Abstract
This paper introduces a new conceptualization of patterns of democracy that is based on a combination of power-concentrating and power-dispersing effects of political actors as well as electoral and legislative decision-making rules. It corroborates its conceptual reasoning with empirical findings from ten Central Eastern European parliamentary democracies (1995–2004). Thus, the paper contributes to the theoretical and empirical debate about the impact of institutional and actor-oriented factors on the performance of parliamentary democracies.
1 Introduction

Empirical research on democracy faces different theoretical and methodological challenges that arise when interactions between institutional arrangements and the behaviour of political actors are used to explain policy performance (for a summary cf. Roller, 2005). These challenges are reflected in widespread discussions on different types of democracy. Although there is consensus that levels of performance vary between different types of democracy, the exact specification of this relationship remains controversial (Schmidt, 2002, p. 148).


According to Fuchs (Fuchs, 2000, p. 41), Lijphart introduces “empirical characteristics that correspond to constellations of actors” and “formal (constitutional) characteristics” in the discussion on types of democracy. In this respect, Lijphart’s approach conforms to one of the central claims of neo-institutionalism that aims at a combination of an actors and an institutional perspective (Peters, 1996; Rothstein, 1996). Even though Lijphart’s *Patterns of Democracy* has been labelled „pathbreaking“ (Armingeon, 2002, p. 82; Schmidt, 2000), the study has been widely discussed (for a summary cf. Müller-Rommel, 2007; Roller, 2005). We can distinguish a methodological critique and concerns with his conceptual decisions.

Critics highlighting methodological problems point to the development of different types of democracy. Bogaards (2000) for example discovers an incongruence between the two polar types of majoritarian and consensual democracy and the relevant empirical indicators. Additionally there is some doubt whether each of Lijphart’s indicators really matches the respective dimension (Schmidt, 2000, p. 350) and whether the operationalisation of individual indicators as well as their unweighted contribution to the dimensions are justified (Armingeon, 2002; Kaiser, 1998; Schmidt, 2000, p. 341).

With regard to conceptual concerns, Ganghof (2005) identifies Lijphart’s attempt to describe democratic types by using indicators that intermingle institutional rules and forms of behaviour as particularly problematic. There is a widely shared agreement in the discipline that institutional arrangements guide behaviour by setting the rules of the game that define the relevant actors and their roles. Roles defined by institutions frame the expectations of what actors are allowed and ought to do (North, 1990). Since actors are familiar with these rules, they can be expected to develop an adaptive and / or anticipatory behaviour to compensate institutional effects. Combining institutional rules and behaviour in one indicator than
encounters the risk that institutional effects and behavioural counterstrategies cancel each other out in an empirical analysis. In addition, many researchers consider Lijphart’s one-dimensional conceptualisation of democratic patterns debatable as he uses it to classify democracies empirically despite of his analytical distinction of two dimensions (Bogaards, 2000; Ganghof, 2005; Kolk, 2000; Nagel, 2000). Furthermore, critics argue that the terminology Lijphart uses to characterise the two democratic types disguises differences of the system attributes and is therefore misleading. These criticisms are confirmed by attempts to apply Lijphart’s concept empirically in further studies. Fortin (2008) and Roberts (2006) for example show that the ideal types of consensus and majoritarian democracy cannot be found in new Central and Eastern European democracies. This can be understood as a hint that Lijphart’s concept of patterns of democracy cannot be used in different contexts. This finding can also be interpreted as a strong indicator for the fact that Lijphart’s typology is in general unable to identify different types of democracy.

Since in his opinion the methodological and conceptual problems cannot be remedied within the original concept (Ganghof, 2005, p. 408) Ganghof consequentially advocates a newly developed typology of democracy that overcomes the shortcomings of Lijphart’s concept and is therefore better able to systematically explain different performance levels in democratic states. The same argument is advanced by a number of contributions that critically review Lijphart’s typology of democratic regimes. Hence, based on the insights generated by Lijphart, it is necessary to test alternative explanations and variables (Armingeon, 2002, p. 89 ff), to experiment with different revised types of democracy (Armingeon, 2002; Kaiser, 1997, 1998) and, above all, to systematically attempt to analyse the effects of different combinations of institutional sub-systems on political performance. Additionally, it is essential to apply these concepts to different world regions in order to critically assess their capacity to travel across contexts. At the moment, most typologies of democracy have only been applied to established Western democracies. Therefore, especially the new parliamentary democracies in Central and Eastern Europe that today can be labelled consolidated require closer inspection. This article aims at closing this research gap. Based on the existing literature we develop a new concept for the description of patterns or types of democracy and apply it to consolidated Central and Eastern European parliamentary democracies. In doing so, we remedy the conceptual, theoretical and methodological shortcomings of existing concepts.

We state that the typological analysis in the tradition of Lijphart is – for methodological as well as for theoretical reasons – less able to determine the pattern of democracy of a given
state than a dimensional analysis of parliamentary democracies. We hypothesise that the performance of democratic systems does not depend on the consensual or majoritarian character of a polity. Rather, its performance depends on different combinations of formal institutional structures and constellations of political actors.

In a nutshell, this article presents an analytical framework for the description of patterns of democracy that firmly rests on a theoretical foundation. In contrast to Lijphart’s approach, this concept provides different dimensions for institutional characteristics and those regime attributes related to political actors. In this framework, we do not aggregate the different dimensions into one typology, but explicitly – and in opposition to most of the current concepts – maintain each dimension separately. Each dimension is characterised by its power concentrating and power diffusing effects. Thus, different combinations of these dimensions are assumed to have varying power concentrating and power diffusing effects on the political decision making process. As a result, our approach prevents the artificial reduction to ideal types like majoritarian and consensus democracy but allows for the identification of hybrid types. In our view, this enables us to provide a more adequate description of modern democracies.

By concentrating on the combination of different power concentrating and diffusing institutional characteristics and actor constellations, we propose a concept that enables us to consistently explain different levels of democratic and policy performance across varying contexts. We apply this newly developed concept empirically to consolidated parliamentary democracies in Central and Eastern Europe in order to close the research gap that exists on this region.

We proceed as follows: We first critically review the refinements to Lijphart’s *Patterns of Democracy* that have been proposed by Ganghof (2005), Freitag, and Vatter (Freitag & Vatter, 2009; Vatter, 2009). Building on this literature, we secondly develop an alternative conceptualisation that systematically avoids the pitfalls and shortcomings of the existing proposals. Third, we propose an empirical operationalisation of this alternative concept. In the remainder of this article, we empirically apply this new concept to Central and Eastern European democracies in order to characterise these systems. We end with a summary and a discussion of the advantages and limits of dimensional patterns of democracy. The focus of this article is therefore the presentation of conceptional considerations and the demonstration of their empirical applicability. With this contribution we wish to provide a theoretically guided and empirically founded grounding for future quantitative analyses of political performance in different contexts.
2 State of Research

Especially Ganghof (2005) has stimulated the theoretical discussion on the definition of different types of parliamentary democracy. He proposes to further differentiate Lijphart’s (1999) executive-parties dimension into two separate dimensions. In order to achieve this differentiation, he discerns two decision rules: the electoral decision rule that captures the effects of the electoral institutions in place and the legislative decision rule that describes the effect of veto institutions in the law making process. Based on works by Scharpf (1997) and Schmidt (2000), Ganghof (2005, pp. 416-420) in addition includes the effects of actor constellations in the analyses of performance differences between regime types. The actor constellation in this context is defined as the interaction between government and parliament. Finally, in order to derive specific assumptions on the performance of governments and governmental systems, Ganghof (2005, pp. 421-423) discusses how the characteristics of different regime types affect the capacity of governmental majority and opposition to agree. With his approach, Ganghof convincingly argues that the electoral and legislative decision rules have to be considered as equally important basic dimensions of democratic political systems (also see Fuchs, 2000). In doing so, he provides a central key for the conceptualisation of relevant institutional dimensions in a neo-institutional analysis of different types or patterns of democracy. Nonetheless, two problems remain: First, Ganghof treats the effects of the electoral and legislative decision rules as additive. This allows him to match his concept with Nagel’s (2000) conceptualisation of different types of political regimes which emphasises the inclusion of voter preferences. Unfortunately, the additive nature of Ganghof’s concept finally again leads to a one dimensional model of democracy that disguises relevant differences in regime characteristics. Second, and in contrast to his own theoretical reflections, Ganghof, in the operationalisation of his dimensions of democracy, intermingles behaviour of political actors and institutional arrangements. These two problems in Ganghof’s conceptualisation are surprising since his critical reading of Lijphart explicitly concentrated on the one dimensional character of and the confounding of behaviour and institutions in Patterns of Democracy.

Another attempt to elaborate on Lijphart’s Patterns of Democracy has recently been proposed by Vatter (2009). Instead of the two polar types of democracy described by Lijphart, Vatter identifies “three dimensions of democracy”. After solving the methodological problems in Lijphart’s analysis, his main concern is the inclusion of instruments of direct democracy into the analysis. In doing so, and analysing 23 modern OECD democracies, he finds three
dimensions of democracy. Two of these dimensions more or less reproduce Lijphart’s analysis, while the third dimension combines the share of oversized coalitions and the institutions of direct democracy. In their analysis of the German Länder, Freitag and Vatter (2009) describe a similar pattern. After including direct democracy into the analysis, they also find three dimensions of democracy, even though these dimensions differ from those presented in Vatter’s (2009) international comparison: in the case of the German Länder, executive-legislative relations instead of the share of oversized coalitions load on the same factor as the strength of direct democracy; additionally, the degree of decentralisation clusters with the type of cabinet, the electoral disproportionality and the number of parties. All in all, Freitag and Vatter again solve the methodological problems inherent in Lijphart’s study by resorting to a different operationalisation of several indicators and by using a coherent sample of unity of analysis. Furthermore, the inclusion of institutions of direct democracy is well argued: it is doubtlessly a core concept of consensual democracy. Nonetheless, neither of these studies copes with the conceptual critique Ganghof (2005) formulated with respect to Lijphart’s approach. On the contrary: both studies exactly follow Lijphart’s path in the purely inductive identification of patterns of democracy. As a result the approach by Vatter and Freitag / Vatter is problematic with regard to two aspects. Questionable is first the lack of conceptual considerations as they, based on the result of a factor analysis, combine variables into three dimensions without any prior theoretical reflections on the logic of power concentrating and diffusing elements of democratic systems. This results in combinations of elements from both domains which is meaningless with regard to the differentiation of specific regime types as well as the explanation of their performance. Additionally, neither study clearly differentiates between institutional arrangements and political actors’ behaviour. This problem in Vatter’s (2009) case even occurs at the level of individual indicators: alongside with institutional characteristics, his index of direct democracy also includes a measure of the use of instruments of direct democracy. The same is true for the indicator on electoral systems, Gallagher’s (1991) disproportionality measure, that Vatter (2009) adopts from Lijphart (1999). The indicator is not only influenced by institutional arrangements but also by the behaviour of parties and voters (cf R. Taagepera, 2003). This is, as stated above, problematic with respect to distinguish between institutional necessities and adaptive behaviour to compensate for these. In sum, Vatter’s and Freitag / Vatter’s approach is as problematic as Lijphart’s with respect to conceptualisation and therefore cannot be considered as a beneficial development of the concept of patterns of democracy in this context.
To summarise the review of the recent literature on patterns of democracy, we can conclude that Ganghof’s (2005) proposal to systematically differentiate between electoral and legislative decision rules and behaviour of political actors is important, innovative and theoretically far reaching. Unfortunately, neither Ganghof (2005) himself nor Freitag and Vatter (Freitag & Vatter, 2009; Vatter, 2009) have respected these conceptional developments in their contributions. In our view, it is therefore necessary to underline again the importance and the potential of a differentiated and theoretically guided look at patterns of democracy. We aim at closing a gap in very often too inductive comparative political science by developing theoretically and applying empirically a new and truly dimensional concept of patterns of democracy that differentiates two purely institutional decision rules and the behaviour of political actors. This concept can be used fruitfully in further research to explain different levels of systemic and democratic performance.

3 Alternative Conceptionalisations

3.2 Conceptional Foundations

In order to overcome the theoretical shortcomings of existing concepts for the identification of patterns of democracy, we first need to clarify the aims of such a concept. Only on this basis, a logically consistent and theoretically convincing model can be formulated. Generally speaking, the existing approaches to the identification of distinct types of democracy describe these types on the basis of certain observable characteristics. Theses types are than used to explain differences in the quality or performance of the respective regimes. Performance is a rather broad concept: In general we can distinguish between systemic and democratic performance (Almond & Powell, 1978; Eckstein, 1971; Fuchs, 2000). Systemic performance is usually understood as the performance related to specific policies (as measures of societies’ ability to problem solving) whereas democratic performance is related to the quality in which democratic values and rights are granted to the citizens. We tie on these basic considerations. Our newly devised concept will discern different institutional and actor related characteristics that can be directly linked to differences in democratic and systemic performance and explain these differences.

In this context, we can build on Nagel (2000) who bases his typology on the capacity of a system to include voter preferences. This results in a continuum ranging from dictatorship to unanimity. To base an attempt to define types of democratic systems on the inclusion of voter preferences is promising since it allows link the concept to democratic as well as to systemic performance. Voter preferences relate to democratic performance in that they introduce the
guarantee of political freedoms and human rights as well as representation. They additionally introduce the systemic performance into the model since systemic performance can be understood as the capacity of a system to translate preferences into policies. On this account the starting point of our model building is the capacity of a political system to include voter preferences. We assume that this capacity is defined by characteristics of a polity.

3.2 **A three dimensional conception of patterns of democracy**

Neo-institutional models of types of democracy assume that the characteristics of a political system are defined by the interplay of institutional arrangements and behaviour of political actors. Institutions define resources and restrictions for the action of the relevant actors and their roles. The institutionalist approach has demonstrated the explanatory power of institutional arrangements for outputs and outcomes in various policy fields (Castles, 1982; Lijphart, 1999; Roller, 2005; Schmidt, 1982). Nonetheless, we believe that political outcomes and outputs can only be consistently explained when both, institutions and behaviour are taken into account (Scharpf, 1997). Therefore, the cornerstone of our concept is the following reflection: democratic and systemic performance cannot be explained by institutional arrangements alone. Institutions structure but not fully predetermine the behaviour of the relevant political actors. Any political decision is significantly affected by their behaviour. Therefore, a concept that aims at the explanation of political performance has to comprise both institutions and behaviour. In order to map the interactions between different institutional and behavioural dimensions, each dimension has to be explicitly examined and operationalised individually. Consequently, in our analysis we focus explicitly on each dimension’s particular effect on the inclusion of voter preferences.

Based on these assumptions and theoretical postulates, we have to answer the question how institutional arrangements and political actors’ behaviour can be incorporated into our model in order to adequately grasp the effects of a political system’s elements on its performance. To answer this question, we have to recognise the central role of majorities for the political process in a democracy. Gaining a majority is necessary not only for access to political offices but also when political power shall be used to change the societal or legislative status quo. The majority requirement, regardless whether the selection of personnel or specific decisions are concerned, therefore is vital for the democratic process.

Since a democratic majority always depends on voter support, it is possible to translate a political system’s capacity to include people’s preferences into the decision rules it has implemented on a formal and behavioural level. These decision rules base on the
characteristics of a given political system and can, depending on their relevant thresholds, either have a power concentrating or a power diffusing effect. More power concentrating systems include a lower number of voter preferences while more power diffusing systems impose higher majority requirements and force decision makers to include a larger number of voters and their preferences to take collectively binding decisions.

In the following, we elaborate on how institutional arrangements and actors’ behaviour relate to the majority requirements and the respective decision rules in a given political system. With regard to institutional arrangements we differentiate two relevant dimensions:

According to Fuchs (2000, pp. 31-34), the role of formally defined institutional characteristics of a political system boils down to the selection of rulers and to the provisions governing the exercise of power. In our reading, these two roles of political institutions and their effects are defined by two decision rules: the electoral decision rule, embodied in the electoral system; and the legislative decision rule, embodied in the veto institutions of a democratic polity. Therefore, the relevant decision rules in a given system are shaped by the formal rules on the electoral system and the system of government respectively. By translating the elements of the electoral and governmental systems into the more general electoral and legislative decision rules, we gain analytical clarity. With this translation we are able to discern the combined and individual power diffusing vs. power concentrating effects that each of these elements within a particular pattern of democracy has on the capacity to include voter preferences. Even though the effects of the electoral and the legislative dimensions manifest themselves at different stages of the political process, they are nonetheless comparable in that they both increase or decrease the number of voter preferences that need to be included to be able to fulfil the majority requirement to take collectively binding decisions. The electoral decision rule unfolds an effect on the inclusion of preferences at a very early stage in the political process as it defines the number of voters a party or actor needs as supporters in order to gain a majority. The legislative decision rule in comparison has a more subsequent effect on the preference inclusion as it affects the decision making of the actors that gained majorities by overcoming the electoral decision rule. This is why both decision rules are part of an encompassing concept of patterns of democracy. But even if they have comparable effects, since they occur at different stages of the political process, they have to be regarded as separate dimensions that cannot be aggregated and as a result artificially be forced into a polar typology.
Electoral Decision Rule

Electoral systems are composed of several elements such as legal thresholds, district magnitudes and electoral formulas that together influence its level of proportionality. The level of proportionality in turn defines the number of voters whose preferences have to be included to gain the absolute majority of seats in parliament. Therefore, the electoral system can be considered as the electoral decision rule of a given system.

Legislative Decision Rule

The electoral decision rule alone does not always capture the majority criterion that applies in parliamentary votes and decisions that aim at a collectively binding and enduring transformation of the legislative or societal status quo. Certain additional rules *de facto* might increase the majority requirement and force decision makers subsequently to take into account the preferences of additional voters. This leads to a deviation between the majority requirements of the electoral and legislative decision rules. The need to include additional voter preferences is defined by institutions of the governmental system that either directly or indirectly increase the legislative decision rule. Direct increases can be observed if decisions require qualified majorities. Indirect increases are caused by institutions with a certain potential to veto parliamentary decisions. The literature on veto institutions is extremely rich and diverse (Armingeon, 1996; Birchfeld & Crepaz, 1998; Colomer, 1996a; Crepaz, 2001; Crepaz & Moser, 2004; Fuchs, 2000; Huber, Ragin, & Stephens, 1993; Kaiser, 1997; McGann, 2006; Schmidt, 1996; Tsebelis, 1995, 2000). Generally speaking, we can determine that veto institutions with an effect on the legislative decision rule are those institutions that belong to the horizontal system of checks and balances. They exercise their veto power either through primary or secondary control mechanisms. Primary control mechanisms rely to the fact that the relevant institutions are explicit partners in any decision process, like second chambers or institutions of direct democracy. Secondary control is exerted ex post through mechanisms that set in only after a decision is taken. Examples are the retroactive control by constitutional courts or veto powers of a president. Some of these procedures are limited to certain thematically restrained areas. Depending on their formal characteristics, these institutions affect the legislative decision rule in very different ways. In order to differentiate generalised institutional patterns with effects on democratic and systemic performance, we do not further consider thematically bound veto institutions. All other horizontal control mechanisms however – regardless whether they belong to the primary or secondary control – have a relevant and continuous effect on all parliamentary votes since we can reasonably
assume that parliamentary actors anticipate the effect of these veto institutions and try to absorb them by including actors that represent additional voter preferences into their decisions. These institutions therefore have to be taken into account in order to identify the relevant elements defining different patterns of democracy.

Political Actor Constellations
So far we defined the institutional characteristics of political systems. Missing in the conceptualisation as yet is an argumentation of whether and how to include political actors or their behaviour in a typology to identify different patterns of democracy. We believe that the inclusion of actor and behaviour related aspects is in fact necessary in order to differentiate all relevant characteristic of a political system since political actors might adopt to institutional necessities, which leads to a potential compensation of institutional effects.
From the neo-institutional literature we can draw the conclusion that political outputs and outcomes can only be explained by the interplay of institutional arrangements and the behaviour of political actors. We therefore propose a broadened concept of patterns of democracy that goes beyond existing notions of democratic patterns by including political actors. This approach ties with Ganghof’s (2005) and Schmidt’s (2000, p. 347) concepts who both argue that political performance can only be realised through the behaviour of political actors. Additionally, Ganghof points to the challenge that behaviour analytically has to be treated separately from institutional arrangements. We therefore introduce the constellation of actors as a third, independent dimension that supplements the two institutional dimensions. In this behavioural dimension, in order to follow the logic of explaining democratic and systemic performance, the focal point of the analysis is again the inclusion of voter preferences.
Political actors only are capable of acting if they adapt their behaviour to the relevant political majorities. This is why political performance can, in the first place, be explained by the majority seeking behaviour of political actors. Majority seeking behaviour conceptualised in this understanding is observable behaviour that aims at the stabilisation and / or increase of the majority status that is needed to override the hurdles set by the institutional decision rules. Since we describe generalised patterns of democracy, we will nonetheless not look at individual behaviour pertaining exclusively to a particular situation or even an actor’s motivations and preferences. Instead, we concentrate on the result – or pattern – of political actors’ behaviour. Majority seeking behaviour relating to political decisions and thereby to political performance primarily manifests itself in the characteristics of governments. In the context of government formation, political actors, who seek majorities, ultimately seek
influence on decision making processes. Beyond the numerical majority building the ideological homogeneity of a government is relevant. It influences the decision making process since a more homogenous government will better be able to agree and compromise on relevant political decisions. Therefore, the dimension of actor constellations combines numerical as well as ideological patterns of governments as they are the behavioural elements of the political system that affects its power concentrating or power diffusing characteristics.

The Three Dimensions of Patterns of Democracy
To sum our conceptual considerations up, we believe that patterns of democracy have to be conceptualised in a three dimensional way. We combine two institutional and one behavioural dimension: the electoral and legislative decision rules and the majority seeking constellation of actors. These three dimensions have to be considered as individual dimensions that jointly (but not in their aggregate) allow to identify and systematically compare the characteristics of democratic systems and that jointly (but not in their aggregate) explain democratic and systemic performance. We therefore propose a three dimensional pattern of parliamentary democracies that combines elements of the electoral and governmental systems as well as the constellations of actors in a dimensional way. The resulting three dimensional pattern of democracy can be graphically represented in the following way.

4 Three Dimensions of Democracy in Empirical Perspective
The following paragraphs are devoted to the empirical examination of our three dimensional pattern of parliamentary democracy. First, we operationalise the three dimensions of our concept. Second, we show that our theoretically derived concept can be empirically applied to ten Central and Eastern European democracies. We demonstrate the viability of our concept with these cases for two reasons. First, Lijphart’s (1999) typology – apart from the conceptual problems discussed above – cannot be successfully employed in the context of the postcommunist world (Fortin, 2008). Secondly, since systematically comparative research on the types of democracy in the region is scare, there is a need to classify these systems in an adequate manner. By basing our empirical exploration on ten states with a similar historical background and the prospect of a common development within the European Union, we avoid the danger to mix up a “most similar” and a “most dissimilar case design” (Przeworski & Teune, 1970), a criticism that confronted Lijphart’s (1999) empirical study (Armingeon, 2002,
We collect yearly data for the period from 1995 to 2004 as in this period, all ten states can be considered consolidated democracies (Blondel, Müller-Rommel, & Malová, 2007; Merkel, 2007; Schneider & Schmitter, 2004).

4.1 Data Sources and Coding Techniques

In order to empirically account for Central and Eastern European patterns of democracy, we first need to measure the individual indicators that operationalise the three dimensions. A particular challenge is to exclusively incorporate those elements that influence the power concentrating or diffusing character of a given political system. Since there is no data with this specific focus available in disaggregated form, we have to resort to a primary data collection. To assemble the relevant data for the electoral and legislative decision rules as well as for the constellation of actors, we exploit electoral statistics, composition of parliaments and governments (cf. Müller-Rommel, Fettelschoss, & Harfst, 2004; Müller-Rommel, Schultze, Harfst, & Fettelschoß, 2008), and constitutional and legal texts. In addition, we rely on secondary literature in order to validate our findings.¹

The selection of information and variables we use all relate to the power concentrating or diffusing potential of the formal institutions or the constellation of actors in question. In all cases, this is characterised by a multitude of elements, which causes specific challenges for the operationalisation. Some power related characteristics can only be measured in a qualitative way and even if individual elements can be measured quantitatively, they often can only be captured at different levels or scales of measurement (cf. Stevens, 1946). This reflects the peculiarity of political systems that divide power in very particular ways by according each institution or actor constellation a given share of veto power on political decisions. We therefore face the challenge to describe each institution or actor constellation as gradually equipped with (or without) veto potential. Since we aim to construct for each of the relevant elements of the political system one indicator that reflects the joint power concentrating or

¹ There is a number of indices and operationalization proposals for the description and classification of institutional arrangements some of which provide data for Central and Eastern European countries (see, for example Armingeon, Gerber, Leimgruber, & Beyeler, 2009; Fish, 2006; Johannsen, 2000; Krouwel, 2003; Rüb, 2001). These data sources cannot be used for the present analysis for two main reasons: First, they all publish the data on a level of aggregation that precludes a differentiated examination of individual dimensions of democracies. The endeavour to differentiate patterns of democracy in our conceptualization requires disaggregated data. Second, the reference point of our theoretical reasoning is the democratic and systemic performance of political systems. All approaches to the classification of political systems we are aware of first measure institutional characteristics and relate these to political performance only a posteriori. Therefore, these studies often include competences like the powers of a president in the state of emergency that do not have an influence on the result of parliamentary votes in general. Therefore, the use of these approaches and data sources is not possible in our particular case. We nonetheless use them as yardsticks and sources of inspiration.
diffusing effect of all these factors, we make use of a coding procedure that allows – in cases it is necessary – to translate qualitative information into quantitative data.

Based on the discussions on social science methods for the conversion of qualitative information into quantitative values (Bryman, 2004, pp. 65-69; Gerring, 2001, pp. 35-64; Sartori, 1984), we develop for the operationalisation of qualitative characteristics an index that bases on argumentative techniques. The development of this argumentative index profits from advances in formal logic and the technique of fuzzy sets (Ragin, 2000). By using this technique, we ensure that different levels or grades of power concentration or diffusion of a given variable are able to describe the interplay of different formal characteristics of the respective phenomenon adequately (Klir, Saint Clair, & Yuan, 1997; Zadeh, 1965, 1968).

As a result, in our analysis, the veto potential of political institutions and actor constellations in parliamentary democracies is identified by the help of scales. This leads to the question how to define the different scales. According to Ragin (2000, p. 7 and 150) the definition of extreme points as well as indifference points has to be built on theoretical reasoning. In the following, we therefore present the theoretical foundations of our concepts and justify the categories we use (Hall, 2003, p. 389; Mahoney, 2003, p. 347). This leads to a scale for which

a) extreme values as ideal types of the concept under consideration (maximum veto potential) or its complement (absence of veto potential) can be specified, but not necessarily be observed;

b) there is a point of indifference or cross-over point where neither the concept under consideration nor its complement can be found; and

c) there are gradual manifestations of the concept under consideration between the extreme points and the point of indifference (Ragin, 2000, pp. 153-159; Schneider & Wagemann, 2007).

In the coding process, all values between zero and one may be used. In our case, a value of 1 corresponds to the ideal type of an institution or actor constellation with high veto potential while we code 0 for a perfect “non-veto” institution or actor constellation. The point of indifference, coded 0.5, designates a situation in which a case cannot be classified (neither) as rather belonging to nor as rather not belonging to the concept under consideration.

In the following we describe the operationalisation of the single elements within the given three dimensions of the patterns of democracy with special regard for the coding procedure in cases where qualitative information has to be translated in veto or power diffusing potential.
Dimension I: Electoral Decision Rule

The electoral decision rule reflects the proportionality of an electoral system. More proportional electoral institutions have a power diffusing effect while less proportional electoral system have a power concentrating effect. A proportional distribution of parliamentary seats requires the inclusion of a large number of voter preferences in the decision making process since more parties gain access to this process. Inversely, a disproportional electoral system lowers the number of voter preferences that have to be included in order to be able to take and implement collectively binding decisions.

Research on electoral systems has proposed a number of different indicators to measure the institutional characteristics of electoral rules. In our context, it is important that the “institutionalised” proportionality of the electoral rules in place instead of an amalgam of institutional features and behaviour of relevant actors is reflected by the indicator. The latter is the case for Gallagher’s (1991) disproportionality measure that compares electoral and parliamentary party systems. A truly institutional measure should exclusively take the institutional configuration of the electoral system into account. One such measure is the often used “effective threshold” (Lijphart, 1994). We cannot use this indicator here because it focuses on individual constituencies, not on the national electoral system that we are interested in. Taagepera (2002) has developed an alternative measure, the national threshold, in order to be able to describe an electoral system at the national level. After the calculation of the national threshold, we transform this measure into a national district magnitude (Lijphart, 1994; R. Taagepera, 1998). Because the national magnitude takes low values for less proportional electoral systems this operationalisation reflects the logic of the power diffusing vs. concentrating conceptualisation of our patterns of democracy better than the national threshold as it corresponds to the polarity of the other indicators used in this analysis.

Dimension II: The Legislative Decision Rule

The second dimension, the legislative decision rule, measures the veto potential of extraparliamentary political institutions vis-à-vis the government and the parliamentary majority. We only consider horizontal primary and secondary institutions of ex post control that influence parliamentary votes at the level of the nation state. Since the focal point of the analysis is the definition of a generalised pattern of democracy with effects on political performance, thematically limited or vertical institutions are not considered. We therefore concentrate the following analysis on bicameralism and federalism, presidential powers, constitutional courts and institutions of direct democracy as they are the relevant veto
institutions in this context that influence the additional majority requirement beyond the electoral decision rule. This selection is based on Birchfeld and Crepatz’s (1998) analysis of competitive veto points and similar concepts (Armingeon, 1996; Colomer, 1996b; Fuchs, 2000; Huber et al., 1993; Kaiser, 1998; McGann, 2004; Schmidt, 1996; Tsebelis, 1995, 2002). Each of the four veto institutions is characterised by a multitude of competences that influence its veto potential vis-à-vis government and parliamentary majority. In order to measure their effect on political performance, the following analyses only incorporate those competences that are relevant for decisions on political issues. Purely ceremonial or representative competences or special powers in cases of emergency are explicitly excluded since they do not have a direct effect on the democratic and systematic performance of a political system. In the following paragraphs, we turn to the operationalisation of the four institutions’ veto potential in the political process. In this particular case, fuzzy logic has been thoroughly used.

Bicameralism and Federalism
A first possible veto institution that influences votes and political decisions at the level of the nation state and can therefore unfold a considerable effect on the legislative decision rule are second chambers and a federal organisation of the country. In order to capture their effect, we build an index of bicameralism and federalism. This index will map the power sharing at the level of the central state. As a rule, this can be done by evaluating the competences of second chambers. Even in federal states this is sufficient without considering the characteristics of federalism separately. Only in those cases where the mechanisms of power sharing in federal states are not reflected in a second chamber, the competences of subnational units are taken into account. By this procedure we avoid to overestimate the power distribution related effects of federalism and bicameralism as it is problematic within existing classifications of political systems (Armingeon, 1996; Birchfeld & Crepaz, 1998; Colomer, 1996b; Fuchs, 2000; Huber et al., 1993; Kaiser, 1998; McGann, 2004; Schmidt, 1996; Tsebelis, 1995, 2002).

Presidential Powers
Presidents in parliamentary democracies have varying veto competences. Under which circumstances, we ask, can presidents veto parliamentary decisions? The first characteristic we analyse to address this question is the direct election of the president. A direct election increases the legitimacy of the president and therefore her ability to achieve his political goals. Therefore, the direct election of the president structures her competences. As a rule,
presidents in parliamentary democracies are granted three classes of competences: political competences, the power to nominate, and symbolic competences (Johannsen, 2000). Only the political competences have a direct influence on the political decision making process as they define a president’s relative veto power vis-à-vis parliamentary decisions. With respect to this, four competencies have an important effect on the legislative decision rule in parliamentary systems. These are the right to send laws back to parliament for an additional reading, the right to submit a law to a constitutional review, the right to propose laws as well as the right to initialise a referendum. Six more competencies that allow the president to influence sessions of parliament and cabinet meetings play a subordinate role that nonetheless support the core competencies of the president.

**Constitutional Courts**

Constitutional courts are an important element of the legislative decision rule since they control decisions of parliament and government and have therefore a power diffusing function. Tsebelis (2002, pp. 225-235) even compares the veto potential of constitutional courts to that of second chambers. Decisive for the veto potential of a constitutional court is not the simple existence of this institution but its competences in the field of control over national legislation. The following formal rules with direct effects on political decisions are included in the following analyses: the constitutional court’s possibility to decide on popular and individual complaints, the right to interpret the constitution and the court’s right to act on its own initiative. Possible other competencies are not relevant for the present study.

**Direct Democracy**

Institutions of direct democracy allow the population to directly participate in the process of political decision making. Therefore, direct democracy is an important element of the legislative decision rule. The more pronounced direct democratic elements in a polity, the more the political process is characterised by power diffusion. Institutions of direct democracy can be distinguished according to their subjects, the degree of binding force and the institutions or persons who are allowed to initiate a direct democratic procedure (Schiller, 2002, pp. 13-14). Tsebelis (2002, pp. 116 and 122-135) further differentiates institutions of direct democracy by asking who formulates the question to be voted on. This leads to a four fold classification power diffusing effect in decreasing order: initiatives, (facultative) referendum, obligatory referendum and plebiscite. Finally, we include the number of different procedures of direct democracy as well as the number of persons or institutions who are
granted the right to initialise such a procedure. The more different procedures and the more persons who are allowed to initialise them, the higher the probability that direct democracy is used to veto a decision taken by parliament.

*Dimension III: Constellation of Actors*

An approach that is designed to explain different performance levels between political systems by relying exclusively on institutional characteristics is incomplete. Neo-institutional theory has clearly demonstrated that the behaviour of political actors has a decisive influence on democratic and systemic performance (Rothstein, 1996). Our third dimension therefore introduces the influence political actors have on the lawmaking process. We assume that a given legislative or societal status quo can only be changed if political actors are powerful. In a parliamentary democracy, political power depends on the ability of a political actor to build a parliamentary majority for a specific decision. Majorities can be assured in particular if governments act in a united way. The unity of governments themselves depends on their ability to agree on policy proposals and to impose these proposals on a parliamentary opposition. Single party majority governments usually act in a united way and therefore are able to dominate the political decision making process effectively. The unity of coalition governments depends on the number of coalition partners and their ideological proximity. The more parties in a coalition and the larger the ideological distances between the partners, the more difficult, due to potential conflict, it will be for this coalition to effectively dominate the decision making process. In this case its ability to change the legislative and societal status quo will be lower. Based on these considerations, in the following we propose measures for the power relations between government and opposition as well as governmental unity.

**Power Relations Between Government and Opposition**

The power relations between government and opposition are best captured by the parliamentary support of the government. This indicator measures the seat share in parliament controlled by a government. It not only discriminates between majority and minority governments but also picks up the formal enforcement potential of a government vis-à-vis the opposition.

**Unity of Governments**

The unity of governments is measured by two indicators, the effective number of governing parties and the ideological distance between government parties. The effective number of
government parties, based on the number of parties and their mutual relative strength measured again by the parliamentary seats controlled by each government party, is calculated using Laakso and Taagepera’s (1979) index.

Along with the number of government parties, the ideological distance between these parties is relevant for the ability of governments to agree on issues. The lower the distance between government parties, the more likely they achieve consensus and can act as a unified government that can therefore control the decision making process more effectively. In order to measure the ideological distance within governments, we compare the positions of parties on a left right scale, ranging from 1 (left) to 20 (right) and calculate the difference between the two most extreme parties. Data for these calculations is taken from Benoit and Laver (2006). Those cases not covered by this distribution were supplemented with the help of interviews with country experts.

4.2 Patterns of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe

In the previous sections, on the basis of theoretical and conceptual considerations, we derived eight indicators to measure patterns of democracy more reliably than in previously published approaches. These indicators will now be integrated in a multidimensional analysis. We aim at an empirical demonstration of the interrelationships of the three dimensions, the legislative and electoral decision rules and the constellation of actors. Our example will be ten parliamentary democracies in Central and Eastern Europe in the period from 1995 to 2004.

Statistical Measures of Association

The eight indicators we developed and operationalised in the previous sections are first submitted to a test on normal distribution. This is necessary since we intend to employ correlation as well as factor analysis that both assume a normal distribution of the data. Using a Shapiro-Wilk test, a normal distribution can only be shown with certainty for the variables Constitutional Courts and Cabinet Support. Especially in the case of District Magnitude, Bicameralism-Federalism, Number of Government Parties as well as Ideological Distance we have to assume a skewed distribution while the variable Presidential Powers seems to be a case of kurtosis. This result is confirmed by a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. A visual inspection of the data nonetheless suggests that the deviations from normal distribution can be tolerated in the following analyses.

Since the data distribution allows for it, we calculate Pearson’s correlation coefficients for all the eight variables to show that the hypothetical three dimensions are reflected in the data at
hand. According to our theoretical assumptions concerning the relationships between the variables, we expect that the indicators of one dimension display considerably more important measures of association between each other than with the indicators of the other dimensions. The statistical analysis confirms this expectation for two of our dimensions (see Table 1 below). The indicator that operationalises the electoral decision rule (*District Magnitude*) correlates to only one other indicator that measures the power concentration or diffusing effect of institutions of direct democracy. Since direct democracy’s association with the veto potential of constitutional courts is still more substantial, we nonetheless conclude that the electoral decision rule is adequately pictured by *District Magnitude*. The second dimension we can identify without any doubt is the level of power concentration or difusion, which is realised by the behaviour of political actors and that we designated as actor constellation (*Cabinet Support, Number of Government Parties, Ideological Distance Between Government Parties*). These three indicators closely relate to each other (see bold coefficients in Table 1). We can therefore conclude that the indicators of Dimension I (electoral decision rule) and Dimension III (actor constellation) correspond to our theoretical assumptions.

[Table 1 about here]

In Dimension II (legislative decision rule), we observe two groups of indicators. On the one hand, *Direct Democracy* and strong *Constitutional Courts* correlate to each other. On the other hand, strong *Presidents* and far reaching competences for *Bicameral-Federal* structures, that display an only weak relationship with each other, are negatively correlated with the first group. We believe that these two groups of indicators reflect two different ways of assuring an institutional veto in a polity. Either a constitution provides for mechanisms where popular vote has the possibility to influence the legislative process via veto institutions such as constitutional courts and direct democracy or a constitution conversely limits the veto power to formal institutions like presidents or second chamber that can act independently from popular vote in the decision making process. Both control mechanisms are not combined in Central and Eastern European democracies. Such a combination would presumably bear the risk of a continued blockade of the political process and is therefore not realised in the sample of countries we analyse. Furthermore, there are no cases of federal states in this sample; with Romania there is only one country with a second chamber. At the same time, presidents in Central and Eastern Europe are relatively strong compared to those in other parliamentary democracies. We therefore believe that our sample reflects a biased picture of potential veto
institutions of a modern parliamentary democracy. For these reasons, we will drop the two closely related variables *Presidential Powers* and *Bicameral-Federal Structures* from the following analysis.

Validity and Reliability of the Three Dimensional Pattern of Democracy

In a second step, we complement Pearson’s correlations with additional analyses that test for validity and reliability of the proposed concept of patterns of democracy and its operationalisation. First, we implement an analysis that helps us to judge the validity of our three dimensions. Therefore, the six remaining indicators (Dimension I – Electoral Decision Rule: district magnitude; Dimension II – Legislative Decision Rule: direct democracy and constitutional court’s competencies; Dimension III – Actor Constellation: cabinet support, effective number of government parties and ideological distance of government parties) are subjected to a factor analysis (see Table 2 below). The rotated solution, respecting the commonly accepted Kaiser criterion (eigenvalue above 1), retains three factors that correspond to the three proposed dimensions: The indicator for the electoral decision rule (district magnitude) loads on factor 3 which matches Dimension I. The competences of constitutional courts and institutions of direct democracy both load on factor 2 which corresponds our Dimension II. Finally, the three indicators that measure the power concentrating vs. diffusing constellation of actors all load on factor 1 which corresponds our Dimension III (all relevant coefficients in Table 2 in bold). With these findings, the factor analysis confirms the internal validity of the three theoretically derived dimensions of democracy.

[Table 2 about here]

Secondly, we are looking for confirmation whether our patterns of democracy are reliable. We use Cronbach’s Alpha to additionally perform a statistical test for reliability of one of our dimensions. This test confirms that the three indicators of the actor constellation can reliably be combined into one dimension.\(^2\) In summary, with this test for reliability we can strengthen our finding that our three dimensional model of democracy can be empirically applied to Central and Eastern European countries. This validates that our reflections on dimensions of democracy.

\(^2\) For the three standardised variables of Dimension III \(\alpha = .74\). The usually accepted threshold for this test is a value of .7 or higher. We therefore conclude that Dimension III reliably measures constellations of actors’ behaviour. Since Cronbach’s Alpha can only be calculated for three or more variables, this test cannot be performed for the other two dimensions which are composed of one or two indicators respectively.
democracy, derived from theoretical considerations, are conceptually better informed than previous approaches and can therefore be confirmed. With this finding supporting our theoretical considerations, we can now confidently describe the three dimensional pattern of democracy in Central and Eastern European states (see Graphic 2 below).

[Graphic 1 about here]

We plot the two institutional dimensions, the electoral and legislative decision rules on the y- and x-axis respectively. Than we add bubbles, whose size corresponds to the value of the actor constellation dimension. Low values in all three cases stand for power diffusion, while high values indicate power concentration. This means that the lower left quarter of the graph stands for institutional arrangements that strongly diffuses power. The upper right part of the graph represents a combination of strongly power concentrating institutions. If actor constellations were completely predetermined by institutional arrangements, we would expect power concentrating actor constellations (small bubbles) in the lower left area of the graph, power diffusing actor constellations (large bubbles) in the upper right area. Looking at the upper panel of Graphic 1 we observe that Bulgaria is an outlier with regard to it’s comparatively power diffusing electoral decision rule. Excluding Bulgaria for the sake of a better demonstration (lower panel of Graphic 2), we first have to stress that purely power concentrating or purely power diffusion institutional arrangements do not exist in Central and Eastern Europe. The political systems under observation are institutional hybrids. This confirms our assumption that an aggregation of the two institutional dimensions into one polar type will cancel out differences in the two dimensions and result in mean values on the polar scale. This kind of scale masks more than it reveals and is therefore not suitable to adequately describe patterns of democracy. Additionally, we can state that Central and Eastern European actor constellations are not predetermined by institutional arrangements. There is no systematic pattern observable that relates actor constellations (size of bubbles) to institutional characteristics (values on x- and y-axis). This corroborates our conviction that, first, actor constellations have to be included in an analysis of democratic patterns and that, second, actor constellations have to be thoroughly kept separate from institutional characteristics. To conclude, the main finding of this paper is that Central and Eastern European political systems are hybrid types of democracy that do not display consistent patterns of power concentration of diffusion, neither with respect to institutions, nor regarding their actor constellations. They
all combine institutional and actor related elements in very different ways. This precludes aggregation of the three dimensions into one polar concept and confirms our assumption that three dimensions are needed to adequately describe patterns of democracy.

5 Conclusion
In this paper, we developed an alternative concept for the identification of patterns of democracy. The foundation of this concept is the clearly stated aim of the analysis: provide a tool that enables us to systematically evaluate democratic and systemic performance of parliamentary democracies. The theoretical focus is, first, the systematic reference to power diffusion or power concentration and, second, the clear distinction of three dimensions of democracy. The electoral and legislative decision rules and the actor constellation jointly exert an effect on performance, but may not be aggregated. This aggregation is one of the major failures of all the other concepts we are aware of, and we were able that any attempt to aggregate these dimensions will necessarily disturb the picture we draw of patterns of democracy. Aggregation into one polar type forces differences to cancel each other out. In Central and Eastern Europe we find hybrid types of democracy that cannot be adequately described by a polar concept of democracy like the one proposed by Lijphart. One of the shortcomings of the present paper is that one of our dimensions is clearly biased. The legislative decision rule is characterised by the absence of bicameralism and the presence of comparatively strong presidents. We therefore had to exclude both indicators from our analysis. This can be remedied by the inclusion of additional cases. Once these cases are included, we will proceed with the introduction of data on democratic and systemic performance in order to test whether our concept can explain observable differences in levels of performance.
Table 1  Correlations of Eight Indicators Operationalising Three Dimensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dist. M</th>
<th>CC</th>
<th>DD</th>
<th>BicFed</th>
<th>PresiP</th>
<th>NGov</th>
<th>Dist.</th>
<th>CS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnitude</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Const.</td>
<td>0.0971</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>0.3367</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>-0.4785</td>
<td>0.4805</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicamer.</td>
<td>-0.1363</td>
<td>-0.0211</td>
<td>-0.2769</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federalism</td>
<td>0.1762</td>
<td>0.8346</td>
<td>0.0053</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>President.</td>
<td>0.1133</td>
<td>0.0728</td>
<td>-0.1841</td>
<td>0.2329</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Powers</td>
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<td>0.4719</td>
<td>0.0667</td>
<td>0.0197</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Number Gov</td>
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<td>-0.2558</td>
<td>0.1861</td>
<td>-0.2160</td>
<td>-0.0119</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>0.0007</td>
<td>0.0102</td>
<td>0.0638</td>
<td>0.0197</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideologic.</td>
<td>-0.3139</td>
<td>-0.1679</td>
<td>0.1694</td>
<td>0.0630</td>
<td>-0.2250</td>
<td>0.6234</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>0.0015</td>
<td>0.0950</td>
<td>0.0920</td>
<td>0.5336</td>
<td>0.0244</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet</td>
<td>-0.0685</td>
<td>0.0975</td>
<td>0.3287</td>
<td>-0.2446</td>
<td>0.1917</td>
<td>0.4764</td>
<td>0.3445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>0.4980</td>
<td>0.3348</td>
<td>0.0008</td>
<td>0.0142</td>
<td>0.0560</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
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</table>

Table 2  Factor Analysis of Six Indicators

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Factor1</th>
<th>Factor2</th>
<th>Factor3</th>
<th>Uniqueness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dist. Mag.</td>
<td>-0.1067</td>
<td>-0.0248</td>
<td>0.9466</td>
<td>0.0920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial Re</td>
<td>-0.1257</td>
<td>0.9015</td>
<td>0.1099</td>
<td>0.1595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Demo</td>
<td>0.2062</td>
<td>0.7372</td>
<td>-0.5403</td>
<td>0.1220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N Gov Part.</td>
<td>0.8204</td>
<td>-0.1957</td>
<td>-0.2979</td>
<td>0.1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideologic D</td>
<td>0.7281</td>
<td>-0.1790</td>
<td>-0.3309</td>
<td>0.3281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Sup.</td>
<td>0.8216</td>
<td>0.3330</td>
<td>0.1374</td>
<td>0.1953</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Principal components analysis and orthogonal rotation; an oblique rotation slightly decreases the explained variance of the model, but a correlation analysis of oblique factors yields a maximum R = .35 which provides no evidence that the factors are correlated. This conclusion is also supported by the results of the correlation analysis of individual indicators (cf. Table 1). Extraction of factors with eigenvalue > 1 only (Kaiser criterion). A Scree plot confirms this decision. Explained variance of the whole model (cumulative): .82
Graphic 1  Graphical Representation of a Three Dimensional Concept of Democratic Patterns
Graphic 2  Three Dimensional Patterns of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe


