Gendering Executive-centric Governments:
The Power, Peril, and Paradox of Leadership in Anglo Nations

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Abstract

Gendering the executive-centric governments of Anglo nations can shed light on the range of opportunities and obstacles that prime ministers encounter. Concentration of executive authority might permit the development of a presidentialized premier or remain in the collective decision making of cabinet even with a prime minister more influential than one who is “first among equals.” Whether presidential or prime ministerial, the scope and nature of the executive always include gender-specific requirements. Presidentialization proves predominantly masculine, while more traditional prime ministerial leadership tends to mix the masculine and the feminine – and both types of leadership fluctuate in political development. Understanding the gendered character of particular leadership environments can highlight the power and peril of presidentialization and expose the paradox of prime ministerial leadership. The record of female prime ministers reveals what the study of men alone often conceals: how institutions and their development determine the gendered nature of the executive in ways that define leadership challenges. While comparing the experiences of male and female leaders, this paper focuses on five women in Anglo nations: Margaret Thatcher (United Kingdom 1979-90), Kim Campbell (Canada 1993), Jenny Shipley (New Zealand 1997-99), Helen Clark (New Zealand, 1999-2008), and Julia Gillard (Australia 2010-present). Data include public opinion polls, news sources, leaders’ memoirs and diaries, and extensive elite interviews conducted by the author.
Gendering the executive-centric governments of Anglo nations can shed light on the range of opportunities and obstacles that prime ministers encounter. Concentration of executive authority might permit the development of a presidentialized premier or remain in the collective decision making of cabinet even with a prime minister more influential than one who is “first among equals.” Whether presidential or prime ministerial, the scope and nature of the executive always include gender-specific requirements. Presidentialization proves predominantly masculine, while more traditional prime ministerial leadership tends to mix the masculine and the feminine – and both types of leadership fluctuate in political development. Understanding the gendered character of particular leadership environments can highlight the power and peril of presidentialization and expose the paradox of prime ministerial leadership. The record of female prime ministers reveals what the study of men alone often conceals: how institutions and their development determine the gendered nature of the executive in ways that define leadership challenges.

While comparing the experiences of male and female leaders, this paper focuses on five women in Anglo nations: Margaret Thatcher (United Kingdom 1979-90), Kim Campbell (Canada 1993), Jenny Shipley (New Zealand 1997-99), Helen Clark (New Zealand, 1999-2008), and Julia Gillard (Australia 2010-present). Several reasons exist to examine the experience of female prime ministers in the “Anglo sphere.” Although the small set presents too few cases to generalize, their records hint at what the future holds for female leaders. Moreover, exploring their limited experience can generate hypotheses for subsequent research not only on women as prime ministers but also in other positions of executive leadership. Finally, Anglo nations share legal, philosophical, and political traditions that facilitate reasonable comparisons. In all Anglo nations, the gender-specific character of executive leadership affects both men and women, although it often does so in different ways.

The gendered nature of Anglo systems usually erects higher barriers for female leaders, but men as well as women differ in their inclination and ability to convey gender-specific attributes (Connell 1995, 69). Gender-based norms become embedded in institutions, and gender provides a lens that filters leadership traits and determines their value. The gendered context of leadership helps shape perceptions of a prime minister as weak or strong, empathetic and compassionate or unresponsive and out of touch. Especially in Anglo nations, masculinity usually permeates power and politics, and “masculinism” often pervades expectations and constructs of leadership (DiStefano 1991; Duerrst-Lahti and Kelly eds. 1995, 21-26). Gender studies have generated the term masculinism to denote the privileged status of conventional masculine attributes such as strength, decisiveness, and determination. Applied to executive leadership, masculinism prefers characteristics such as conviction, confrontation, and combativeness. By contrast, “feminalism” prefers traits associated with women such as conciliation, cooperation, and consensus building. Though masculinism and feminalism (or “the feminale”) can be distinguished from their socially-constructed counterparts (Duerrst-Lahti 2002), for the sake of simplicity, this paper employs the simpler adjectives masculine and feminine.
Gendering Institutions and Development

Masculine requirements for leadership become most apparent in the adversarial institutional arrangements that traditionally characterize Westminster systems. To facilitate programmatic change, adversarial systems concentrate power in the executive, and to ensure accountability, they rely on combat between two major parties. The more adversarial the system, the more masculine its norms and expectations of executive leadership tend to be. In general, majoritarian systems prove more challenging for female leaders than consensual ones (Lijphart 1999), which is one of the reasons why, among the “families of nations” (Castles ed. 1993), the Anglo sphere ranks much lower in the representation and leadership of women than Scandinavia. Female leaders in adversarial, Anglo systems often need to develop styles and strategies that show they are capable of being tough enough for the job. As a result women who wish to engender change by practicing different styles get caught in a double bind. If they mimic men, they reinforce the masculine norms and expectations of their institution, but if they introduce a different approach to leadership, they might well appear too weak to lead. Furthermore, when executive leaders exalt the values of rugged individualism and fierce competition, as they have done during neo-liberal era, prime ministers prove to be masculine in word as well as deed. Ideas have often reinforced the masculinity of institutions in Anglo systems where liberal ideology (classic or neo) has tended to dominate development.

The gendered nature of institutions fluctuates in development, and two types of time – linear historical and cyclical political – influence the prospects and performance of prime ministers. Despite the dominance of masculinity, Anglo institutions also include some aspects of governance that could be construed as feminine. To secure individual rights, for example, classic liberal theorists in the Anglo tradition promoted a political order that would generate consensus and require compromise or conciliation for the sake of stability. Furthermore, even within adversarial systems, Anglo institutions usually operate with some degree of consensus, and debate takes place within a constitutional context of mutually agreed-upon principles. Finally and most significantly, in Anglo two-party systems, traditional cabinet government forces prime ministers to negotiate with the various factions or tendencies that ministers represent, thereby providing the basis for and legitimizing “collective responsibility.” If Anglo institutions contain both masculine and feminine elements, then the gendered nature of governance will shift at different junctures in political development. As a result, time itself becomes gendered.

Linear historical time generally limits female prime ministers in Anglo systems, although it once provided a path for the progress of women’s movements. In historical development, a “Britonnic network” of reformers linked and assisted women’s movements during much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Belich 2001, 167; Backhouse and Flaherty 1992), and the success of those movements has made it possible for women to become prime minister. Despite the substantial achievement of the women’s movements, their efforts eventually ran up against at least one significant institutional development in the second half of the 20th century. The increased concentration of power in the executive permits various degrees of “presidentialization” in many parliamentary systems (Poguntke and Webb eds. 2005) and the politicization of
presidential ones (Moe 1985). In theory, a female executive could seize the opportunities inherent in the position of a presidentialized premier and use them to set a feminist agenda. Nevertheless, in Westminster systems it has proven much more difficult for a woman than for a man to adopt a feminine style of leadership and still satisfy the linear, historical demands of a strong executive.

All Westminster systems are executive centric (Dowding 2012), but whether the centralization of executive authority maintains the collective decision making of cabinet or lands in the hands of a prime minister often determines whether and how far presidentialization can proceed. The nature and extent of presidentialization in parliamentary systems has generated substantial scholarly debate. On the side of presidentialization, scholars have identified three “faces”: the executive, where prime ministers politicize the appointment process and devise unilateral policy; the party, where power shifts to a leader who prefers to bypass the organization; and the electorate, which becomes the target of and responds to the leader’s appeals channeled through the media rather than traditional intermediaries (Poguntke and Webb eds. 2005). On the other side of the debate, opponents tend to concede that prime ministerial leadership has become personalized (Campbell 1998) and prime ministers often circumvent their parties and engage in media management, but they focus on the core executive where a web of agencies and interests continue to impede implementation (Rhodes 2005). (Ironically, US presidents face similar impediments to implementation of their policies.) As a result, opponents of the presidentialization thesis argue, prime ministers have become “more equal than others” in cabinet but not presidential. Rather than attempt to resolve this scholarly debate, this research hopes to enhance and clarify it by employing a gender lens and adopting a comparative, historical perspective.

Debates about presidentialization quite often overlook both variations among political systems within a category of countries and, just as important, fluctuations within a single nation. Notably, in New Zealand the electorate attempted to alter institutional arrangements (and limit the executive) by adopting mixed member proportional representation (MMP) in place of a first past the post system (FPP). But even where no such fundamental reform has occurred, among Westminster systems the integrity and viability of cabinet differs significantly from one country to another – in most cases the consequence of the distinctive character of political parties and party systems. Moreover, within any particular nation, political developments can change institutions. As a result, it might be more apt to ask where and when presidentialization prevails or prime ministerial leadership persists rather than whether or not it does. Finally, both the character of institutions and the direction of their development can alter the gender-specific nature of leadership: The more presidential the prime minister’s role becomes, for example, the more masculine the norms and expectations of leadership prove to be.

Among the numerous factors that determine the pace and extent of presidentialization, cyclical political time emerges as one of the most significant and at first glance, it would appear to provide more opportunities for feminine leadership. Its several stages – regime construction, maintenance, and degeneration – define the scope of leadership opportunities (Skowronek 2006) and can alter the gendered nature of leadership challenges. During periods of regime construction, political time demands determined and decisive leadership (arguably the most presidential); later, the maintenance of the political order requires more conciliation and mediation. Viewed in
this way, development goes through periods that fluctuate in the degree to which the elite and the public value and reward masculine or feminine attributes – and leaders are able to practice presidential or prime ministerial leadership. Female leaders with a feminine approach to leadership might seem more likely to succeed during periods of regime maintenance, but to succeed at those junctures in political time, linear institutional development and the prevailing ideology must also be in sync with leadership style. At its peak of popularity, the neo-liberal ideology of the last full cycle in political time limited programs that would benefit women as a group and restricted the female leaders who tried to advance them across the Anglo sphere (Bashevkin 1998, Sawer 2007, Grey and Sawer eds. 2008). And even when stages of the political cycle shift, women must still struggle to satisfy the masculine standards of contemporary executive-centric government in Anglo nations.

In addition to political time, other factors can expand, contract, or reconfigure the range and reach of executive authority – and change its gendered nature. While the scope of executive power generally increases, not every prime minister proves able (or willing) to wield power in the same way or to the same extent. Notwithstanding the contingent factors that characterize all leadership, institutions and their paths in political development produce patterns of executive leadership that fuel presidentialization or preserve prime ministerial leadership. Gendering executive-centric governments by looking at institutions and their development highlights the structural and systemic (rather than personal) factors that shape leadership in Anglo nations.

**Masculine Power of the Prime Minister in the United Kingdom and Canada**

Among the four nations in this study, the UK and Canada generally have the strongest prime ministers, and the highest degree of masculinity characterizes executive power. Both nations have FPP electoral systems and dominant two-party systems, which produce combative, adversarial environments. Furthermore, both have experienced extensive presidentialization, which has sometimes stretched the already expansive scope of executive authority. While the institutional power of the prime minister proves substantial in the two systems, the two female prime ministers provide contrasting case studies in gendering leadership. Similarly situated in linear historical development (with the power and perils of presidentialization), they are situated very differently in cyclical political time. Margaret Thatcher meets the masculine standards of her times, while Kim Campbell falls far short.

*The Masculine Power of Presidentialization – and its Peril: Margaret Thatcher*

The model for Westminster systems world wide, British government has always tended to celebrate strong prime ministerial leadership. For much of modern history, the strength of leadership generally depended on the unity of the party, the prime minister’s ability to command partisans, or the degree to which a party would simply succumb to its leader’s initiatives (McKenzie 1954). When British voters elected Thatcher in 1979, she and her Conservatives provided a sharp contrast to her opponents in Labour, who were
already severely wounded by the internecine warfare that would eventually split the party in 1981. Divisions and fragmentation on the left and center left put Thatcher in a position better than any Labour leader to satisfy the masculine requirements of a strong prime minister in the British adversarial system.

That masculinity was magnified by a moment in time when the electorate called for especially strong leadership. Voters indicated they were looking for leadership capable of compensating for the loss of empire and reversing the direction of a declining economy. The electorate’s demand for strong leadership reflected not only the historical trend of increased independence of (and dependence on) the executive, but it also provided a critical part of the reconstructive moment in political time. At this point, political development linked most Anglo-American nations in both types of time: The call for strong leadership echoed across the Atlantic and the Pacific, producing “strong men” as national executives in the UK, the US, and Australia (Little 1988) as well as Canada. More directly relevant here, the UK’s first and only female prime minister managed to meet the masculinity of her times by practicing a distinctly determined and decisive style of leadership.

Thatcher responded to the call for strong leadership by adopting and advocating an approach she described as “conviction politics.” A highly masculine style, conviction politics requires the leader to articulate principles and then promote them by crushing opponents. Shunning any attempts to build consensus or conciliate, Thatcher attacked those who advocate consensus as dithering and indecisive, trying to “satisfy people holding no particular views about anything” (Thatcher 1995, 148-150). She even derided her intra-party opponents – “one-nation Tories” – as effete or “wet,” as in naïve little boys wet behind the ears. While she mocked and diminished her opponents by attributing feminine qualities to them, her own conviction-style leadership facilitated her ability to meet the masculine expectations of executive leadership in the combative environment of the British adversarial system. By appearing tough, firm, and determined, Thatcher showed how women who practice conviction politics can convey the leadership attributes that linear, historical time requires and her own political time rewarded.

At a juncture in political time ripe for the neo-liberal revolution, Thatcher articulated her convictions in bold terms that facilitated the construction of a new regime, emphasized the masculine features of its ideology, and bolstered the masculinity of her institutional leadership position. According to Thatcher, rolling back the state would benefit members of society by encouraging rugged individualism, and the expansion of the free market would fuel the fierce competition necessary to produce prosperity. By contrast, the vast corporatist state had made individuals dependent and weak, and those who wished to maintain social programs were not compassionate and caring as they alleged, but “whimpering and whining” for help. Harking back to the Victorian era, Thatcher suggested that it is the proper role of women to practice womanly virtues in the private sphere of the home. Meanwhile, she projected the manliness of her ideas into the international arena, where she took a tough approach to defeating those whom she deemed the enemies of individual freedom. During the Falklands war, the prime minister with a preference for Victorian values became the embodiment of the heroine of the Victorian era, the ancient Queen Boadicea, the woman warrior who valiantly fought to fend off Roman conquerors (Warner 1987, 49-51). Even earlier, Thatcher had joined
forces with United States President Ronald Reagan in his battle against the Evil Empire, and her fierce anti-communism led her to acquire the title of Iron Lady.

Prime Minister Thatcher admired the US and envied the power she imagined President Reagan possessed on the other side of the Atlantic (Sykes 2000, 298). (Presidential leadership need not be conviction-style leadership, but as Thatcher understood presidentialization provides greater independence and autonomy to practice conviction politics while bolstering strong leadership.) An outsider in her own party, she relied on personal media consultants and formed her own campaign teams to contest general elections. As she reached outside the party for political advice and policy recommendations, the prominence of her private advisors at Number 10 came to exceed the influence of their cabinet counterparts. Not content to circumvent the party and cabinet, she also altered the civil service in ways that facilitated the institutionalization of her ideas. In doing so, she convinced many observers – in journalism and political science – that the prime minister had managed to establish a British presidency (Foley 1993 and 2000).

In addition to substituting her own structural arrangements for traditional institutions, Thatcher had a pronounced tendency to take an independent stance and go public with it, and polls indicate her leadership style helped her build and maintain public support. Throughout the 1980s, an overwhelming majority of the public admired Thatcher for her leadership qualities, even when they opposed some of her specific policies. From 1980 until 1990, Thatcher consistently ranked above other leaders as “a capable leader” and “good in a crisis.” When Gallup asked voters to choose statements that describe particular leaders, Thatcher led the list of strong leadership qualities, including “you know where he/she stands on issues” and the leader “says what he/she believes.” From 1985 through 1989, voters described their prime minister as “determined,” tough,” and one who “sticks to principles” far more frequently than they attributed these qualities to any of her opponents. Voters also viewed Thatcher as “most likely to get things done” and “most likely to improve Britain’s standing abroad” (Gallup and MORI opinion polls, 1979-90). Throughout most of her premiership, the style of her leadership mattered as much as, sometimes more than, the substance of her ideology.

In many cases, the public registered its preference for Thatcher’s leadership through individual MPs, reflecting a significant change in British parties and parliamentary representation: MPs have grown more constituent-oriented and consequently prove more susceptible to the pressure of public opinion (Cain et. al. 1984). For much of her tenure as prime minister, Thatcher’s approval ratings ensured the support of her parliamentary party and shielded her from backbench revolts. At times, however, according to Norman Tebbit (a Thatcherite and initially an ally in cabinet), “The radical agenda did throw quite a lot of strain on the parliamentary party here. Members of parliament can get quite windy when they get masses and masses of word-processed letters saying the government’s doing this and that, and it’s upsetting. They begin to say we’re upsetting too many people” (Personal interview, June 27, 1990). Backbenchers declined to rebel against their prime minister when Thatcher’s approval ratings ran high (and they did not always rebel when her public approval was low), but they dared to do it only when she or her policies clearly lacked public support.

Of all Thatcher’s radical reforms, none “upset the people” more than the poll tax, and ultimately public opposition to the tax determined the timing of the revolt that
removed her from office. Ministerial resignations based on opposition to Thatcher’s style and her policy concerning Europe made the context conducive to a coup, but public reaction to the poll tax explains why she was seriously challenged then (and not earlier). According to one of Thatcher’s long-term critics in the Conservative party, “What is remarkable is that we did get rid of her. She always regarded herself as a presidential figure. She created lots of enemies, but that wasn’t enough to get rid of her. After the poll tax, there was a growing conviction that the party wouldn’t win with her. Then the worm that is the Conservative party did at last turn” (Personal interview, Ian Gilmour, June 26, 1991).

In the fall of 1990, Thatcher learned the painful lesson that US presidents know well: Plebiscitary leadership is a double-edged sword. If a prime minister can build and maintain public support, she can generally ensure that members of parliament will go along with her policies. But the opposite also holds true: When a prime minister loses public support, she will find it more difficult to remain leader of her parliamentary party. The public approach to leadership carries risks, and public opinion can impose its own limits. Opponents of the presidentialization thesis might point out that the ability to remove a leader while in office provides a distinctive feature of parliamentary (not presidential) government. And it is possible to view Thatcher’s descent as a fall from the pinnacle of presidential power to depths of prime ministerial authority grounded in parliamentary (or in this case party) accountability. Even so, Thatcher’s presidential style enabled her to promote her principles much longer, and achieve much more, than the constraints of traditional prime ministerial leadership would have allowed.

Political time does not stand still, and public opposition to the poll tax was only one sign of a significant shift in sentiment that would alter assessments of Thatcher’s leadership. As her tenure came to a close, many elite critics condemned her tough, aggressive style, and that fundamental criticism resonated with the public. One of her ministers summed up the change in time when he recalled “I always entertained the hope that Boadicea would become Florence Nightingale” and declared “That’s what we need now – Florence Nightingale” (Personal interview, John Biffen, July 2, 1990). In 1990 Thatcher’s own private consultants became alarmed when their polls showed the public wanted more “caring” in government, and Thatcher fell well below her rivals on measures of “caring” and “compassion.” The very same feminine features of leadership that Thatcher once disparaged as signs of weakness were becoming popular in political time — though it remained unclear how female leaders would fare when the two types of time conflict until Kim Campbell became prime minister in Canada.

**Masculine Presidentialization in Feminine Political Time: Kim Campbell**

In a parliament that has often more closely resembled the Westminster model than Westminster itself, Canadian parties possess greater discipline than the British (Bashevkin 1993), and Canadian prime ministers have always enjoyed greater independence and autonomy than their Anglo counterparts. In Canadian politics, the role of the extra-parliamentary party in selection makes it difficult to remove the prime minister, loyalty to the leader provides the primary path to career advancement for MPs, and retired prime ministers rarely return to the backbenches, further diminishing the
limited clout of the caucus. Moreover, recent studies on the nature and degree of presidentialization generally conclude that Canada provides the most extreme case (Bakvis and Wolinetz 2005). As a result, for Campbell, historical time required a strong, independent executive, even though political time generated new public expectations and altered the gendered nature of leadership norms.

When Campbell became prime minister in 1993, the electorate had grown tired of the tough tactics of her predecessor Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. As a neo-liberal reformer, Mulroney proved more pragmatic than some of his contemporary Anglo counterparts, but he was a determined, independent leader in a Conservative party (“Progressive Conservatives” or PCs) that greatly admired strong leadership. Many of the problems Campbell encountered came from within her own party – particularly from members of the political elite who disdained her feminist inclinations as well as her feminine style. Linear time – and the historic Conservative party (Canada’s oldest) – required that she perform as manfully as Mulroney, even though political time had made Mulroney and his party extremely unpopular.

Campbell proved to be more in tune with political time by adopting a distinctly feminine approach to leadership, but that style stifled her ability to satisfy masculine expectations. True to feminine leadership (and the egalitarian spirit of feminism), as prime minister she promised to practice “the politics of inclusion,” a phrase she had frequently used as Justice Minister (Campbell 1996, 266). During her brief tenure as prime minister, she held cabinet meetings far more frequently than her predecessor had, and she organized a national conference to consult provincial premiers. Rather than win praise for practicing participatory leadership, however, she appeared weak and unable to make decisions on her own. In addition, when she rejected attempts by media consultants to revamp her image, her refusal to be stage-managed made her seem naïve. As a feminist, Campbell wanted to defy stereotypes, not reinforce them, but she repeatedly ran up against the historical masculine norms that persist even when political time shifts.

Prime Minister Campbell could not have been presidential even if she wanted to be. Facing a general election three months after taking office, she struggled to hold together a party sliding into a state of rapid degeneration and tottering on the brink of disintegration. At the same time, she could hardly practice “conviction politics” as the public had begun to qualify (if not withdraw) its support for neoliberalism. To a great extent, Campbell faced the same challenge as her Anglo counterparts US President George Herbert Walker Bush (41) and British Prime Minister John Major. They needed to offer a softer style and moderate policies, thereby creating distance from their (by now unpopular) predecessors without denouncing their own parties or the neo-liberal policies they produced. These “kinder, gentler” times (to borrow a phrase coined by Bush 41) might be considered more feminine – favoring traditional feminine attributes and thereby enhancing the prospects for a female leader. Yet in political times that call for conciliation, moderation, and maintaining consensus, traditional Anglo adversarial arrangements can continue to generate highly masculine expectations of executive leadership.

Essentially, Campbell dealt with the dilemma by pursuing the same electoral strategy Major and Bush adopted. All of them avoided taking precise policy positions and issued mainly ambiguous, equivocal statements. Admittedly, their critics alleged that
both Bush and Major lacked vision, and both were perceived as less manly than their predecessors. (As Major followed Thatcher that perception attests to her success as a masculine leader as well as demonstrates how political time can transform leadership from presidential back to prime ministerial.) Campbell might have created the same impression during her 1993 campaign, but as a woman she was held to an even higher standard. Rather than simply appear weak, Campbell’s evasions conveyed incompetence and ignorance, and her vague statements raised doubts about her abilities. Before the general election and at the time of her selection, the popular press observed, “She has proven herself to be a highly intelligent, innovative politician who is certain of her opinions and unafraid of controversy” (Maclean's, June 21, 1993). A former university lecturer in political science, critics initially accused her of intellectual elitism. Nevertheless, when Campbell adopted the electoral strategy of her male counterparts, her public image went from egghead to airhead – and the media magnified the metamorphosis.

Not only was Campbell criticized for her ambiguity and apparent uncertainty, but she also got into trouble when she articulated precise positions, especially when those positions reflected her feminism. She continued to advocate many neo-liberal policies and emphasize the importance of “fiscal responsibility,” but she was a feminist who believed the state should play a positive role in setting social policy. As Justice Minister, she had assigned top priority to women’s issues, especially abortion (which had just been decriminalized in 1988), gun control, and violence against women. She also convened a symposium on “women, law, and the administration of justice” in 1991, but later her own government rejected her proposals to reform the judicial system, because they would constitute “special treatment” for women. Feminine moments in political time do not necessarily fuel feminist reform, especially when they occur in the midst of maintaining the neo-liberal regime.

The PCs suffered a devastating loss in 1993: With only two seats remaining, the party lost its official status in the House of Commons. It won roughly the same percentage of the vote that it had secured in the opinion polls when Mulroney resigned (almost 17%), but the party blamed Campbell for their demise and forced her to resign. In fact, any PC leader is likely to have lost that election. Rather than merely reflect her personal shortcomings, the character of Campbell’s campaign highlights the obstacles inherent in the conflicting demands of masculine linear time and feminine political time, between the trend toward powerful presidentialization and a period of modest regime maintenance. Her experience also provides hints that it proves considerably more difficult for a woman to adopt a feminine style at any time within traditional adversarial Anglo systems.

**Feminine Power, the Context of Reform, and the Pace of Presidentialization: Jenny Shipley and Helen Clark**

In 1996 New Zealanders broke away from Anglo traditions and tried to reverse the linear, historical trend of increased executive authority by adopting MMP (with both constituency-based and party-list MPs). For most of the twentieth century, New Zealand had practiced the purest form of adversarial, Westminster politics – with a FPP electoral
system and a single-chamber parliament. Under that system, the nation witnessed extreme neo-liberal restructuring as it went from one of the most state-controlled economies to an open, unregulated market – a process that started in the 1980s during the fourth Labour government and under the leadership of Roger Douglas as Finance Minister. To slow down the pace of change, electoral reformers tried to shift authority from the executive to the legislature – in this case, from cabinet to the House of Representatives as it was cabinet, not the prime minister alone, who wielded executive power. (The fact that neo-liberal economics is known as “Rogernomics” – as opposed to Thatcherism or Reaganomics – attests to the prominence of cabinet ministers before electoral reform.) In theory, with MMP, governments would enact only very moderate, incremental change, and prime ministers who lead coalition governments would need to mediate among diverse interests, balance conflicting demands, and facilitate interpersonal relations.

Institutional arrangements that foster such feminine leadership tend to narrow the scope of executive authority (as electoral reformers hoped), and initially MMP appeared to achieve that goal as the nature and tenure of Jenny Shipley’s premiership indicate. Shipley became New Zealand’s first female prime minister in November 1997 when she successfully launched a coup to replace James Bolger, leader of the National party and prime minister since 1990. In July 1998, Shipley’s coalition government lost its majority when an MP from New Zealand First, the coalition partner, became an independent and voted against the government. The next month, the coalition collapsed, and from then until the November 1999 election, she led a minority National government. To pursue legislation or win votes of confidence, the government depended on the support of non-government MPs, and Shipley confronted an increasingly assertive House. Explaining how the new system altered the requirements of prime ministerial leadership, she recalled: “What it did was require consensus-building skills… And so as a leader it’s much more demanding on your time” (Personal interview, April 29, 2003). While aspects of the old adversarial environment might have lingered after electoral reform (as both Shipley and Clark insisted), the new institutional context required a much more feminine approach to leadership.

Shipley might have benefited from the ideological climate as she was a self-proclaimed neo-liberal feminist faced with the leadership task of regime maintenance. She explained her views as she recalled, “When I was Women’s Minister, you know I had every bleeding heart telling me what we should be doing for women, usually patronizing them and making them dependent... my commitment to those women was that if we were spending any money, it was to provide them with ladders – so they could both develop skills and then grow their own success.” By the time Shipley became prime minister, she recognized the moment no longer called for bold initiatives, and she acknowledged “there was reform fatigue. [People were asking] ‘Do we always have to change? Does New Zealand always have to change?’” As in other Anglo countries, a neo-liberal consensus had emerged, but aspects of the agenda were becoming controversial and contentious with the public. In New Zealand, this made the ideological environment as well as the institutional context (post MMP) a feminine moment, much more conducive to pragmatism than to ideological zeal.

With a new electoral system and at this unusual juncture in political development when both linear and cyclical time favored feminine leadership, two women led the two
largest parties in the 1999 election. An editorial writer for the *New Zealand Herald* captured the gendered nature of the contest when he observed, “Women will not be alone in looking forward to a more feminine style of debate (emphasis added)” (November 2, 1999). New Zealand voters wanted compassion and caring, not bold initiatives – a requirement both women “naturally” seemed able to fill. As one journalist put it, “[T]his election is about caring, not daring. It will not be the case of who dares wins, because none of the parties likely to win seats has any daring policies at all that they’ve announced to date” (*North & South: Election 1999 Special Issue*, September 1999).

Labour promised change as its campaign theme – “a kinder, softer New Zealand” as Shipley mocked it – but it offered few concrete proposals. Throughout the campaign, both Shipley and Labour Leader Clark delivered vague, equivocal statements about their parties’ policies, and yet they escaped the harsh treatment Campbell received in Canada.

When National won only 31% of the votes, its worst record in history, the results might have shaken Shipley’s status, but she continued as party leader for two more years, and Clark replaced Shipley as prime minister after Labour won the highest percentage of the vote - almost 42%. (Although Labour initiated neo-liberal restructuring, National had been in government since 1990 and took more of the blame for its negative consequences.) The feminine nature of the two types of time provides one of many factors that facilitated the first election of a female prime minister, though its independent influence is difficult to assess. Two female candidates leading the two largest parties probably leveled the gender playing field: Being a woman mattered much less than it generally does when a woman competes with a man. Moreover, New Zealand had already achieved higher representation of women in parliament than any other Anglo country, and it was the only one to make the top-ten list worldwide (Rule 1994). For a brief period after the 1999 election, women held all the top posts – prime minister, opposition leader, attorney general, governor general, and chief justice. While not the only or an isolated factor, the feminine times both reflected and helped to further boost the representation and leadership of women throughout government.

Initially, the institutional context and juncture in development seemed the same for Clark as for Shipley, more conducive to feminine leadership in a context of circumscribed authority – distinctly non-presidential. For her first government, Clark managed to reach a coalition agreement with the Alliance, while convincing the Greens and New Zealand First to support her government on votes of confidence. To make matters even more challenging, the Alliance leader Jim Anderton had previously left the Labour party in opposition to its neo-liberal policies, and the relationship between Clark and Anderton had been extremely tense before they formed a government together. Nevertheless, they established a good working relationship, and when she formed her third government following the 2005 election, he provided the critical support she needed. (By then a Progressive, Anderton was the only member of her inner cabinet outside the Labour party.) In between, she managed to negotiate a complicated agreement with the other parties in order to sustain her minority government after the 2002 election. Throughout most of her tenure as prime minister, she governed effectively within the MMP system – successfully mediating among interests and maintaining consensus.

Public opinion polls provide some evidence that attests to Clark’s success in satisfying post MMP public expectations. She generally ranked ahead of her major party opponent as the preferred prime minister – usually leading by 10 to 20%. Those who
viewed her as a “capable leader” constituted at least 80%, and for “understanding economic problems,” Clark consistently rated 65 to 75%. More directly relevant to the subject of gendering leadership, the number who viewed her as “narrow-minded” or “inflexible” never exceeded 40%, and fewer than 30% believed Clark had “more style than substance.” At the same time, the number of respondents who thought that she has a lot of personality never reached 50%. Indeed, pollsters appear to have framed their questions in ways that make the vices in an adversarial system (indecision, wavering) virtues in the MMP system (not narrow-minded or inflexible). Given her high level of support, the public seemed to appreciate her skill rather than her style and personality, values consistent with the norms and expectations of a successful prime minister in the new MMP system (3 News TNS Poll, April 1, 2006).

Nevertheless, while Clark skillfully worked within the new system, she also found ways to circumvent its constraints and exercise independent executive authority. By doing so, she put prime ministerial leadership on the path toward presidentialization, though MMP ensured that it would not be a fast track. When interviewed, Clark emphasized the opportunities rather than the obstacles inherent in her position, and she downplayed the constraints of MMP (in contrast to Shipley’s comments above).

According to Clark, cabinet continued to meet weekly and the meetings consumed much of her time, but it failed to limit her leadership. Managing her own party in cabinet and caucus became easier as the Labour party became more ideologically cohesive. Moreover, while the Labour caucus technically chooses ministers, by the second government Clark alleged she could recommend ministers and the caucus would quickly comply with her choice – an indication that she proved able to parlay poll results into greater party influence. Furthermore, after 2005, her government no longer observed cabinet solidarity. Clark’s old inter-party adversary Shipley described what she saw as the decline of cabinet and recalled, “In fact one of the characteristics of the government of the 1990s was that if you went out on the street and asked who was in government, they’d be able to quote senior ministers just like that [snap of fingers]. If you go down on the street now and ask how many people they know in the current government – you won’t find any who can quote a senior minister.” The notoriety of finance ministers in the 1980s and 90s (as well as Shipley’s own reputation as Social Services Minister) seem to support the view that cabinet’s place in the political order changed under Clark. Rather than rely on cabinet, Clark preferred to use her own advisors for policy expertise and political advice.

Clark also insisted that parliament posed few obstacles to her leadership. Asked specifically whether MMP had created a more assertive, perhaps even unruly House, Clark quickly responded “That’s not true [laugh]. Well, it’s what you make of that… Actually parliament as a forum is less and less important than it ever was.” According to Clark, “What’s happened I think is that the parliamentary systems are transforming themselves into presidential systems. We’re the head of government as prime minister just as the American president is the head of government. So there are certain functions that go with being the head of government – and sitting around parliament for hours isn’t one of them” (Personal interview, April 14, 2003). Clark continued by discussing her time spent “out and about at public functions” and dealing with the press. With her cadre of consultants and private pollsters, she often preferred to go public with policies rather than promote them in parliament.
The presidentialization that Clark describes contradicts reformers’ intentions and scholars’ predictions when New Zealand adopted MMP (Jackson 2001; James 2001). Paradoxically, electoral reform might have fueled presidentialization by shifting power from cabinet to the prime minister rather than from cabinet to the House. Arguably, the strength of cabinet government in New Zealand’s old Westminster-style system served to thwart presidentialization in the 1980s and early 1990s. MMP might have ensured that the pace of presidentialization would be slow – when New Zealand is compared with its Anglo counterparts rather than with its own past – but it has not prevented it.

Just as Clark presided over the changes in government and politics that followed electoral reform (while seizing new opportunities to expand prime ministerial power), she also adapted to and guided shifts in the status of the regime. When Clark became prime minister, political time continued to require regime maintenance, and at first, she declared she only wanted to halt neo-liberal change, not reverse it. She had remained in the Labour party when its fourth government initiated the neo-liberal agenda, and as prime minister she initially promised to maintain the public philosophy of her predecessors. Strategically situating her party in the middle of the ideological spectrum, she initially endorsed the centrist approach of US President William Clinton and British Prime Minister Tony Blair known as the Third Way, although Clark always differed from those men in the value she placed on policies that affect women as a group.

As the neo-liberal regime moved from maintenance to degeneration, Clark seized opportunities to shift the agenda toward greater state involvement in ways that would benefit women. According to Clark, “women in the end have a greater reliance on an active state than men do” because of their primary responsibility for child rearing and care of the elderly, their greater need for public housing as single parents, and their “vulnerability in a free market situation” (Personal interview, April 14, 2003). Among the achievements that she believed “made a difference to women,” Clark singled out boosting minimum wages, strengthening labor laws, introducing paid parental leave, and appointing a new Employment Equity Commissioner on the Human Rights Commission. Despite her initial modest aspirations, Clark did renationalize some industries, recentralize the public sector, and reinstate “a kinder welfare state,” efforts that indicate she came to “consciously eschew the triangulation strategies” of Blair and Clinton (Simms 2008). Her own remarks suggest that her feminism motivated her to move public policy away from neoliberalism and toward greater collectivism. Ultimately, Clark was able to practice prime ministerial leadership that was both feminist and feminine in institutional and ideological settings that permitted modest, incremental change.

Masculine/Feminine Limits and the Paradox of Prime Ministerial Leadership: Julia Gillard

Gendering prime ministerial leadership in Australia reveals the mix of masculine and feminine that characterizes traditional Westminster systems. At first glance, both parliament, particularly the House of Representatives, and cabinet seem strikingly masculine. The adversarial House provides an extremely masculine institution that demands aggressive, assertive prime ministerial leadership. And, as in New Zealand before MMP, the cabinet retains a high degree of institutional integrity (Weller 2007),
which impedes the progress of presidentialization. Paradoxically, however, to lead cabinet successfully requires elements of feminine leadership – especially consultation and conciliation. The limited experience of Julia Gillard provides some tentative lessons on the considerable challenges of prime ministerial leadership in such a mixed gendered environment, especially for a woman.

When Gillard became prime minister in June 2010, several aspects of her record indicated she would be able to meet those challenges. She came to power in an intra-party coup that removed Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, a move that attests to the strength of cabinet and the limits on presidentialization. After only two years in government, Rudd’s public approval had fallen, but more significant, he had alienated his cabinet by shunning the institution and making decisions on his own (in his case, slowly and indecisively). Cabinet ministers perceived his independence and autonomy as presidential – and his rapid removal (after two years as opposed to eleven for Thatcher) shows how viable cabinet government works. By contrast to Rudd, as deputy prime minister (and acting prime minister while Rudd travelled abroad), Gillard established a reputation as an effective facilitator of cabinet discussions and collective decision making. Like Clark, she had risen through the ranks of the Labor party through careful calculation and by acquiring considerable political skill. Furthermore, as deputy and as a minister with her own portfolios (Education, Employment), Gillard proved persuasive, quick-witted, and forceful on the floor of the House during question period and debate. The combination of her gender-specific talents – capable of compromise and conciliation within cabinet and the party while also aggressive outside in the adversarial environment of parliament – made her a promising prime minister.

Gillard had little opportunity to fulfill that promise before she called a general election in August 2010. In her one major accomplishment, through compromise she successfully settled the conflict with the mining companies that had been a catalyst in Rudd’s precipitous decline in the polls. Before she tried to do more, she called a general election, believing that a new electoral mandate would strengthen a new Labor government. Instead, the uncertain outcome forced Gillard to negotiate agreements with three Independents and one Green MP, and the conditions of those agreements would further complicate her already demanding job.

Only six months after the election, Gillard and her party had plummeted in the polls – a situation from which she has not yet fully recovered. By March 2011, in a two-way race Labor lagged behind the official opposition (the Liberal-National Coalition) by eight points (46-54%). In November 2010, the prime minister’s approval rating had been 54% but by the following March it had fallen to 39%. Through the next few months, Gillard’s standing continued to decline: In July 2011, a Nielsen poll showed that in a two-way race Labor would secure only 39% to the Coalition’s 61%, voters preferred Opposition Leader Tony Abbott to Gillard 51% to 40%, and the Labor government retained only 26% support (results reported by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation and published in Fairfax newspapers, July 18, 2011).

Perhaps worst of all for the fledgling female prime minister, six months after the election, Gillard’s popularity fell below Rudd’s (who had become Foreign Secretary), and it was lower than Rudd’s when she replaced him (Nielsen polls published in The Age, March 3, 2011). In July 2011, a Nielsen poll showed voters preferred Rudd to Gillard as Labor leader by a 2-1 margin. Not surprisingly, by September rumors started to circulate
that Rudd would replace her as prime minister (*Sydney Morning Herald*, September 13, 2011). In February 2012, Rudd resigned from cabinet and a leadership ballot was held within a week. Gillard won by a wide margin (71-31), but the intra-party rivalry limited her leadership and marred her reputation. News stories blamed her personal shortcomings and the lack of talent or skill among her cabinet ministers (a problem even the 2011 reshuffle did little to resolve). Critical commentators failed to consider why and how the gendered nature of institutions and aspects of political development have made her tenure as prime minister precarious.

To lead her cabinet, Gillard has needed to balance the interests of competing factions within her party. In contrast to Clark, Gillard’s party remains a broad church, and her cabinet includes intra-party adversaries. She has had a rift with the Right over a bill defining Australian Capital Territory (ACT) authority that would affect the status of same-sex marriage. She has also struggled to avoid angering the Left on foreign policy issues. (Foreign Secretary Rudd proved more eager to endorse action in Libya although she supported it.) Most significant, compromise and conciliation have produced budgets with a mix of measures – some reminiscent of the neo-liberal agenda of her predecessors, others that would satisfy old, left-leaning Labor interests. In the context of declining economic indicators, both the political elite and the public question her government’s competence, and doubts about her government’s competence shape perceptions of her as prime minister. While trying to lead cabinet (and her party), her efforts to compromise and conciliate – attributes of feminine leadership – have made her seem weak.

At the same time, Gillard has faced a tough opponent in Opposition Leader Tony Abbott on the floor of Australia’s intensely adversarial House. Abbott has managed to seize control of the agenda, at first depicting her rise to power as ruthless and then later transforming the government’s climate control bill into an anti-tax issue with mass appeal. When she has responded to the opposition’s attacks by rendering a confident, assertive defense, she has appeared to lend credence to the allegation that she is aggressive and ruthless. Protesters outside Parliament House have raised placards that read “Ditch the Bitch” and refer to her as a witch, and hecklers in the House have echoed those sexist slurs (though opposition MPs have been forced to retract some of their worst statements). While trying to lead her parliamentary party in the House, her attempts to render a rigorous defense of her government have made her seem too harsh and ruthless.

Finally, while linear historical time has done little to change the institutional context that restricts her prime ministerial power, cyclical political time has further complicated Gillard’s environment. To form a minority government, Gillard promised the Greens to promote a carbon tax when her Labor party had previously endorsed only a modest emissions trading scheme. As a result, she was forced to reverse her policy on climate change. In the spring of 2011, when she struggled to shift the agenda away from the climate/tax issue, her promise to an Independent MP (also needed to form a government) haunted her as he held his Tax Summit (as promised in the coalition agreement). Forming and maintaining the coalition agreement has magnified some of the mixed messages generated in the institutional environment: Reversal on climate change provides evidence that the witch tricks and deceives, while her inability to control the agenda reveals the weakness of her government and her leadership.

In political time, Gillard’s ideological opportunities resemble Clark’s, with the neo-liberal regime much farther along the stage of degeneration, but Gillard has proven
unable or unwilling to shift policy in any significant way. She came from the Left faction of the Labor party, but as one editorial writer put it, she is “as left wing as a loaf of Tip-Top bread.” (As the editorial continues to explain, factional labels “now denote tribal, personality-based groupings, not philosophical positions in the traditional sense.” [The Age, June 25, 2010]) In contrast to Clark, Gillard is a “post-feminist” who insists that being the first female prime minister is no more significant than being the first redhead (though she is the second). That position disappoints feminists who believe Australian government and politics still need feminist reform. Just as important, pure pragmatism without any clear convictions leaves Gillard vulnerable to accusations that she is a mere manipulator. She is also unable to tap the power of principles that can fortify even pragmatic prime ministerial leadership, essential in adversarial systems where women more often than men need to demonstrate determination and strength.

The circumstances that forced Gillard to reach a coalition agreement in order to govern reflect aspects of the moment in political time affecting many nations across the Anglo sphere, where electorates are ambivalent at best and often depicted as angry and/or cynical. Opposition Leader Abbott tapped that sentiment when he alleged he led a “people’s revolt” against higher taxes/climate change legislation. After only two years in government (and with a relatively strong economy), Labor proved unable to win sufficient support to continue to govern on its own. But the situation in Australia is not unique and Gillard shares leadership challenges with at least some of her Anglo counterparts.

Despite formal structural differences between the US system and its Westminster cousins, President Barack Obama also struggles to lead in a mixed gendered context. When he ran against Hillary Clinton during the primaries in 2008, he could appear strong simply by virtue of being a man. In many respects, he rendered more feminine leadership as he emphasized collective engagement (“Yes, we can.”) and unity (no red states and blue states), while his opponent boasted about her childhood adventures hunting and defended the war in Iraq. But Obama’s gendered environment shifted when he entered the general election and especially once he moved into the White House. Then he needed to demonstrate his manliness, without appearing to be angry or threatening (a dilemma that highlights the intersectionality of gender and race). Like Gillard, Obama confronts a mixed gender environment that generates mixed messages. To conservative critics in the media as well as in the opposition Republican party, Obama seems “scary” when he proposes a national health care plan or advocates regulating the financial industry. To activists in his own Democratic party, the president appears impotent as he concedes too much to Republicans, omitting a single payer option from health care and willing to cut entitlements during debt negotiations. Presidents must frequently compromise with Congress as prime ministers do with cabinet (Neustadt 1969), and as a result, presidents also encounter paradoxical demands on their leadership – needing to be both feminine and masculine. Divided government makes the comparison between Gillard and Obama even more appropriate. Like prime ministers with minority governments that depend on coalition agreements, presidential leadership with divided government requires a feminine conciliatory approach, while party leadership in an adversarial system demands a much more masculine aggressive style. Gillard cannot come close to being presidential, but Obama has been forced to be prime ministerial.
Both Obama and Gillard struggle to lead at an ambiguous moment in political time at a juncture in political development that extends across the Anglo sphere. In 2010, elections in the UK produced its first coalition government since 1978. Two years earlier, New Zealand voted against Clark’s Labour Party and for National Party Leader John Key who stole Obama’s campaign theme and promised change (but pledged to maintain most of Clark’s policies). For more than a decade, Canada has had successive minority governments – both Liberal and Conservative – until the electorate recently returned an extremely unpopular government and prime minister with a majority. With the neo-liberal regime reaching the end of its cycle and without a clear alternative, voters themselves are sending mixed messages about the type of leadership they want, and the gender-specific character of executive-centric government is one of many factors in the mix.

**Conclusion**

Anglo institutions generally prefer prime ministers who demonstrate strong, determined leadership, and it is unlikely the next leader to forge a new public philosophy will succeed by adopting a feminine approach. Adversarial systems encourage leaders to take a combative stance against opponents in parliament, especially to effect change as Thatcher did. At the same time, traditional Westminster systems often require a conciliatory approach to cabinet – producing a perplexing, paradoxical problem for prime ministers who need to demonstrate a mix of masculine and feminine leadership attributes. Presidentialization enables prime ministers to resolve the dilemma by circumventing their cabinet and party. Where and when presidentialization occurs, it also magnifies the masculinity inherent and dominant in Anglo systems.

In linear historical development, presidentialization has progressed in some countries but not others – one indication of the variation that exists within the family of Anglo nations. Prime ministers have more easily circumvented their cabinet in the UK and Canada than they have been able to do in Australia or New Zealand before its electoral reform. Political parties and the party system play significant roles in eroding cabinet’s institutional integrity or sustaining its viability. In the UK and Canada the character of parties has usually bolstered strong leadership, in contrast to Australia where institutionalized factions maintain the organization and restrain leaders. Where presidentialization does take place, extra-institutional public support enhances executive power, though leading by plebiscite often proves perilous and public opinion inevitably changes.

Cyclical political time can impede or halt the progress of presidentialization by shifting stages in the regime sequence, thereby altering leadership expectations and norms. As a result, substantial variation also exists within any particular nation. Thatcher’s zealous regime building magnified the masculinity of her neo-liberal ideas and fortified her executive leadership, but later leaders who faced the task of regime maintenance struggled to soften that ideology’s toughness while preserving their own strength. In contrast to Thatcher’s success meeting masculine standards, other female leaders have striven to strike a balance between the need for firm leadership and the desire to cultivate consensus. The experience of Campbell suggests women have an even
harder time trying to satisfy leadership expectations when linear historical time intensifies masculinity but cyclical political time calls for a feminine approach.

Where and when the different dimensions of time and place come into conflict, the prime minister’s prospects and performance are likely to prove precarious. The changing nature of gender-specific norms and expectations fuels the fluctuating fortunes of leaders, and as a result, today’s virtue (kinder, gentler leadership) can quickly become tomorrow’s vice (weak, ineffective leadership). Most of the time both male and female prime ministers struggle with conflicting challenges or shifting demands, although at least initially men get greater room to maneuver in a masculine, adversarial environment as they appear to bring strength to the executive simply by being men.

On the other hand, where and when institutions and the two types of time all point in the same gender-specific direction, prime ministers possess the greatest potential power. If those dimensions prove to be masculine, a prime minister can transform both institutions and ideology in fundamental ways as Thatcher managed to do. If the dimensions are all feminine, the synchronicity can support a different type of successful leadership, where prime ministers gradually shift the direction of public policy and incrementally alter institutional practices as Clark did – in a reformed environment that marked a departure from the Westminster model and fueled feminine leadership.

In conventional Westminster systems, the increasing centralization of executive power affects both the gendered nature of leadership and the prospects for female prime ministers – whether that power proves concentrated in a prime minister who dominates cabinet or a more autonomous presidentialized premier. Combined with the adversarial atmosphere of parliament where prime ministers often command large majorities, presidentialization can permit highly masculine power and produce excessively independent leadership. That presents a peril not to leadership but to legitimate limits in a constitutional order. In addition, conventional wisdom holds that female leaders fare better in parliamentary than in presidential systems, as the prime minister is only “first among equals” and reservations remain about placing concentrated executive authority in the hands of a woman. If that view is valid, then leadership that compromises the collective decision making of cabinet also diminishes the range of opportunities for female prime ministers in the future. Ultimately, the leadership experiences of women highlight the power, peril, and paradox that generally prevail in executive-centric governments, while they also indicate the particular challenges female prime ministers continue to encounter in Anglo nations.

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For analysis of several ways time and gender interact, see the symposium “Studying Gender and Politics Over Time,” 2007.

World wide, where executive power is circumscribed, women are more likely to become prime minister – and vice versa (Jalalzai 2008).
An environment of ambivalence and anger might also invite the overt expression of hateful sentiments such as racism in the US (the rational, pragmatic President Obama as “scary”) and sexism in Australia (the congenial and collegial Gillard as “witch/bitch”).
References


