EU and the structure of government of the global political system.
The case of multilateral security.

Abstract. In the mainstream approaches to the conceptualization of the global political system, this is the system where a few great powers give orders to the others but no state is obliged to conform to common rules and policies. There is some truth in this view but the states can hardly escape from the world-wide policies that the global political institutions issue forth in the present time. This paper outlines a conceptual framework about the analysis of the policies and policies of the global system, defines the present structure of government of the global political system, and examines the role of the European Union in multilateral security and in peace operations in order to test the EU’s attitude towards the present phase of competition on the global political structure.

In a journal article about the powers candidate to lead the world system, the American sociologist David Wilkinson (1999) was clear in enumerating the reasons why Europe is unlikely to lead the world in the years to come. A superpower Europe is not inconceivable, but some tasks are to be completed, like fixing on the EU, dropping out commitment to neutrality, developing a politico-military organization, and sustaining a strategic arms race to parity with the United States. Each of the necessary steps involve resistance, trauma, the need to build elite consensus, and the need to face electoral opposition and receive confirmation and reconfirmation in some rather substantial number of states and/or in a still rather pluralistic and ill-defined Europe. On the contrary, the Europe’s elites have no drive to superpower, there is no great inclination for collective sacrifice of other immediate goods in and for Europe, there is no European military system, and the institutional capacity, like the will, for Europe to engage in a classic arms race with the United States is absent.

Ingo Peters (2004), another American scholar, in the effort to understand the logic of the CSDP building process put on place by the EU (and NATO) member states, lists three possible logics. CSDP is driven by a global logic, i.e. it aims at responding to outside expectations and making the European voice. CSDP responds to an integration logic, i.e. it wants to deepen integration by incorporating the security and defense policy in the Union affairs. Lastly, CSDP has a transatlantic logic, i.e. it is directed towards making the EU stronger in security and defense affairs within the existing Atlantic partnership but the EU’s objective of this logic is not clear. It may be either to please or challenge the United States; either to become an equal partner or a competitor to the United States; either to strengthen the European contribution to the Western Alliance or to gain autonomy from the US influence. At the end of the day, nobody is sure about what is the true logic of the CSDP building process.

These are two of many expert commentaries questioning the EU role in global politics. They symbolize two issues at stake in the study of the EU and the structure of power in the contemporary world system. The former recalls to us the need to take in due consideration the constraints of power competition at the global level. In particular, it emphasizes the internal requisites of the actor that aims at playing the top role in the structure of the world system. The latter, instead, focuses on the need to deal with the problem of the relationship between the unit that aims at the top role and
the state which is in the role, i.e. the United States. In particular, it addresses the crucial relation between the challenger and the leading power when the former is member of the dominant coalition of the world structure of government and also the major friend power of the leading state of the coalition.

This paper shares the views of the two authors to “say the truth” about the EU’s wish to play as leading actor in the world structure of government. In particular, this paper wants to say the truth about EU’s role in multilateral security policy. It skips the existing expert analyses of the EU foreign policy on consideration that this community of experts largely neglects the existing research knowledge about the structure of government of the world system. The community of the EU foreign policy experts prefers, instead, to rely on the EU official documents to understand the nature of the EU’s rise in world affairs. The first section of the paper, then, deals with the analysis of the world structure of government and global power competition (see more in Attinà, 2011a). It wants to demonstrate that the world is a political system where policies are made by competing coalitions of actors within a structure of political institutions. The second section aims at demonstrating that the EU’s world policy is trapped in this structure of government and competition. In particular, the EU’s world policy is tied to the EU’s membership in the Western coalition which, under the leadership of the United States, is still the dominant but challenged leading coalition of the world structure of government. Therefore, the current state of the competition on global power is key to understand existing opportunities and restraints on the EU’s rise in world affairs. To demonstrate this condition of the EU in the contemporary world politics, the second section examines the CSDP operations by taking in due consideration the existing research knowledge on multilateral security and peace operations.

The structure of government of the global system

The world political system has a structure of government because the states created institutions to produce policies and rules to deal with problems having a global reach. Like in any other political system, political authority in the global system is exercised through a governmental structure. Unlike other political systems, however, this governmental structure is founded on an hegemonic relationship that supplies public goods to solve shared problems and maintain social order. States accept the hegemonic relationship and contribute to provide public goods as long as these goods are of value to them, and on condition that they are involved to some extent in the political deliberation process. For this reason, the term ‘leadership’ is synonymous to the term hegemony to indicate that the relationship as far as both refer to participatory decision-making processes within shared institutions. In general, political hegemony/leadership is a relationship which emerges from practice rather than from an agreement which creates formal legal institutions. The hegemonic state authority role is recognized because of its willingness to govern the system, its material and coercive resources as well as ability to conjure the consensus required for the solution of crucial global problems. Nevertheless, international hegemony requires also formal institutions such as international organizations and economic regimes.

Scholars commonly argue that the institutions of the modern European international system became the institutions of the global system because, over time, non-European international systems have been absorbed by the European one. However, other scholars advise that problems with a global reach have been managed by political and economic actors whose activities had an impact all over the world. These are states with the capacity of acting at the global level and the leading international enterprises. Consequently, those scholars remark that, rather than the expansion of Europe to enclose the world, the driver to a global system has been the separate and autonomous growth of political institutions with a world reach. In addition, the building of these institutions has been linked to the rise of global leadership. In the course of the last five hundred years several states, each in their turn, have exercised authority as the global leader over the world system by designing and implementing strategies for the solution of global problems with which most other
important states agreed. Global war has been the way in which, at each turning point, the leading global state, with its allies, has sought or sustained its leadership position as the dominant coalition of the world system. The century-long cycles of political leadership were fulfilled by Portugal, the Netherlands, Britain (twice) and the United States, the current global leader in the last phases of the on-going global power cycle (Modelski, Devezas, and Thompson, 2008).

Besides the institutions like diplomacy, war or international law which bring order to the system, other institutions promote the formation of binding decisions for problems within the ambit of world politics. These organizational institutions are created when a new international system is constituted, above all, by the victors of a global war that have the capacity to act at the world level and the resources for dealing with the system’s fundamental problems. Until the 19th century, the basic organizational institution of the international systems was the concert of the great powers. It included the leading global state and dealt with political and some economic problems. In the course of the 20th century, states have substituted the concert of the great powers with a variety of formal institutions endowed with administrations, resources and explicit statutory and concrete aims in the political and economic sectors as well as in other technical and social sectors. Eventually, there emerged intergovernmental institutions, namely the United Nations, quasi-organizations such as G7/8, and economic regimes, such as the monetary, financial, commercial, environmental and energy regimes and those of other sectors – telecommunications, transport and the like – in and through which multilateralism started to spread.

The majority of IR scholars does not give due importance to such organizational institutions despite their impact was demonstrated by the neo-liberal and institutionalist schools and regime theorists. Accordingly, the government structure of the world political system is the totality of institutions as well as principles, roles and procedures by which binding decisions on common rules and policies are made and implemented, and to which states by and large conform. By conforming, state governments recognize, and thus legitimize, the governmental structure of the world’s political system. Although all states benefit from a governmental structure based on world institutions, in real terms the benefits do not always match their expectations and strategies. This difference in regard to policies and public goods is because during its formation – when the victors emerge from a war – the institutional design promotes the values and interests of the leading power and its allies in preference to those of other states. Consequently, different states assume different roles in global politics. Once the new governmental structure is formed, the states’ role within it reflects firstly their position in the alliances that fought the war and, secondly, their strategic choice of either accepting and strengthening that structure or transforming and dismantling it. Thus, the governmental structure is influenced by political competition between states reflecting their differing affinities in their domestic political, economic and cultural systems and of their individual and collective political projects. Briefly, what matters are the coalitions and major alignments of states which support either the governmental structure of the leading power or the strategy of the challenging states.

This view of world politics corrects the common view of the contemporary world system as bipolar up to the end of the 1990s and multipolar later on. Competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, with their allies, characterized the forty five years following the Second World War, but it was not crucial in influencing the many world institutions which produced important policies such as financial and trade policies, and the sectorial policies (like the energy, environmental and human rights policies) which have taken shape over the years. From the Second World War to end of the 1960s (the global power phase of the current cycle of global politics) international relations were essentially organized and implemented under the leadership of the United States and the dominant coalition. Their conceptions also guided the international organizations and regimes which produced and implemented the major global policies. Later, from the early 1970s the governmental strategy of the dominant coalition was increasingly delegitimized giving rise to debate about a new agenda of world problems. World politics thus entered an agenda-setting phase. New differences troubled governmental relations within the dominant coalition.
Strong expectations of change in the global governmental structure came to the fore. The principal world economic regimes – the monetary and finance regime and that of trade – underwent revision. The economically less advanced states demanded a new international economic order. Bloc politics waned. Western European states set in motion the common foreign and defence policies. African and Asian states abandoned non-alignment and adopted volatile foreign policies. Recourse to multilateral practices grew progressively more important. Although the Soviet Union influenced political competition in the system, nevertheless the policies of the governmental institutions of the global system were still legitimized by the majority of states.

The multipolar view of the present world system implies that, on the declining time of the agenda-setting phase - that is in the present years time - the system is moving from the American leadership phase to a phase of competing coalitions of states aligned to defend new agendas and strategies of government. It seems obvious that the old and the new problems of the global system call for a new governmental strategy because of important changes in the constitutional principles of the system. It seems equally obvious that the new governmental strategy of the global system will have to take into consideration the changing characteristics of state sovereignty. We shall define this briefly as weak or perforated sovereignty because of the high level of permeability of borders, complex interdependence between the states, the humanitarian principles including the responsibility to protect masses of people who are victims of the violence of governments, and because of the challenges of the new actors of global politics which are the private and non-governmental organizations endowed with differing resources and capabilities. These actors at times are capable of derailing the policies chosen by governments as is the case of economic operators. On other occasions they are able to put onto the agenda problems that governments would prefer to ignore, as is the case of non-governmental humanitarian organizations, while others, such as terrorist organizations, are able to undermine the mechanisms of international security. The hypothesis that we are living in a prolonged phase of agenda-setting rather than coalition-formation and multipolarity therefore appears also plausible. All the more so because there are not sufficient conditions to create coalitions of states for the priorities of the agenda problems. In particular, there is no consensus on how to define and manage the state sovereignty in the contemporary world, how to govern the world economy and, above all, on how to reform the governmental institutions of the global system. When such a consensus is formed we shall enter a new phase of global politics which, unlike in the past, will also depend on which groups of states will be able to establish stable relations with private and non-governmental organizations with a global reach. If groups of state and non-state actors with different agendas and solutions for global problems become strong and stable coalitions, they will transform the governmental structure of the world system. However, it is not clear whether economic or cultural solidarity will give rise to such strong and stable coalitions. Economic solidarity between states is debilitated by persistent differences on the appropriate economic policy at the domestic and international level, while cultural solidarity reflects differences in the principles and practices of domestic societies and political regimes.

To conclude this part if the argument, the present world system cannot be seen as organized on the basis of the concentration of power in the hands of a small number of states which enjoy the legitimacy and power attributes of political poles as the multipolar view contends. Formal institutions with a tangible and concrete organization, instead, have become the central element of the world governmental structure and are destined to lead to further change in the global system. Indeed, formal institutions introduce practices and rules of co-ordination and also of validation which do not stop at external relations but concern the internal life and daily political practice of states. The growth of organizations in the framework of the United Nations in the past forty years shows clearly that the formal institutions of the global political system, which emerged immediately after the Second World War on the initiative of the states of the dominant coalition, are now spontaneously producing new institutions and organizations destined to provide solutions to the new categories of problems emerging on the world stage. The principal states of the system, the leader state and the states of its coalition, participate more in this growth process than other states
but they are not able to control this process with its autonomous logic of growth. The best way of explaining this process and its future is to consider it as a process of self-organization which is inherent in systems which are dynamic and adaptable to the demands and challenges of processes occurring in their environment.

The institutions of the world system have acquired legitimacy in the course of contemporary world politics thanks to the strengthening of formal procedures as well as the inclusion of new political actors, both state and non-state. The co-opting of new states has recently transformed the G8 role by siding it with the G20. The participation of non-governmental organizations in world conferences and United Nations activities are significant examples of the possibility of transforming the governmental structure of the global system. The question remains, however, on how to achieve this transformation because of the coexistence of the traditional logic of international relations and the new logic of the pluralist world. The latter is taking shape and gaining vigour in particular with regard to the management of the new problems on the agenda of the global political system, but the former still dominates. As a result, we pay attention to the arguments of governments, and especially to those of the governments of the major states which direct the global political competition, that is, the United States, the global leader, and its possible competitors, that is China, Russia and perhaps India, and we question the role of Europe. Although all the major states accept today’s world economic regimes, it is by no means assured that the competition about the functioning of these regimes and the rules emanating from them will always remain within the framework of the current contractual procedures. For example, China or India could demand profound changes in the rules of the world economy and, simultaneously, place themselves at the head of a coalition favourable to a change in the governmental structure which would include principles for the world economy as well as for state sovereignty which differ from those favoured by other coalition of states. Russia pursues the traditional aims of state power while the United States retains its link to the principles of the organization of the world based on the sovereignty of states, and, of course, defends its leader’s role of the existing global governmental structure. Meanwhile its principal ally, Europe — although in the weak quasi-state form of the European Union — is the global actor that more than any other has opened the discourse on the transformation of the world political system stating, through the Treaty of Lisbon, the need to the principles of innovative organization such as multilateralism, fair trade and sustainable development. On the whole, therefore, the different positions of the major states have not yet brought much change to the global political competition. On this account, the role of Europe in world affairs is to assess.

EU and multilateral security operations

The EU policy-makers claim that multilateralism is the foundation of all European international actions. In particular, the Common security and defence policy (CSDP) operations and the military and civilian capabilities of crisis management, conflict resolution and post-conflict state reconstruction are actual demonstration of the EU’s allegiance to multilateral security (Attinà and Iarrera, 2010). The first move was made by the European Council at Helsinki in 1999. Four years later, the European Union launched the first operation in Bosnia. Since then, the EU got a reputation in the area of multilateral security. In particular, it is appraised as able to organize and keep on several military and civilian operations at a time. Scientists acknowledge also that the EU contributes extensively to peace operation regionalisation (Rischke, 2010) and hybridization (Bellamy and Williams, 2009). The former term refers to the widening phenomenon of peace operations organized under the initiative and action of regional organisations. The latter refers to the increasing number of peace operations formed by different kinds of actors (states, NGOs, and IGOS) and mandated to exercise multi-task functions. In the present analysis, however, the EU is appraised as one of the international organisations that contribute to both multilateralism and minilateralism. As explained later in this paper, minilateralism depicts better than regionalisation
the form of multilateral security played by groups of states in the current stage of the global political competition.

The 1999 Helsinki European Council’s Headline Goals that aimed at building the European capabilities of crisis management and the subsequent organisation of military and civilian operations, as well as the Headline Goals issued in 2004, have stirred the research of many analysts. The main concern of these analysts is to draw lessons from the organisation and performance of the past and current CSDP operations, and give advice to the EU policy-makers for future operations. Learning about various aspects of the preparation and organisation of the European peace missions is scientifically and politically important. However, the CSDP operations are to appraise and assess against the existing research knowledge on multilateral security as world-wide phenomenon. The analysis in the following pages is founded on such knowledge. It draws on the ADISM Project dataset1.

The community of analysts of peace operations has monitored and analysed important changes especially in the last twenty years period of time. First, the change of peace operation tasks. Nowadays, peace building missions, mandated to accomplish assignments like protecting minorities, transferring refugees, and reconstructing the political, civil and administrative structures of states, in addition to the mandate of stopping violence, have overcome in number and importance the missions tasked only to peacekeeping, i.e. watching over truces and cease-fires, the typical mandate of peace operations in the late 1940s - late 1980s time period. Second, the change of the demand and supply factors of the peace operations. The number of international wars and the devolution of violence control to the United Nations and regional security organizations after the end of the Cold War have been declining over the last twenty years as, respectively, the most important demand and supply factor. Domestic social conditions, worsened by economic recession and political repression, ignited political violence and became the most important demand factor of peace operations. On the supply side, the propensity of well-off western countries and of the United Nations and inter-governmental organisations of Europe and Africa to take on themselves the costs of “defending and re-building” has been sustained by the troops made available by the governments of the large states of Asia. These have entered into the peace operation supply business and have contributed huge contingents of military personnel to United Nations peace missions also because of economic advantages like receiving the over $1,000 per month peacekeeper payment. However, the transformation of the tasks of the peace operations from peacekeeping to peace building and state reconstruction underpins the belief that peace operations are the tool of the dominant (Western) coalition’s strategy of transmitting norms and practices from the centre to the peripheries of the world system. A number of analysts contend that peace operations are the tool of the world institutions for managing conflicts and reducing violence as well as the instrument of the coalition of the dominant countries for diffusing the ‘Western model’ to the rest of the world (Legaré, 2010; Paris, 2002).

Change in the peace operation agency is also one of the much debated issues. It concerns questions like the following ones. Are the Non-UN led missions suited to accomplish the peace building task better than the UN-led ones? Have Non-UN operations a detrimental effect on the UN security role? (Bellamy and Williams, 2005) Non-UN-led operations have been always organised by international organizations and state coalitions but their incidence has been increasing considerably since the early 1990s. This change, however, is far from being a neat one. UN-led operations coexist with UN-authorized and UN-endorsed operations put on the ground by regional organisations as well as with operations of international organizations and coalitions of states which have no UN authorization and endorsement. Such a mixed state of affairs can be understood as an effect of the erosion of the United States and Western countries leadership in the world structure of government and, consequently, in multilateral security. Briefly, multilateralism is strong and wide, and minilateralism is rising as well.

1ADISM is the Italian acronym of the “Data Archive on Italy and Multilateral Security” at University of Catania http://www.fscpo.unict.it/adism/adism.htm.
The change of the mandate and agency of the peace operations is explained in this paper by testing the hypothesis that this change is tightly linked to, and dependent on, the change of the competition on the world system structure. In particular, the propensity of states to contribute to peace operations is influenced by their orientation towards the existing structure of the government of the world system and by their place in the global power competition. Hence, the changing nature of the global political competition determines the form of the peace operations deployed by the United Nations and regional organisations like the European Union. Briefly, it is argued that growing minilateralism is key to understand the rising importance of Non-UN-led peace operations in consistency with the global power competition.

Multilateralism is the institutionalised form of collective action that is founded on universal principles, the equal participation of the states in the decisions about the rules and mechanisms for multilateral action, and no discrimination in the application of the principles, rules and mechanisms (Ruggie 1993). Minilateralism, instead, is the form of collective action of small groups of states that support the multilateral principles but recurrently decide to act disjointedly from the United Nations, the international organisation that legitimizes intervention in foreign countries. In this context, then, minilateralism is not the form of collective action studied by rational choice analysts, namely the action of the smallest possible group of actors to have the largest possible impact on solving a particular problem. It is, instead, multilateralism carried out by small groups of states that deliberately restrict the group membership. Consequently, self-interest and discrimination is present in all minilateral endeavours because membership is selective and restricted. At the same time, minilateralism is appraised as the only instrument available to forward multilateral goals in the cases in which agreement to make multilateral intervention is unachievable. Moreover, the few actors involved minilateral operations easily converge on the intervention decision because they have the same political interest and position in the structure of government of the world system.

The multilateral-minilateral dimension of security governance of the contemporary world system in relation to the change of the competition for global power/leadership is summarized as it follows.

In the phase of global power and strong leadership, international and domestic violent conflicts are few in number, and low in intensity. In these circumstances, resort to multilateral mechanisms of intervention in violent conflicts is low as well.

In the following phase, power de-legitimation and the erosion of the leadership of the global power and dominant coalition cause the growth in number and intensity of conflict and, consequently, of intervention, and new tasks are given to peace operations.

In the third phase, the level of conflict remains high but resort to multilateral security is influenced by the process of the re-configuration of coalitions. In these circumstances, it is increasingly difficult to the United Nations to organize peace operations. Hence, minilateralism grows, and partially reshapes the form of multilateralism.
Change in resorting to POs is linked to change in global politics, in particular in the competition for global leadership.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase of global politics</th>
<th>Resort to Peace Operations</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Execution of the strategy of the global power (1945-c. 1973)</td>
<td>Low and centralized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International and domestic violent conflicts are few in number, and low in intensity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agenda setting (c 1973-c. 2000)</td>
<td>High and mainly centralized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth in the number and intensity of conflict</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition building (c. 2000-c. 2025)</td>
<td>Rather low and de-centralized (minilateral)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resort to multilateral security is influenced by the process of re-configuration of the coalitions. The UN meets with difficult conditions in POs organisation</td>
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</table>

The number of armed conflicts is related to the features of the global competition phases. Violence in the de-legitimation phase was higher than in the phase of the global power when the dominant coalition was able to control the main problems of the world system. The high level of violence during the second phase is confirmed by the UCDP/PRIO data on the intensity of conflicts that distinguish wars from minor armed conflicts\(^2\). In the early 1990s, both the number and intensity of conflict have been decreasing, but during the past six years they have been increasing again. This fact is linked to the transition of the global competition from the agenda setting to the coalition building phase. Power de-concentration in the global system is an important factor of violence as well as interference and intervention in the affairs of other countries, especially countries ravaged by turmoil and warfare. Both external governments, for national interest, and international organisations and coalitions of states, for promoting multilateral security, might decide to act in order to influence political change by resorting to peace operations. Briefly, the change of the number of violent conflicts and active peace operations (see the Chart here below) confirms the hypothesis that the features of multilateral security operations vary with the features of the competition on the structure of government of the global system.

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Peace operations, as the main multilateral mechanism of intervention for the sake of defending international peace and security, are legitimate collective action in world politics thanks to the authorization of the UN Security Council (SC). This is the case of (a) the UN-led operations and SC-authorized POs, and (b) the operations organized and conducted by international organizations and ad hoc coalitions authorized by the Security Council. UN-led and SC-authorized peace operations are fully, i.e. legally and politically, legitimate operations. In addition, the UN Security Council has endorsed and recognized a number of non-legal operations at an advanced stage of their deployment. Consequently, also these operations are legitimated by the United Nations. Last, a number of peace operations have been conducted with no UN recognition and endorsement. From a legal point of view, these operations are not legitimate. Briefly, also the growth in number of non-legitimate and non-UN legitimated operations, and the high number of Non-UN-led peace operations in recent years confirm the hypothesis that minilateralism has an impact on the nature of the resort to peace operations in world politics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN MANDATE / STATUS</th>
<th>European</th>
<th>Ad Hoc Coal.</th>
<th>African</th>
<th>CALC</th>
<th>American</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN-led</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>83</td>
<td>40,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security-Council-authorised</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security-Council-endorsed or recognised</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>15,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No recognition or explicit endorsement</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>24,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandate unclear or undeclared</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7,3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

46 34 24 11 7 205 100,0

On the existing knowledge about rising minilateralism and the linkage to global political competition, the EU’s role in multilateral security is finally checked.

The military and civilian capabilities of crisis management, conflict resolution and state rebuilding have been created to serve the aspiration of the European Union to act as actor capable of intervening in all the theatres of the world and of playing responsibly in all the major global institutions (Attinà, 2011b). But Europe and Africa are the prominent regions of the EU’s peace building operations. The CSDP capabilities are employed firstly to curb crises and conflicts in the EU’s own region, and secondly in Africa. This conclusion is supported by taking respect of the number of operations, the total personnel peak number, and the total time length of the operations (See Table 1, Column A, C and D).

Table 1: CSDP operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(A) Number of operations</th>
<th>(B) No. of active operations in 2010</th>
<th>(C) Total of personnel: peak numbers</th>
<th>(D) Total time length (years)</th>
<th>(E) Mean time-length (years)</th>
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In the past seven years, armed conflicts have been more numerous in Asia than in Africa (Table 2) but the European Union and the world system institutions have been much more disposed and able to set up multilateral intervention in Africa than in Asia. In fact, from 2003-2008, 36 UN-led, Non-UN-led and ad hoc coalition operations were dispatched to Africa, eleven to Europe, nine to Asia, and six to the Middle East. Almost no attention has been given by the peace operation scientists to explain the difference in the recourse to multilateral intervention to curb violence and armed conflicts in Asia and Africa. Very much has been written, instead, about the European Union as the main actor of peacekeeping and peace building in Europe.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

fact that the EU is not a UN member, US-EU cooperation is an enabling factor in the area of UN peace operations. By shaping the UN agenda setting and consensus building processes, US-EU cooperation creates a more favorable environment for UN peace operations to be authorized or renewed. In particular, her research demonstrates that the US and EU decision to cooperate on the management of a specific conflict seems to exert a strong influence on the UN decision to insert that conflict in its agenda and authorize intervention on the basis of the two variables considered as determinants of UN intervention, conflict intensity (number of battle-related deaths per year) and number of refugees.

Conclusion

Attention has been called on the relation existing between the phase of the competition on the world structure of government and the number and form of peace operations, and the implication this knowledge has on assessing the CSDP operations. In particular, it has been demonstrated that (a) the number of peace operations varies in consistency with the features of the global competition phase; and (b) minilateralism is increasingly present in the peace operation practice of the transition period towards the next phase of global politics. The association of the growth in number of Non-UN-led peace operations to the current global power competition phase qualifies the regionalisation of peacekeeping as a structural process of the political system. Consequently, the choice of the governments of a region, the European ones included, to organize peace operations for the sake of reducing violence in their own region is interpreted as adaptive behaviour to a structural process. Regarding the European Union, and to say the truth to the power, it is worth signalling that the policy of developing capabilities of crisis management, peace building, and state reconstruction has to take in due consideration all the implications of such a policy, in particular regarding issues like the peace building partnership with the United Nations and the risk of widening the minilateral turn of peace operations and fomenting the criticism of exporting the Western cultural and political models.

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