loans, also they found that right wing cabinets are more fiscal responsible.

After this explanation about cabinets and their characteristics, we are going to explore on the next section the literature that carried out analysis of how Executive makes the fine-tuning of coalition during the term.

3. Pork barrel and the coalition adjustment during the term

Another resource provided to the president, which was also not considered on the pessimistic view about the system, is money in the federal budget given to MCs for pork barrel. With a wide number of studies about the topic, these researches, mainly focused on econometric analysis, showed the process of budget amendment from its proposition until its execution as vital to Executive-Legislative relations. In this process, representatives can amend the annual budget sent from the president to the Congress in order to get its approval for the next year. So, MCs can ask for some money in this annual budget for pork barreling. From this ask, the Executive can (or not) authorize the amount requested, but if authorized, it not necessarily need to give it for the Deputy. We can see that the president can authorize the money in return for support from the House member in $t_0$, and release or not the amount in $t_1$. So he has the bargain power in this process, first in authorizing the money, and second, effectively giving it for deputies to use it for pork.

Amorim Neto and Santos (2003) showed that representatives have more interest regarding local legislation; this interest is even bigger for those with a concentrated vote pattern who belong to the government coalition. Contrary, for Figueiredo and Limongi (2007) even looking for local bills to benefit their constituency, legislators cannot get resources for pork because the biggest part of this amount is targeted to collective and institutional use$^13$. Despite this last

$^13$A question that arises and that was not presented by the authors deals with the transmission mechanism of these collective amendments adopted and implemented. Nominally, they lack the recipient of the funds, but for whom do leaders directing these values? We can see Pereira and Orellana (2009) who argued that Lula government
citation, we seek to present ideas about the topic as a control mechanism over allied parties also capable to influence the House electoral outcomes.

This variable (budget amendments) can be seen as one that is able to influence deputies’ electoral ambitions. When Ames (1995a) tried to explain the spatial patterns on 1990 Brazilian House election he found that in 1989 and 1990 candidates looked at safe strongholds in vulnerable cities solving in this way their electoral weaknesses offering pork. Mayor candidates who had previous experience in early years as a representative allocated more pork resources on the city where they were current running for Mayor. Those who tried a higher-level job (like senator or governor) but also had been a representative on early years, allocated more money for their states when compared to deputies that did not run for those jobs. Although incumbents searching re-election have a similar performance in implementing their budget amendments than those who are running for higher jobs (SAMUELS, 2002; LEONI, PEREIRA and RENNÓ, 2003). Both, national and local characteristics influenced the winning likelihood for the House in 1998, but pork had a more positive effect on the results than pure legislative activities like proposition of new laws and so on. Even when MC did some national activities, they were driven by the ambition of more resources for pork (PEREIRA and RENNÓ, 2002, 2003; PEREIRA and MUELLER, 2003).

The following studies see pork as a coalition maintenance instrument. The previous paragraph gave us fairly evidence that this is a high valued good for congressional representatives. With this felling, the president uses it as a currency to deal with his Congress coalition. He also uses the approval or execution of budget amendments to get ad hoc support from outside coalition representatives (those who belong to opposition parties).

An analysis determining representatives’ support to Congress bills and for those that came from the president shows that dominant-concentrated elected deputies give more support to presidential ones. The same trend could also be observed in congressmen with high amounts of money received from budget amendments (AMES, 1995b; PEREIRA and MUELLER, 2002). Pereira and Mueller (2004) pointed that it is a very low cost coalition maintenance tool. They also said that budget amendments are a link between individual electoral incentives and the centralizing Congress internal rules. The number of executed individual budget amendments in

realized that unruly parliamentarians were making use of collective amendments to feed his constituency without the need for government support.
1998 was a direct function of the same instrument in 1997 having also a positive relationship with the support to Executive bills. Individual and collective amendments cannot be considered substitute goods since the former have a positive relation with the approval of Executive bills on the House while the latest have an inverse relationship with the success of Executive propositions on the floor (ALSTON and MUELLER, 2005; PEREIRA and ORELLANA, 2009).

Refining the thought about the mechanisms used by the Executive to get support, Reile, Pereira and Power (2011) as already cited, stated that jobs on the federal bureaucracy are used in order to build the coalition while budget amendments are used as a sustenance tool serving also to aggregate in a few cases some representatives from opposition parties. This last feature could be observed on 2003 Pension Reform when members from the government coalition who already has jobs in departments observed the execution of many amendments proposed by representatives from oppositional parties. Nevertheless, observations from 1997 until 2005 showed that bigger the government coalition smaller is the execution amendments to outside or oppositional parties. Obviously, approval and execution of amendments to the opposition are not the rule, but can be used as a powerful tool sometimes.

Seemingly, the authors addressed this issue comprehensively and competently, leaving at first glance little things to be done. However, we have see a new research agenda opened by the imminent approval of the Authoritative Budget Constitutional Amendment proposed by Senator Antônio Carlos Magalhães making compulsory by the Executive the granting of a fixed sum of money to all congressmen to use it for pork (BRAZILIAN SENATE, 2006). Thus, with such a law, what would be the replacement of budget amendments for pork as one of the basic mechanisms of containment of allies used by Executive? The indiscriminate increase in the supply of public jobs in departments? New restrictions for granting and funding?

4. The role played by institutions on the Executive-Legislative game

In this part of the paper, we intend to show the main contributions carried out under an institutionalist approach. Many characteristics can emerge in this view, those studies that look on institutions while a kind of government, those that focus on electoral issues, those
prioritizing the legislative powers of the president and others\textsuperscript{14}. In almost all the times, these institutional executive powers and its strength were not considered in the first wave of studies about the theme.

First, we will see studies about constitutionalism, especially those dealing with organization and functioning of republican powers. According to Melo (1998), National Constitutions reduce transactional costs when they stipulate the role played by each part on electoral and governmental processes. When politicians tie their own hands for future actions this could be interpreted as a forecast made by these actors in order to avoid future irrational behavior. Cheibub, Elkins and Grinsburg (2011), in a documented analysis said that the number of Latin American Constitutions which allow parliament dissolution is very small, it is also granted to the majority of the Executives in this region more power (like creation of new laws and urgency request in its bills) than those awarded to Executives in other geographical regions. Meanwhile this strength does not occur in all cases with the loss of Congress powers; the authors stated that the Latin American Legislatives have greater powers to surveillance over the Executive when compared with other continents.

The 1988 Brazilian Constitution gave to the president huge legislative powers, like partial veto power, decree power, urgency requests in his bills and exclusively kick off on budgetary bills. Nevertheless, strong presidents have not been considered dangerous for presidential democracies (CHEIBUB e LIMONGI, 2010). In contrast to this view, another one sets that there is an inverse relation between policy stability and the legislative powers of the president. In this case, Brazil would be an exception because of the possibility of its Judiciary branch to constrain the president. Other institutions like media and a Congress capable to check the Executive can more frequently be seen in countries with higher governance indexes. Besides these, there also are independent check institutions arisen as a counterweight to the superpowers of the Executive: Public prosecutors (Ministério Público), courts of accounts, etc. All of them are what the literature calls checks and balances\textsuperscript{15}. (MELO, 2009; MELO, PEREIRA and FIGUEIREDO, 2009; PEREIRA, SINGH and MUELLER, 2011).

\textsuperscript{14} The focus is on formal institutions, but we cannot neglect the role played by informal institutions, this approach has few analysis. As an example, Desposato (2006) based on São Paulo and Piauí States said that clientelism as an informal institution creates minor party cohesion and more difficult to achieve governance.

\textsuperscript{15} Another interesting point is that partisan fragmentation is seen as beneficial while increasing transaction costs between parties for a joint attack on judiciary and other a control agencies (MELO, 2009).
About government or regime institutions (parliamentary and presidential), Przeworski et. al. (1996) based on data from 135 nations from 1950 until 1990 concluded that parliamentary regimes tend to live more. Cheibub and Limongi (2002) reviewing the literature on the topic found that cooperation incentives are bigger in parliamentary systems, but the probability of coalition formation is equal in both systems when any party has more than 1/3 of the seats in the Legislative. Cheibub, Przeworski and Saiegh (2004) also showed that parliamentary regimes has more coalitions than presidential ones, but they are far from to be unusual on the latest.

Regarding electoral rules, their electoral permissiveness and the heterogeneity of Brazilian population leads to high party fragmentation. Multiparty system has statistically significant relations with the rise of minority parties. Notwithstanding this fragmentation couldn’t avoid political stability among the five biggest Brazilian political parties (Workers’ Party – PT; Brazilian Social Democracy Party – PSDB; Liberal Front Party - PFL; Brazilian Democratic Movement Party – PMDB and Progressive Party – PP) (AMORIM NETO and COX, 1997; CHEIBUB, 2002; SANTOS, 2008). To Colomer (2005), the best electoral rules are proportional representation for legislative elections and two round pluralism for executive jobs, in this way, parties and the median voter would be closer, unified governments won’t exist and the presidents would be elected with a broad -including the median voter- support.

Two of the president legislative powers must be highlighted: One is his partial and full veto against Congressional bills and the other is his agenda power. When Santos (1997) compared two periods: 1946-1964 and after 1988 he found that presidents on the first period had some advantage over the currents because on the former only 2/3 of the Congress was necessary two pull down a presidential veto while nowadays it is necessary just an absolute majority.

A documentary analysis can show that Colombia, Chile, Argentina, Peru and Equator have presidents able to start legislation. We can interpret the provisional decrees (Medida Provisória, 62nd article of 1988 Constitution) as a delegation of power from Legislative to Executive. The MCs’ profits of such a delegation will vary according their capacities to control the Executive’s activities. On the 1980s, National Constituent Assembly one of the aims was to make the Legislative more agile avoiding the fact that if stronger, it would suffer from the same problems

16 Current called as Democrats - DEM
of the past, the provisional decree rises offering modernizations and administrative action (FIGUEIREDO and LIMONGI, 1997). This hypothesis was tested by Pereira, Power and Rennó (2005a) who assessed to what extent delegation theory\textsuperscript{17} and unilateral action\textsuperscript{18} could be observed in Brazil from 1988 until 1998. They showed that there is not a unique situation. In the whole period, unilateral action fits well, but regarding just Cardoso’s first term, delegation theory was observed thanks to Real Plan\textsuperscript{19}.

In the view of Figueiredo and Limongi (1995), after 1988 Brazilian Federal Executive proposed 88% of all the federal laws in the country. Presidents supported by coalitions are expected to rule less drastically proposing more constitutional amendments and complementary laws instead of using provisional decrees removing in this last option a big part of congressional responsibility in the approval of the law (AMORIM NETO, COX and MCCUBBINS, 2003). The constant reissue of provisional decrees can fit in a situation where every new reissue creates new bargain scenarios between congressional representatives and the Executive. Armijo, Faucher and Dembinska (2006) called this theory as “recurrent bargain”, stating that neither, the propensity to political chaos nor governance created with the sacrifice of representatives, mayors and governors in favor of the executive can be applied to Brazil. To them, all governments since Sarney until Lula in his first term were based in this cooperation system in which a strong president gets support through the participations of other political agents.

At last, Pereira, Power and Rennó (2005b) put this question inside the Brazilian Federal government context, seemingly, a bigger or smaller number of provisional decrees does not affect presidential approval and other similar instruments issued.

4.1. Party leadership and its place on bargain

Party leadership has an important position in Executive-Legislative relations. The biggest part of the researches uses an econometric approach to deal with the problems posed. During a voting procedure on the floor, the party leader can give the following positions to his delegation: Vote positively, contrary or put the party in obstruction (take away his delegation denying the minimum number of representatives required to vote the bill); decontrol the delegation to vote

\textsuperscript{17} Increasing on the number of provisional decrees on situations of high presidential popularity.

\textsuperscript{18} Increasing in the number of provisional decrees in periods of low indexes of presidential popularity and less support of Congress to his bills.

\textsuperscript{19} The successful economic stabilization plan carried out by Cardoso when Finance Minister during the Franco Presidency. After this, Cardoso was elected president in 1994 and re-elected in 1998.
as they want or; does not take any position (these last two situations are more rare). Between 1988 and 1998 parties delegations was observed as very disciplined to their leaders allowing easy forecasts about future behavior on roll calls. This discipline neglects the first wave of theories which concluded that Brazilian system would collapse at any time. The key point here is that the party leader acts as a link between congressmen and the Executive and that is why we can observe such levels of discipline (LIMONGI and FIGUEIREDO, 1995; FIGUEIREDO and LIMONGI, 1999).

About this link position, contrary American legislative decentralization, Brazilian system gives wide power to political parties inside Congress. The role played by leadership is important because since there is no difference between representatives regarding rights in votes and other common stuffs it does exist regarding pork resources distribution and nominations for important positions in the House. Leadership makes these distributions, so it is expected that a rational MC follow his leader to make possible his future demands. Meanwhile, a leader acting as an autocrat with his delegation is not common because he is elected by his party colleagues who may rebel and elect a new leadership. Thus, we expect cooperation between delegation and its leadership (Limongi and Figueiredo, 1998).

Acting by his own, the bargain power of a representative against the Federal Executive is too small; this is one of the reasons that we do not see isolated negotiations between the president’s emissaries and individual deputies. To get what they want, congressional representatives must cluster in a political party with a clear representativeness to conduct the bargains with the Executive on their behalf. This role is played by the party leader. Therefore, the assumption of a president very independent from the Legislative and of a blind opposition able to undermine government desires does not make sense. Because to the Executive it is necessary to have its agenda approved and not all parties are able to compete in future elections as opposition being more interesting to them join the government coalition than to disconnect from it (LIMONGI and FIGUEIREDO, 1998, 2002; FIGUEIREDO and LIMONGI, 2000; PEREIRA and MUELLER, 2003).

We can see that a healthy delegation-leadership relation would be useless if the leadership-Executive relationship does not have the same pattern. Because there is a new fact arising, we

20 Key decisions on parliamentary amendments are made by the rapporteurs with party leaders.
argue that it might be interesting an analysis concerning the interactions among nowadays party-leadership and the president Dilma’s negotiators. According to a famous Brazilian newspaper, *Folha de São Paulo* (2013), president Dilma’s coalition is the less disciplined since 1989. Party leaders of the government coalition are protesting that they do not receive any care from the Executive. Another problem arises with the team of the president charged of the political articulation with Congress; they have been considered day after day as unskilled for the job. The studies covered in this review were based on analysis about Presidents with good political skills (Sarney, Cardoso and Lula). Other presidents, Collor and Franco, did not have the same level of political ability but neither them had such a low level of party discipline during their terms. What can be the cause of these data? Dilma’s centralizing and authoritarian style, her low profile and awkward political team charged for bargaining with Congress or the fall of the political popularity indexes as a whole in Brazil?

The group of leaders (called *colégio de líderes*) acts in Executive favor when the latter asks for urgency in some bill. This is allowed by the 64th article of our Constitution, which truly avoids the articulation of minority groups that wanted to overthrow some presidential proposition. Usually the Executive’s agenda is approved more easily than the one presented by the Legislative (FIGEIREDO and LIMONGI, 1995).

Another important leaders feature according Figueiredo, Limongi and Valente (1999), is related to their ability to appoint and take out at any moment colleagues for committees. Pereira and Mueller (2000) look at this question and conclude that Brazilian committee system is totally dominated by the Executive thanks to the urgency request. If the urgency request was not done, committees would be able to get and reveal House Members preferences decreasing uncertainty that might arise on floor voting. Even in this case, urgency request is made because of the high waiting cost created by the assessment of the bill in all congressional bodies.

5. Federalism and multiparty presidential system

Now we are going to see a variable that affects indirectly the relationship between the president and the Congress. There are two streams regarding federalism. The first one looks at the weaknesses of states and the strength of Federal Executive branch acting over delegations. The other stream argues the opposite, that state’s issues are more important to representatives than partisan and Federal ones.
The first just cited stream tried to test econometrically the power exercised by State Governors over national party cohesion wondering that party leaders and governors compete against each other. In this case, the delegations would tend to take the party leaders’ side. Carey and Reinhhardt (2003) said that governors’ actions were not statistically significant over party cohesion in the Brazilian House of Representatives between 1986 and 1991. Arretche and Rodden (2004) also seeking evidence of state power over the federal level conclude that the fact of a governor party integrate the federal party coalition is not significant for voluntary financial transfers from the national Executive, but that over representation and higher turnout tend to favor states. Cheibub, Figueiredo and Limongi (2009) also claim that belong to a state where the governor is opposed to the national Executive has no influence on the likelihood of a congressman vote to be in accordance with the recommendations of the national government. The outcome remains the same when controlling for exclusive voting interests of states, members of the governing coalition continue following the direction of the national government and their leaders.

Contrary, the other wave of studies analyzing the same question has conclusions of strong governors and States and weak national party leadership. These conclusions come from: i) the state power of partisan leadership which defines who will have his name on the party list next election and who will not, they also define the campaign money destinations among candidates; ii) the electoral power created by a governor being personally side by side of some House candidate in a neighborhood or town during the campaign; iii) on the office resources held by a governor; iv) on the ambition that some politician has to get future higher jobs on state bureaucracy and; v) on the weakness of party leaders, in this view candidates don’t have campaign funds, nor power over advertisement on TV, nor power to appoint friends to get job on federal bureaucracy. Even with a small sample, studies showed that for a House candidate, to tie his image with the governor candidate creates more electoral profits than to do the same with the image of the presidential candidate. Basic statistics also showed that candidates for state offices (senator, governor and vice-governor) if were representatives on the past had amended the budget in favor of their home states. And, an analysis found that all of their MCs, PSDB, PMDB, Brazilian progressive Party – PPB, Democratic Labor Party – PDT, had

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21 An example of the control over office resources by governors can be checked in Melo, Pereira, and Werneck (2010) where the authors performed a detailed study about how a governor determines the degree of autonomy of state regulatory agencies based on their expectation to keep their power.

22 Contrary to what was exposed in the previous section.

23 Actual Progressive Party – PP.
greater tendency to follow the state governor instead of the party leader (SAMUELS, 2000, 2002; DESPOSATO, 2004).

In this field it must be emphasized the unusual power that 1988 Constitution gave to all Brazilian municipalities. From that year, they have been an independent federative unity, just like the states. Many situations have been performed directly between the federal Executive and the local level Executives. One example is the public health system, where a Mayor decides if his city will join the program or not. If yes, he must inform this to the federal Executive without any interference of the state Executive. We can assume that the Mayors’ strengthening may have occurred due to the power decline of governors. However, we found no studies that looked at this fact and the relations at the national level between the Executive and Legislative powers.

Concluding remarks
In this paper, we tried to show the different views about the Brazilian multiparty presidentialism system. A first wave of studies led by Juan Linz, Scott Mainwaring, Matthew Shugart and John Carey developed ideas focused on the presidentialism fragility when compared to parliamentarism; the forecasts about governance in Brazil were the worst.

Once the previous forecasts did not perform, we tried to show the answers why the system did not collapse. Another stream of studies tried to understand how such unusual system could survive with reasonable level of stability. Octávio Amorim Neto studying cabinet composition in different times found that Brazilian presidents build their government coalition giving jobs on the bureaucracy to political parties. Coalescent cabinets lead to stability, but important variables like discretionary spending in the budget, ability to hire outsourced employees, normative power and others were not taken into account in these analysis.

Carlos Pereira can be considered the author with more studies about the role played by pork. His studies showed how this tool could serve as a fine-tuning during the term in order for the president gets his agenda approved with a low cost. On this point we leave the question about the possibility of adoption of an authoritative budget, how then would be the bargain between Powers, just based on the supply of jobs or other solutions could appear?

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24 Even with such a claim, we note that the coefficients used to determine this level of state and local cohesion of these four parties are very close to the two found as most cohesive (PT and PTB).
Another important issue to keep the relations between the president and the Congress are institutions. Authors who dealt with this theme like José Cheibub and Carlos Pereira observed the impact of huge legislative powers granted to the Executive by 1988 Constitution. There was also observed the use of other institutions in a way to restrain president’s liberty like a strong Judiciary, public prosecutors, courts of accounts, etc.

Another source of thought regarding governance in Brazil gives to party leadership a strong control over their delegations. Fernando Limongi and Argelina Figueiredo are the main authors here. To them, representatives are highly obedient to their leaders and, since the leader has declared the party’s position in some issue, the delegation will vote according to it on the floor.

Finally, we showed some studies about the strength or weakness of state governors and the Executive-Legislative relations. Few papers dealt with it, some with results pro governors and others against them. In this case, any study looked at the role of municipalities’ Executives, considering that their strength had increased considerably in 1988 at the expense of governor’s power.

A new approach to the theme begins to emerge as seen in Pereira and Melo (2012), when they suggested the inclusion in the analysis of more than one issue we have seen. To the authors the stability of a government comes from the legislative powers of the president, the existence of trading currencies for bargain (like money for pork and job on the cabinet) and from strong checks institutions (an active Judiciary, a watchdog Legislative, independent media, courts of account, etc.)

Finally, we would like to raise one question: it is clear that granting jobs, pork, submission to leadership and other factors are sufficient to maintain governance with reasonable stability in Brazil after 1985. However, why MCs and other politicians subject themselves to this? Because in fact consider these rewards as appropriate or because they fear the uncertainty regarding a new political regime that will emerge with a breach of rules?

Reference list


