Beyond the Cartel Party? Party Patronage and the Nature of Parties in New Democracies

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I. Introduction

Understanding the nature of political parties in new democracies is an important area of academic inquiry (e.g. Webb and White, 2007; Randall and Svasand, 2002). Political parties emerged as important actors in most neo-democracies of the third wave of democratization. Because of their importance as political actors in these new emerging democratic political systems, parties have become worthy studying as subjects on their own. In addition, party performance is often related to regime performance or regime consolidation. In other words, how parties behave and organize is also assumed to have important implications for the likelihood of new democracies to stabilize and take root.

This paper addresses the organizational nature of political parties in new democracies. Our central question is how do parties organize and what is the nature of partisanship in new democracies. We try to answer that question by looking specifically at party patronage in new democracies. Questions of organizational nature of parties in new democracies have of course been addressed in the literature, for example by studies dealing with party membership, electoral behavior, or the relationship between parties and organizations of civil society (e.g.). We add to this literature in at least three ways. Firstly, we look at the nature of parties in new democracies by exploring their relationship with the state rather than, as is routinely done, with society (see van Biezen and Kopecký 2007 for an overview). Secondly, we advance a theoretical argument which systematically links different patterns of party patronage with different models of party organizations. Thirdly, we offer an original empirical measurement of patronage which allows us to assess patronage practices and which, ultimately, also provides us with significant insights into the nature and functioning of parties in new democracies.

The paper proceeds as follows. In the first section we identify party patronage, defining it in terms of appointments to public jobs; we also single out three key aspects of party patronage that are likely to differ across time and space. The second section provides a theoretical argument which links different models of party organizations with party patronage. The third, empirical part of the paper explores whether our empirical indications place the emerging model of party organization in the new democracies within any of the existing categories. For this exploration we use data from our own expert interviews which we carried out in five new third wave democracies: Argentina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Ghana and South Africa.

II. Party Patronage

Most literature conceives of patronage as an exchange of various public goods for electoral support. In other words, patronage is understood in this literature as an electoral resource (for two most recent accounts see Piattoni 2001; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2006). It is assumed to involve a more or less dyadic relationship between a party (or politician), on the one hand, and a supporter or group of potential supporters, on the other, whereby the parties use their own resources, or resources to which they gain privileged access in public institutions or other arenas, in order to cement political support within the wider community.

For the purposes of this paper, however, we are more concerned with patronage as an organisational resource. When it is understood as an organizational resource, party patronage represents a form of institutional control or of institutional
exploitation that operates to the benefit of the party organization. Patronage in this sense is less a form of vote gathering or a means of establishing loyal clienteles and more a strategy to build parties’ organizational networks in the public sphere. Empirical studies of party patronage as an organizational resource have usually revolved around the distribution of jobs within the state (see e.g. Sorauf 1959; Wilson 1971; Goldston 1977; Müller 1989 and 2006; Bearfield 2009), and we also follow this tradition here. More specifically, we define party patronage as the power of political parties to appoint people to positions in state institutions; we consider the scope of this patronage to be the range of positions so distributed.

Political parties acting in democratic settings have always had access to the distribution of public jobs. However, the underlying rationale for party patronage has not always been the same. We distinguish three key aspects of party patronage that deserve a special attention:

The first aspect concerns the *intra-party control of patronage resources*. The term party patronage in general is fraught with difficulties because in practice it is hard to distinguish whether an appointment is made by the party, or by an individual politician. Indeed, a vast majority of appointments are officially done by individual politicians (usually the ministers) and, in that sense at least, party patronage rarely exists. The key question therefore is to what extent is the party involved when the ministers and other party actors in the public office make the appointment? Is it the party as a bureaucratic structure (the party in central office) who decides or is it those party leaders who hold public office that make appointments in the manner relatively unconstrained by their respective party organizations? For example, studies on patronage in countries as different as Belgium and Chile have shown that party organizations are, as such, the major players of the game, while government officials simply ratify decisions made by the parties’ central offices (De Winter et al, 1996:172-3; Angell, 2007:299). Conversely, in countries such as France and the United States, it is the elected executives themselves (presidents and prime ministers) who chiefly decide appointments (Morel, 1996; Katz, 1996).

The second key aspect of party patronage concerns its *motivations*. The question here is why do political parties appoint people to state positions? Most studies on patronage simply assume that the distribution of jobs is aimed at rewarding activists and other party figures for their services to the party. However, patronage may be driven by different motivations and serve a variety of goals. We suggest classifying the motivations of patronage in three different types: electoral, organizational, and governmental.¹ We summarize these different motivations in Table 1.

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¹ We mainly draw this distinction from the different uses of patronage described in Sorauf (1969); Gump (1971); Johnston (1979); Katz (1996), and other works which are opportunely quoted.
Table 1: Parties´ motivations to exercise patronage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motivations</th>
<th>Goal of the party</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral</td>
<td>Votes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organizational</td>
<td>Cohesion and Discipline</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Fund-Raising</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Activism /Partisan Networks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Governmental</td>
<td>Control over decision-making processes</td>
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Patronage may certainly be aimed at gaining and conserving electoral support. However, it is generally agreed that in contemporary mass democracies patronage is unlikely to be a very useful electoral strategy for general elections; however high the number of public employees, it seems unlikely that it can secure an electoral advantage in a general election (Piattoni, 2001; Hopkin, 2006). Yet, a good number of quantitative studies on patronage insist on assuming the distribution of jobs to be an electoral strategy (for instance Calvo and Murillo, 2004).

The distribution of jobs may also be targeted to strengthen and cement the party as an organization. As Alan Ware notes, government is an obvious resource for strengthening the party itself, allowing the placement of “party supporters in administrative or quasi-administrative positions over which the government has influence” (1996:349). We can think of three different specific modes in which the distribution of jobs serves organizational goals. First, allocating public positions might boost intra-party cooperation, “wielding the differing blocs within the party into a unified whole” (Sorauf, 1969). A wise distribution of public positions is part of the strategy to keep a party unified, knitting together the various factions and groups that comprise a party organization. Second, appointments can be a significant source of fund-raising for the party when the appointees are compelled to contribute a percentage of their salaries in return for the appointment. It is an established norm in many parties that a fixed share of the salaries of those who get their jobs due to their party affiliation is destined to the party budget (Ware, 1996:299). And third, public jobs may be distributed at the bottom of the state in order to create and keep active partisan networks of activists. Jobs as a prominent material incentive for political participation among low-rank activists – “jobs for the boys” - has been the form of patronage on which scholars of party organizations and patronage have mainly focused. In that sense patronage makes it possible to sustain the armies of activists “… necessary to induce the canvassing of neighbourhoods, mailing and telephoning … and other activities” which characterize mass politics (Sorauf, 1969:385).

Finally, appointments may also be thought of as a fundamental government resource. Patronage may be used to control crucial areas of government in order to...
secure the implementation of policies along the lines preferred by the party.\(^3\)

Patronage in this sense is not conceived as an exchange for support but as a requisite to guarantee the very existence of party government. In Rose’s terms, party government requires that “… the number of partisans nominated for office should be large enough to permit partisans to become involved in many aspects of government” (1974:382). The control of state institutions through appointments may also be understood in a broader sense, not just in the sense of implementing a party platform but also taking over state institutions and putting them in the service of a political party. As Blondel (2002:234-5) notes, ruling parties may try to “… invade or even take over the state” in order to undertake shady deals at their political convenience.

The third and final key aspect of party patronage we wish to single out concerns the nature of appointees. The key question here is: who exactly is appointed by parties to public jobs and what criteria parties follow in making public appointments? Needless to say, party membership has usually been seen as the most obvious criterion to select appointees, mainly because it signals political trustworthiness and loyalty (Manow and Wettengel, 2006). In a highly partisan state, party elites would occupy senior positions of government whereas the parties’ rank and file members would fill lower level state jobs. Yet, the literature on party government has shown that the actual partyness of a government may be variable (Katz, 1986:42-46); indeed, recent studies have shown the decrease of partyness in cabinets, a trend particularly visible in cases of weakly institutionalized party systems (Strom, 2000; Blondel et al, 2007).

Parties might also search for highly qualified appointees outside of the party channels if they are concerned with securing an efficient government. The growing complexity of policy-making as well as the increasing heed voters and media pay to governmental competence can lead parties to prioritize the recruitment of experts in different fields of the administration. In that context, parties could find themselves in trouble to fill exclusively with partisans those state positions for which a high level of expertise is required.

Finally, party politicians can select the appointees on the basis of their personal linkages. This criterion may be particularly important in cases of non-institutionalized parties in which decisions about appointments rely on office-holders themselves rather than the party. Also, as Geddes notes, recruitments on the basis of personal linkages might provide elected leaders with more certitude on the loyalty of the appointee and more room for manoeuvre (1994:147).

In any case, neither the motivations nor the criteria to appoint mentioned above are mutually exclusive. We certainly do not claim that every appointment matches just one of these options. Rather, it is expected that the same appointment can be driven by more than one motivation and can follow more than one criterion simultaneously. Yet, we contend here that it is possible to identify dominant patterns of party patronage, and that it is possible to link these different patterns to different types of party organizations. This we will endeavour in the following section.

III. Party Patronage and Party Organizational Models

In the previous section we outlined three key aspects of patronage that are likely to vary among political parties. In this section, we attempt to link these three aspects of party patronage systematically to the existing theoretical models of party

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\(^3\) This is what Müller (2006) with “power patronage” as opposed to “service patronage”.
organizations. Although the classic literature on party organizations has only marginally dealt with the practice of party patronage, we can think of the different ideal types of party organizations clearly differing in the three aspects or dimensions of patronage presented earlier. We summarize these differences in Table 2.

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<tr>
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<th>Cadre Party</th>
<th>Mass Party</th>
<th>Cartel Party</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Intra-Party Control of Patronage</strong></td>
<td>Party Notables</td>
<td>Central Office</td>
<td>Public Office</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Motivations for Patronage</strong></td>
<td>Electoral</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Appointees</strong></td>
<td>Personal Friends and Supporters</td>
<td>Partisans</td>
<td>Party Elites and Experts</td>
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The Cadre Party

In the context of the cadre (or notables) party, patronage is exclusively dominated by the notables that occupy the public office. As a matter of fact, the cadre party itself is marked by the absence of a well-structured party organization beyond the interpersonal networks of elites who hold public offices. In the context of democracies with limited suffrage, in which these parties operated, the distribution of public jobs used to be a common mode of obtaining votes. This was the case especially in countries which did not have established professionalized bureaucracies. For example, during the second half of the nineteen century the distribution of jobs functioned as a key electoral tool used by political notables in the main cities of Italy, the United States, or Argentina (see for instance Shefter, 1994). These notables were not concerned with the building of a large and permanent political structure. Instead, their chief goal was to get elected and keep their positions in Parliament. Formal party membership was not a decisive criterion to appoint people to state jobs. Instead, appointments were done on the basis of personal networks which linked the notables to the appointees. Personal criteria were decisive in the process of choosing the appointees.

The Mass Party

In the vast literature on the mass party patronage seems to be a neglected phenomenon. For instance, patronage is not mentioned even once over the long description Maurice Duverger (1954) dedicates to the mass party. The main reason for this lack of reference to patronage is that mass parties are essentially seen as voluntary organizations which mobilize members on the basis of strong commonly shared feelings of identity. Indeed, whenever the mass party is compared to other models of party organizations, it stands out in its strong and continuous bonds with membership, based on a sense of belonging; it also stands out in its programmatic, rather than particularistic or charismatic, bonds with voters (see e.g. Panebianco, 1988; Katz and Mair, 1995). This said, a closer look at mass parties reveals that many times the functioning of these extensive organizations was hardly possible
without access to patronage. The large infrastructure of mass parties required thousands of people devoting their time and efforts to the party; in this regard, mass parties have always been characterized as “labour-intensive”. Even when volunteer activism was seen as a normal thing at that period of time, the requirements of this kind of organizations demanded the participation of a large number of people on a full-time basis. In such times, as V.O. Key Jr. put it, “it seems almost indispensable that many persons devote their time to party work. …. Without the inducement of public jobs and other perquisites, the formation of party organization becomes difficult” (1964, 367).

However, even if patronage was far more widespread in mass parties than we tend to think, it is important to emphasize that it did look quite different to the patronage employed by the cadre party. First, patronage in the mass party was dominated by a central office or a central committee which steered the distribution of jobs and controlled other party’s organizational areas (e.g. Panebianco, 1988). Second, the central office of the party used patronage predominantly as an organizational resource. As mentioned above, patronage was many times crucial to sustain the infrastructure of the party, including large networks of activists on the ground and a well-developed party bureaucracy at the centre. In addition, patronage was often also helpful to sustain the cohesion of the party by distributing positions among the multiple factions or tendencies that made up mass parties. The Italian DCI, the Japanese LDP, and the Austrian SDAP and OVP are among the most commonly cited examples in this regard (Leonardi and Wertman, 1989; Park, 2001; Müller, 1989).

It goes without saying that mass parties selected appointees primarily among party members. Large organizations endowed leaders with sizeable pool of available candidates. Party membership provided the leaders with clues regarding appointees’ trustworthiness. Competence might have often been seen as far less relevant than appointing ‘our own man or woman’. Besides, the recruitment of non-partisan appointees would have been rejected by the party on the ground. Mass parties also faced a strong demand for jobs, especially for those low qualified but protected jobs that the public bureaucracies provided.

**Cartel Party**

There are two possible ways of seeing the importance of patronage for the contemporary cartel parties (on cartel parties see Katz and Mair 1995). On the one hand, several scholars argue that in the present context parties are expected to use patronage more than ever before as the main incentive to recruit activists (e.g. Bolleymer, 2009). The rise of patronage as a strategy to recruit members and activists is seen as the obvious consequence of the present characteristics of electoral competition. Current party–voter linkages are increasingly feeble and volatile. Parties pursue everybody’s votes. Their electoral success depends to a large extent on the continuous approval of the public which acts as an audience, reacting to party leaders’ performance through the mass media. In such a context, the linkage party–activist cannot but become a particularistic one. If parties cannot sustain their positions as representatives of specific groups, the recruitment of members must rely on resources other than ideology and values. As Müller (1989) suggests, when there are no ideological motivations and a traditional sense of belonging, patronage becomes a useful resource to deal with the issue of membership. Besides, identity or

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4 In contrast to cartel parties, which are “capital intensive” (Katz and Mair, 1995).
ideologically motivated activists turn out to be a nuisance for current party leaders, who require autonomy and flexibility to be electorally competitive (Katz, 1990). Hence parties would prefer patronage-driven memberships, which adapt much better to the shifting conditions of audience democracy (Manin, 1997).

On the other hand, the arguments that see patronage as increasingly relevant for contemporary non-ideological parties are largely based on the assumption that an extended organization on the ground is a priority for current parties. But how valid is such assumption? Empirical findings show that most mainstream contemporary parties do not perceive a strong membership as necessary and that, consequently, they rarely endeavour to invest in their organizations (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000; Webb and White, 2007). When Maurice Duverger referred to the activists as those who performed “fundamental activities” for the mass parties it was because they were the ones “who regularly attend meetings, share in the spreading of the party’s slogans, help to organize its propaganda, and prepare its electoral campaigns” (Duverger, 1954:110). But the importance Duverger assigned to activists’ tasks is not shared by current observers of party politics nor by, seemingly, current party leaders. Specialists on public opinion, political marketing and media, along with shady political operators, have replaced armies of activists in media-based political campaigns. Hence enhancing contemporary party organizations rarely refers to enlarging the presence of activists on the ground. In fact, as Katz anticipated two decades ago, parties have become organizations of leaders rather than of citizens (1990:146).

All this leads us to the crucial question of what happens with the cartel party and patronage. The fact that parties have removed the recruitment of large rank and files from their list of priorities does not mean that patronage has lost importance in the field of contemporary party politics. In fact, there are good reasons to think that the ability to appoint people to public positions is now at least as important as it has always been for parties. Those reasons, however, suggest party patronage quite distinct from cadre and mass parties.

In the first place, party patronage functions predominantly as governmental resource (see e.g. Sotiropoulos, 2004; Kristinsson, 2006; Meyer-Sahling, 2008; Kopecký and Mair, 2011). Cartel parties no longer function as expressive-representative institutions, but rather as agencies of government in democratic regimes (e.g. Bartolini and Mair, 2001; van Biezen, 2004). Claiming to be the (present or potential) most efficient and experienced managers of government becomes political parties’ key electoral concern, as well as the way in which they set themselves apart from their competitors. Hence the ability to appoint officials who combine political loyalty with professional expertise becomes a major asset and a primary party goal. By appointing trustworthy officials at the various tiers of policymaking that characterize modern governance systems, parties make their policies flow more effectively and get better informed about the likely demands posed on their leaders, thereby enhancing their policy-making capacity and reputation.

Secondly, the advent of the cartel party changes the intra-party dynamics of control of patronage resources. It is generally acknowledged that the contemporary dominant pattern of party organization entails the ascendancy of the party in public office. The central office or central committee, and thus also the party on the ground which this central office represents, are relegated to a symbolic role (Katz and Mair, 2002). As a result, it is now the party elite in public office - the ministers, MPs and key partisan figures in public life - which are primarily responsible for the allocation of this government-oriented type of patronage. Party’s central office and party’s
chapters and regional organizations may still occasionally voice their preference over candidates for appointive positions, but such demands are now likely to be channelled via personal contacts with party elites, rather than through a coordinated and centralized fashion as in the past.

Thirdly, concerning the appointees, the advent of cartel party increases the importance of party elites and party experts in the process of recruitment for appointive positions within the state. The special skills required for the successful management of public offices, as well as the decline of party membership, mean that rather than recruiting from within the ranks, parties’ elite networks become the primary source of candidates. Partisanship still constitutes an important clue, but only insofar as it provides party leaders with the assurance that they will obtain “responsive competence” (Suleiman, 2003:215) from people they place in state institutions.

Ultimately, the party might not be the most appropriate or even a possible source for obtaining politically responsive and professionally qualified experts. As Peter Mair notes, “parties in both old and new democracies seem increasingly willing to look beyond their immediate organizational confines when searching for suitable candidates and nominees” (Mair, 2003:8). Personal networks of acquaintances might consequently emerge, once again, as the most common channel for the recruitment of political appointees. This would, however, signify possibly yet another organizational transformation, away from the cartel party. As we shall see in the following empirical analysis, such transformation might already be under way when we observe patronage in new democracies.

IV. Empirical Analysis

In the previous sections we defined party patronage in terms of appointments. We then tried to link systematically various key features of party patronage so defined to the existing models of party organizations. This section uses our empirical data concerning intra-party control of and motivations for patronage, as well as the nature of appointees, to probe their correspondence with various party types. We should state directly from the outset that our aim is not to prove or disprove the existence of any of those party organizational types. Party organizations are characterized by more than their patronage patterns; we lack data on those different other characteristics. Importantly, our aim is to shed light on the nature of partisanship in new democracies and not to perform an ultimate test of some broader theoretical hypothesis. In that sense, we use our analytical distinctions as a heuristic device.

Data and Case Selection

The data that we use to explore the trends along the three dimensions of patronage that concern us here – its intra party mechanics, its motivations and the nature of appointees -- comes from an expert survey conducted in 18 old and new democracies. Here we use detailed data for Argentina, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Ghana and South Africa. These five countries are all part of the third wave of democratization but represent three continents and three different types of non-democratic past. Most importantly they also differ in terms of their parties and

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5 The method is described in detail in Kopecký et al (2008) and Kopecký, Mair and Spirova (2011).
6 The expert surveys were conducted during 2006-2008. We interviewed a
party systems: Argentina and Ghana have two-party systems dominated by highly personalistic partisan machines with long history; South Africa has a dominant party system, under the control of disciplined, well-organized former liberation movement; and two moderate multi-party systems based mainly on recently emerged parties.

The five countries also score relatively differently on the overall extent of patronage in them. In Argentina, the practice is most extensive, the parties there reach in almost all state institutions and often at all levels within them. In contrast, in the Czech Republic the practice is modest: parties appoint in a smaller set of institutions and at the top managerial level only with the rest of countries showing medium levels of patronage. 7 We believe that exploring the empirical trends in such a sample of new democracies will allow us to find out the general patterns that characterize the patronage practices of political parties in new democracies and thus be able to make some claims about their organizational nature as well.

Experts for our study were chosen from within four major groups: academia, the non-governmental sector, media and the civil service, using the snowball technique. 8 They were chosen as experts knowledgeable about appointments to institutions in nine different policy areas (judiciary, economy, finance, foreign affairs, welfare, media, military and police, culture and education, and regional/local government). The experts responded to a uniform questionnaire in face-to-face interviews, with 5 closed-end and 6 open ended questions probing into the pervasiveness, persistence and several other aspects of the party patronage practices within their policy area of expertise. Here we use the data they provided on the questions related to the internal party mechanics of patronage, the motivations behind the practice and the nature of appointees. We aggregate the individual answers at the national level to look for the trends in the five countries and a general trend in the new democracies overall.

Intra-Party Control of Patronage

To find out the nature of intra-party control of patronage we look at the extent to which party leaders of various kinds decide on the patronage appointments. Finding out that the party organization represented by a party council or some other high level structure controls the appointments would point out to a mass party organizational model, while finding the ministers and the Prime Minister or President (who are also party leaders) in charge of the appointment process would suggest either the cadre or the cartel party model.

In all five countries, of course, appointments to the state institutions are formally made by the people in the top executive positions such as the President or the Prime Minister and the ministers; our real question in fact is how free the-party-in-public-office is from pressures from the party-in-central-office or the party-on-the-ground in making these appointments. And while in all five countries we can observe a certain inter-party variation, the following country trends emerge (summarized in Table 3). In Argentina, the Czech Republic and South Africa, the party-in-public office reigns supreme -- appointments at the top level are a prerogative of the top executive positions – the President and his office in Argentina and South Africa, and the Prime Minister and the ministers in the case of the Czech Republic. At the lower

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8 Needless to say, the guiding idea for selecting the pool of experts was to avoid, as much as possible, respondents who were either active politicians or themselves political appointees.
levels, appointments are decided on by the minister or agency directors but the people in top executive positions retain quite high levels of oversight and ability to interfere.

Table 3: Appointment Mechanisms, by country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Appointments are a prerogative of:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Party in Public office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Party in Central Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Party in Public Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Party in Public Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Party in Public Office</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In Ghana, we observe a similar pattern, certainly if one looks at the highly centralized and personalized appointments process that was typical of the National Democratic Congress (NDC) rule (1993-2000) in the early years of democratization. The appointments done by the National People’s Party (NPP) between 2000 and 2008 suggest at first sight a somewhat different pattern than that of its predecessor in government: the President formally makes vast majority of appointments but, as our respondents pointed out, the party’s extra-parliamentary Council of Elders often held the decisive power to make the appointments recommendations. This might suggest that party is in this case an important player in appointments. To an extent it is also the case, because the Council of Elders, the NPP’s party in central office, does represent a developed organization in the country and among the Diaspora. However, and above all, the Council also represents, and is composed of, the wider party elite, making the body more an extension of the party in public office, rather than party on the ground. It is for these reasons that WE classify the country as a case similar to Argentina, South Africa and the Czech Republic.

It is therefore only in Bulgaria that we observe a stronger role for the party in central office. the party chairman and the party’s central office have played a significant role in controlling the patronage appointments for all parties in government since 1990. As Dimitrov (2006) has argued earlier, in Bulgaria it is the Party Chairman who calls the shots in the party. When the party is in power and the party Chairman is also Prime Minister, their power extends also into the government of the country. However, unlike in other cases, it is the function of party chairman combined with that of Prime Minister that gives that person the legitimacy and authority to influence politics and patronage.

This practice was carried out most illustratively by the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) – the leading governmental partner in 2005-9. The party has a well developed system of securing a large pool of potential appointees and the process of selection of appointees is subject to the intra-party dynamics and reflects the distinct ideological and personal factions within the party while the positions at the local level are controlled by the regional party headquarters. Similar, yet more centralized processes characterize the rest of the governing parties in Bulgaria. In the case of the 1997-2001 government, for example, appointments made by the governing Union of Democratic Forces, (SDS) were coordinated in the National Council of the party. As one of our respondents put it: “the media commission in the party [SDS] was
stronger and more influential than the media commission in the Parliament”. While these trends are not exclusive they make us consider Bulgaria an example of patronage dominated by the party-in central-office, and thus a bit of an outlier in our sample.

It should be noted that in all countries we observe some variation among different governments and political parties. In the Czech Republic, for example, a small Christian Democratic party (KDU-ČSL) is a slight exception to the overall country trend in that party on the ground (and in central office) plays much higher and autonomous role in the patronage process than in the case of other parties. Similarly, while party in central office does not play any role in making patronage appointments in Argentina’s main parties, this feature is probably stronger with the Peronists than with the Radicals.

However, some of the most interesting variation we observe is cross-temporal. The case in point here is South Africa. Immediately after the ANC got into power following the first free elections in 1994, appointments to key positions within the state were coordinated within the so-called Deployment Committee - an unofficial, yet institutionalized and active body charged with personnel politics within the movement. Importantly, besides the ANC leadership, the Deployment Committee also included representatives of the party in central office, and hence of the party on the ground. In fact, for a long time, the Committee was headed by Jacob Zuma, the head of the ANC party organization. However, since the mid-2000s, through the processes of organizational change and adaptation, the Deployment Committee has gradually lost its influence. Instead, key appointments within the state at the time of research organized within the ever growing office of the Presidency, under the direct control of Thabo Mbeki and later of Jacob Zuma. In that sense, ANC is a good example of a major organizational shift from a mass party pattern of intra-party patronage control to the one corresponding more closely with the cartel party.

**Motivations for Party Patronage**

Second, we investigate the trends in the motivations for patronage appointments in our attempt to discern the features of the party organizational model emerging in the new democracies. We look at whether our respondents identified reward, control or both as the dominant motivation of patronage practices in each country and then link the reward one to the mass party and cadre party models and the control one to the cartel one. The data is reported in Figure 1. While the variation in the three possible motivations among countries is substantial, “controlling the state structures” clearly emerges as the most widespread drive for patronage in all five countries. This result to a total of 56.9 per cent of our sample of respondents reporting “control” as the dominant motivation, 27.7% mentioning “control and reward” as equally important, and only 7.7% identified rewarding followers and activities as the dominant motivation for patronage.
In the five countries parties are extremely concerned about appointing at the
top of state and semi-states offices a solid circle of loyal people. Not surprisingly,
they show a clear determination to appoint top state positions in order to control the
functioning of the state apparatus. But interestingly, and in contrast to the
conventional wisdom, appointments aimed to gain control of state structures in the
Argentine, Bulgarian, Czech, Ghanaian, and South African states are not restricted to
top level positions. As the values of the Index of Party Patronage reported in Figure 1
indicate, in the five cases parties reach not only the top level of the state but often
also appoint mid-level positions and sometimes (mainly in Argentina) also bottom
level jobs. While the traditional understanding of patronage suggests that parties
appoint to lower level positions primarily because of a desire to or need to reward
their members and activists, our findings show that even for these mid- and bottom
level positions parties are primarily interested in what we broadly call patronage for
control.

In general, patronage for control refers to nominations which seek to
dominate the process of policy formulation and implementation. From a principal –
agent perspective, elected party politicians (principals) use the power to appoint to
ensure that the policies they decide and the orders they send will be carried out
without distortions by those who must effectively implement them (agents) (Huber,
2000). But control of state institutions through appointments may also be understood
in a broader sense, not just to implement a party program but to take over state
institutions and put them to the service of a political party, distorting the official
function of the public office.

Politicians in all these five countries are usually worried about the actual
loyalty from employees which have been appointed by a previous administration,
while they do not trust the permanent bureaucrats either. They therefore try to appoint people whom they can trust at least in managerial positions to make sure that their decisions will be complied with and their policies will not be sabotaged. This pattern seems to be present in all the five cases, getting more pronounced in competitive political systems. As has been suggested for the Eastern European, feeble bureaucracies in the context of competitive political systems pave the way for cycles in which no new officials rely on the personnel hired by their predecessor (Meyer-Sahling, 2008; Kopecký and Scherlis, 2008).

Argentina is, of our five cases, the one in which “patronage for control” ranks the highest. Almost all our interviewees (97.3%) agreed that in every policy sector and institutional type of the Argentine state control is either the only dominant motivation (78.4%) or a motivation as important as reward (18.9%). In this country, appointments for control are by no means confined to top level positions. In the same way that, at the very top, the president appoints in search of obedience and loyalty from senior authorities, every official seeks to appoint his subordinates in order to control the area for which he is responsible. This pattern owes much to the perennially high levels of rotation and instability of Argentine bureaucracies. The pattern can be illustrated by drawing a contrast with the Scandinavian cases. For instance, in Denmark a professionalized civil service has also proved extremely efficient in carrying out the political programs of elected political executives. According to Christensen, the ability to adapt to and serve loyally every new democratically elected government – whatever its political color – by pursuing its political goals, has prevented parties’ attempts to take over managerial positions (Christensen, 2006). In telling contrast, in most institutions of the Argentine state, every time a new authority assumes political responsibility over an agency he tends to distrust the personnel he finds there. The mistrust is either based on the idea that the employees were appointed by previous politicians and therefore are not loyal to the new “project”, or that they are bureaucrats and are thus unmotivated to serve the new principal. In both cases, political authorities simply think they can not rely on the faithfulness of those employees (Ferraro, 2006; Spiller and Tommasi, 2007).

“Working with your own people” is, according to various interviewees, the only way the administration has ever functioned in this country. In these circumstances, control over policy-making often appears to overlap with corrupted, or at least dubiously legal, activities and decisions to favor the government political project.

In Argentina, Bulgaria, and Ghana control of processes of policy-making often goes together with the control of corruption circuits and kickbacks of different kinds as a common motivation to appoint. Parties seek to get a tight control especially over those agencies which control big flows of money, as for example those in charge of conceding licenses for public works, because these are a crucial source of political fund-raising.

This does not seem to be the case of Czech Republic and South Africa, countries in which corruption is hardly mentioned by appointees as a driving force for appointments. In Czech Republic, parties are mainly concerned about securing loyalty of personnel towards the policies of the governing party, for which they seek to maintain a permanent surveillance over state institutions. In the initial years of democratization, up until the mid 1990s, large-scale replacements of personnel were justified in the name of the need to “clean” the communist cadres from the

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9 Accordingly, Czech Republic and South Africa rank much better than the other three cases in the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International.
bureaucracy (O’Dwyer, 2004), something which also happened in Bulgaria (see Spirova 2011). But that reason ceased long ago to be a justification for appointments, which must now be more selective and limited in number.

In the case of South Africa, and unlike what happens in Bulgaria and Czech Republic, appointments for control are still justified in order to fundamentally reform the state. Since 1994, the ANC has dominated the political process in the country and has been particularly concerned with the realization of a political project of state transformation and “de-racialization”. In that sense, the party established a Deployment Committee (see above) which pursued the implementation of the cadre deployment policy adopted at the ANC Mafikeng conference in 1997 (Lodge, 2006:156). While other motivations such as reward obviously exist, political appointments in the South African national state are thus chiefly (and overtly) aimed to realize the ANC policies which start by a thorough transformation of the apartheid state.

Despite these country-specific peculiarities of the patronage process, it is, all in all, motivated predominantly by the desire to control the state institutions. In comparison, reward by itself plays a relatively minor role as a motivation to appoint people to state positions in these new democracies’ national states. It is important to underscore, however, that this by no means indicates that parties have completely given up on appointing as a mechanism to pay for favors rendered to the party or that patronage for reward should be disregarded as an outdated feature of party politics. Actually, we find that appointments for reward are still present across all our five cases and, in fact, 27.7 per cent of the respondents mentioned that both reward and control are equally important factors in making appointments. Moreover, reward is the dominant motivation in specific policy sectors of some countries and Bulgaria stands out in this regard as the country where patronage for reward ranks the highest, reaching a 51.3 per cent of the answers (although only 13.5% refer to reward as the only dominant motivation and 37.8% mention both reward and control). In this country, politicians still strive to enlarge their party organizations, which they find useful for electoral purposes. In this context, Bulgarian politicians find both possible and useful to distribute jobs in order to sustain and enlarge their party organizations (see also Spirova, 2005).

Although to a lower extent than in Bulgaria, appointments provided as a reward for services rendered (or to be rendered) to the party occur in all the five analyzed countries. In addition, the practice of patronage for reward conserves a great deal of importance at the level of regional and local politics. However, the point we want to stress here is that both the aggregate data and the further details provided by the interviewees suggest that the importance of patronage for reward has receded as a motive to distribute state jobs in the five countries. The conventional wisdom and also the majority of the literature, which automatically associates patronage to a mode of linkage between parties and supporters, does not grasp the actual practice of patronage as it is taking place in new democracies.

Appointees
To analyze the third dimension of patronage as it relates to the nature of party organization, we look at the nature of people who get appointed to patronage positions. We ask the respondents to identify the most prominent characteristic that has allowed them to be appointed. We suggest that the personal allegiance will be the

10 Cite Kopecký on Deployment Committee
dominant characteristic of appointees of cadre parties, while the political allegiance will be important for the mass parties, and the cartel parties will call for appointees to be both politically loyal and professionally expert. While political loyalty is not surprisingly the first requisite to be appointed, the importance of the professional skills help explain what parties actually pursue through patronage. As Figure 2 illustrates political linkage is generally a necessary condition to be appointed (85.2% of our respondents mention it a characteristic of the appointees). However, almost as many (79.1%) considered professional expertise as equally important feature. Personal allegiance is the one feature mentioned the least with only about half of our respondents identifying it as a necessary feature of patronage appointees.

Figure 2: Characteristics of Appointees, by country.

A frequent answer in all of the countries, with the partial exception of Bulgaria, is that politicians appoint people who prove to be politically loyal (or at least responsive) to the party but who, at the same time, can carry out the tasks of the job efficiently. In this sense, we can see that parties appoint in state positions primarily with the goal of controlling processes of policy-making and implementation. They do so by selecting people who combine political loyalty and some level of proficiency for the job. It is important to note that while personal and political linkages appear in many cases as alternative factors (most respondents choosing either one or the other), professional qualifications came out as a complementary requisite to the other two. Certain degree of expertise is perceived

11 This explains why in some cases professionalism ranks first.
by our respondents as a common requisite in all the cases, except in Bulgaria where proficiency is demanded only in a few sectors of the state.\(^{12}\)

Sometimes this technical competence clearly refers to high levels of expertise. The growing complexity of contemporary structures of government and the acknowledgement that ruling parties are evaluated by the electorates on the basis of their governmental capacities lead these ruling parties to be attentive to the people that will run the different state sectors on their behalf. Moreover, the recruitment of highly qualified personnel has been in some cases a clear political decision to modernize and professionalize the management of the state. For instance, the ANC government under Mbeki’s leadership adopted a technocratic turnabout, prioritizing managerial competence over ideological concerns (Kopecký, 2011a). In Argentina, that has been the case in some agencies of financial sector during the Carlos Menem presidency in the 1990s (Eaton, 2003).

In other instances, technical competence does not necessarily mean formal professional qualifications, but it is related to a wider concept of managerial ability and experience in working in that sector, or to what could be called the political knowledge of the field. For instance, in the media sector skills usually refer less to an academic career in communications than to an extensive knowledge of and experience in the media field. In any case, the increasing professionalization of politics has led to changes in the types of appointees the ruling party seek to attract. Instead of many foot-soldiers who will carry out campaign activities in exchange for the job, parties seem to be more concerned now by appointing qualified, experienced and sometimes experts whom they can place in key functions in the polity. This also helps explain the increasing importance of personal linkages in parties’ recruiting processes.

Parties in new democracies play a very limited role not only as instruments of political socialization but also as channels of elites’ recruitment (Webb and White, 2007; Randall and Svasand, 2002). As a consequence, governing parties need qualified, experienced, and sometimes expert professionals to run the state, but they hardly count on these people before they actually reach state offices. Hence the selection of (qualified) appointees is many times funnelled through party leaders’ personal linkages. Especially in countries in which parties are poorly or very informally institutionalized, political leaders often resort to their personal networks in order to find the “responsive competence” they pursue to fill state positions. People whom the politician met in the university, an NGO, or a research centre or just friends or relatives are thus often chosen for state jobs rather than party activists.

It comes thus at no surprise that personal linkages are particularly high in Argentina (70.3% of answers). Party affiliation is still important in this country for the nomination of the most senior positions (ministers and a few state secretaries) but below the highest levels of government appointments are rarely linked to any previous party membership. Experts agree that recruitment of mid and bottom level personnel have little to do with a party and much more with acquaintances and networks of affinities.\(^ {13}\) It may be a network of experts in security from a university recruited for the ministry of defence, an NGO specialized in consumers´ rights called

\(^ {12}\) The relatively low level of proficiency demanded in Bulgaria in order to be appointed positively correlates with the high scores of patronage for reward displayed by the Balkan country.

\(^ {13}\) Interestingly, Scott Mainwaring refers to a similar pattern for Brazil (1999:184): “partisanship in the narrow sense is weak in Brazil. There is a politicization of the bureaucracy, but more according to personal than partisan loyalty.”
to run the commission of consumers´ defence, a tiny social movement with some
experience in volunteering in marginal neighbourhoods that is put in charge of a
program at the ministry of social development; and so on. A large range of networks
originally unrelated or with very loose ties to a party are in that way incorporated to
the government. Party belonging, in contrast, has become of little relevance as a
criterion to select the appointees. As a consequence, the vast majority of state sectors
are managed by a diversity of loosely connected networks, with different origins
(rarely with previous ties to the party) but which guarantee loyalty to the nominator
and, eventually, to the ruling party.

Personal linkages are relatively less important in the other four countries, but
still significant as a criterion followed by parties to appoint. In addition, many of the
people appointed due to a political linkage are sympathizers rather than card-carrying
members or real party people. What is remarkable is, in any case, that parties
generally lack in their own ranks the necessarily qualified personnel which are
nowadays required for many state positions. For example, in Czech Republic
professional expertise seems to be an absolute must for any important position, but at
the same time parties suffer from a chronic lack of qualified cadres for those top
managerial functions. As a result, many people are recruited on the basis of their
personal connections to politicians who think they can be entrusted with a particular
state position. In this sense, the figures presented in Figure 3 fail to make clear an
important distinction among all those appointed by “political reasons”. Political
linkage that leads to the appointments in new democracies is only sometimes
associated with a previous party membership. More often the political linkage is
simply based on ideological affinity, such as a shared experience in a social
movement.

In South Africa, for instance, interviewees explain that a background in the
anti-apartheid struggle can be more than enough as a political credential to be
appointed to some state positions, regardless of the ANC affiliation. In Ghana, tribal,
ethnic, and religious reasons are often intertwined with political ones. In Argentina,
where party affiliation says little about political stances, politicians many times select
on the basis of the ideological profile of the appointee, irrespective of the party
affiliation. Certainly, in all these cases those appointees have to show loyalty to the
ruling party and sing the correct tune, irrespective of the previous party affiliation.

We do observe then, an intensifying phenomenon of recruiting not strictly
party cadres who, once appointed, become (formally or not) part of the ruling (party)
elites. A Ghanaian expert in education described this trend by noting that it is
common to appoint people without a previous party allegiance in this sector of the
state, while it is expected that once they are appointed they “will sing the tune of the
party”. Actually, many times personal and party linkages are so intertwined that it is
difficult to distinguish between them. In the context of loosely institutionalized
parties, personal links turn into political links and vice versa.

Conclusions
A decade ago Phillipe Schmitter observed in a now well known piece: ‘Parties are
not what they once were’ (Schmitter 2001). The past he referred to was of course the
past associated with the mass party. The present he referred to was the political
reality of third wave neo-democracies and their parties. The evidence on the patterns
of party patronage that we presented in this paper confirms this picture of nature of
the party organizations in new democracies: appointments to jobs in state institutions
are done by the party in public office without major constraints by extra-
parliamentary party organizations; the chief motivation for making these appointments is governmental control, and the appointees themselves are recruited on the basis of their professional expertise combined with a broad notion of political allegiance. In all three aspects, parties in new democracies differ quite radically from both the cadre and mass parties of the past, notwithstanding some cross-country and intra-country variation that we observed in the sample of our five third wave democracies.

One other important aspect in which party patronage in contemporary democracies differs from the past is in its mode. The difference in this case is very important for the countries that are generally or traditionally seen as patronage-ridden, clientelistic polities, including Argentina, Ghana and South Africa. Our evidence suggests that the conventional view of party patronage that sees it as a mode of linkage between parties and their supporters has been replaced by a more contemporary pattern, in which patronage functions simultaneously as a mode of government and as a mechanism for party building. Rather than a public job in exchange for political loyalty and party activism, we observe patronage that is in itself the way by which the party in government, as a group of elite networks, comes together.

Viewed from the perspective of party patronage, the general pattern of the organizational nature of parties in new democracies most closely corresponds to the cartel party, something that has been documented also with respect to other aspects of party organizations, such as party membership or party financing (Casas-Zamora 2005, Mainwaring and Scully 1995, Mainwaring 1999, van Biezen 2003). What we do find striking, however, is that the patterns of party patronage that we observe have in some sense already superseded the cartel party dynamics. If we look at party appointees, for example, political loyalty is increasingly divorced from any notion of partisanship, with appointments being determined by personal connections, vague ideological affinities, or simply by recommendations made by political colleagues. If we examine the intra-party control of patronage, we also find increasingly a very small group within the public office deciding on appointments without any major constraints not only from either the central office or the party on the ground, but also from other public office holders. The core of the party elites are thus still formed by (old) party members, but the appointed networks themselves are commonly recruited from outside the party boundaries and developed through the appointment of non-party people to governmental positions. In short, there is distinctly little partisan about the elites that run the state for the organizations that put them into these positions.
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